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FORWARD 
 
Books that shape emerging fields of scholarly endeavor are 
like this one by Roger A. Lohmann.  Their analysis is as acute 
as that of policy analysts, which Lohmann was trained to be.  
Their purview is as broad as the interdisciplinary field of 
social work, the field Lohmann teaches.  Their vision is that of 
a poet, which Lohmann proves to be with his original images 
of the subject of voluntary action.  And their writing is as 
crisp and expressive as that of the social critic, which 
Lohmann also succeeds at being in this persuasive and 
original work. 
 
I first started reading the papers of Roger Lohmann some 
years ago and was startled by the power of the metaphors he 
applied to the world of voluntary action and nonprofit 
organization.  The concept of "the commons" to take the 
primary example, embodied brilliantly the core value of 
voluntarism in society:  to create a protected space for the 
collective expression of what people find most important in 
their lives. 
 
I made space for Lohmann's vision in the preface to my own 
book Mapping the Third Sector when I wrote:  "It is within 
these commons--in neighborhood associations and interest 
groups, in houses of worship and secular places of 
contemplation, in nonprofit organizations and social clubs--
that people communicate across the chasms between different 
life experiences and create meaning and value for their lives.  
It is in these modern commons that people learn the arduous 
joys of sharing what is good within the complex web of 
contemporary society." 
 
 xiii 
Roger Lohmann has written a book that is in many respects 
the first definitive large-scale theory of the voluntary and 
nonprofit sector.  Up until now, theory has largely been 
descriptive (an example is that of Michael O'Neill) or middle-
range (the largely economic theories of Henry Hansmann, 
Estelle James, Dennis Young; the largely sociological work of 
Albert Meister, David Horton Smith, David Knoke; and the 
largely political work of me and Jennifer Wolch). 
 
Readers, accustomed to earlier theory, should approach this 
book as though they were embarking on a voyage to a new 
land.  Think of it this way:  we divide our institutions into four 
major sectors to accomplish our societal tasks.  Corporations 
and businesses (the first sector) make most of our products 
and hire most of our labor:  they provide jobs that amount to 
80 percent of the country's payrolls.  Government (the second 
sector) provides a military capacity and a number of ancillary 
regulatory and welfare services:  it meets about 13 percent of 
the national payroll.  Voluntary and nonprofit organizations 
(the third sector) address a number of educational, charitable, 
and membership purposes:  their payroll amounts to more than 
7 percent of the national total and is supplemented by much 
valubale voluntary effort as well.  Finally, households and 
informal organizations (such as neighbors, kin, and so on--the 
fourth sector) perform the lion's share of home management 
and child raising, though without the benefit of the transfer of 
cash. 
 
What Lohmann does is to help us look at the work of the third 
sector so that it becomes as familiar to us as that of business, 
government, and the family.  He reminds us that voluntary 
choice is at the core of this sector, rather than the more febrile 
legal or economic concepts of "nondistribution constraints" 
and "sector failure" cited by earlier theorists.  
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Lohmann's broad-scale theory transcends disciplines; it is 
original, robust, and powerful.  Moreover, the theory forces 
those who believe they know something about this field to 
think about it anew.  The theory of the commons forces those 
who have swallowed the nonprofit metaphor whole to 
contemplate the wisdom of their diet.  It fortifies those who 
have seen in voluntarism the core value of the sector with the 
power of that vision, both in empirical reality and normative 
preference.  And it invites those who have yet to approach the 
work of the third sector to do so in a clear and caring fashion. 
 
The Commons is a significant work.  It has the potential of 
defining a field at the point of its full scholarly emergence.  
The author has done his work:  it is now for the rest of us to 
read, learn, and apply. 
 
Camden, New Jersey    Jon Van Til 
August 1992 
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PREFACE 
 
Sometimes the most familiar objects can be extremely 
difficult to speak and think about clearly.  Such is the case 
with the patterns of human association we ordinarily denote as 
“nonprofit organization” and “voluntary association.”  
Empirical findings and middle-range generalizations about 
such entities are expanding very rapidly; in the process, 
however, some of our cherished assumptions about the 
exceptional role of volunteerism in American culture and the 
charitable nature (or lack thereof) of nonprofit purposes are 
eroding or being transformed.  Conventional categories, such 
as the distinction between “profit” and “nonprofit” motives or 
orientations, and broad distinctions between competition, 
cooperation, and conflict are no longer sufficient in a global 
village of pluralistic cultures, insecure families, bureaucratic 
states, and mixed economies. 
Nonprofit and voluntary action studies have a major problem 
of theory.  For many readers, theory is an ugly, intimidating 
term that suggests irrelevance and impracticality.  For others, 
theory has very exacting connotations of assumptions, 
precisely defined terms, and clearly states propositions. The 
Commons seeks to be theoretical in neither of these senses: it 
seeks to talk generally (and interestingly) about the social, 
economic, and political structures and processes of nonprofit 
and voluntary action and at the same time to redraw some of 
the major internal and external boundaries of the field.  In 
undertaking this task, I made an effort to recondition some 
traditional, and even archaic, terms and to draw attention 
away from preoccupation with nonprofit corporations as sole 
representatives of the field as a whole.  Nonprofit 
organizations, voluntary associations, and several other 
distinct types of related organizations are, in the theory which 
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is offered here, subsumed within a larger category called the 
commons. 
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Audience 
 
The Commons is written for all those who care deeply about 
the practice of social democracy and who continue to marvel 
at the multitude of ways in which people with similar interests 
seek out one another and commit themselves to shared 
purposes and joint actions of all types.  In particular, the 
theory of the commons is addressed to investigators, students, 
and practitioners of the several subfields of the science of 
association, which de Tocqueville called “the mother 
science”: social workers, sociologists, political scientists, 
economists, anthropologists, psychologists, lawyers, fund 
raisers, accountants, foundation staff members, volunteer 
coordinators, grant writers, and anyone else with a serious 
intellectual interest in this fascinating topic. 
 
Organization of the Book 
 
The introduction sets out the nature of the task undertaken in 
this book; it is built around and addressed to the expanding 
group of nonprofit organization and voluntary action 
researchers whose current quest is defining a commons 
devoted to the study and understanding of common action. 
Chapter One reviews the current state of nonprofit and 
voluntary theory.  Nonprofit corporations and nonprofit 
organizations are considered, along with nonprofit, voluntary, 
third, nongovernmental, independent, and various other sector 
conceptions. 
Chapter Two sets out a basic theoretical framework called the 
theory of the commons.  It begins with a consideration of 
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eight alternative assumptions, and thus systematically 
attempts to adjust the theoretical footings of nonprofit and 
voluntary action theory.  The chapter highlights the marginal 
status of nonprofit “firms” and shifts the focus to the much 
broader category of associations, clubs, groups, and 
gatherings that make up the commons.  The term commons 
and its adjective form, common, are elaborated in terms of 
participation, shared objects and resources, mutuality, and 
fairness.  Endowment is said to encompass cultural, as well as 
material, resources.  Civilization is said to be the endowment 
of societies and cultures.  The positive implications of 
patronage in terms of support and protection are emphasized.  
I coin a special term, benefactory, to summarize social 
organizations whose purposes involve giving and gift 
exchange in some fundamental way. 
Endowments of voluntary action in Western civilization are 
the theme of Chapter Three.  Although the American 
nonprofit corporation may be a unique phenomenon, there is 
abundant historical and anthropological evidence of the prior 
existence of associations, endowments, and commons of many 
types throughout the history of the West. 
Chapter Four is devoted to broadening the range of recognized 
benefactories; it examines, in addition to the association and 
social agency, other types of benefactory such as the solo 
trusteeship; public bureaucracies in the arts, sciences, and 
charities; common places or spaces devoted exclusively or 
primarily to commons; campaigns and committees; scientific, 
religious and professional conferences; and cooperatives and 
disciplines.  Other types of commons examined include 
fiestas, foundations, holidays, journals, political parties, 
pilgrimages, institutes, secret societies, sciences, and trusts. 
Chapter Five suggests ways for extending conventional 
nonprofit economics beyond its present concerns with 
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revenue-oriented nonprofit service producers to the analysis of 
commons and comments on the production model. 
Chapter Six addresses the question of the relation between the 
state and the commons.  The relation is reciprocal because 
democratic states arise out of the political activity of parties 
and political interests to function as dominant protective 
associations in societies.  Because of its singular position, the 
state must be constitutionally restrained from exerting control 
over common activities.  We do this in the United States 
through the provisions of the First Amendment, with its 
related guarantees of freedom of speech, religion, assembly, 
and redress of grievances. 
Chapter Seven expands the range of the theory of the 
commons by examining four types of nonmarket exchange 
involving voluntary labor and the exchange of common 
goods.  These are termed tributes, gifts, potlatches, and 
offerings. 
Chapter Eight explores the social structure and process of the 
nonprofessional charity world.  Current explorations of  
mutual aid, self-help groups, volunteerism, and related topics 
suggest that the professional, publicly funded world of social 
service contracts between state agencies and professionally 
staffed nonprofit corporations has grown up alongside another 
world of helping volunteers, friends, and neighbors.  
Charitable activity that involves mutual aid, self-help, and 
volunteers offers preeminent examples of commons in 
operation. 
In Chapter Nine a large and somewhat unwieldy body of 
psychological research is introduced, reviewed, and shown to 
bear upon traditional issues and concerns of nonprofit and 
voluntary studies.  Although its theoretical implications do not 
appear to have been closely examined, “prosocial” behavior 
appears to be emerging as a broad rubric for linking such 
 xvii 
important topics as altruism, charitable behavior, responses to 
fund raising, bystander behavior, free-riding, and other topics.  
Prosocial behavior involves both selfish (egoistic) and 
unselfish (altruistic) motives on the part of the actor (Dozier 
and Miceli, 1985). 
Chapter Ten links the descriptive and explanatory discussions 
of the commons with the normative and value issues that 
practitioners, in particular, must struggle with.  Rather than 
the misplaced reliance upon productivity, maximization, and 
efficiency, the standards of satisfaction, proportion, 
hermeneutics, conservation, and prudence are suggested.  
Chapter Eleven is a brief recap of central aspects of the 
theory. 
The epigraphs to the chapters are slightly edited extracts from 
Alexis de Tocqueville’s famous Book Two, Chapter, 5, “Of 
the Use Which Americans Make of Public Associations in 
Civil Life.”  Gender references to “men” have been 
modernized and specific references to Americans have been 
removed.  This was done simply for reasons of historical 
currency, human dignity, and optimism. 
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Introduction: Rethinking 
the Nonprofit Issue 
 
eople, it has been said, form associations at the 
drop of a hat. In fact, almost any such occasion 
may well provoke more than a single new 
association: One society perhaps will be devoted 
to promoting hat dropping as recreation, while another 
will be dedicated to keeping records on the longest and 
highest recorded drops. A third group may form to 
raise funds for victims injured while bending over to 
retrieve their dropped hats while a variety of ethnic, 
religious, nationality, gender and other self-help 
organizations are formed so that those who have 
dropped their hats may share this and other common 
experiences. Moreover, the network of organizations 
connected in some manner with the issue of hat 
dropping can give birth, at some point, to a kind of hat 
P 
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droppers’ sub-culture or even a broad social movement 
devoted to transforming society. 
While the tendency to organize for any civil purpose 
was once thought to be a uniquely American 
characteristic, recent events have raised important 
doubts about the accuracy of this view. News stories in 
the 1970’s of small groups of Russian dissidents 
meeting in apartments and passing samizdat literature 
from hand-to-hand in the face of rigorous attempts at 
repression by a totalitarian state apparatus were among 
the many widely available clues that this is a much 
broader phenomenon.  Elsewhere in the world, 
‘American-style’ associations and nonprofit 
organizations were adopted with an ease and for a 
diversity of purposes contradicting the supposed 
culture-boundedness of these social forms. Yet, few 
were exact copies of American way of associating; 
they were more like Andrew Lloyd Webber musicals--
seemingly infinite variations on a central theme.  
The amazing, revolutionary social, political and 
economic events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union beginning in 1989, accompanied as they were 
by reports of the formation of hundreds and perhaps 
thousands of new clubs, groups and associations 
provided proof for those who needed it that what we 
Americans tend to call nonprofit organization and 
voluntary action was part of a world-wide 
phenomenon. Either the world was adopting 
American-style voluntary association practices or (and 
this seems more likely) our perceptions were catching 
up with tendencies deeply embedded in a great many 
different cultures. Many of us are still not exactly sure 
which is the more plausible view.  
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This book is devoted to formulating a new 
multidisciplinary view of nonprofit organization and 
voluntary action to address these and other issues. 
Nonprofit and voluntary action scholars have made 
great strides in recent years in fleshing out detailed 
analyses of many separate aspects of this important 
topic. A recent bibliography, for example, contains 
more than 5,000 scholarly and literary listings on 
philanthropy and the nonprofit sector. (Foundation 
Center, 1989) However, specific research agendas 
have been addressed within an increasingly threadbare 
conventional wisdom about the basic nature of 
nonprofit and voluntary action built up largely from 
American experience over this century. As in any field 
heavily influenced by practical concerns, a large 
number of topics and issues of nonprofit organization 
and voluntary action and more than a few questions of 
major importance, have gone largely unaddressed 
simply because no research agendas have crystallized 
around them.  
In first looking at nonprofit and voluntary action, we 
might easily grant the rather obvious and frequently 
repeated (yet simplistic and misleading) assessment 
that "nonprofit" endeavor is characterized by the 
negative condition of lacking a profit. In doing so, we 
may still be at a loss for any real explanations of why 
and how they occur as they do; hard pressed to 
identify those positive traits or characteristics most 
closely associated with such “nonprofit” endeavors. 
Do churches, volunteer fire companies, nonprofit 
charities and symphony orchestras, for example, really 
have anything in common with professional 
associations, scientific journals or service clubs? 
Moreover, do any of these or other “tax exempt 
entities” really share any common characteristics with 
the political parties, or cemetery associations near 
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which they are classified in the Internal Revenue 
Service Code? (Biemiller, 1991; Sloane, 1991) Or is 
the "nonprofit sector" actually only a residual category 
of the disparate and dissimilar--a kind of Victorian 
attic of the unrelated and irrelevant castoffs of a profit-
oriented civilization? 
For most of the recent history of social science, such 
questions have been of interest to only a handful of 
researchers and scholars at any given time. However, 
interest in nonprofit and voluntary action in virtually 
all of the social sciences has grown very rapidly within 
the past decade. The number of active research 
projects underway in this field has gone from a mere 
handful to dozens and perhaps hundreds in only a few 
short years. Part of the reason for this growing interest, 
of course, was politically inspired; as early as the mid 
1970’s and definitely after 1980, a newly vigorous 
conservatism professed an agenda of limiting 
government by passing many of its current activities 
and functions off to the voluntary sector with praise 
for a Thousand Points of Light. Another motive force 
was empirical: Data like that reviewed in the next 
chapter suggest dramatic increases in the number of 
nonprofit organizations, as well as substantial growth 
in public support and donations for voluntary action in 
recent years. Upon closer examination, however, the 
data also point towards several entirely new, and 
related recent developments -- the growth of “support 
groups” and “self-help groups” being one of the most 
dramatic examples.  
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Rethinking Nonprofit, Voluntary and 
Philanthropic Studies 
Present interest in the nonprofit sector involves more 
than interest in simple growth and novelty, however. It 
has been evident to a number of scholars that 
rethinking and reordering of some of the larger 
questions of the place of nonprofit and voluntary 
action in the social world was overdue. (Van Til, 1988; 
1989; Billis, 1988; 1989; Smith, 1988; 1989; etc.) Yet, 
despite tremendous progress made by research in this 
area, important questions about the fundamental nature 
of charitable and philanthropic action remain 
unanswered. 
Such rethinking is, inexorably, a theoretical enterprise. 
(C.f., Langton, 1987; Ostrander, 1987) Yet, 
empirically and practice-oriented social researchers 
and practitioners interested in voluntary action are 
often highly suspicious of any exercise which smacks 
of theory, per se. A colleague at a recent meeting of 
the Association for Research on Nonprofit and 
Voluntary Associations put the matter rather directly, 
when she asked, “Why do you think we need a new 
theory of the nonprofit sector?”  To a considerable 
extent, this book is an attempt to answer that question.  
More formal considerations notwithstanding, any 
social theory is first and foremost an expressive 
vocabulary; a communication matrix, an expressive 
medium for articulating ideas and asserting premises. 
In the terms presented here theory, to the extent it is 
accepted and utilized constitutes a common good. It 
can offer a broad framework of shared terms, 
understandings, nominal and operational definitions, 
assumptions and conventional approaches within 
which discrete but related issues can be formulated 
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and researchable questions addressed by many  
investigators.  
Undoubtedly, some new terminology (or revitalized 
old terminology) is needed in the study of the 
nonprofit sector. Virtually everyone who attempts to 
say anything meaningful on this topic eventually finds 
themselves stumbling over the expression of certain 
key ideas. Researchers and scholars frequently find it 
necessary to add qualifiers to their work such as: “Of 
course, we are not looking at many other activities 
which are ‘voluntary’ in the sense that they are non-
coerced.” 
Devising a suitable vocabulary with which to share 
experiences and interact with others over common, 
shared issues and concerns is preeminently a 
theoretical task. The kinds of hesitations, 
qualifications and stumbling after words characteristic 
of nonprofit and voluntary action dialogue are clear 
signs of theoretical exhaustion, and point directly 
toward the need for some enhanced theoretical 
language within which to discuss nonprofit and 
voluntary action. It would be convenient, of course, if 
such new theories were to spring forth full blown, as if 
from the mind of God. The social sciences, 
unfortunately, have been noticeably short on divine 
inspiration and must settle for an often-faltering 
human dialogue full of fits and starts, misstatements 
and false leads. This book is conceived as a part of that 
dialogue.  
Four-Part Dialogue 
Four interrelated aspects of the on-going dialogue over 
rethinking the nonprofit issue are uppermost in 
importance. First, an effort is made to call attention to 
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research on matters of importance to nonprofit and 
voluntary studies in the work of scholars in the broader 
scholarly community. It may be desirable, in other 
words, to expand the paradigm of nonprofit and 
voluntary action in a number of directions more or less 
simultaneously.  
Second, in talking about important nonprofit and 
voluntary action issues, less attention needs to be 
focused upon the arcane jargon and particularistic 
perspectives of earlier isolated work in discrete 
academic disciplines. In many instances, simply 
because independent scholars were working in relative 
isolation, rather than within the multidisciplinary 
academic community which has now emerged in this 
area, it may have been necessary to adopt unwarranted 
assumptions, misleading terminology, and unsuitable 
premises simply to fit their work within hostile or 
unsympathetic academic traditions. Instead of 
swearing continued allegiance to arcane terminology, 
we should pay more careful attention to the 
tremendous language resources available to the 
common community of speakers of English.  
Third, less effort overall should be expended on the 
convention that research on nonprofit and voluntary 
studies is a value-free exercise in objective science and 
greater attention should be paid to explicit 
consideration of the underlying values operating in the 
arenas of nonprofit and voluntary action.  
Finally, additional attention should be paid to 
questions of parsimony and the economic and 
thoughtful use of language in describing and 
discussing these matters. Each of these issues will be 
addressed more fully in the following pages. 
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In the this book, I shall be engaged in a task of theory 
building primarily concerned with three 
considerations: 1) developing descriptive terms and 
language that allow for adequate identification of the 
phenomena of nonprofit and voluntary action as we 
observe them; 2) developing explanations for the 
phenomena labeled by these terms; and 3) framing our 
descriptions and explanations within the context of 
values that we can observe in use by nonprofit and 
voluntary actors. My inspiration for this effort came, at 
least in part, from Bernstein’s challenging work (1976) 
on “restructuring social and political theory.”  
 
Expanding the Scholarly Community 
Nonprofit and voluntary action research today is a 
viable multidisciplinary concern, of interest to 
researchers, scholars and practitioners in many 
different disciplines and professions. Aspects of the 
broad issue of the role of nonprofit and voluntary 
studies in society are of importance to a dozen or more 
disciplines in the social sciences and humanities and 
others are of potential interest and significance to a 
great many other fields in the humanities and the 
natural and life sciences as well. Moreover, this issue 
is complicated because the sciences, humanities and 
other academic disciplines and professions are 
themselves examples of nonprofit and voluntary 
action. Indeed, understanding the social organization 
of any scientific interest or discipline, from nonprofit 
and voluntary studies to the anatomy of wombats, is 
critical to understanding the central concept of the 
commons. 
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In some cases, interest in nonprofit and voluntary 
action is a matter of day-to-day attention to practical 
questions and immediate concerns. For example, 
issues of accountability in social services can impact 
directly upon the ability of workers to continue 
delivering service to clients or of solicitors to raise 
funds. (Milofsky and Blades, 1991)  In other cases, 
major issues of interdisciplinary theoretical and 
research importance are buried deep behind layers of 
arcane and specialized jargon within a particular field. 
The distinctive organizational theories of religious 
bodies are sometimes grounded in sacred beliefs, and 
buried deeply within theologies, for example.  
Much of the contemporary knowledge regarding 
nonprofit and voluntary studies has emerged in 
interdisciplinary settings explicitly devoted to the 
topic. The Association for Research on Nonprofit and 
Voluntary Associations (ARNOVA), formerly the 
Association of Voluntary Action Scholars (AVAS) 
has, for more than two decades, provided a national 
and international forum for multidisciplinary 
discussion and consideration of important nonprofit 
and voluntary action issues. Through its annual 
conferences, proceedings and journal, Nonprofit and 
Voluntary Sector Quarterly, ARNOVA has embodied 
many of the principles of nonprofit and voluntary 
action, which interest its members.  
Recently, these efforts have been supplemented with 
the creation of two national periodicals, the Chronicle 
of Philanthropy and Nonprofit News, and two new 
academic journals, Nonprofit Organization and 
Management and an internationally oriented journal, 
Voluntas. More than a decade ago, Yale University 
broke new ground with the formation of the Program 
in Nonprofit and Voluntary Organizations, and 
 10 
Independent Sector, a coalition of national voluntary 
associations also sponsors an annual research 
conference. (Hodgkinson and Lyman, 1989) We have 
also seen the development of more than 40 academic 
centers and programs devoted to nonprofit and 
voluntary action research and teaching. Even so, the 
bulk of the scholarly work on nonprofit and voluntary 
action, as befits the topic, is still being done by 
independent scholars at institutions of all sizes and 
descriptions from the largest and most prestigious 
universities to small, independent one-person 
consulting firms and “think tanks”. 
Taken together, these developments indicate the 
existence of a scholarly community. Such scholarly 
community is itself evidence of what we will be 
identifying as a commons in the pages which follow. 
We need to note that membership in such a scholarly 
community is not always simply a matter of affiliation, 
or even of regular attendance at conferences and 
meetings. Such activities merely define the formal 
core of contemporary scholarly communities. Such 
communities also typically include peripheries as well; 
in this case, those whose teaching, research, or practice 
is influenced by the body of nonprofit and voluntary 
action studies without any direct, formal participation. 
At present, the renaissance of nonprofit and voluntary 
studies has been sudden and dramatic enough that its 
periphery extends throughout most of the social 
sciences. 
We must be careful to avoid thinking of the periphery 
only in terms of a passive audience. Despite a certain 
level of coherence and integration of efforts in the core 
of this particular commons, we cannot overlook the 
simultaneous existence of a host of independent 
scholars in a variety of disciplines and settings who 
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have made important contributions to our collective 
understanding of nonprofit and voluntary phenomena. 
Much of the material produced by such past and 
present “independent operators” may be well known to 
members of the interdisciplinary community of 
nonprofit and voluntary action scholars. For example, 
the central metaphor of this study -- the commons -- 
was first derived from an essay by a biologist. Hardin 
(1968) succinctly posed what has become known as 
the free-rider problem in an essay on “The Tragedy of 
the Commons.”   
Reconnaissance on the Periphery 
Review of materials for this volume suggests that 
some of these independent research efforts and work 
in non-traditional disciplines may have major 
implications for rethinking nonprofit studies. A wealth 
of interesting and relevant material is to be found in 
anthropological studies of other cultures and in 
medieval and ancient history. For example, an ancient 
Northern Indian ruler we call Asoka deserves to be 
ranked as one of the world’s notable philanthropists. 
Asoka patronized the institutional base of Buddhism 
just as Constantine did for Christianity, endowing 
hundreds--perhaps thousands--of monasteries, 
monuments and temples, and legitimating a distinctive 
set of Buddhist giving ethics and fund-raising 
practices.  
Although attention has been lavished on various 
practical aspects of the contemporary relations 
between government and the nonprofit sector, 
systematic political insights are rare in nonprofit and 
voluntary action theory. Perhaps as a result, politics as 
nonprofit and voluntary action, and important political 
activities in political conventions and campaigns, party 
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finance and organization, and interest group behavior 
have been largely ignored or only touched upon lightly 
in the existing nonprofit and voluntary studies 
literature. 
Furthermore, any enterprise that seeks to deliberately 
expand the paradigm of a field by bringing in new 
evidence and additional questions must also raise the 
issue of parsimony as an objective of sound social 
theory, or risk simply adding to the cacophony. The 
qualities of appropriate brevity, succinct presentation 
and avoidance of redundancy are normally held up as 
desirable characteristics of any sound theory. 
However, parsimony is far easier to talk about than to 
achieve in a multi-disciplinary context characterized 
by differing sets of taken-for-granted assumptions, 
variations in definition and variable emphasis of even 
basic terms and concepts. In a scientific world 
characterized by multiple exploding universes of 
knowledge and discourse, it is difficult even to gain 
access to all of the relevant materials, much less 
organize and collate them. In such a context, it is 
tempting to view any attempt at theoretical synthesis 
and parsimony as hopelessly naive and utopian.  
Nevertheless, one of the principal justifications of the 
effort reflected in this book is a desire for greater 
parsimony in nonprofit and voluntary action theory. If 
the example of other sciences is a guide, classification 
and taxonomy are beginning steps toward more 
parsimonious theory. To begin this process, we can 
suggest that particular concerns found in six different 
social science disciplines form the emerging skeletal 
structure of a multi-disciplinary theory of the 
commons. In the following brief introductions, each of 
which is expanded later in the book, In introduce 
aspects of this theoretical anatomy.  
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Altruism  
In some instances, independent examinations of 
nonprofit and voluntary action issues speak directly to 
matters of central importance to a particular academic 
discipline. For example, a number of psychologists 
have been interested in issues of motivation associated 
with charitable and philanthropic behavior. A number 
of studies of bystander behavior, for example, shed 
important light on the central issues of what motivates 
giving aid, donation and other forms of giving and 
helping behavior. In what follows, we will deal with 
these and other psychological concerns under the label 
of altruism theory and suggest that they are part of a 
pattern of concerns and theoretical issues concerning 
motivation and individual behavioral aspects of what 
we are calling the theory of the commons. In the 
context of contemporary nonprofit and voluntary 
studies, altruism theory can be seen as addressing 
behavior which occurs outside the family and not 
motivated by profit or gain. 
Philanthropy  
Researchers in sociology have been interested in the 
organized social relations of the associations, formal 
voluntary organizations and social institutions of "the 
nonprofit world."  Philanthropy theory, in this sense, 
is concerned broadly with the social organization of all 
attempts to make the world a better place. Fisher 
(1986) defines it as voluntary giving, voluntary service 
and voluntarily association for the benefit of others. 
Nonprofit organizations and voluntary action are thus 
the principal medium of philanthropic studies. 
 Some researchers have examined primarily the 
internal and extramural relations of formal 
 14 
organizations, including inter-organizational 
coordination and community relations. More recently, 
groups of applied social scientists in gerontology and 
other fields have added extensive research on informal 
support groups to this list.  
These concerns might be termed charity organization 
theory as they once were, or community organization, 
as they were more recently. Early in the present 
century, Amos Warner went so far as to suggest 
calling them “philanthropology”. In this study, we 
shall designate them simply as philanthropy theory, 
and attempt to encompass the broadest possible range 
of concerns with the social organization of all efforts 
at social improvement.  
Patronage  
As noted earlier, one of the least examined aspects of 
nonprofit and voluntary studies is the political aspect 
of charitable and philanthropic behavior. This topic is 
actually part of a broader pattern of concern with the 
theoretical implications of patronage relations. Aspects 
of patronage theory, in this sense, have been of interest 
to a broad interdisciplinary community including 
historians and political scientists. Patronage is the 
giving of either protection or support. (Gifis, 1991, 
346) Some of the most fascinating contributions to 
patronage come from the work of classicists, art 
historians, literary critics and musicologists.  
Patronage is the giving of either protection or support 
(Gifis, 1991) Patronage theory is concerned with an 
extremely broad range of hierarchical relations 
between patrons (or donors) and their clients. Such 
phenomena include status, power, authority and the 
state and all of its relations to the nonprofit sector, not 
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just nonprofit service vendors, but also explicitly 
including political parties and party caucuses and 
conventions, interest groups, political campaigns and 
related political phenomena. Patronage theory 
explicitly includes not only the patronage of the 
nonprofit sector by the state, but also the unique forms 
of political patron relations by which the democratic 
state is constituted, and expressions of power and 
authority within nonprofit organizations and voluntary 
associations. 
Gifts 
The broad horizons of patronage theory open up to 
multidisciplinary scholars of nonprofit and voluntary 
scholars a significantly expanded view of nonprofit 
and voluntary action. The same may be said of a little-
known area of specialized studies in anthropology and 
archeology. Following the lead of the French 
anthropologist, Marcel Mauss, a small but diverse 
group of researchers have made significant advances 
in understanding variations on "the gift exchange" in a 
cross-cultural context. The potlatch for example, is an 
important kind of serial gift exchange found in a 
number of different cultures.  
Gift theory is a fitting label for cross-cultural and 
comparative studies that form an increasingly 
important aspect of our collective understandings of 
nonprofit and voluntary action. Because it deals with 
what is often centrally significant behavior in cultures 
very different from our own, gift theory must be 
approached very cautiously. In its broadest sense, gift 
theory is concerned with the consequences -- including 
social integration and social equilibrium -- arising 
from various forms of nonmarket and noncoercive 
exchange.  
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Charity  
Many American social sciences, social work and parts 
of sociology in particular, originally arose in the wake 
of the reform Darwinism of Lester Ward and remain 
heavily committed to the pragmatic use of social 
science for social improvement. Charity theory is 
concerned with conscious, deliberate understanding 
and use of altruism, philanthropy, patronage and gift 
theories for the purpose of organizing and carrying out 
social improvement projects directed at aiding those in 
need. 
Norms and ethics endorsing and advocating individual 
acts of charity can be traced to the brink of Western 
history and beyond. Organized eleemosynary efforts to 
aid the poor and disadvantaged were well established 
by the early Middle Ages. Beginning late in the 
nineteenth century, the scientific charity movement 
established the base of the contemporary model of 
social service with emphasis upon efficient and 
effective organization and the adoption of established 
routines and “methods” of charitable practice (Walter, 
1987). Creation of the legal category of nonprofit 
corporations and the granting to such corporations tax-
exempt status can be seen as by-products of those 
same efforts. 
Endowments 
Another major question of general importance that has 
been receiving increased attention in recent years, 
involves the economics of nonprofit and voluntary 
action. In its most general form, nonprofit economics 
is concerned with the economical use of a society's 
endowment--the social surplus of a productive society 
diverted from future production, public goods and 
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private consumption and dedicated to various 
charitable and philanthropic purposes. Like other 
economics, endowment theory is a theory of means. In 
this case, however, the concern is with the uses of a 
society's endowment--its culture and its wealth--, 
which together define much of what we conventionally 
think of as its civilization. Ultimately, then, 
endowment theory is concerned with how a 
civilization uses what it currently possesses and what 
is known to strive for common goods.  
Business  
Some researchers and scholars working in the area of 
nonprofit organizations and voluntary action are very 
enthusiastic about what might be called the nonprofit 
business perspective. In general, this approach is based 
on a categorical assumption, a critique and a 
viewpoint. The categorical assumption is that not-for-
profit organizations, especially those that employ paid 
staff and receive fees or other compensations for their 
services, are more akin to commercial business 
organizations than they are to voluntary membership 
organizations. The critique based on this assumption is 
that these same organizations are often poorly 
managed, inefficiently operated and, all in all, rather 
poor specimens of the species. The resultant viewpoint 
is one placing heavy emphasis on management 
problems and perspectives. 
 
Native Language Resources 
One of the most basic common goods of any society or 
group is the spoken and written language, which its 
members share and through which they are able to 
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express their thoughts, ideas and aspirations. In this 
sense, we are fundamentally concerned with the 
endowment of terms and concepts inherent in 
nonprofit and voluntary action studies. The objective 
of this book is modest in this regard: To state in words 
as plain and ordinary as possible what appear to be 
some of the most important aspects of how and why 
certain nonprofit and voluntary actions occur.  
The theory of the commons as presented here does not 
answer all questions and resolve all issues, for in truth 
it is not yet fully clear what all of the issues and 
questions raised by an adequate interdisciplinary 
theory of nonprofit and voluntary action may be. 
Moreover,  at least as many relevant disciplines are 
left out of this book for practical considerations, as are 
included. For example, important contributions by 
geography and regional science, archeology, 
accounting and several additional major subfields of 
history are not discussed.  
Another field of major importance only touched upon 
here is legal studies, in which a virtually unbroken 
chain concerned with inheritance, trusts and 
foundations and other relevant matters leads back to 
Roman law. We might expect that insights from each 
of these fields would broaden and enrich nonprofit and 
voluntary studies considerably. Others more familiar 
with these fields, however, must elucidate materials in 
those fields. It is sufficient to note that nothing 
currently suggests that evidence from any of the 
neglected areas would overturn the basic insights 
offered in this book.  
As befits its subject matter, this book is in part a 
lighthearted language experiment; an effort to create 
word-pictures descriptive of the ways in which people 
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in the nonprofit world think about themselves and their 
social worlds when things are functioning about as 
expected. It is also partly a thought-experiment into 
the possibilities of setting aside the materialistic and 
utilitarian “nonprofit” paradigms, which have so often 
guided public discourse and research on this topic.  
I make no inflated claims about the overarching 
significance or public gravity of the language of the 
commons as offered up in this volume. The theory as 
presented here will not immediately cure human greed, 
ignorance or stupidity. Yet, some of its implications, 
consistently followed through, do appear to have 
promise of significant policy impact at some point in 
the future.  
To those people suspicious of such cautious claims, 
take note: If physicists can indulge themselves with 
the fascinating wordplay of “quarks” like “up,” 
“down” and “charm” to give added meaning to their 
data, why can’t social scientists do likewise? Initially, 
it will be sufficient if the model presented here stands 
on its own as a description and explanation of an 
important slice of social, economic and political life. If 
it does, its practical significance may be more 
appropriately assessed on a later occasion.  
I do not suggest that what follows is presented as an 
objective or value-free exercise. Theories of nonprofit 
and voluntary action, like theories of the family, suffer 
from our limited abilities to describe and explain 
without simultaneously evaluating in every sense of 
the word. In the case of nonprofit and voluntary action, 
utilitarian theory--certainly through economics, but 
also through psychology, political science and the 
sociology of organizations--has proven to be 
particularly susceptible to this shortcoming.  
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For some people, the calculus of costs and benefits has 
become a universal index to what is rational. Yet it 
would be the most repulsive kind of reductionism to 
suggest that the fantastically diverse pursuits of 
nonprofit action should be conditioned or governed for 
all time by the narrow insights of twentieth century 
cost/benefit thinking. Enlightenment, virtue, beauty, 
rapture, truth, salvation, perfection, community, art-
for-its-own-sake and untold other nonprofit objectives 
sought after by the philanthropists, philosophers, 
artists, scientists, athletes, religious and charitable of 
human history stand on their own merits as human 
endeavors. They do not need to be transformed into 
utility-maximizing or goal attainment in order to 
account them reasonable pursuits.  
In developing the language of the model presented 
here, I sought to use what might best be called poetic 
license. The basic effort is to create a semantic model 
of various key elements of nonprofit and voluntary 
action. Considerable time and energy went into 
simplifying the basic terms. In particular, four and five 
syllable nouns ending in "tion" were cast out wherever 
and whenever possible. (Information and rendition, it 
must be acknowledged slipped through.) Also, I 
avoided meaningless meta-theoretical formalisms like 
outcome and input whenever feasible. 
Substantial efforts went into exploring the 
connotations of ordinary English terms that might be 
used in the model, particularly those with a long 
history of practical use in this area. The English 
language is remarkably rich in ways of describing and 
discussing aspects of nonprofit organization, voluntary 
action and philanthropy. Ordinary speakers of English 
have been dealing with nonprofit, voluntary and 
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philanthropic issues in their daily lives for many 
centuries. 
Some terms, like dower and benefice, were retrieved 
from linguistic oblivion. Others, like endowment, 
commons and repertory, were given slight tweaks to 
bring out latent or hidden implications of theoretical 
value. A few terms, most importantly benefactory, 
were deliberately constructed (in this case, by analogy 
with the terms manufactory and factory or factors of 
production) with an occasional dash of pun-intended.  
Terms, such as endowment, foundation, benefit, and 
trustee stretch back hundreds of years and are 
anchored deep in western culture. (Chalmers (1827), 
for example, used the term in roughly the sense 
intended here nearly 200 years ago. Other terms 
(including borrowings from Latin, like benefice, or 
fideocommisia or from Greek, like koininia) express 
important contemporary ideas, but have either never 
been adopted or have fallen into complete disuse, and 
may be beyond recall. 
In calling upon these rich linguistic reserves, any 
theory of nonprofit and voluntary action necessarily 
becomes a kind of reflexive exercise--demonstrating 
(or failing to demonstrate!) some of the very principles 
it asserts. All speakers of a common language are 
members of an association of sorts--mutual 
beneficiaries of common meanings and the resulting 
outlooks and worldviews that condition their actions in 
infinite subtle ways. At another level, the particular 
communities of researchers and scholars interested in 
nonprofit and voluntary studies declaim and sustain 
their joint interests through modes of communication 
and interaction and in so doing dramatize and 
demonstrate their subject matter. 
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Using a poetic frame of reference as a basis for social 
and political theory is not as whimsical as it may at 
first appear. Much existing work on nonprofit and 
voluntary action relies upon such literary devices, 
sometimes unintentionally. Nonprofit economics in its 
current state has been built up from market economic 
theory with a whimsical series of analogies, ironies, 
metaphors and word play: Nonprofit organizations are 
treated "as if" they were profit-oriented firms. (Crew, 
1975, 7) Such similes are a common poetic device, 
often used for irony or other dramatic effect. Nonprofit 
leadership is characterized ironically as 
"entrepreneurship”. (Young, 1987) In the same vein, 
some existing nonprofit usages are suggestive of 
nothing quite so much as Lewis Carroll. The pretzel 
logic evident in compound negatives such as “the 
unrelated business income of the non-profit, non-
governmental sector” is an issue truly worthy of the 
Red Queen in Alice in Wonderland. What can one 
possibly be asserting in such a phrase?  Such terms 
often seem to operate at a strictly poetical level. 
Regrettably, at times they appear to convey largely 
negative images of disheveled, disorganized, 
unfocussed and unmanageable establishments peopled 
by the confused, impractical and erratic.   
 
Overview of the Theory 
The first task of any theory is to establish a suitable 
nomenclature. I call the interdisciplinary theory set 
forth in this book the theory of the commons. The 
theoretical rationale for using this name will become 
increasingly clear as the theory unfolds. The term 
commons plays upon many relevant meanings and 
connotations. For example, the conventional wisdom 
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of a group is sometimes called common knowledge. 
The Anglo-American experience of common law arose 
out of custom and conventional practice and the much 
broader experience of common lands held in joint 
tenancy or ownership. 
Several American states including Pennsylvania and 
Massachusetts are self-identified as Commonwealths, 
and the economic transformation of Europe was 
undertaken under the heading of a Common Market. 
Clubs and membership organizations, including the 
Smithsonian Institution, frequently have common 
rooms for the mutual use of members while public 
elementary education often occurs in common schools 
and is thought by many to emphasis common sense, 
which was also the title of a political polemic at the 
time of the American Revolution. That revolution was 
undertaken as a common action of the people of the 
United States against the English state, which already 
included its famous House of Commons. Then as now, 
it was common knowledge that many of us engage in 
commonplace tasks, some of which like the 
Revolution may be undertaken for the common good. 
Each of these connotations of the term “commons” is 
related to the others, and as we shall see, and to the 
fundamental, constitutive ideas of nonprofit and 
voluntary action, as well.  
A number of contemporary academic uses of the term 
commons support the usage in this book: Edney and 
Bell (1984) call their decision-making game, in which 
teams of participants harvest resources from a shared 
pool, a commons game. And, there is a rich tradition in 
social philosophy concerned with the common good 
roughly as we use the term in this book. 
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The term commons as it is used in this book may refer 
to a club or membership organization, social move-
ment, political party, religious, artistic, scientific or 
athletic society, support group, network, conference of 
volunteers, or to several other forms of what we think 
of as nonprofit or voluntary social organization. As 
developed here, the term is an ideal type; it distills an 
essential set of related characteristics, that are seldom 
if ever empirically observable in pure form. As an 
ideal type, we should expect to find in any empirical 
commons, evidence of altruistic motives and behavior, 
philanthropy and charity, as well as patronage, various 
forms of donations and gift giving, as well as 
programs involving search, learning and other ways of 
expanding common endowments.  
I hope that  readers of this book, including members of 
the Association for Research on Nonprofit and 
Voluntary Studies and all those interested in nonprofit 
and voluntary studies may see themselves as 
collaborators in a commons of which the author is also 
a participant. The project of the book and of the theory 
of the commons is partially to clarify the nature and 
purposes of the tasks facing this particular commons 
by pointing toward future directions for research and 
study of the multiplicity of other commons in 
contemporary society. 
Attention to common purposes and objectives by the 
participants of any commons can be expected to result 
in the rendition of "common goods", which are 
distinguishable not only from the private goods on sale 
in the marketplace and the public goods of the state, 
but also from THE common good. Unlike public 
goods, no assumptions need be made about the 
universal desirability of such common goods. In most 
instances, it is sufficient that common goods are 
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shared or held jointly by members of a particular 
commons, even in the face of indifference or 
downright hostility from others. Common goods may 
be transformed into true public goods only under very 
special circumstances.  
Any set of common goods suitable for further use are 
said by the theory to constitute an endowment and the 
full set of all endowments in a society or group of 
societies are seen as constituting a civilization. The 
endowment of any commons ordinarily consists of its 
treasures of money, property and market goods, its 
collections of precious, priceless objects, and its 
repertories of routines, cults, skills, techniques and any 
other meaningful behavior learned by participants in 
the commons or passed on to others for the common 
good. 
Any endowment is a dynamic entity. Treasures, 
collections and repertories carried forward into the 
present constitute a common heritage, while those 
made available as resources for future use make up a 
common legacy. Oft-quoted commentaries by de 
Tocqueville and others on the unique American 
penchant for voluntary action, for example, point to it 
as an important part of the heritage of American 
civilization and presumably its ongoing legacy as well. 
Children who learn basic repertories of voluntary 
association in scouts and churches or synagogues, 
grow up to be parents who organize PTA’s, little 
leagues and new political parties, interest groups and 
professional associations.  
Practicality alone does not define an endowment. 
Among primitive tribes, past or present, many of the 
same skills, which go into tool making also go into 
decorative and ritual art forms. (Van Gennep, 1960; 
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Shils and Young, 1953; Smith, 1972B) It is usually a 
moot question whether practicality preceded or flowed 
from decoration and ritual. Endowment theory, 
therefore, is concerned in part with the special 
circumstances of the rational choice between carving 
an ax and decorating a ceremonial pipe. In the life of 
any people, such choices may be equally as 
momentous as the better-known “guns and butter” 
choice between food and defense. 
The social organization of any commons may 
encompass one or more benefactories, consisting of 
the organized social relations between patrons, clients 
and various intermediaries, or agents, devoted to 
various forms of gifts, grants or benefits. Two major 
contemporary types of benefactories are those engaged 
in various problem-solving efforts and those engaged 
in presentations of various types.  
Other complex acts in the commons may link various 
benefactories together in a variety of complex ways. 
Thus, the conduct of voluntary action (like any other) 
research may be a particular form of problem-solving 
activity, while the discussion of that research at a 
scientific meeting such as the annual ARNOVA 
conference, or publication of the findings in a 
scholarly journal such as NVSQ constitute 
presentations. Yet, conduct of the research and 
presentation of the findings are clearly part of the same 
larger act (which we call “the research”). These and 
other acts derive their meanings in part from one 
another and from the commons, which encompasses 
them.  
Commons are not physical entities or places, although 
a variety of common places may be set aside for 
shared uses. Indeed, the architecture of such common 
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places and the unique architectural forms, which 
express and facilitate common values, is, itself, an 
important area of inquiry completely outside the 
repertory of the modern nonprofit and voluntary action 
scholar. (A few scattered examples can be found. 
Taylor [1975] considers prisons and “moral 
architecture”, for example.)  
Commons consist principally of acts incorporating 
dialogue or interaction and building up successive 
understandings and the aggregation of separate 
meanings between participants. Such aggregations 
may include events, situations as well as organizations 
and other complex acts, which link together many 
separate events, and typical situations. 
The theory of the commons explicitly departs from the 
sociological practice of treating society as an 
aggregation of many separate institutions. Instead, the 
theory of the commons conceives of society as 
composed of four fundamental institutional sectors -- 
households, markets, the state and, of course, the 
commons. The sociologist Arnold Rose, an early 
student of nonprofit and voluntary action, set forth a 
similar conception more than three decades ago: 
“Voluntary associations consist of all classes of 
functioning groupings except families, the formal 
government (including its specialized organs such as 
schools and armed forces) and economic enterprise...” 
(Rose, 1960, 667) See Ross (1977) for an appraisal of 
Rose’s work on voluntary associations. 
The popular characterization of the commons as the 
third sector is usually derived by ignoring another 
sector – the household sector. No harm is done (and 
the phrase ‘third sector’ remains intact) if we merely 
acknowledge households as the fourth.  
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A fundamental goal of the theory of the commons is to 
set forth a base for greater common ground among 
disciplines in a model of nonprofit and voluntary 
action as rational behavior. While the issue of the 
rationality of common behavior has often been treated 
as a matter of little importance to social researchers, it 
is of critical importance in the politics and economics 
of nonprofit and voluntary action and, as we shall see, 
important also in establishing the practical basis for 
action in the commons. To accomplish this, we shall 
attempt to set the concepts of the theory and the value 
premises within a limited “rational choice” theory.  
  
Conclusion 
Van Til’s metaphor (1988) of conceptual maps 
concisely sums up the status of third sector studies 
today. Both nonprofit organization and voluntary 
action studies have been historically distinct 
intellectual maps that appear to be converging at the 
very point where the compass of philanthropy studies 
– long thought extinguished – shows signs of pointing 
toward a number of new and interesting landmarks as 
well. 
A great many different disciplinary maps of parts of 
the emerging territory are waiting to be discovered – in 
law, social work, history, anthropology, public 
administration, sociology, political science, 
economics, and many other fields of study. Some of 
the more important areas of study that overlap 
disciplinary boundaries have been labeled in this 
chapter as altruism, philanthropy, patronage, gifts, 
charities, endowments and business maps. 
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By present consensus, the vast territory of society has 
been divided into three sectors: state, market and the 
awkwardly unnamed “third sector.” This introduction 
offers a brief synopsis of some of the main terms of a 
theory of commons that seeks to make and further map 
this third sector. A number of additional terms and 
concepts as well as further explication of these basic 
terms will be introduced in the chapters that follow. 
In Chapter One I shall examine a number of existing 
perspectives on the nature of nonprofit organizations 
and voluntary action. Taken together these 
perspectives delineate many of the major areas of 
interest to nonprofit, voluntary and philanthropic 
studies as the field is currently emerging and also raise 
a number of unresolved issues and questions. 
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Political and industrial associations strike us forceably; but the others elude 
our observation, or if we discover them we understand them imperfectly 
because we have hardly ever seen anything of the kind.  
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 
 
 
 
1 
Current Approaches 
to Nonprofit Organization  
and Voluntary Association 
 
he central defining concepts of nonprofit and 
voluntary studies are generally thought to be the 
following: The most pervasive and characteristic 
forms of nonprofit and voluntary behavior are 
nonprofit formal organizations. Together, the network of 
nonprofit organizations define a socio-economic “sector” 
known variously as the nonprofit, voluntary, independent 
or third sector, in contrast with the profit-making sector of 
business and the public sector of government.  
T 
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For many, this nonprofit sector (a.k.a., “the sector”) is the 
province of simpletons, knaves and fools: Those who lack 
a clear understanding of their goals and purposes and must 
therefore be aided in clarification; those whose declared 
purposes mask and conceal their real interests in personal 
gain and profit; and those whose goals and purposes are 
irrational, foolish, impractical and unattainable. In this 
chapter, we shall examine further some of the 
contemporary expressions of these formative ideas, 
finding a good deal that is worthy, as well as certain 
nagging theoretical problems. For others, particularly true 
believers of all stripes, the sector may equally be viewed 
as the province of the wise, brave, good and foresighted. 
 
The Non-Profit Organization  
The conventional way of approaching the sector is through 
the legal and economic category of the nonprofit 
organization--a residual category arrived at by negation or 
exclusion. (Lohmann, 1989) According to Anthony and 
Young, "A non-profit organization is an organization 
whose goal is something other than earning a profit for its 
owners. Usually its goals are to provide services." (1984, 
35)  Precisely what other purposes may be at hand here is 
not evident in such a definition. (But, see Elkin and 
Molitor, 1984) 
There is general consensus that the simple presence or 
absence of profit is, by itself, an insufficient indicator. As 
an example, there is much concern today about enormous 
profits of professional sports, and their distribution in the 
form of large salaries and bonuses to players. Yet, when 
the Cincinnati Red Stockings did the first professional 
baseball tour in 1869, the total profit from the tour was 
reported to be $1.69. Does that mean that in its early 
years, professional baseball was almost a nonprofit 
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activity?  The general consensus among nonprofit and 
voluntary action scholars would be that it does not.  
It is largely to distinguish intent from result that some 
authors prefer the term "not-for-profit". However, this 
usage is distinctly marginal. Blacks Law Dictionary, 
Kohler's Dictionary for Accountants, Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary, Funk and Wagnell's Dictionary, 
and American Heritage Dictionary, among others, make 
no mention of "not-for-profit". The principle object of this 
turn of phrase appears to be to distinguish bone fide 
nonprofit organizations from failing businesses (which are 
nonprofit in an entirely different sense), and without 
excluding successful nonprofits that may incorrectly speak 
of their undistributed surpluses as “profits”.  
The issue has been further complicated by statutes in a 
number of states (New York, California, Pennsylvania) 
which now allow types of "not-for-profit" business 
corporation whose purposes fall largely outside those 
under consideration here. (Oleck, 1986, vii)  In what 
follows, those whose sensibilities prefer the term “not-for-
profit” may safely pencil in two dashes and the word “for” 
wherever the phrase “nonprofit” occurs in this volume 
without seriously affecting the meaning.  Note, however, 
that this work is grounded in the view that two-dashes-
and-three-letters fail to resolve any of the underlying 
theoretical problems presented by the nonprofit concept.  
Initially, Anthony and Young have pointed to two 
defining characteristics of the nonprofit form: 1) 
preoccupation with “something other than profit” and 2) a 
tendency toward service provision. The first is hardly an 
exclusive criterion, unless one adopts the peculiar fashion 
of contemporary exchange theorists of viewing any and all 
attainments of goals, realization of objectives or 
fulfillments of purpose as “profit”. (C.f., Becker, 1976; 
Alhadeff, 1982; Blau, 1967; Homans, 1961) On the basis 
of such an approach, the nonprofit world would indeed 
appear to be limited to the confused, deceptive and 
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uninformed. Anthony and Young, however, clearly regard 
these two criteria alone as insufficient to define 
“nonprofit” activities, so they go on to expand their initial 
criteria to nine: 
  
1. The absence of a profit measure 
 2. The tendency to be service organizations 
 3. Constraints on goals and strategies 
 4. Less dependence on clients for financial support 
 5. The dominance of professionals 
 6. Differences in governance 
 7. Differences in top management 
 8. Importance of political influences 
 9. A tradition of inadequate management controls 
 
A key assumption of much of the current management 
literature on nonprofit organizations, widely shared by 
accountants, economists, public and business 
administrators and others is that "the absence of a single, 
satisfactory, overall measure of performance that is 
comparable to the profit measure is the most serious 
problem inhibiting the development of effective 
management control systems in non profit organizations." 
(Anthony and Young, 1984, 39) In the same vein, Gifis  
(pp?) says a nonprofit corporation is one chartered for 
other than profit-making activities. Thus, this particular 
construction of the theory of nonprofit organizations 
begins with the critical assumption that nonprofits are a 
flawed, or incomplete form of organization. ( ) Advocates 
of this position tend to assume, based on the absence of a 
unitary performance measure, that nonprofit organizations 
as a class are inherently more inefficient in the conduct of 
their affairs than comparable for-profit establishments. It 
is important to note that this is an assumption, rather than 
an empirical finding, although it is seldom presented as 
such. Moreover, it is an unjustified assumption, in that, 
systematic empirical evidence of generalized 
“inefficiency” as a definitive characteristic of nonprofit 
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organizations is simply nonexistent. In charity theory, for 
example, it has been assumed for decades that greater 
efficiency was needed in the delivery of social services. 
(Lee, 1937) As early as 1906, the Cleveland Chamber of 
Commerce was calling for improvements in the efficiency 
of charitable activity. (Lubove, 1965) Yet, incredible as it 
may seem, there has never been an empirical or 
comparative study, which establishes the greater 
inefficiency of charities over other forms of profit-oriented 
organization. The matter rests entirely upon theoretical 
deduction! (And upon a theoretical lacunae, as we shall 
see below.) 
A somewhat different tack toward defining the nonprofit 
organization has been taken by scholars less interested in 
nonprofit management and more interested in policy 
issues. Hall (1987, 3) defines a nonprofit organization as 
“a body of individuals who associate for any of three 
purposes: 1) to perform public tasks that have been 
delegated to them by the state; 2) to perform public tasks 
for which there is a demand that neither the state nor for-
profit organizations are willing to fulfill; or 3) to influence 
the direction of policy in the state, the for-profit sector, or 
other nonprofit organizations.”  This approach expands the 
residual “other-than-profit” approach to recognize what 
other sources call the “non-government organization 
(NGO)” dimension as well as the possibility of 
autonomous action. 
This approach is particularly evident in the distinction of 
(nonprofit) museums and (for-profit) galleries. According 
to the National Academy of Art, as cited by DiMaggio 
(1987, 195), “All American museums are nonprofit.... 
because the definition of museum the American 
Association of Museums (AAM) adopted excludes 
proprietary enterprises that mount exhibitions for public 
view.” From this vantage point, the first order distinction 
between profit-oriented and other activities necessitates a 
second-order distinction like “non-government 
organization” because the nonprofit heading encompasses 
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both public (or governmental) and private (or 
nongovernmental) endeavors. 
 
Legal Types of Organization 
Current legal terminology makes a number of 
organizational distinctions worth noting here: An 
association as “a collection of persons who have joined 
together for a certain object”. (Gifis, 1991, 32)  This is 
also very close to the original meaning of company, which 
is “any group of people voluntarily united for performing 
jointly any activity, business or commercial enterprise.” 
(Gifis, 1991, 83)  A corporation is an association of 
shareholders created under law and regarded as an 
artificial person, with a legal entity entirely separate from 
the persons who compose it, and the capacity of 
succession, or continuous existence, able to hold property, 
sue and be sued, and exercising other powers conferred 
upon it by law. (Gifis, 1991, 103)  The issue of succession 
has attracted little interest among nonprofit and voluntary 
action scholars. It will be treated below under the twin 
headings of heritage and legacy. The heritage of Anglo-
American nonprofit law, for example, is clearly traceable 
to the 1601 Statute of Charitable Uses, adopted by 
Parliament in the same year as the Elizabethan Poor Law. 
(History of English Philanthropy) 
Legal terminology offers several clear alternative models 
of nonprofit organizations with interesting implications: 
First of all legally, a nonprofit corporation is not an 
organization, but a legal personality. A cooperative 
association is “a union of individuals, commonly laborers, 
farmers or small capitalists, formed for the prosecution in 
common of some productive enterprise, the profits being 
shared in accordance with capital or labor contributed by 
each.” (Gifis, 1991, 101) Perhaps nonprofit organizations 
are distinctive forms of cooperatives. A syndicate is a 
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group of individuals or companies who have formed a 
joint venture to undertake a project, which the individuals 
would be unable or unwilling to pursue alone. (Gifis, 
1991, 479) Nonprofit organization may be a constrained 
form of syndicate. By contrast, a cartel is a group of 
independent corporations...which agree to restrict trade to 
their mutual benefit. (Gifis, 1991, 63) Many of the 
systems, networks, collaboratives, and federations impart 
something of the character of syndicates.  
 
Characteristics of Nonprofit 
Organizations 
Local nonprofit organizations are often small, loosely 
structured and democratically governed and do not fit 
conveniently into traditional theories of organizational 
behavior rooted in management science and bureaucratic 
theory. (Milofsky, 1987)  
 
The Nondistribution Constraint 
The largest contribution of law to nonprofit theory to the 
present is the concept of the nondistribution constraint in 
state and federal law and tax policy. (Hansmann, 1981; 
1987)  As Hansmann points out, the legal concept of 
nonprofit does not rest on the theoretical basis of profit or 
profit-seeking motivation noted above. In law and tax 
policy, the concern is not with earning a profit, or how it is 
earned (by service or otherwise), or the degrees of 
freedom, client-dependence or professional domination 
involved, or differences in governance, top management 
or political influence, or the sufficiency of managerial 
control. The key issues in state and federal public policy 
have been two: The critical question for attaining the legal 
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designation of a nonprofit corporation is, in most cases, 
“charitable purposes” broadly defined. And the critical 
issue in attaining exemption from taxation is what 
Hansmann calls “the nondistribution constraint.” 
(Clotfelder, 1985; Clotfelder and Salamon, 1982; 
Hansmann, 1987; Simon, 1987)  
 
The Nonprofit Sector 
The second formative idea of contemporary nonprofit and 
voluntary theory is the concept of the nonprofit sector. 
Together, nonprofit organizations are said to make up a 
distinct “sector” consisting of a number of discrete but 
related nonprofit organized, possibly classifiable into 
nonprofit “industries”. (Van Til, 1989)  According to 
O’Neill (1989), this sector owns roughly ten percent of the 
property in the U.S., has as many employees as the federal 
and state governments combined and a bigger budget than 
all but seven nations. Even though there seems to be 
widespread agreement upon the existence of this “sector”, 
there is little agreement over its definition or organization. 
Anthony and Young offer one conception of this sector, 
discussed below. The chapter outline of O’Neill’s The 
Third Sector (1989) offers another, somewhat different, 
classification. The NTEE typology offers yet a third, and 
the Internal Revenue Service Code, with its labyrinth of 
classifications noted in Figure 2-1 below.  
In general, these various efforts at classification point to at 
least two of the greatest and most controversial 
ambiguities in the contemporary field of nonprofit and 
voluntary studies. First, there is the question of whether or 
not clubs, associations and other types of membership 
organizations should be considered as part of the nonprofit 
sector, or as (a) separate sector(s). (C.f., Smith, 1989) Is 
the nonprofit sector defined exclusively by formal 
organizations, or are the activities of membership 
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organizations, individual volunteers, informal groups and 
private acts of charity and philanthropy to be included as 
well? 
Equally controversial, especially among public 
administration theorists, is the issue of whether federal, 
state and local governments are nonprofit organizations. 
Federal and state nonprofit laws do frequently speak of 
private nonprofit organizations, and there is a long 
tradition in public administration, in particular, of treating 
private and public nonprofit organizations as a class (over 
against profit-oriented business organizations.) One must 
concede that public agencies do, typically, lack a profit 
orientation. On the other hand, including them as part of 
the nonprofit sector initially appears to make a complete 
muddle out of attempts to deal with the interaction 
between the “nonprofit sector” and the “public sector.”  
As we shall see in Chapters 8 and 9, it is indeed possible 
to make a satisfactory distinction between state and 
commons, without forfeiting the equally useful distinction 
between commercial and “nonprofit” ventures.  
Introducing the question of tax-exemption further 
complicates the issue. As already noted, the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) standard of “nondistribution” of 
profits to stakeholders offers a distinct alternative to the 
“profit-motive” criterion. Indeed, as we shall see in 
chapter 4, the concept of “profit-motive” (and the 
underlying distinction between self-interested and 
altruistic behavior) is an unnecessary oversimplification of 
the range of observable behavior. Although some 
contemporary nonprofit managers will undoubtedly be 
unhappy with the results, it may indeed be possible to 
make a stronger theoretically grounded distinction 
between tax-exempt and tax eligible nonprofits.  
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Nonprofit Typologies 
Analysts of the nonprofit sector have long been concerned 
with deriving an appropriate classification scheme for 
nonprofit organizations. Anthony and Young, for example, 
offered the following classification of nonprofit industries, 
in conjunction with the definitions noted above. (58-61) 
Note that items 5 and 6 explicitly incorporate government 
organizations into the nonprofit sector, rather than 
segregating them into a separate “public sector”. 
 1. Health Care Organizations 
 2. Educational Organizations 
 3. Membership Organizations 
 4. Human Service and Arts Organizations 
 5. The Federal Government 
 6. State and Local Governments 
 The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Code offers a 
somewhat different way to categorize nonprofit 
organizations. 
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Figure 2-1 
IRS Classification System 
Under Section 501 of the IRS Code of 1934 
(Numbers in parenthesis are the number of active 
organizations on the IRS master file, 1985) 
 
501(c)(2) Title holding corporations (5,758) 
501(c)(3) Charitable corporations (366,071) 
501(c)(4) Civic leagues, social welfare organizations and local  
                        associations. (131,250) 
 501(c)(5)   Labor, agricultural or horticultural organizations (75,632) 
 501(c)(6) Business & trade associations (54,217) 
 501(c)(7) Social/recreational clubs (57,343) 
 501(c)(8) Fraternal beneficiary societies and associations (94,435) 
 501(c)(9) Voluntary employees' beneficiary associations (10,668) 
 501(c)(10) Domestic fraternal societies, orders or associations (15,924) 
 501(c)(11) Teachers Retirement Funds (11) 
 501(c)(12) Benevolent life insurance associations of a purely local  
                        character (5,244) 
 501(c)(13) Cemetery companies owned and operated by members  
                        (7,239) 
 501(c)(15) Mutual insurance companies (967) 
 501(c)(17) Supplemental unemployment benefit plans (726) 
 501(c)(18) Employee funded Pension trusts (3) 
 501(c)(19) Veteran's organizations (23,062) 
 501(c)(20) Legal service organizations (167) 
 501(c)(21) Black Lung trusts (15) 
 
 
 
National Taxonomy of Exempt 
Entities 
Under the federal tax code, only “charitable 
organizations” under paragraph 501(c) 3 are fully and 
completely exempt from federal taxation. This has led to a 
secondary concern with categorizing the types of 
organizations, which fall under this heading. A project 
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spearheaded by Independent Sector has attempted to 
resolve this question. The National Taxonomy of Exempt 
Entities is described as “A System for Classifying 
Nongovernmental, Nonbusiness Tax-Exempt 
Organizations in the U.S. with a Focus on IRS Section 
501(c)(3) Philanthropic Organizations.” The title alone 
reminds us once again of some of the signs pointing 
toward the need for more refined theory in Chapter 1. The 
NTEE Taxonomy incorporates a four-digit coding scheme 
in which the first digit, called the Major Group Code, is 
one of the 26 letters of the English alphabet; the second 
pair of digits, called the Major Activity or Program Code 
consists of generic fixed or reserved code numbers 
between 1-20; and unique code items 21-99 which may be 
unique to each particular Major Group; and a single digit 
alphabetic Beneficiary Code to identify the primary 
beneficiary class. 
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Figure 2-2 
NTEE Major Group Code Items 
 A - Arts, Culture, Humanities 
 B - Education/Instruction and Related - Formal and 
Informal 
 C - Environmental Quality, Protection and Beautification 
 D - Animal Related 
 E - Health - General and Rehabilitation 
 F - Health - Mental Health, Crisis Intervention 
 G - Health - Mental Retardation/Developmentally  
Disabled 
 H - Consumer Protection/Legal Aid 
 I - Crime & Delinquency Prevention - Public Protection 
 J - Employment/Jobs 
 K - Food, Nutrition, Agriculture 
 L - Housing/Shelter 
 M - Public Safety, Emergency Preparedness & Relief 
 N - Recreation, Leisure, Sports, Athletics 
 O - Youth Development 
 P - Human Service, Other 
 Q - International/Foreign 
 R - Civil Rights, Social Action, Advocacy 
 S - Community Improvement, Community Capacity  
Building 
 T - Grantmaking/Foundations 
 U - Research, Planning, Science, Technology, Tech.  
Assistance 
 V - Voluntarism, Philanthropy, Charity 
 W - Religion Related/Spiritual Development 
 X - Reserved for New Major Group (Future) 
 Y - Reserved for Special Information for Regulatory  
Bodies  
 Z - Nonclassifiable (Temporary Code) 
The NTEE is, in part, a refinement and expansion of concepts 
incorporated into a social services classification project completed 
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a decade earlier. (UWASIS-II, 1976)  By itself, however, the 
NTEE is not a sufficient typology for theoretical purposes. It 
merely supplies labels for major categories of presently tax-
exempt organizations. It provides us with nothing in the way of a 
rationale for the inclusion or exclusion of particular categories, or 
any of the relationships between them.  
 
Size of the Sector 
One of the issues, which has been of particular interest to 
advocates of the nonprofit concept, involves estimating 
the size of the sector. Until quite recently, there has been 
little in the way of demonstrated interest in information of 
this type. Even today, major measurement issues remain. 
Nevertheless, we can get some approximate idea of the 
extent of the phenomenon from a variety of existing 
sources. The following discussion is based on two 
sources: Information on organizations is based on a series 
of tables published in the Appendix of Weisbrod’s The 
Nonprofit Economy. Information on nonprofit 
employment is taken from   (1987). 
Working from IRS data, Weisbrod (A-1) estimates that 
there were 887,000 nonprofit organizations in the U.S. in 
1985.  Of this number, 366,000 are estimated to be tax 
deductible (meeting the requirements of Section 501(c)(3) 
of the IRS Code. Breakdown of the 1985 figures for the 
other IRS categories are listed in Table 2-1 above. Our 
primary focus in this work is with the tax-deductible 
(“charitable”) organizations, which are often thought of as 
the “core” of the nonprofit sector, although many of the 
perspectives offered apply to other categories as well.  
 There are about 120,000 officially registered nonprofit 
charities in the United Kingdom. (Weisbrod, Appendix B) 
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Salamon (1983) found significant regional variations 
among nonprofits, with the South falling below the 
national average of 47.1 organizations per 100,000 
population and the Northeast, North Central and West 
regions above. It is important to point out that this could 
simply mean that nonprofits in the South are larger. Data 
on expenditures suggest exactly the opposite, however. 
Nonprofit expenditures in 1977 were below the national 
average of $323 per Capita in both the South and West 
and roughly half the per Capita expenditures of $522 for 
the Northeast.  
Hodgkinson and Weitzman (1986) estimate private 
contributions to nonprofit organizations in the three 
decades after 1955 to range between a high of 2.7% of 
national income (1963) and a low of 2.21% in 1979. Over 
that same period, there was an uninterrupted decrease in 
contributed funds as a proportion of aggregate nonprofit 
organizational expenditures. Figures varied from a high of 
70.7% in 1957 to a low of 31.2% in 1984. (Weisbrod, 
Table C2)  In 1980, private giving was most important 
among religious organizations (93% of total receipts) and 
least important in health services (9%). The proportion of 
government support was highest in civic and social action 
(44%) and health and human services (43%). Service fees 
made up the greatest portion of total support of education 
and research nonprofits (79%) with all other categories 
falling at least 25% lower.  
 
The Minority View 
As noted above, one way to classify nonprofit 
organizations is by the degree to which revenues and 
charges meter their activities. According to a random 
sample of 274 IRS-990 tax reports, nonprofit 
organizations are clearly bimodal on the question of 
contributions, gifts and grants as a proportion of total 
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revenues. We shall call such resources public support or 
simply support (after the manner of United Way of 
America). For the largest single group of nonprofits (47% 
of the total) such support constitutes less than 20% of total 
revenues. These correspond with the Type A nonprofits 
noted by Anthony above, and could reasonably be 
expected to be most “firm-like” in their behavior. For the 
second largest group (27%) of Type B’s such support 
constitutes 80% or more. The remaining 26% (which we 
might call A-B’s) are disbursed rather evenly from 21-
79%. From these data, we can generalize that roughly half 
of all nonprofit organizations are likely to be, “firm-like”, 
while one-quarter are clearly not and the remaining 
quarter represent a continuum of variations of a blended 
type. It is important to note also that these data reflect only 
the measured or counted portions of total nonprofit and 
voluntary action in the U.S. The legal protections and 
requirements of incorporation and tax-exemption are 
likely applied disproportionately to Type A organizations, 
while Type B’s may be somewhat more inclined to rely 
upon factors such as trust and mutuality between donor 
and recipient. This would suggest that Type B nonprofits 
are disproportionately represented among the unreported 
and underrepresented in the above. At any rate, the 
primary focus of this book is on the smaller half -- the 
quarter which are clearly dependent primarily on We 
must, for the time being leave open the question of the 
degree to which the perspective offered here applies to 
Type A nonprofits. 
Counting organizations may not give a true picture of the 
role of the total nonprofit sector in the economy. 
Consequently, some sources have favored paid 
employment instead. These same sources have also tended 
to locate nonprofit employment within a broader “service 
sector.” (Ginsberg and Vojta, 1981; Rudney, 1987) 
According to Rudney, employment in philanthropic 
organizations (nonprofit service organizations, which tend 
to be labor intensive) totaled roughly 6.5 million in 1982. 
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This was roughly 13 percent of total private 
(nongovernmental) employment, and an increase of 43% 
since 1972. In 1980, philanthropic organizations employed 
only 5.7% of all workers, but disproportionately large 
portions of total professional employment (14.1% of all 
professionals) and service workers (15.3%). As a result, 
about 40% of all philanthropic employees were 
professional and 36 percent were service workers. Data on 
nonprofit employment also tend to present a minimal 
picture, since they do not take volunteer labor into 
account.  
Another category of “the sector” is the philanthropic 
foundation. According to the Foundation Center, there 
were 21,967 non-governmental foundations operating in 
the United States in 1981-82, with total assets of $47.6 
billion, total gifts received of $2.4 billion and total grants 
awarded of $3.8 billion (or about 7.9 percent of total 
assets). (Statistical Abstract, 1984. #651. p. 385)  Table 17 
shows the number of grants, total amount of awards, and 
percentage distribution of grants of $5,000 or more 
reported by 450 foundations representing about 42 percent 
of all grant dollars awarded in 1983. The categories of 
health, education and welfare together account for about 
two thirds of the awards, with the remainder divided 
among culture, science, social science and religion. 
(Statistical Abstract, 1984. #652. p. 385.) 
 
Nonprofit Action and Unproductive 
Labor 
We might ask to what extent it is possible to identify the 
theoretical origins or conceptual basis of the nonprofit 
concepts outlined above. At first glance, the nonprofit 
concept appears to be derived directly from direct 
experience and recent practice; none of the broad range of 
legal, economic, political or social “grand theories” or 
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formative doctrines of any of the social sciences make any 
mention whatsoever of “nonprofit organizations” or a 
“nonprofit sector”. In contrast with Tocqueville’s 
references to associations, the nonprofit concept appears at 
first glance to be a mid-twentieth century invention.  
Yet, upon closer examination, the theoretical (as distinct 
from the practical) origins of the concept of nonprofit 
action can be traced to the neglected half of a dichotomy 
made by Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations, first 
published in 1776. In that work, Smith dichotomized 
“productive” and “unproductive labor”: “There is one sort 
of labor which adds to the value of the subject upon which 
it is bestowed; there is another which has no such effect. 
The former, as it produces a value, may be called 
productive and the latter unproductive labor. Thus the 
labor of a manufacturer adds, generally, to the value of the 
materials, which he works upon, that of his own 
maintenance, and of his master's profit. The labor of a 
menial servant, on the contrary adds to the value of 
nothing. Though the manufacturer has his wages advanced 
to him by his master, he, in reality, costs him no expense, 
the value of his wages generally being restored, together 
with a profit, in the improved value of the subject upon 
which his labor was bestowed. A man grows rich by 
employing a multitude of manufacturers; he grows poor 
by maintaining a multitude of menial servants.” (Smith, 
1973, 430) 
In making this distinction, Smith set out the basis for the 
contemporary view of nonprofit organizations outlined 
above. Robert Anthony, whose model of nonprofit 
organizations was discussed above, has updated Smith’s 
exact distinction and translated it into the contemporary 
organizational context by distinguishing between "Type 
A" nonprofits, which generate revenues (usually because 
of sales or user fees), and "Type B" nonprofits, which do 
not. (Anthony, 1978) In a two-by-two typology of 
nonprofit organizations, Henry Hansmann (1981, 503) 
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uses this same distinction to differentiate “commercial” 
and “donative” nonprofits. 
Although Smith’s concept of unproductive labor applies to 
donative nonprofits as a class, one should not conclude 
that Smith (an “unproductive” moral philosopher) meant 
to be critical of unproductive labor. Smith went on to say 
that  “The labor of some of the most respected orders of 
society is, like that of menial servants, unproductive of 
any value, and does not fix or realize itself in any 
permanent subject, or vendible commodity, which endures 
after the labor is past and for which an equal quantity of 
labor could afterwards be procured.” (432) 
Smith continues: “Unproductive laborers, and those who 
do not labor at all, are all maintained by revenue; either, 
first, by that part of the annual produce which is originally 
destined for constituting a revenue to some particular 
persons, either as the rent of land or as the profits of stock; 
or secondly, by that part of which, though originally 
destined for replacing a capital and for maintaining 
productive laborers only, yet when it comes into their 
hands whatever part of it is over and above their necessary 
subsistence may be employed indifferently in maintaining 
either productive or unproductive hands.” (432) 
That Smith had many of the activities later labeled 
nonprofit in mind when he spoke of unproductive labor is 
clear from his references to "the declamation of the actor, 
the harangue of the orator, or the tune of the musician ...." 
Smith also affirms the basic quality that led Anthony and 
Young and others to associate them with services: their 
intangible, immaterial character. Like the services of 
actors, orators and musicians, Smith said, "the work of all 
of them perishes in the very instant of its production." 
(431)  
Once the distinction between productive and unproductive 
labor was introduced, however, Adam Smith, like most of 
the economists who followed him for the next 200 years, 
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devoted his complete attention to productive labor. One of 
the few notable exceptions to this was the American 
institutional economist John R. Commons, who also noted 
the nonmarket character of unproductive labor. “The 
physician or surgeon, the lawyer, statesman or politician, 
the minister or priest, the teacher, the musician or actor, 
the scientist, the domestic servant, the housewife, were 
'unproductive' because the usefulness of their labor did not 
appear in a commodity which could be saved and sold on 
the markets, or exchanged directly for other commodities 
or for the labor of others.” 
Commons was more interested in the paradoxical 
implications for economic value than in the nonprofit 
question. “The only way in which the value of such 
services could be measured was in terms of money, as 
wages or salaries, or in terms of the commodities directly 
exchanged for them. For this reason, labor itself could be 
treated only as a commodity, whose value was its 
exchange-value. Personal services had exchange-value, 
but their use value appeared only in the happiness of other 
people and there were no units of measurement, like tons 
or yards, which could measure happiness.” (180) His 
argument is often echoed in later discussions of the 
economics of services, wherein the point is made that due 
to inability to measure the productivity of nonprofit 
services, employment and wages must be used as proxy 
measures of output. (Stanback, 1979) 
Commons, it should be noted, does not make any 
distinction between commercial and nonprofit ventures or 
declare further interest in the matter. Yet, his line of 
reasoning is of critical importance to the nonprofit 
question: "A hundred and fifty years of economic 
theorizing has puzzled over the problem of giving a decent 
status to these personal services.” Even though we now 
have over 200 years of such theorizing, his basic point 
remains the same: "If they are use-values how can we 
measure them except by the dollar? But the dollar 
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measures their scarcity-value and not their use-value." 
(Commons, 1961, 181) 
A somewhat different slant has been taken up by the 
sudden emergence of nonprofit economics in the 1980’s. 
In general, the nonprofit economics literature skips over 
the Smith distinction completely, on the strength of near-
unanimous acceptance of an operational simile whereby 
the economic performance of nonprofits is analyzed “as 
if” they were profit-oriented. ( )  Weisbrod (1988, 67; 130-
141) approaches the unproductive labor dichotomy in 
terms of “volunteer labor”, a largely operational concept 
the definition of which he terms “vague and inconsistent.” 
(See also Wolozin, 1975; Stinson and Stam, 1976)  
Volunteer labor in this sense represents a narrowing of 
Smith’s concept, which embraces all non-revenue 
endeavors, and Commons’ concept, which embraces all 
intangibles. The vagueness and inconsistency noted by 
Weisbrod are probably related to the unresolved issues 
raised by Smith and Commons. However, it is unlikely 
that these conceptual problems can be resolved within 
economics alone. Any economic concept of volunteer 
labor as the action associated with production of nonprofit 
services and the implicit dyadic concept of leisure as the 
action associated with consumption of those services will 
remain vague and inconsistent. The reason for this is quite 
simple: modern social science understandings of the 
“unproductive” efforts to which Smith alludes, the 
“intangibles” to which Commons refers as well as the 
“volunteer” labor cited by Weisbrod are bound by 
important constraints the understanding of which are the 
explicit domain of other social sciences. The same might 
also be said for “leisure” which also figures prominently 
in what follows. Leisure has a very narrow and restricted 
meaning in economics and is virtually ignored in other 
social sciences. (Except, see Rybczynski, 1991) One can 
no more ignore those constraints and understand nonprofit 
activity than one can construct an economics of energy, 
which ignores the laws of thermodynamics. 
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Voluntary Association and Civil 
Society 
Until quite recently, the concept of a nonprofit sector has 
been of interest primarily to public officials, lawyers, 
accountants and public and association administrators. 
Despite the theoretical anchor in economics noted above, 
economists remained largely indifferent to nonprofit 
activity until the early 1980’s. Meanwhile, social workers, 
sociologists, fundraisers, administrators of volunteer 
programs and others have tended to emphasize voluntary 
association concepts for denoting approximately the same 
phenomenon. (Babchuk and Schmidt, 1976; Caulkins, 
1976; Kramer, 1966, 1973, 1981; Lanfant, 1976; 
Lenkersdorf, 1976; Perlstadt, 1975; Ross, 1977; Rogers 
and Bultena, 1975; Rose, 1954; Smith, 1974 )  
Current usage in nonprofit and voluntary action studies 
suggests a possible connection between nonprofit and 
voluntary. The name of the Association for Research on 
Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Associations, for 
example, suggests just such a link. Yet “nonprofit” and 
“voluntary” are hardly synonyms. There appear to be 
important, if subtle, differences between the two, 
including different theoretical origins and different accents 
or points of emphasis. Most importantly, the emphasis on 
social behavior evident in the voluntary action tradition 
can be seen as complimentary to the nonprofit concept 
addressed above addressing the unresolved definitional 
concerns of the “unproductive labor” approach. We can 
begin to see this more clearly by examining various 
definitions of voluntary associations.  
“A voluntary association develops when a small group of 
people, finding that they have a certain interest or purpose 
in common, agree to meet and act together in order to 
satisfy that interest or achieve that purpose.” (Rose, 1960, 
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666) Another sociologist, Sutton defined associations as 
“functionally specific nonascriptive structures” and 
claimed them as an essential feature of modern industrial 
society. (Douglas, 1972)  
MacIver and Page (1949) defined associations as “groups 
organized for the pursuit of an interest or group of 
interests in common” and called them the most 
characteristic feature of modern complex society. Norbeck 
(1972) suggests the existence of a broader category of 
“common interest associations” of which voluntary 
associations are a sub-category. Cavallaro (1983) 
identifies the study of “participatory” voluntary 
associations, marginalized deviant groups and political 
studies of pressure groups to be three of the five most 
predominant current approaches to the study of social 
groups. 
Laskin (1962) and Kerri (1972) defined voluntary 
associations as “any private group, voluntarily and more 
or less formally organized, joined and maintained by 
members pursuing a common interest, usually by means of 
part-time, unpaid activities.” Berelson and Steiner term 
them “organizations that people belong to part-time 
without pay, such as clubs, lodges, goodworks agencies 
and the like” (1964,364) David Sills makes explicit a 
connection to leisure by defining voluntary associations as 
“spare time participatory associations” (Sills, 1968, 363) 
Smith (1966, 483) defined formal voluntary associations 
as “formal organizations the majority of whose members 
are neither paid for participation in the organization nor 
physically coerced into such participation.”  Smith (1972; 
1974) identified five basic categories of voluntary action: 
occupational or self-interest; consummatory or self-
expressive; philanthropic/funded; issue/cause oriented; 
and service oriented. Stinchcombe (1973, 53) 
distinguished the voluntarism of the activities of the 
members as opposed to the process of becoming a 
member. 
  
 
53 
This complex of meanings is also very close to the 
anthropological concept of sodality, which Hill (1970, 15) 
defines as “nonresidential associations having corporate 
functions or purposes that serve to integrate two or more 
residential units...” including warrior societies, ceremonial 
societies, kachina societies and ritual groups. Smith and 
Friedmann also briefly discuss sodalities in their review of 
the voluntary association literature. (1972, 16-17)  
The theoretical origins of the voluntary association are 
somewhat more clear-cut than those of the nonprofit 
organization. The idea is usually tied explicitly to the 19th 
Century French social analyst Alexis de Tocqueville, 
whose observations on the unique and distinctive role of 
associations in American life are cited by advocates of 
pluralist democracy. (Tocqueville, 19 )  At approximately 
the same time that Alexander Hamilton was warning 
Americans against the dangers of faction in Federalist 
Paper #10, Tocqueville articulated the doctrine of 
associations as “mediating institutions” between 
individual citizen and the state. 
Yet, as Peter Dobkin Hall (1987, 24) notes, the original 
formulation was an explicitly political one. “Tocqueville 
did not view private voluntarism as an amusing carnival 
midway of private intentions, but as a fundamental part of 
a national power system. At its core there was, as he 
observed, ‘a natural and perhaps a necessary connection’ 
between civil associations and the political associations 
through which citizens combined to influence the state. 
(II: 123).”  In this important sense, the view outlined in 
this book is fundamentally Tocquevillian. (See also 
Pennock and Chapman, 1969) To the model of nonprofit 
organizations components of a service economy noted 
above, we must add this view of associations as 
components of civil society.  
Arnold Rose made a compatible distinction between two 
types of voluntary associations: “expressive” and “social 
influence” groups: Expressive groups were said “to act 
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only to express or satisfy the interests of their members in 
relation to themselves” while social influence groups 
“wish to achieve some condition or change in some 
special segment of society as a whole.” (Rose, 1954) This 
dichotomy has since been supplanted by the more 
apolitical distinction between expressive and instrumental 
purposes, seemingly removing any trace of the essential 
Tocquevillian insight noted by Hall above. (Gordon and 
Babchuk, 1959; Bonnett, 1977; Palisi and Jacobson, 1977) 
The citizen participation movement is grounded in such 
democratic aspirations and has attracted a good deal of 
practical and research and practical interest among 
nonprofit and voluntary action scholars. (Barker, 1979; 
Faramelli, 1976; Flynn and Webb, 1975; Gluck, 1978; 
Heshka and Lang, 1978; Klobus-Edwards and Edwards, 
1979; Molnar and Purohit, 1977; Ostrom, 1978; Paris and 
Blackaby, 1979; Rosenbaum, 1977; Salem, 1978; 
Schulman, 1978; Sharp, 1978; Stinson and Stam, 1975; 
Thornton and Stringer, 1979; Van Til, 1975; Walker, 
1975) 
The theoretical Achilles heels of the “voluntary sector” 
concept appear to be twofold:  First, as in the case of the 
adjective “nonprofit” the idea of a voluntary sector seems 
to connote a set of discernable establishments and a level 
of formal organization which may at times prove 
misleading. By itself, this objection can be easily 
overcome. The term sector does not have to mean a set of 
industries, establishments or formal organizations 
exclusively. Sector can also mean category, type, division, 
genre or even territory (as in the American sector in post-
war Berlin). As with the nonprofit sector, however, 
asserting the existence of a voluntary sector also 
introduces the problem of typology noted above. 
However, there has been far less effort at exhaustive 
classification and censuses of the voluntary sector. In fact, 
many voluntary sector adherents regard such an exercise 
as essentially pointless. One of the major recent stumbling 
theoretical stumbling blocks to voluntary sector theory 
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have been the multiple connotations of the term 
“voluntary”, since it seems to refer to all behavior which is 
uncoerced. Does this not mean, for example, that 
unconstrained buying and selling in the marketplace is 
part of the voluntary sector? “Sex between consenting 
adults is usually voluntary,” one colleague is fond of 
pointing out. “Does that mean that sexual intercourse 
should be included in the voluntary sector?” Although the 
question may be frivolous, the underlying issue of 
definition is not. 
Further, there is the complex question of the relationship 
between the nonprofit and voluntary sectors as posited? 
Are these two conceptions completely independent, 
overlapping or identical terms? Because usage divides so 
neatly along disciplinary lines, the issue has generated 
remarkably little interest or attention. However, the 
overlap view has gotten increased attention recently. The 
terms “Independent Sector” and “Third Sector” were both 
coined, for example, to seek a compromise between 
adherents of the “Nonprofit” and “Voluntary” labels. New 
labels arrived at through committee compromise, 
however, fail to resolve underlying theoretical issues, and 
entirely new issues are raised by these labels, threatening 
to create further distractions: In an open society, aren’t 
markets and families independent also? Several sources 
have already asked whether there are really four sectors, 
rather than three, and at least one has asked whether there 
are four or five (Smith, 1991). 
Tabulating the voluntary sector is an even more daunting 
task than tallying nonprofit organizations or philanthropic 
employment, because of the ease with which groups are 
formed and members move into and out of them. Indeed, 
it could well be argued that the best approach to the 
voluntary sector might be to tabulate the average number 
of groups and associations in which populations are active 
at any given time. In general, however, data of this type 
are spotty at best. 
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Smith (1991) and others have sought to differentiate 
voluntary action into an organized corporate realm, which 
appears to correspond closely with nonprofit organizations 
and an “informal” sector of unincorporated associations, 
clubs, groups and organizations that have never 
incorporated or sought tax-exempt status.  One source 
claims the Internal Revenue Service estimates at least a 
million such organizations in the U.S. (Society of 
Association Executives, 1991) Another frequently cited 
estimate of the scale of this portion of the informal sector 
is the proportion of the adult population reporting 
"volunteer work" in any given year. Studies by the 
National Center for Citizen Involvement found that 52 
percent of all Americans reported that they "worked in 
some way to help others for no monetary pay" during 
1980, and that in 1982 the comparable figure had risen to 
55 percent. (Statistical Abstract, 1984. #647. p. 384.) 
Each of the various sector concepts has its uses. A 
nonprofit sector can be defined as consisting of those 
corporations which are constrained by legal and/or ethical 
constraints on the distribution of surplus revenues 
incidental to the corporation’s activities (that is, “profits”) 
to shareholders, stockholders or stakeholders. In this, we 
follow Hansmann’s useful emphasis upon the 
“nondistribution constraint”. (Hansmann, 1987)  Most 
authorities today would probably define a nonprofit sector 
somewhat more broadly as encompassing both those 
corporations legally bound to the nondistribution 
constraint and other organizations ethically bound or 
voluntarily subscribing to the same standard. (It should be 
noted that such an approach denotes a legal/ethical, or 
formal/informal distinction that will be important 
throughout.) 
Whether or not it includes nonprofit corporations, a 
voluntary sector can be defined as those clubs, 
associations, groups or other, similar social organizations 
characterized largely or exclusively by noncoercive 
membership and/or free and unconstrained participation, 
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especially in leisure rather than employment settings. 
Recalling Stinchcombe’s objection above, it may also be 
desirable under some circumstances to denote a club 
sector along the lines Smith (1991) suggests, in which 
membership rather than participation is the key delimiter. 
A nongovernmental sector is defined as those 
organizations or institutions outside the political state and 
functioning independently of state oversight or direction, 
but interacting with the state frequently enough to justify 
differentiating them. The modern welfare state in the 
United States and elsewhere frequently incorporates such 
a nongovernmental sector. (Kramer, 1981) An 
independent sector is presumably one able to function 
autonomously and without external interference or 
involvement. A third sector is simply the non-business, 
non-government side of public life outside the family. 
(O’Neill, 1988)  
Further, voluntary action from the voluntary tradition, 
which is the social interaction which occurs among 
participants in voluntary associations, can be seen as 
sharing several important characteristics with volunteer 
labor, as put forth by the nonprofit tradition. The full 
implications of this important linkage, however, remain to 
be dealt with below.  
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Conclusion 
Modern nonprofit and voluntary action studies, as 
exemplified by the Association for Research on Nonprofit 
Organizations and Voluntary Action (ARNOVA) are 
occurring at the intersection of two distinct, but related 
research traditions. The nonprofit tradition can be traced to 
Adam Smith’s concept of unproductive labor, and is 
animated by a central concern for what might be termed 
the appropriate uses of the surplus product of an affluent 
society. In contrast, the voluntary tradition can be traced to 
Tocqueville’s concept of intermediate institutions, and is 
animated by a central concern for the individual and social 
consequences of uncalculated and uncoerced participation 
in organized social endeavors within civil society. 
These two concerns are connected in numerous ways in 
the ongoing social reality from which they have been 
abstracted. At present, however, the traditions of nonprofit 
organization studies and voluntary action studies are 
upheld along largely disciplinary lines, with only a few 
genuine evidences of crossover. In the chapters which 
following, a preliminary attempt is made to sketch the 
outlines of a “fusion” perspective known as the theory of 
the commons, which seeks to reconstruct voluntary action 
as unproductive labor (or leisure action), and broaden the 
conception of nonprofit organizations to include both 
formal and informal (or communal) organizations.
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In democratic countries, the science of associations is the mother science; the 
progress of all others depends upon the progress it has made. 
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Theory of the Commons 
n the first issue of the Journal of Voluntary Action 
Research, Smith (1972A) identified definitions and 
conceptual issues of voluntary action first in a list 
of “major analytical topics of voluntary action 
theory and research” identified by the interdisciplinary 
voluntary action task force planning conference held 
earlier that year. That same article asked “Can there be 
a theory of voluntary action, or must/should we pay 
major attention to theories and models about one or 
another aspect of voluntary action without attempting 
to put it all together for the moment? Clearly, the latter 
proved the prudent course and “the moment” lasted for 
more than twenty years.  
Two decades later voluntary action theory and its 
cognate, nonprofit theory, even with the various 
I 
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extensions identified in the preceding chapter are still 
insufficient for clarity of understanding, policy or 
practice. Simon notes for example that tax policies 
“have been unaccompanied by a coherent theory of 
intervention or by empirical support for intervention.” 
(94, 1987) Because the ground on which such an 
adequate theory of nonprofit and voluntary action must 
be constructed is an explicitly interdisciplinary one, 
the task of theory construction should begin at an 
elementary level with the statement of assumptions. In 
this chapter, a number of key assumptions will be 
identified and definition of some of the fundamental 
concepts of such a theory will be set forth. This will be 
followed in succeeding chapters with further empirical 
and theoretical investigations of the implications of 
this theoretical approach. Finally, this effort will 
conclude with a number of propositions. 
The approach here is an attempt to identify a set of 
interdisciplinary “first principles” rather than the more 
conventional residual approach, which according to 
the introductory editorial statement of Voluntas, treats 
the voluntary sector “as what is left over once 
government and commercial agencies, and probably 
also the ‘informal sector’ has been put to one side...”  
Especially important in defining the sector in this way 
is value for comparative studies in the international 
domain. (Anhier and Knapp, 1990, 4-5)  
We are not primarily concerned in this study with all 
nonprofit organizations, nor with all members of the 
legal category of nonprofit corporations, nor with all 
members of the subcategory of tax-exempt 
corporations. The primary concern here is with 
eleemosynary or donative associations, organizations 
and groups engaged in unproductive or volunteer 
labor, whether or not they are incorporated, recognized 
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by the state, tabulated in national data or hire paid 
employees. This broad category of social organizations 
will be termed “commons” for reasons set forth below, 
and generalizations about them will be said to 
constitute theory of the commons. 
 
Initial Premises and Assumptions 
The following discussion sets forth eight basic 
assumptions upon which the theory of the commons is 
premised. Some of these assumptions are explicit 
alternatives to other commonly employed assumptions 
set forth about the nonprofit and voluntary sector, and 
as such may be controversial. Others are 
straightforward and uncontroversial.  
Social Action 
One of the most interesting and challenging 
characteristics of nonprofit and voluntary ‘services’ is 
their intangible character. Thus, a basic assumption of 
the theory of the commons is that nonprofit services 
and “unproductive labors” are composed of social 
action, or substantively meaningful experience 
emanating from our spontaneous life based upon 
preconceived projects. (Schutz, 1970, 125) Or, as Max 
Weber (  ) put it, "In 'action' is included all human 
behavior when and in so far as the acting individual 
attaches a subjective meaning to it. Ignoring or 
explicitly rejecting profit orientation, said by some to 
be the defining characteristic of nonprofit action, 
constitutes such a subjective attachment of meaning. 
  
 
62 
Action, in this sense, is social in so far as, subjective 
meaning attached to it by acting individuals, “it takes 
account of the behavior of others and is thereby 
oriented in its course." (Weber, 1968) Philanthropy as 
action for the good of humanity; charity, as action for 
the good of others; altruism, as in the interest of 
others, all involve social action in this sense. Thus, the 
various organizations and structures of nonprofit 
organizations and voluntary action will present 
predictable, recurring and institutionalized as well as 
ideosyncratic patterns of social action. (Billis, 1991)  
Affluence 
Coherent, self-aware actors in nonprofit organizations 
and voluntary associations capable of social action are 
aware that they were acting outside of the institutional 
contexts of markets, households and the state. Under 
ordinary circumstances overriding ethical 
considerations of philanthropic, charitable and 
altruistic purpose discourage the priority of personal 
gain and mandate that individuals in the commons 
deny, downplay or ignore their own self-interests. The 
appropriateness of such self-denial, however, is 
conditional upon the absence of any immediate threats 
to the safety, security, health or well-being of those 
involved. (One cannot, for example, ethically demand 
of a starving person that they take time out from the 
pursuit of food to aid others who may be ill or 
homeless.) One might ask under what circumstances is 
such self-denial reasonable? An answer to this is 
offered by the condition of affluence. 
Bona fide participation in the commons is available 
only to the affluent; those whose individual and group 
survival and reproduction are sufficiently assured that 
their own self-interest is not their paramount concern. 
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Only those whose basic needs for survival and 
reproduction have been met are in a position to 
rationally choose or reject self-interested behavior. It 
is unreasonable to expect that persons who are 
starving, under siege or assault or threatened with 
extinction should rationally choose to ignore their own 
interests or that any society or association can have a 
legitimate interest in encouraging them to do so.   
 Substituting an assumption of affluence for the 
customary economic assumption of scarcity has major 
implications for future research (Neal, 1984). In the 
theory which follows, it is assumed that commons can 
only emerge where the fundamental problems of 
material, human and social reproduction have been, at 
least temporarily, overcome. (Wolfe, 1985, 9-13)  
Under conditions of affluence, when the problems of 
material, human and social reproduction are 
overcome, even momentarily, the choice of whether to 
engage in profit-maximization or some other 
“nonprofit” activity is, itself, a rational choice. In the 
American context, intentionally creating a tax-exempt, 
non-profit (501-c-3) corporation signifies creation of a 
commons and knowingly accepting the legal 
obligations of board membership for such an 
organization indicates a willingness to abide by its 
standards.  
Authenticity 
 The theory of the commons also assumes that actors 
operating in nonprofit and voluntary settings are 
authentic, that is they are what they appear to be to 
informed others also operating in the same context. 
(Etzioni, 1968)  Affluent actors who seek to pursue 
their own self-interest in the commons, or whose 
individual or organizational goals include utility 
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maximization are operating under false pretenses, and 
subject to penalty or expulsion from the commons. 
Norms of authenticity may not be universally or 
consistently invoked in reality, but when they are the 
result is usually consistent and convincing as in the 
collapse of various televangelical empires in the past 
decade. State charity fraud statutes almost universally 
seek to enforce such norms of authenticity. 
Theoretically, persons who adopt a self-interested (or 
"profit oriented") posture at any time are assumed to 
remove themselves from the commons.  Such 
abnormal behavior is treated as evidence of deviance, 
and invoking the “profit orientation” to justify or 
sanction such deviance serves no useful theoretical 
purpose. This is a simplifying assumption, intended to 
focus clearly upon the issue of the basic nature of the 
commons. In the real world, commons often appear to 
be inherently unable to enforce contested claims and 
the practical problems of enforcing the norm of 
authenticity is often left to the coercive powers of the 
state. Whether this is because of the weakness of 
particular group norms or inherent limits on common 
social action is not clear. 
Although it may appear to be somewhat pretentious or 
moralistic, the norm of authenticity points up the 
fundamentally ethical core of common social action 
and encapsulates numerous examples of actual 
empirical practices in the commons: Professional oaths 
in helping professions usually prohibit placing the 
professionals’ own interests above those of their 
clients, for example, and scientific research in most 
disciplines is subject to severe sanctions for falsifying 
data or results. Thus, although enforcement may be 
complex and problemmatic, there is little doubt of the 
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importance of assumptions of authenticity in nonprofit 
and voluntary action. 
 
Continuity 
   The experience of charitable, philanthropic, altruistic 
and other common action is also associated with 
consistent life-style choices and the experience of 
others in nonprofit and voluntary action is an on-going 
one, characterized by past, present and future and a 
sense of connectedness between them. The experience 
of continuity offers a basis for explanation and 
prediction: 
  "I trust that the world as it has been known to me up 
until now will continue further and that consequently 
the stock of knowledge obtained from my own 
experiences will continue to preserve its fundamental 
validity. . . From this assumption follows the further 
and fundamental one: that I can repeat my past 
successful acts." (Schutz, 1970, 7)  
The on-goingness of common experience and the 
social nature of the commons mean that desirable 
purposes and goods also have inevitable 
intergenerational aspects. Because individuals 
involved in many types of commons will be of 
different chronological ages, decisions of on-going 
groups, will as a consequence, inevitably take on an 
intergenerational character, as old members die and 
new ones are born or socialized into the group. 
Intergenerational continuity is an important 
characteristic of religious commons, for example, 
where organizations and practices often stretch over 
decades, centuries and millennia.  
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Continuity is not simply a matter of rational action. 
Continuity in nonprofit and voluntary action is often 
experienced in the form of tradition. I (and others) will 
continue to exist in a known and knowable world 
through the repetition of time honored ceremonies, 
habitual and familiar ritual acts. The continuity of 
present experience may also be experienced as 
rational. We will act in the appropriate manner 
because it is reasonable, predictable or productive of 
desirable consequences to do so. Occasionally the 
experience of continuity even takes the form of 
transformative, “inexplicable” or other charismatic 
experience.  
Practical questions of an intergenerational nature often 
arise with respect to the appropriate division of an 
individual's estate between heirs and commons. Legal 
issues of this type are among the oldest and most long 
standing and thorniest of issues of the law as it relates 
to common goods. This was a fundamental concern of 
the 1601 Statute of Charitable Uses, for example, and 
also a major concern of Islamic law. (Gray, 1967, 35f; 
Coulson, 1978, 254)  Recruitment of new members 
and the quest to keep and restore particular heritages 
figure large in decision-making of many commons.  
Rationality 
Moreover, we shall assume that actors in the 
commons, engaged in acts of philanthropy, charity and 
altruism, act rationally, in the sense of observable 
consistency between the intentions they announce to 
themselves and others and the results they hold up to 
be successful outcomes. The rationality of actors in the 
commons is a practical rationality, concerned with the 
exercise of reason in solving the problems which arise 
in the conduct of daily affairs. It is often also a 
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prosocial rationality, devoted to solving problems 
primarily affecting others and to engaging in various 
forms of presentation, and to obtaining the resources 
necessary to carry out these pursuits. 
The rationality of the commons is not merely a matter 
of moment-to-moment consistency of thought or 
behavior. The term "rational" refers, instead, to the 
wider philosophical sense of having (and following) a 
life plan. Decisions and actions are rational, in so far 
as they implicate and contribute to a broader life plan. 
(Rawls, 1974, 408)  Thus, practical rationality, in this 
context, involves the day-to-day decisions which must 
be made in consistent pursuit of a life plan.  
Finally, as Suzanne Langer notes, "Our standards of 
rationality are the same as Euclid's or Artistotle's --
generality, consistency, coherence, systematic 
inclusion of all possible cases, economy and elegance 
in demonstration -- but our ideal of science makes one 
further demand: the demand of what has been called 
'maximum interpretability'. This means that as many 
propositions as possible shall be applicable to 
observable fact."  (1967, 273-4)  
 
Near-universality 
  Commons are assumed to be near-universal cultural 
forms, known in some manner in most, possibly all 
human cultures although the degree and exact ways in 
which the theory transcends the American cultural 
context and history remains to be determined. (Brown, 
1991) Research has already been supported on a 
variety of countries and cultures. See, for example, 
studies of Ghana, (Gray, 1976); France (Lanfant, 
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1976); Jamaica and Carribean (Fletcher, 1977; Gray, 
1976) Norway (Anderson and Schiller, 1976; 
Caulkins, 1976; Hallenstvedt and others, 1976; 
Kvavik, 1976; Moren, 1976;) Mexico (Lenkersdorf, 
1976)  
Nonprofit corporations and philanthropic foundations 
are the distinctive products of Anglo-American legal 
traditions. American voluntary associations are the 
unique inventions of an open society devoid of a long 
heritage of intermediate institutions and intent upon 
creating an open society. Both are members of a larger 
class of related groups, organizations and institutions 
to which the name commons is applied.  
In all known cultures, self-defining collectivities of 
voluntarily associating persons act jointly outside of 
markets and households and independent of the state 
in pursuit of common purposes. Even among itinerant 
hunter-gathers and farming and fishing village cultures 
leisure time not spent in subsistence activities can be 
devoted to group participation in common activities: 
construction of kivas and other spirit centers, 
organization of spirit quests and initiation rites, 
'donations' of beads, feathers, and shells, drums and 
other valued objects to dance and ceremonial activities 
are just part of the broad range of endeavors. 
The issue of whether, like families, commons are 
found in absolutely every human culture ever known, 
or like markets and states they may be found in most 
cultures, is an empirical question. Until it can be 
ansered, anecdotal evidence suggests that there is good 
reason to assume universality, as we shall see in the 
following chapter. 
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Autonomy 
 Organized action in the commons is also assumed to 
be autonomous, in the sense that actors in the 
commons are capable of acting independently and 
exercising both individual and group self-control. Such 
autonomy may merely be assumed or take institutional 
form as freedoms of speech and association, or under 
repressive conditions may invoke conscious choices to 
engage in covert actions or secret societies. The 
autonomous character of rational action in the 
commons supports several related assumptions: 
Actors in the commons are assumed to be able to 
create and sustain autonomous social worlds. Although 
this is most evident in the case of certain social 
movements and religious zealots, it is also implicit in 
everyday clubs and associations of bird watchers and 
stamp collectors and peace or environmental activists. 
(Baer, 1979; Cavan, 1977; Cummings, 1977; Hurvitz, 
1977; Kelly, 1978; McMillen, 1978; Richardson, 
Simmonds and Stewart, 1979; Ross, 1977)  The ability 
to act with others to create and sustain an autonomous 
social world is one of the most fundamental 
characteristic of nonprofit and voluntary action. 
Intrinsic Valuation 
This leads to the further assumption that the proper 
basis for evaluating an autonomous common world is 
on the basis of values arising within it. This 
assumption is consistent with those found generally in 
qualitative social research, symbolic interactionism 
and ethnomethology. Following Garfinkel, the theory 
of the commons refuses to give “serious consideration 
to the prevailing proposal that efficiency, efficacy, 
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effectiveness, intelligibility, consistency, planfulness, 
typicality, uniformity, reproducibility of activities -- 
i.e., that rational properties of practical activities -- be 
assessed, recognized, categorized, described by using a 
rule or standard outside actual settings within which 
such properties are recognized, used, produced and 
talked about by settings' members." (emphasis added) 
(Mitchell, 143) 
Ordinary Language 
A related assumption is that a satisfactory theory of 
nonprofit and voluntary action must be stated in 
language which philanthropic, charitable and altruistic 
actors can recognize and understand. While subjects 
are not accorded veto power or monopoly control in 
interpreting the correctness or applicability of the 
theory, their views may be taken into account. This 
ordinary language assumption mandates that language 
regularly in use by charitable, philanthropic and 
altruistic actors may also be employed in theories of 
their actions. In this case, terms such as endowment, 
benefit, gift, patron, legacy, heritage and treasury, are 
among those borrowed from common usage and 
applied in the theory of the commons.  
Terms and Concepts 
On the basis of these assumptions, we can now look 
more closely at the basic vocabulary of the theory of 
the commons. It should be clear to anyone who 
examines the issue closely that new ways to speak and 
think more clearly about nonprofit and voluntary 
action are needed. The very first necessity, therefore, 
is to identify some terms and concepts which are both 
clearcut and faithful to the observable realities of 
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action in this arena. In particular, we need an adequate 
summary term to describe the range of nonprofit and 
voluntary action usually associated in law, statistics 
and tradition and to set it apart in a general sense from 
other human endeavors. In the following discussion, a 
set of related terms are set forth as fundamental to an 
understanding of nonprofit and voluntary action: 
common, benefit, benefactory, endowment, heritage, 
legacy, treasury, collection, repertory, regime and 
patronage. Together, they provide a basic theoretical 
language for discussing nonprofit and voluntary 
action. 
Benefactory 
The largest, most important and, from defining sub-
class of nonprofit organizations are those 501 (c) 3 
nonprofit corporations which are exempt from federal 
taxation on the basis of their “charitable purposes.” 
Such organizations are part of a larger class of service 
organizations in which no tangible product is 
produced, marketed or sold and no individual or group 
of owners or stockholders should legitimately expect 
to profit. In the voluntary tradition of social services, 
such entities have been known as “agencies”. 
Theoretically, this term is a legal one, intended to 
highlight their role in acting as agents for the interests 
of others. Such organizations also corresponds closely 
with the conception of “Type B” organizations 
engaged in unproductive labor discussed in Chapter 2. 
A good deal of additional conceptual work defining 
social agencies has already taken place. Etzioni (1963) 
laid the theoretical groundwork for the “three-sector” 
view when he distinguished these normative from 
coercive (state) and remunerative (market) 
organizations. Hansmann (1987) divides organizations 
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into "mutual" and "donative" types, based upon the 
origins of their resource inputs. They are also 
sometimes lumped into a broader class of producers of 
public or "semipublic" goods. (Austin, 1981; Austin, 
1983; Weisbrod, 1977; Weisbrod, 1988) 
The use of the term benefactory is grounded in the 
tendency to categorize nonprofit organizations by the 
types of benefits they produced. A benefit  is an 
advantage, useful aid or financial help. (Gifis, 1991, 
1991 46) In a social action context, it is also an 
increased opportunity for future action resulting or 
arising from present or past action. Categorizing 
organizations by the benefits they create dates at least 
from Blau and Scott ‘s(1962, 43) distinction of 
mutual-benefit organizations, whose primary 
beneficiaries were their members, from business 
concerns, whose primary beneficiaries are their 
owners; service organizations, whose primary 
beneficiaries are their clients; and commonweal 
organizations, where the primary beneficiaries are the 
public at large. All four types can be labeled 
benefactories in the sense that they are “producers” of 
benefits, albeit for different groups. 
The Blau-Scott typology has been applied and 
extended in many different directions in nonprofit and 
voluntary organization studies. In an examination of 
voluntary associations in Malaysia Douglas (1972) 
leads off with a 2x2 table: ascription-universalism as 
the horizontal axis and diffuseness-specificity as the 
vertical axis. He labels the four cells (from upper 
right) interest groups, mass collectivities, kin groups 
and communal organizations. According to Douglas, 
the 1962 Blau-Scott typology fits as a diagonal from 
kin groups (lower left) to interest groups (upper right).  
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 Smith (1991) revived interest in this four part 
classification with his suggestion of a fourth (or fifth) 
sector. His four beneficiary classes -- owners, public, 
clients and members-- correspond with the market, 
state, nonprofit and membership (or informal) sectors. 
This class of private organizations which we will call 
"benefactories" do not distribute surpluses to owners 
or stockholders, and most engage in unproductive or 
voluntary labor on behalf of primary beneficiaries who 
are either members or clients. The term benefactory as 
used here is a play on the economic terms factor and 
factory, intended to highlight the central place of 
benefits. Benefit, in general, involves enhancing or 
assuring the wealth, health, well-being, safety or 
security or advancing the interests of any person or 
group. A benefactory, then, is any network of 
organized social relations established for the purpose 
of aiding, assisting, helping, improving, supporting, 
comforting, enabling or in other ways benefiting 
persons or groups of others. Likewise, within 
organized benefactories, those who act to enhance the 
interests of others in any way have traditionally been 
termed benefactors and recipients whose advantage or 
gain is an organizational purpose are beneficiaries. In 
English, both benefit and benefice have been 
traditional terms for the gain or advantage conferred. 
Obviously, charities such as soup kitchens or a free 
counseling centers, would be benefactories in this 
sense. However, the term can also be extended to 
encompass churches, symphony orchestras, 
experimental theatre groups and dance companies, 
museums and galleries, and all types of artistic and 
athletic events in which a performance or presentation 
by one group (actors, athletes, priests, political 
candidates and others) has as its purpose enhancing the 
interests of others (congregations, audiences) whether 
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that purpose is to save, inform, entertain, startle, 
“actualize” or in any way benefit those others. 
Catharsis, or the benefit of emotional release for the 
audience, is the principle motive behind the 
Aristotelean theory of Greek tragedy. 
In keeping with the assumptions of autonomy and 
authenticity discussed above, there are two tests for 
whether or not an organization should be considered a 
benefactory: First, there is the test of authenticity: Is 
the potential benefactory what it appears to be, or is it 
merely a “front” for some other type of “non-
benefice”. This, for example, is the test ordinarily 
applied by legal authorities in prosecution of charity 
scams and telephone solicitation “boiler rooms” where 
false charitable claims are made. Secondly, there is the 
test of purpose: Does the structure of the organization 
identify classes of benefactors and beneficiaries, and 
are the goals or purposes of the possible benefactory 
intended to benefit individuals or groups other than the 
benefactors? 
As organizations, benefactories are distinct from firms, 
government bureaus and families. If we follow the 
logic of Blau and Scott and Smith, benefactories are 
also intrinsic, extrinsic and mixed. Intrinsic 
organizations, including self-help groups, social and 
recreational clubs and membership associations, 
fraternal societies, trade associations and employee’s 
beneficiary associations focus their benefits upon 
members. Extrinsic benefactories, including charitable 
organizations, foundations, civic associations, legal aid 
societies and others focus their benefits upon non-
member clients. Mixed benefactories engage in both 
intrinsic and extrinsic benefactions. Most churches, for 
example, combine ecclesiastical and missionary 
efforts. 
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The distinction between revenue-oriented and non-
revenue nonprofits discussed in Chapter 2 can also be 
applied here. "Type B" benefactories like churches, 
free museums and community theaters, non-revenue 
intercollegiate sports and amateur athletic associations, 
settlement houses and soup kitchens can be 
distinguished from "Type A" nonprofits like hospitals, 
museums and theatres charging admissions, nursing 
homes, fee-based social service agencies, 
intercollegiate football and basketball and other 
revenue-based activities in which the level of 
involvement or activity is metered by revenue inflows.  
Particular benefactories (most notably voluntary 
associations) have been seen to fall functionally into 
two additional major types: purposive and 
expressive.(Babchuk, Rose, ) Purposive organizations 
are goal-oriented, devoted to solving particular and 
often clearly identifiable problems from among a 
repertory of known and workable solutions.  
Expressive benefactories are those devoted primarily 
to presentations: exhibitions, performances, 
dramatizations, rites, and ceremonies. Once again, 
mixed benefactories would combine purposive and 
expressive elements. The unique combination of 
religion and social service of the Salvation Army, for 
example, has been confounding and infuriating those 
devoted to a solely purposive and instrumental 
interpretation of charitable work for decades. 
Commons 
The concept of benefactory as employed here 
corresponds with many usages of the generic term 
organization, albeit with an explicit emphasis on the 
dispensing of benefit to designated target groups. It 
necessarily implies a second level of organization of 
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relations between the benefactors (or patrons), 
beneficiaries, and those who, in turn may be acting as 
benefactors to the benefactors (as in the case of 
government agencies, foundations, United Ways or 
others providing grants to service agencies so that they 
may, in turn, provide grants or services to clients.) In 
the case of membership associations and intrinsic 
benefactories, this relation involves a strictly internal 
division of roles; the relations of members to 
themselves, as it were. In the case of extrinsic 
benefactories, however, it gets into complex questions 
of defining who is “in” an organization, the nature of 
interorganizational relations and ultimately of 
community organization. 
In both cases, a concept is needed to denote the 
complex of organized relations between benefactors, 
intermediaries (defined as beneficaries benefitting 
others as a condition of their benefit) and end 
beneficiaries. This is one of several related meanings 
we will attach to the term “commons”. The main 
characteristics of what we intend by the concepts of 
commons are encompassed by the Greek term 
koinonia. According to the ancient historian M.I. 
Finlay (1974), there were five prerequisites of 
koinonia for the ancient Greeks: 
1)Participation must be free and uncoerced. 2) 
Participants must share a common purpose, whether 
major or minor, long term or short. 3)Participants must 
have something in common which they share such as 
jointly held resources or a collection of precious 
objects or a repertory of shared actions. 4)Participation 
involves philia (a sense of mutuality; often 
inadequately translated as "friendship"). 5)Social 
relations are characterized by dikiaon ('fairness'). This 
five-part definition encompasses all of the major 
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elements sought by advocates of “nonprofit”, 
“voluntary”, “independent” and “third sector” 
terminology, and does so in a manner which is at the 
same time simple and elegant. 
Defined in this manner, the commons is an explicitly 
interdisciplinary concept which links under a single 
rubric the separate concerns of the nonprofit 
organization/ voluntary labor perspective with the 
voluntary action concern for associations and groups. 
Definitions of groups tend to emphasize stable patterns 
of interaction and feelings of unity and shared 
conciousness of which parallel shared purpose and 
mutuality in the definition of 
koinonia/commons.(Smith and Preston, 1977; 
VanderZander, 1977) Defining organizations as 
groups “deliberately formed to achieve a specific goal 
or set of goals through a formalized set of rules and 
procedures” connects purpose with a specific set of 
means. Voluntary participation is ordinarily implicated 
by placing the modifier “voluntary” before group, 
organization or association. Two of the five elements 
of the commons are not ordinarily inherent in 
definitions of group or organization. The treatment of 
jointly held resources is an explicit economic concern. 
Dikiaon  as fairness or justice (Rawls, 1976) can be 
interpreted as an explicitly political concern. Thus, any 
set of related social acts characterized by uncoerced 
participation, common purpose, shared resources, 
mutuality and fairness can be characterized as 
common, and social organizations and institutions in 
which such norms predominate can be termed 
commons.  
A commons can be thought of as an economic, 
political and social space outside the market, 
households and state in which associative communities 
  
 
78 
create and reproduce social worlds. Associative social 
worlds are composed of the images, meanings and 
sense of reality shared by autonomous, self-defining 
collectivities of voluntarily associating individuals. 
The following table shows a systematic comparison of 
the five key characteristics of the commons with 
markets and states. Market participation is free and 
uncoerced, just as it is in the commons, while the 
potential for coercive participation (as in military 
drafts or prosecution of tax evaders) is a fundamental 
characteristic of states. 
 
 
Comparison of Commons, 
Market and State 
Sectors On Five Dimensions 
 
 
 Commons Market State 
Participation Uncoerced Uncoerced Coercive 
 
Purpose 
Shared 
(Common 
Goods) 
Maximization 
(Private 
Goods) 
Authoritative 
(Public 
Goods) 
Resources Common Private Public 
Reciprocity Mutuality Quid pro quo Equity 
Social Fairness Caveat Law 
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Relations Emptor 
While shared purposes, goals and objectives are 
characteristic of commons, profit or utility 
maximization is the presumed universal purpose of 
markets, while authoritative allocation of values is the 
fundamental defining characteristic of state purpose. 
(Easton, 1965) While private ownership of property is 
the basic market expectation, and universalistic state 
conceptions of public goods (such as beaches, roads 
and national parks) are characteristic of market and 
state, common resources held jointly and allocated 
collectively are characteristic of commons. Existing 
economic theory makes a fundamental distinction 
between market goods and services and the special 
characteristcs of public goods. An additional category 
of common goods will be introduced below. 
A basic characteristic of social action in commons is 
the norm of mutual reciprocity, whereas participants in 
markets and states feel no such mutuality. Instead, 
market participants are usually governed by the norm 
of quid pro quo (or give and take) and concepts of the 
democratic state place emphasis on equity -- in 
particular, the equality of citizens before the state. 
Finally, social relations in the commons are governed 
by the basic norm of fairness, whereas market relations 
are governed by caveat emptor (literally, “let the buyer 
beware.”) and social relations in the state are governed 
by law (including rules, as in the Weberian model of 
bureaucracy.) 
Norbeck (1972) presaged the approach to the 
commons introduced here when he advocated 
“common-interest associations” as a broader, cross-
cultural classification under which voluntary 
associations are a sub-category. (Norbeck, 1972, 39) 
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Specifically, the Japanese “common-interest 
organizations” examined by Norbeck met some but not 
all of the five criteria noted above: membership was 
not “voluntary” and governance was not democratic, 
yet participants appear to have shared purposes, joint 
resources, and distinctive norms of mutuality and 
fairness. 
As commentators since Adam Smith and de 
Tocqueville have noted, commons include some of the 
most intrinsically interesting of human endeavors. In 
addition to their examples, also worth noting are 
religious celebrations, ceremonies, rituals and 
observances, dialogue and contemplation, basic 
scientific research above the level of idiosyncratic 
projects ("hobbies") of interest only to their 
perpetrators, from butterfly or insect collecting, to 
astronomy, geology, archeology, or other natural 
sciences, anthropology, sociology, economics, and 
other social sciences, literary criticism and 
hermeneutics, drama, painting, sculpture, photography, 
dance, music, poetry and prose writing, and other arts, 
intercollegiate, Olympic and amateur athletics, 
including baseball, football and basketball, but also 
golf, rugby, track and field, swimming, polo and 
squash, counseling and psychotherapy, care of abused 
or neglected dependent children and adults, the 
mentally and physically handicapped, aged, dying and 
incompetent. We might even induce political activities 
such as electoral campaigns, legislative or 
administrative advocacy, political parties and 
caucuses, labor unions, and trade associations, in so far 
as their immediate goals are non-commercial.  
Commons in art, religion, philosophy, and athletic 
games, are cultural universals found in diverse forms 
in all human societies. In addition, achievements in 
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these commons are frequently among the elements 
cited as hallmarks of the attainment of high 
civilization. Thus, the philosophical schools of Plato 
and Aristotle and the temples and amphitheaters of 
ancient Athens are intrinsic to our understandings of 
the Greek origins of western civilization.(Matson, 
1968)  Likewise, the patronage of the Medicis must be 
recognized as a fundamental factor in the Italian 
Renaissance. (Acton, 1967 ) 
Wherever and whenever commons are found, we find 
the coordinated social action of benefactors, agents 
and clients. Indeed, commons are inherently social. 
The existence of a community--a plurality of mutually 
interested and interacting persons is a fundamental 
precondition of religion, games and ceremonies, art 
and science, social service, and all true commons. 
The essential character of commons rests in their role 
in presentation and dramatization of profound symbols 
of community--in the affirmation of the most 
fundamental human values of the community through 
human communication. (Goodman and 
Goodman,1960; Hillary, 1963; Nisbet, 1953; Warren, 
1963; ) No civilization can afford to ignore or deny 
this role of the commons without trampling underfoot 
its most sacred values. To see an American Fourth of 
July celebration only as an activity of state, for 
example, is to miss much of its fundamental character 
as a celebration of the nation -- itself a kind of 
commons. 
Commons are not places any more than are markets or 
states. Commons consist of sets of complex social acts 
which are basic, universal and not reducible to other, 
more fundamental categories of social behavior. The 
mutual, collective purposes, ends or objectives which 
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participants in these complex acts share (regardless of 
their "rationality" or "irrationality" as perceived by 
outsiders) constitute the common goods which are the 
real economic products of the commons. 
Significant common acts include worship, 
contemplation, helping, inquiry, self-expression, and 
play (the latter often dignified as "leisure", 
"recreation" or "athletics"). Each of these is a 
fundamental human activity at least as basic as 
production, consumption or exchange and not 
reducible to them. Any economics which reduces 
common goods to the basic categories of production, 
consumption and exchange is necessarily 
reductionistic and misleading. 
A commons is not primarily a physical place (although 
it may be a place as well, as in the case of temples and 
other common spaces). However, a commons can be 
any social space for interaction within a community or 
coparticipants. Common space may be a committee 
room, a conference center, a restaurant dining room or 
almost any other public or private space. It may also 
be the social space of a newspaper, scientific journal 
or electronic bulletin board. The commons can be 
anywhere in the community where the baseline 
assumptions discussed above are played out. 
Commons are fundamentally "universes of discourse". 
They are composed of groups of people who 
understand one another, speak common languages, and 
over time evolve specialized terminology and 
language. Such discursive universes are a type of 
commons whose shared understandings have, in the 
case of scientific commons, become known as cultures 
(Urban, 1991), communities (Schwartzman, 1992) or 
paradigms. (Berger and Luckmann, 1970; Bernstein, 
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1983; Kuhn, 1962) In this sense, philosophers, 
librarians, physicists, Roman Catholics, philatelists, 
joggers, and social workers are all terms for such 
commons, and realism, information science and 
Copernican cosmology are the names of particular 
paradigms.  
Commons tend to be organized both informally, 
through use of common languages and a common 
world view, as well as formally through associations, 
and other non-coercive groups. The structure of a 
commons consists of a community of one or more 
benefactories and related basic institutions. Three such 
institutions are most basic:  
Common language is essential, because without it 
meaningful common activities would be literally 
impossible. Certain elementary types of "trading", 
tool-making and usage can be observed among primate 
species. Also, there are recorded instances of human 
economic activity between non-communicating 
language communities, such as the "silent trade" 
between Ghanian and Arab traders during the Ghana 
Empire in Africa (3-1200 A.D.). However, the 
existence of all types of common activities on a 
significant scale requires substantial language ability. 
This is particularly so with commons where the 
community functions as a reference group to set and 
reinforce attitudes and values-- processes which occur 
primarily through the medium of spoken and written 
language. 
Another set of institutions basic to the commons are 
those necessary for education, training and 
socialization of participants. Because knowledge, as 
the combination of available meanings and 
information, is a key element in the commons, ways 
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and means of passing knowledge among members of 
the community, and from one generation to another are 
basic to any commons. This applies equally to the 
socialization rites by which primitive youth are 
initiated into the mysteries of tribal dance and legends, 
the apprenticeship of medieval cathedral builders, and 
the "management training program" of the modern 
private nonprofit settlement house.  
In the American context, on-going associations of all 
types tend to be incorporated, because of explicit tax 
concessions and limits on participant liability offered 
by incorporation. Incorporation, however, represents 
the legal adaptation in a particular society and not a 
fundamental defining characteristic of commons. Even 
within the Anglo-American tradition stemming from 
the Statute of Charitable Uses, a great deal of 
"voluntary" common action occurs outside the formal 
limits of incorporation, and numerous cases of 
incorporated and unincorporated organizations 
performing similar functions can be pointed to.  
There is a danger in over stating the importance of 
corporations and seeing commons primarily in terms 
of sets of discrete benefactories. Commons also 
constitute associative social worlds, which have two 
important characteristics: 1) Collectively, participants 
are free to order their behavior as they choose, so long 
as their actions do not threaten others or the 
community as a whole; and 2) Participants are free to 
leave at any time to join another social world (such as 
another association, the social world of the 
marketplace, or the "private" social worlds of the 
household.) In associative social worlds, such action 
occurs all the time, as lodge or fraternity members 
become inactive and take up the church choir or 
political campaigning, for example. Nozick (1974) has 
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defined the ability to leave a social world as one of the 
characteristics of his utopia. 
As associative communities built up of benefactories, 
commons are composed of three basic classes of 
participants: patrons, agents, and clients. Patrons 
contribute, give or donate resources in nonmarket 
transfers, or "grants". Agents or intermediaries, 
process or coordinate the transfer of resources. Clients 
are usually the presumed recipients or beneficiaries of 
these transfers. Publics (in the behavioral political 
science sense of the term) are aggregates from which 
both patron classes and client classes are organized. 
Memberships are special cases of patrons who 
constitute their own publics.)  
Social actors throughout history have known that there 
is public space outside the marketplace and the state. 
The public space of the commons is not predominantly 
a space for buying and selling, or of ordering and 
forbidding. It is a space for talking and listening 
(dialogue), and for seeing and being seen 
(presentation). This should be evident to anyone who 
has ever attended an association meeting, given a 
speech to a public gathering, or in any way 
participated in an associative community. It is evident 
as well by the frequency with which community terms 
such as "fellowship", "congregation", etc. are used in 
describing such communities. 
It is useful, therefore, to locate the Commons 
alongside the marketplace, and the state, with its 
distinctive concerns for the authoritative allocation of 
values. (See Figure 3) The metaphor of the commons 
is particularly appropriate in the context of American 
history, where important historic cities as diverse as 
Boston, New Haven, Philadelphia and Sante Fe have 
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such public areas even today, and the town square is a 
major feature in many smaller communities as well. 
Similarly, most associations have an annual "meeting" 
or "conference" whose function, at least formally, 
illustrates the potential for open dialogue in the 
commons.  
 
Governance of Commons 
 The model of the self-governing association is 
characterized by a special vocabulary. By-laws are 
rules adopted by a group to regulate its own actions. 
Under common law, in the absense of any other law to 
the contrary, the power to make by-laws rests with the 
constituent members. (Gifis, 1991, 58)  Minutes are 
the record of official proceedings of an organized 
group. Legally, the self-governing association can be 
either incorporated or unincorporated, tax-paying or 
tax-exempt. (Oleck, 1986)   
Meetings are official gatherings, sessions or 
assemblies of the group. Plenary means full, complete, 
entire or unqualified. (Gifis, 1991, 357)  As such, a 
plenary session, such as annual meetings are meetings 
open to the full or entire membership.    Articles of 
incorporation are the legal instruments which create 
nonprofit and other corporations. (Gifis, 1991, 30)   
Articles are sometimes also called charters. A charter 
is usually a document issued by government 
establishing a corporate entity. The term derives from 
the practice of medieval monarchs of granting charters 
specifying certain rights, privilges and powers. (Gifis, 
1991, 69)    
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A committee consists of “a person or persons to whom 
the consideration or determination of certain business 
is referred or confided.” (Gifis, 1991, 82) The board of 
directors or trustees is a special committee, elected by 
rules or precedures held by the group to be fair, and 
usually spelled out in the bylaws or articles. In most 
state law, boards are held responsible for the overall 
management of the affairs of the association or 
corporation. (Oleck, 1986) 
Endowment  
Another key concept in the theory of the commons is 
that of the endowment, or the set of resources 
(potentials for action) held jointly by a commons. The 
term endowment is taken directly from historical and 
contemporary usage. The concept of resource 
endowments is linked by definition to the central 
concept of the commons. One of the components of 
the definition of the commons offered above is the 
conception of a “fund” of common, or shared, 
resources. In any commons, that fund or pool of shared 
resources is its endowment. The term endowment has 
been used in this way in English at least since the 
Middle Ages. 
In this case, the term endowment is used to 
specifically include what are today called foundations. 
The term foundation, as the name of a special type of 
managed endowment, does not figure importantly in 
the vocabulary of the commons. In medieval usage, it 
originally referred to the act of creation of an 
endowment. In both medieval and modern times, a 
founder, often the first donor whose act enabled 
creation of the entity was afforded special status. 
(Gifis, 1991, 198) 
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There are many clues for those who wish to see them 
to this usage. Thus, the specialized accounting of the 
nonprofit sector is known as fund accounting (as is 
public accounting, where common funds are also 
held). Unfortunately, in some financial circles this 
robust and useful term has taken on specialized 
connotations not of a fund or pool or shared resources 
generally, but of such funds only when their use is, in 
some way, restricted. Thus, a college’s endowment, or 
an endowed chair of a professor means for some only 
those particular restricted funds. 
It is important to note, therefore, that we can restore 
the broader historical usage of the term endowment, 
without disrupting in any way this more restrictive 
meaning. We can also restore some of the derivations 
of this term, including dowry (meaning gift, as in 
bride-dowry, certainly, but also in the more generic 
sense of any gift or donation, including the creation of 
a restricted endowment) and the archaic verb dower 
(meaning to give). In Chapter 7 we shall further refine 
the concept of endowment by identifying various types 
of resources, including treasuries of financial resources 
, collections of tangible objects and repertories of acts 
which can be learned.  
 Legally, an endowment is “a permanent fund of 
property or money bestowed upon an institution or a 
person, the income of which is used to serve the 
specific purpose” for which it was created. (Gifis, 
1991, 158)  The legal concept of endowment explicitly 
links the dimensions of common purpose and 
resources and implicates mutuality and fairness as 
well. As such, it is a species of trust, or real or 
personal property held by one person for the benefit of 
another. (Gifis, 1991, 501)  This explains why 
nonprofit board members are sometimes called 
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trustees, for they hold legal title to property in trust for 
another. (Gifis, 1991, 505) Such persons have 
fiduciary obligations under the law which are created 
by their accepting the trust, to act primarily for the 
benefit of another in matters connected with the 
undertaking. (Gifis, 1991, 189) To violate those 
obligations is a breach of trust , or “violation by a 
trustee of a duty which equity (that is, justice) lays 
upon him, whether wilful and fraudulent, or done 
through negligence, or arising through mere oversight 
and forgetfulness.” (Gifis, 1991, 54)  This is closely 
related to the cy pres doctrine that “equity will, when a 
charity is illegal or later becomes impossible or 
impractical of fulfillment, substitute another charitable 
object which is believed to approach the original 
purpose as closely as possible. (Gifis, 1991, 116; 
Young, 1926) 
An endowment may be created by a gift, or voluntary 
transfer of property made with out consideration, or 
for which no value is received in return. (Gifis, 1991, 
207)  Legally, these may be individual or class gifts; 
that is gifts to a body of persons uncertain in number 
all of whom receive equal or other definition portions. 
(Gifis, 1991, 74)  estates, or all that a person owns in 
real and personal property. (Gifis, 1991, 165)  A gift 
may be inter vivos (between living persons) or causa 
mortis (in anticipation of death) as in a will. (Gifis, 
1991, 207). An inheritance is an estate distributed to 
heirs acording to the laws of descent and distribution. 
(Gifis, 1991, 237) A bequest, or gift of such property 
contained in a will. (Gifis, 1991, 46) Property is, 
simply, “every species of valuable right or interest that 
is subject to ownership, has an exchangable value or 
adds to one’s wealth or estate.” (Gifis, 1991, 380) 
Property, in the legal sense, can be incorporeal with 
no physical reality (Gifis, 1991, 230) or intangible 
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with no value in itself, but merely representing value. 
(Gifis, 1991, 245) The usual term for tangible goods is 
commodities. (Gifis, 1991, 82) 
Personal Endowments 
The concept of personal endowment has been used in 
psychological research in a manner consistent with its 
proposed usage in the theory of the commons. It has 
been used, for example, in studies of minority issues in 
mental health (Lorenzo, 1989), creativity (Shainess, 
1989), instinct (Schneider, 1988; Gutmann, 1982); 
intelligence (McGlashan, 1986; McGee and Brown, 
1984); personality (Huang, 1984) and mother-child 
bonds (Kestenbaum, 1984). Piechowski and 
Cunningham (1985) addressed the “psychological 
endowment” of artists.  Erikson (1985) speaks of the 
“sensory endowment” of artists, as well as the 
possibility of expanding sensory endowment through 
education. Kodym and Kebza (1982) employed the 
concept in a manner completely consistent with the 
use of repertories as endowments: They studied 
“musical endowment and talent”, which they say 
involves special components (including auditory and 
rhythmical components, memory, harmony and 
counterpoint, tonal feeling, and musical thinking) and 
general components (such as cognitive processes, 
volition, and motivation). Five particular types of 
musical endowment identified were technique, 
singing, teaching, conducting, and composing. 
The endowment concept also figures large in 
physiological psychology, psychoanalytic psychology 
and genetic studies. In particular, the concept of the 
“genetic endowment” (Lidz, 1976; Graham, 1986) of 
an individual has been related to a number of 
phenomena including aggressive and violent behavior 
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(Eichelman, 1985); aphasia (Gainotti, Nocentini, Sena 
and Silveri, 1986); delinquincy (McManus, Brickman, 
Alessi and Grapentine, 1985) and more. Another 
anticedent of the use of endowment is found in game 
studies where endowment is used routinely to denote 
the level of resources available to a player. (c.f., 
Rapoport and Eshed-Levy, 1989; Rapoport, Bornstein 
and Erev, 1989).  
Civilization 
Hill’s (1984) treatment of what he terms the “concept 
pool” offers a useful pointer to the concepts of 
civilization and paradigm as human endowments. The 
full connotations of the term endowment in the theory 
of the commons become clear only in light of the 
concept of civilization. Every commons, it is 
suggested, is endowed with a dowry of jointly held 
resources, some created by its benefactories, some 
received from markets, states and households, and 
some handed down from benefactors of previous 
generations (and thus constituting its heritage).  Thus, 
the rituals and practices of The Book of Common 
Prayer are part of the endowment of the Church of 
England, and the collection of books in its library are 
part of the resource endowment of any school or 
college.  
Some portion of every endowment consists of public 
goods, for the simple reason that any good which is 
available equally to everyone will be available in the 
commons as it is elsewhere. Thus, the Library of 
Congress is part of the resource endowment of every 
American school, thanks to inter-library loan. Current 
economic arguments notwithstanding however, the 
production of public goods is not a fundamental 
objective in most commons. Members of religious 
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groups, lodges, fraternities, sororities and other social 
groups do not indiscriminantly seek to share 
participation, and mutual relations with every other 
social organization, but with others of similar 
affiliation (and presumably similar outlook).  
In the theory of the commons, we shall employ the 
term common goods for this phenomenon. Private 
goods can also be made available to the commons by 
donation. The bulk of common goods, however, are 
characterized by the rather remarkable fact that while 
they may not be universal, in the same sense as public 
goods, they are treated as universal within the 
commons. This is one of the most difficult concepts to 
realize or implement in the case of money and market 
goods entering the commons. Perhaps some examples 
will help. 
It is well illustrated by the system of metric 
measurement as a common good. Metric measurement 
is not yet a public good in the United States: It is not 
indivisible, in that some people can practice it while 
others do not; and it is not universal. Members of the 
human species are not born with intrinsic knowledge 
of the metric system, nor is such knowledge 
universally available to everyone. Indeed, the majority 
of contemporary Americans still struggle with even 
understanding metric measurement and many simply 
do not. Yet in scientific communities in which any 
type of exact measurement is important, the metric 
system is a common good. It is in precisely this sense 
that metric measurement (indeed, mathematics as a 
whole) is an important component of the endowment 
of modern science -- and presumably a part of its 
legacy to future scientific development.  
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In this same sense, the astronomical observations and 
calculations of a great many ancient civilizations were 
part of their endowments, but important parts of this 
legacy have been lost to us. This point can be 
generalized to the level of entire civilizations. Living 
civilizations consist of a great many such legacies, 
whose monetary value is truly priceless (that is 
valuable, but not for sale and consequently without 
price). While they may be more than we can count, 
and sometimes we even take their very existence for 
granted, their impact upon our daily lives is important 
nonetheless.  
The particular legacy of western civilization which we 
call humanism, humanitarianism, or more recently, the 
much derided "secular humanism", is another such 
resource endowment which is especially important in 
the modern private nonprofit/ voluntary sector world. 
Virtually every contemporary benefactory -- including 
those religious institutions which explicitly reject 
certain values which they deride as "humanistic" -- 
relies upon the rich resources of the 
humanist/humanitarian legacy to realize those 
common goods which are most important to it.  
One should not get the impression that it is being 
suggested here that there is a unique role for the 
commons as producers or creators of civilization. 
Civilizations represent the total product of all 
institutions of which they consist, and it is a matter of 
historical interpretations which contributions were 
most important and valuable.   
It is the role of the commons in preserving, restoring 
and utilizing the heritage of a civilization where its 
true uniqueness lies: In applying resources of our 
heritage to solve what might be called the puzzles or 
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the mysteries offered by a particular cultural heritage -
-whether religious, scientific or modern day attacks 
upon social problems. Thus, scientific research 
“paradigms” do not just include formal theories, but a 
complex array of associated (and mutually reinforcing) 
research evidence, techniques and methods, tacit 
assumptions and practical ways of doing things.  
The value of a particular endowment may be realized 
only in dramatizing, presenting and thereby preserving 
it. Thus, the endowment of the Latin language was 
irreversibly transformed when it ceased to represent 
the resource of a living language. This is as true of 
jazz musicians seeking to preserve their legacy in after 
hours jam sessions as it is of the concert halls, 
museums and theatres of the culture industry. Until the 
advent of writing, literature, myth and lore could only 
be preserved through the oral tradition of retold tales. 
In a similar way, prior to visual recording techniques 
and systems of choreographic notation, dance could 
only be preserved through actual regular performance. 
At one level, one might speak of the transformation of 
social surpluses of wealth, power and status, into 
culture. Such transformations have two distinct 
dimensions, both of which have important common (as 
well as public and commercial) examples. The 
instrumental, problem-solving mode associated with 
innovation can be linked with social change through 
the creation or discovery of new cultural values 
(artifacts and symbols as well as larger complexes of 
value embodied in art, music, literature, science). 
Thus, unique to the endowment of Western civilization 
are the discovery and the autonomous individual and 
the model of freedom and liberal democracy with 
which they are associated. In contrast, expressive 
modes are associated with the affirmation of cultural 
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and civilized values through ritual, ceremony and 
other presentations. Once established, these same 
values of individualism, freedom and democracy have 
taken ritual and ceremonial forms from Fourth of July 
celebrations. 
As part of the overall social surplus, the sum total of 
the values of a civilization (it's “social capital”, so to 
speak) may include a great many artifacts which are 
neither purely privately held nor universally accesible. 
In all societies, some such preservation of values is 
also deliberate and intentional part of life-plans. It is 
that portion of a civilization which we can call its 
endowment. In a larger sense, a civilization itself 
represents a common endowment as it is passed down 
from one generation to the next.  
Dynamics of Change in Endowments 
The endowment of any civilization is not a static thing. 
The acts of creation, preservation, presentation, and 
restoration can be very costly in numerous ways. 
Tremendous investments of time and energy are 
necessary in many on-going cultures simply to 
transform the heritage of the past into meaningful 
contemporary terms and to continue it as a legacy to 
the future. A good deal of the social action of 
sustaining cultural continuity occurs within the 
commons.  Much of that action consists of three 
fundamental processes of learning, or socialization, 
technique, performing learned skills and 
demonstrating repertories thereby revitalizing them in 
the present, and search procedures, conciously seeking 
to solve established problems or identify new ways of 
doing things. The learning and presentation of 
repertories, which often take routine disciplines or 
ritual forms, can constitute an important study in itself. 
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Van der Veer (1989) examines how members of the 
Ramanandi order in northern India create and utilize 
abilities and potentialities to totally transform basic 
attitudes and emotions in a discipline of detachment  
As a result, socialization, technique and search are 
fundamentally important processes in any commons, 
market or state. Socialization (or learning or education 
) is a social and psychological process related to 
voluntary participation. (Renshon, 1975)  The role of 
socialization in the formation of commons and in the 
admission of new participants has not been widely 
explored, however.  
Technique is one of two ways of bringing value back 
into a common situation. An accumulated set of 
learned techniques possessed by a person or a group is 
a special set of meanings or values which can be 
termed a repertory. Thus, founding a musical or 
theater group, for example often hinges upon 
identifying seasoned performers with an established 
repertory able to act upon and to teach their 
techniques. The same can also be said for a monastic 
order, an athletic team or a research laboratory. The 
particular techniques may involve problem-solving, 
such as how best to carry out aspects of scientific 
research, social work, or artistic creation. Or they may 
be techniques of presentation, as in concerts, rites and 
performances. In both cases, however, the techniques 
in question are clearly subordinate to the larger 
common goods with which they are associated. The 
value of the cantor is established and maintained 
within the repertory of the synagogue and the 
choreographer within the repertory of the dance 
company. Techniques are, themselves, units of larger 
meaning complexes, and their value in the commons is 
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intimately connected with the meanings associated 
with the common goods which they render.  
The other major way to bring value into the commons 
involves search, which is the primary way in which 
information is brought in. Philosophical 
contemplation, scientific research and artistic creation 
are important forms of search, as are most forms of 
religious activity, such as vision quests and other 
quests for more profound religious experience, and 
some types of athletic activity. Some of these search 
techniques involve searching the immediate 
environment, while others seek to invoke and 
revitalize a common heritage. Value brought into the 
commons through search is value closely associated 
with innovation, novelty and change, as compared to 
the close association between technical values and 
tradition, stability and order.  
Treasury  
Treasuries are generally the best-known and most 
clearly understood sets of common resources held by 
benefactories. They consists of closely measured funds 
of identifiable assets --resources which can be 
measured in monetary terms-- as measured by 
accounting systems and reported in financial 
statements of an association or corporation. Although 
such funds are not as frequently labeled explicitly as 
treasuries today than they once were, it is still 
conventional to refer to the principal officer of an 
association or private nonprofit corporation 
responsible for asset management as the treasurer.  
In a money economy, most benefactories appear to 
have at least minimal need for a treasury. In much of 
the contemporary commons in American communities, 
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treasuries are used to purchase many types of 
resources from the market -- technical and professional 
labor, supplies and equipment, space and other rents, 
and other sources. Evidence suggests that treasuries 
were an important aspect of “nonprofit” institutions 
long before the modern age, however. In addition to 
the ark of the covenant, the original temple at 
Jerusalem contained a temple treasury. (de Vaux, 139, 
248, 322, 325, 377) The treasury is also a standard 
feature in the architecture of Greek temples. (Scully, 
1991)  
The most conventional mistake in identifying the 
resources of a benefactory is to look only at the 
monetary resources of its treasury, because these are 
the most easily identified and more closely measured 
than other types of resources which the organization 
may control and direct. To do so, however, is to 
overlook or understate the resource position of most 
commons. To avoid this error we need some way to 
systematically denote, categorize and signify other 
facets of the resource endowments of benefactories. 
The theory of the commons incorporates two 
additional terms already in widespread use: collections 
and repertories. 
Collection 
Beyond their treasuries, many benefactories also 
maintain extensive collections that are essential in 
rendering their shared purposes or common goods. 
The collection of any benefactory consists of the 
physical objects held or controlled by it as part of its 
endowment. Collections are many and varied. 
(Pomian, 1991)  Many types of historical and 
contemporary benefactories maintain such collections 
as part of their on-going programs: Churches and 
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religious organizations of all types commonly retain 
collections of sacred icons and other worlds of art, 
musical instruments, sacramental vessels, and other 
objects utilized in religious rites and ceremonies. 
Museums and archives exist for the explicit purpose of 
being repositories of collections of artifacts, 
manuscripts and other objects of archaeological, 
historical or literary value.   
Many different types of benefactories maintain 
collections. Every library has its book collection and 
every medieval cathedral and monastery its reliquary 
and collection of statues. Theater companies have 
collections of make-up, costumes, scripts and sets 
created for previous productions. Athletic associations, 
unions and clubs typically have collections of sports 
equipment and paraphernalia associated with their 
particular interests. The overwhelming majority of 
opportunities to participate in sports in Canada, 
Finland, Norway are organized and carried out by 
voluntary associations (Beamish, 1985; Seppanen, 
1982; Sisjord, 1986) 
Such groups offer interesting case studies of the 
divisions between personal property and commons. 
Members of a softball club may own their own gloves, 
for example, while the team collectively owns a set of 
bats and bases. Libraries are collections of books, and 
modern libraries also have highly diverse sets of 
additional, information-bearing objects--from 
professional journals and archaic manuscripts to films, 
microfilms and microfiche, audio and video tapes, 
compact disks and other media of information and 
knowledge.  
Libraries hold one of the most common forms of 
collections in the modern commons. The very idea of a 
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library -- which presumes commons of writers and 
readers knowledgeable of the same languages -- is one 
key to understanding the role of collections in the 
commons. To view a library collection solely from the 
vantage point of the treasury, and to attempt to 
maintain an inventory, in the sense of a current 
running estimate of the combined economic value of 
the collection in money terms, illustrates the problems 
involved in the economics of the commons. While a 
great many fascinating and highly technical economic 
and accounting issues are raised in such a case, it is 
also the case that large numbers of librarians and 
readers and writers of books harbor deep suspicions 
that such an approach misses the fundamental point of 
making money available to library collections.  
Collections are not simple analogues of inventories of 
raw materials and unfinished goods that occur in 
productive firms. While superficially resembling the 
inventories, plant and equipment of productive firms, 
the collections of benefactories are really quite 
different --both in purpose and in scope -- from 
inventories of productive resources in a firm. Most 
importantly, items in collections are seldom acquired 
with the intention of processing and resale.  Thus, 
questions of their enduring market value are almost 
never of any continuing interest once acquired.  What 
is important about items in collection is usually only 
information of their existence, whereabouts, conditions 
and uses. Ordinarily, it should be sufficient in the case 
of a benefactory to maintain such simple records, and 
to avoid extensive and misleading inclusions of 
collections among the monetary “assets” of its 
treasury.  
 Sometimes the connection between a particular 
collection and civilization is especially clearcut. 
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Haeinsa Temple is a Buddhist complex of shrines and 
temples in the mountains near Taegu, Korea. It 
possesses a set of 80,000 wood blocks for printing the 
entire Buddhist canon. These printing blocks were 
carved during the Mongol invasion of the 1230’s. In 
the evolution of the west, the Library of Alexandria, 
with its collection of Greek philosophy, literature and 
science, played a comparable role in preserving 
knowledge of the ancient world. (Forster, 1961; 
Préaux, 1967) 
A troubling application of the collection concept arose 
in the context of a major crime wave directed at 
plundering art and artifacts from the museums, 
churches and archeological sites of Italy, estimated to 
be the largest national collection of art works in the 
world, totaling in excess of one million items. 
(Rowland, 1991)  Police there have been troubled in 
recent years by an unprecedented outbreak of 
burglaries and thefts of art and artifacts that averaged 
more than 55 a day in 1990. Because of the absence of 
institutional collection lists, dockets of stolen items 
reported to police constitute virtually the only records 
of collections in many instances. Italian police have 
estimated that Italy has 3,400 museums and 
archeological sites (700 of which are state-run) 
100,000 churches and 40,000 castles and fortifications, 
as well as 900 important town centers. Because Italian 
churches, archeological sites, and even museums have 
not traditionally kept detailed inventories, the 
problems of even tracking stolen works has been 
extraordinarily complex. Rome alone has 333 
churches, more than 80 convents and monasteries and 
83 museums, not counting the 18 in the Vatican. The 
absense of collection lists is a rather extreme example 
of the way in which preoccupation with treasuries and 
financial accountability leads commons to ignore or 
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neglect the more elementary question of logs or lists of 
collections of precious objects. 
 
Most difficult of all to deal with have been the 
intangible resource endowments of the commons -- the 
symbolic gestures, rituals and ceremonies of religious 
bodies; the skillful, nuanced performances of actors, 
singers, musicians, and other performers, the occult 
bodies of specialized knowledge and practical wisdom 
-- whether scientific, magical, religious, artistic, 
political, or otherwise -- which communities have built 
up over years, decades and in some instances, 
centuries. 
No one can expect to price such knowledge and add it 
to the treasury -- the astronomical knowledge of the 
Druids or the Mayas, for example, poses a continuing 
enigma. In more contemporary terms, much the same 
can be said of the subtle reasoning of a philosopher, 
the skillful intervention of a caseworker. Yet, efforts to 
assess the resources endowments of many types of 
commons are incomplete unless we take such 
resources into account.   
The term repertory -- already in use by actors and 
musicians to describe the range of accomplished 
performances of an ensemble or company -- may be 
applied to the intangible endowments of many other 
commons as well. A repertory is, in this sense, any set 
of acts that an individual or group is prepared to 
perform. It may be the set of discrete-but-related 
skilled behaviors necessary to rescue a community of 
disaster victims, or the set of unique patterned motions 
and utterances that compose a performance of Hamlet 
or Handel.  
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Repertories are often built up of sequences of related 
problem solving strategies. Some such repertories 
involve straightforward applications of "if-then" 
reasoning: If the victim is choking, perform the 
Heimlich maneuver. This maneuver, together with 
numerous others constitute the repertory of emergency 
medical technicians. 
Repertories may involve ordinary, conventional 
behavior or extremely high levels of skill, judgment, 
and timing that only members of the repertory 
company are able to master, and then only through the 
dedication of a lifetime. Yet the point remains--the 
stock of indigeneous solutions in the repertory of 
problem-solving actions constitutes one of the 
principle forms of resources available to a benefactory. 
Although we may be unaccustomed to thinking of 
them as resources, performance repertories are also 
among the key resources of the commons. They often 
constitute the uniqueness and relative advantage "that 
money can't buy". This is as true of charitable and 
religious organizations as it is of artistic performances 
and athletic competitions. The 12-step method of 
Alcoholics Anonymous describes a repertory 
distinctive and unmistakable in its own way. 
The term is perhaps most widely used and understood 
in the arts, where theaters, orchestras, athletes and 
other performance ensembles routinely refer to the set 
of scripts, scores or routines over which they possess 
active mastery as being in their repertory (sometimes 
preferring the French spelling and pronunciation of 
repertoire.) Even in this context, however, the 
underlying problem-solving connotation should be 
apparent: Each new production and each performance 
represents a new problem to be solved. It is in the 
problem-solving of the performance where the 
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excitement of live performance is to be found in an 
age of television, compact disks and videotape.  
What sets professional benefactories apart from 
amateurs are differences in repertories. This is as true 
of social services programs as it is of musicians, 
painters and actors. A brilliant actor, musical 
performer, dancer or surgeon can perform movements 
and introduce nuances of performance that others are 
simply unable to duplicate. When a new type of 
service for intervening with alcoholics, or aged 
persons with Alzheimers’ disease, is developed, the 
greatest interest is always in the repertory of new skills 
and techniques that may be involved. 
Resources specifically associated with capturing 
power and demonstrating authority also clearly 
involve repertories. The endowment whose repertories 
encompass skills of political intelligence-gathering and 
the exercise of influence, as well as ample amounts of 
legitimacy and authority is likely to realize significant 
improvements in its position in terms of additions to 
its treasury, new items for its collection, and further 
expansion of its repertories.  
While collections arouse intense and misplaced 
interest, economists, accountants and managers have 
shown virtually no interest in repertories as key 
resources of nonprofit corporate benefactories. 
Contemporary financial statements and annual reports 
not only fail to list estimates of the value of 
repertories, they usually even fail to note their 
existence. Such are the exigencies of contemporary 
concern with nonprofit “accountability”! Estimating 
the full or true value of any endowment should require 
at least a simple listing and description of its repertory 
of skills and techniques found in a benefactory. 
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Regimes 
As noted above, the nonprofit and voluntary action 
community has been preoccupied in recent years with 
the question of suitable delineations of the nonprofit 
sector in relation to government, business, and even 
“the informal sector”. This preoccupation has 
produced a theoretical and conceptual impasse that 
consists of equal measures straw man, deus ex 
machina and genuine puzzlement. The literature on 
this topic leads to the paradoxical conclusion that 
making distinctions between market, state and 
commons serves only to point up the interrelations and 
connections between these sectors. 
What is needed, according to Ostrander, Langton and 
Van Til (1987) are new ways of thinking about the 
interdependence and interaction of the state, for-profit 
and nonprofit organizations. It may be possible, 
however, to use existing concepts in new ways to 
produce what represent, in effect, such new ways of 
thinking. One approach, for example, is to utilize the 
interdisciplinary model of urbanism, with its 
distinction between core and periphery, as a matrix for 
spelling out the links between sectors. 
The concepts of core and periphery as they have 
evolved in urban and regional theory can serve to 
distinguish the defining, or central characteristics of 
the sectors, from other peripheral functions that they 
may serve. Thus in the traditional terms of the theory 
of civil society, the recognized core of the state 
involves those coercive powers usually identified as 
the police powers. It is a conventional axiom of 
political theory that legitimate governments may justly 
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deprive others of their liberty, property through the 
exercise of these powers. Yet, modern government 
also clearly involves a variety of public (that is, tax-
supported) functions in which coercion is replaced by 
compassion, community, or some other public virtue.  
This distinction is well illustrated by the child welfare 
field, where the core coercive powers associated with 
child custody and adoption and prosecution of child 
abuse and neglect, coexist with peripheral 
compassionate purposes of other child welfare 
services. The public utilities of local government 
(sewer and water, for example), and national park 
camp grounds and just a few of the many peripheral 
commercial services sold or leased by governments.  
Likewise, while the core of the market-oriented, 
business and commercial sector may indeed be profit-
oriented, one can hardly overlook the conclusion that 
some activities at the periphery of business assume 
commons-like and state-like qualities. Thus, the 
traditional company town and the modern corporation 
frequently assume important measures of coercive 
influence over the private lives of employees, 
controlling many aspects of “private life”. Likewise, 
the country store, the proverbial soda fountain, the 
neighborhood Mom and Pop grocery and 
neighborhood bars (like the one portrayed on the 
televison series “Cheers”) are among the many 
examples of commercial establishments that have 
blended a profit orientation with other, more 
communal functions.  
Part of the current enigma of the nonprofit 
organization in part may involve a core transformation 
-- the historical evolution of what were or are thought 
to be commons (like nonprofit hospitals, nursing 
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homes and child care centers) into quaisi-commercial 
enterprises which are clearly “business-like” in 
orientation and operation. In other cases, both modern 
and medieval, commons have evolved essentially 
coercive powers. Such powers may be exercised in 
cooperation with the state as in the case of nonprofit 
child welfare or aging services charged with 
“advocacy”, “ombudsman” and other quaisi-regulatory 
responsibilities. Or, they may be exercised in direct 
opposition, as in the case of terrorist groups and 
organized crime “families”. 
Finally, at their core, families/households serve as 
essential primary groups, but at the periphery, they 
may assume coercive powers (as in patriarchal, tribal 
and other ascriptive societies), commercial functions 
(as in family businesses) or associational 
characteristics (as in large modern “family reunion” 
associations). Consistent application of this model 
yields 12 possible core-periphery complexes in 
addition to the four “pure” ideal types (for example, 
common core with common periphery) 
 
 PERIPHERY 
CORE Commons Market State Family 
Commons     
Market     
State     
Family     
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The hybrid types that emerge from distinguishing core 
and periphery of state, market, household and 
commons represent a step beyond the straight forward 
consideration of isolated ideal types. Such hybrids still 
speak only to the internal organization of each sector. 
An additional distinction is necessary to encompass 
relations across sectors. 
The political concept of regime can be broadened and 
usefully applied for this purpose. A regime may be 
said to be a network of related formal and communal 
organizations across sectors. In some cases, we already 
have names for some such combinations. Democracy 
is the name we ordinarily apply to a regime in the 
control of elected officials. Oligarchy, fascism and 
monarchy are other types of regimes. In one of the 
more rigorous and elegant modern schemes, Dahl and 
Lindblom identified a four-fold scheme of leader-
follower types. (1957) 
The conventional use of regimes in political studies 
primarily emphasizes those in which the state figures 
prominently as a core. Thus, for example, Lowi has 
characterized “interest group liberalism” and the 
Frankfort School has addressed authoritarianism. 
(Lowi, 1969; Adorno, 1950) Capitalism is a label 
applied to any regime with market-oriented enterprises 
in its core, as opposed to state-socialism that brings 
state-controlled enterprise into the core, or barter 
economies that typically incorporate strong common 
elements. “Welfare state” and “mixed economy” have 
frequently been used to denote regimes in which the 
core is shared by market and state and, perhaps, 
commons. 
Applying a regimes model to the problem of the 
relation of commons to other sectors resolves the 
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problem into several distinct sub-problems: One the 
one hand, there is the problem of identifying the cores 
of diverse regimes and the peripheries with which they 
are combined.  
The phrase welfare state conjurs up one type of state-
core regime (regulated mixed economy) to its 
adherents and quite another (state-socialism) to its 
critics. The literatures on participatory democracy, co-
production and collaboration each also conjur up quite 
distinct state-core regimes. At the heart of the Reagan 
Revolution was the vision of a market-
centered/family-centered regime with a restricted state 
and a vibrant commons on its periphery. 
In sum, a regime may be said to consist of a specific 
set of relations between commons, markets, states and 
households, and a civilization a set of relations 
between regimes. Medieval western civilization, for 
example, was built upon the primacy of a particular set 
of religious commons, and modern western civilization 
is to a high degree built upon the “civil society” model 
of the supremacy of the constitutionally limited nation 
state. (Kennedy, 1988) We will examine a case study 
of the regimes model in Chapter 10 below.  
 
Patronage 
The core of the commons, as noted above, consists of 
social relations between patrons, agents and clients. A 
patronage relationship can be defined as one between a 
patron (defined as one with some type of good) and a 
client (who is seeking that same good). Such relations 
are often cast in explicitly hierarchical terms of 
superiority and subordination. The relation of the 
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teacher and student (one with more knowledge and 
one with less); of the master craftsman and his 
apprentice (one with more skill and one with less); or 
of the political boss and a benefice (office, grant, land, 
whatever) -seeker. 
Patronage in the commons is a general term that 
suggests stable relations between a group or class of 
patrons and groups or classes of intermediaries and/or 
clients. Patronage may at various times embrace the 
support, sponsorship, legitimation, financing or 
protection of common goods. Patrons are known 
variously as givers, donors, patrons, supporters, 
benefactors, helpers, philanthropists, and by a range of 
additional terms. In western civilization, patronage can 
be found in ancient, medieval and modern times. 
Patronage is also evident in many other civilizations as 
well. 
The key to understanding the enduring role of 
patronage in the commons is the concept of 
hierarchies. The most fundamental way to view these 
is as unequal or asymmetric social relations -- as in the 
unequal relations between patrons and their clients 
made famous by the definition of patronage as “    .” in 
Samuel Johnson’s famous dictionary. 
The central focus of patronage theory in the commons 
is on the voluntary (uncoerced) hierarchies -- of 
power, influence, wealth, status, information and 
knowledge or other resources -- and the circumstances 
leading to the emergence and continuation of 
inequalities in this sense. This is one reason for the 
strong emphasis on negation in terminology of the 
commons: The absence of kinship as a requirement of 
association membership, for example, points up the 
“non-familial” nature of the commons as a pure type. 
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Apparent exchange asymmetries (or, the absence of 
fair and equal exchanges by buyers and sellers in a 
competitive environment) for grants of all types points 
up the “non-market” nature of the commons. The 
absence of legitimate control or domination by a single 
actor (the so-called “monopoly of force”) points up the 
“non-state” nature of the commons. 
Depending upon particular predilections, the reader is 
likely to leap immediately to all of the most 
controversial and difficult cases: tyrants, dictators, 
political bosses and others who abuse power; 
capitalists, thieves, embezzlers and others who are the 
reason behind the phrase “caveat emptor” (buyer 
beware). Such exceptions are, no doubt, interesting 
and important. (Explaining them as departures from 
the particular hierarchical principles of the commons is 
an essential task of the theory, undertaken in Chapter 
6.)  
Patronage, in this sense may be asymmetric in the 
perceptions of the relationship by various parties: 
Relations can be seen by either party as coercive, 
remunerative or “normative”. Thus, for example, 
Samuel Johnson’s loud literary protestations about 
what he perceived as his exploitation tell us nothing 
about the attitudes or intentions of his patron, Lord 
Chesterfield. 
Note that many patronage relationships are 
asymmetric in another sense: they do not involve 
equitable “exchange” in its traditional sense: The 
teacher who gives knowledge, information or skill to a 
student does not receive the student’s ignorance in 
exchange. The patron who gives to a charity, or 
directly to the poor is a much more complex case: 
while the patron may not expect an equitable return, 
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some reciprocation in terms of recognition, status, 
gratitude may be involved. The current view that all 
common relations involve “exchanges” is thus one 
requiring a good deal of additional close examination. 
  
 
Conclusion 
The vocabulary of ordinary English contains a robust 
vocabulary for speaking of nonprofit and voluntary 
action. Terms like common, benefit, benefactory, 
endowment, heritage, legacy, treasury, collection, 
repertory, regime and patronage provide a conceptual 
matrix for denoting and explaining nonprofit and 
voluntary action. Moreover, they provide a vocabulary 
that places emphasis where many have argued it 
belongs-- on the uncoerced cooperation of peers.  For 
the most part, we may talk of issues and matters of 
common concern by utilizing long standing English 
terms like commons, beneficiary and endowment. In 
other cases, there are no existing terms for important 
ideas and we need to apply well-understood principles 
of language construction to coin terms like 
benefactory. In both cases, the robustness of language 
serves us well. 
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If people living in democratic countries had no right and no inclination to 
associate for political purposes, their independence might be in jeopardy, but they 
might long preserve their wealth and their cultivation: whereas if they never 
acquired the habit of forming associations in ordinary life, civilization itself would 
be endangered. 
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 
 
 
 
 
4. Civilization: Our Common 
Heritage 
 
wo points made in the previous chapter that 
require additional comment: One is the 
suggestion that the concept of commons is 
broader than and encompasses the concepts of 
nonprofit organization and voluntary association. The 
other is that commons that may be related to varying 
degrees to the American nonprofit organization are 
basic to western civilization, and found in many other 
civilizations and cultures as well. The group portrait of 
commons that begins to emerge in this chapter is based 
upon cursory review of a broad range of historical 
sources. It suggests a view quite different from the 
Tocqueville-inspired vision of American 
exceptionalism found in much of the current nonprofit 
and voluntary action literature. 
T 
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The need for a more complete and detailed historical 
understanding of the commons has long been 
recognized. The 1972 interdisciplinary voluntary 
action task force planning conference identified “The 
nature and development of voluntary action from early 
times to modern society (history of voluntary action)” 
as one of a number of major analytical topics of 
voluntary action theory and research. (Smith, 1972A)  
Since that time, historical and cross-cultural 
understanding of facets of the heritage of nonprofit 
and voluntary action has expanded substantially. 
(Bauer, 1990; Bremner, 1980, 1988; Brown, 1973; 
Hall, 1987; Peterson and Peterson, 1973; Ross, 1974A; 
Ross, 1974B; Seibel, 1990 and others) At the same 
time, the conceptual impact of expanding historical 
insight upon the main body of nonprofit and voluntary 
studies has been limited, as witnessed by the apparent 
belief among many nonprofit and voluntary action 
scholars that the American voluntary association and 
nonprofit organization are unique American 
inventions. The priority placed on the concept of 
heritage, collection and repertory in the preceding 
chapter make it clear that in the theory of the 
commons, the beliefs, rituals and ceremonies and other 
practices of a civilization built up over time represent a 
major set of resources of action in the contemporary 
commons. 
Some parts of this picture have been known far longer. 
Chalmers (1827) wrote an early monograph on the 
problem of endowments from which the usage of the 
term in this work is derived. The article on 
philanthropy in the 1917 Encyclopedia of Religion and 
Ethics, for example, included sections on Chinese, 
Indian, Greek, Roman, Jewish, Early Christian and 
Modern Philanthropy. (Hastings, 1917) An article by 
Chambers (1911) is still one of the most encyclopedic 
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sources available on the long history of charity and 
almsgiving.  There are ten sections, each written by an 
authority for that period: Primitive, Biblical, Buddhist, 
Christian (early, mediaeval, and modern periods), 
Greek, Hebrew, Hindu, Jewish, Islamic (reference is to 
“Law, Muhammadan”), and Roman. References to 
classical sources are woven into the text, and a 
selection of additional references follows each section. 
Bruno (1944) cites and discusses selected references 
covering Oriental, Egyptian, Hebrew, Greek and 
Roman concepts of charity.  
In this chapter, we will examine selected aspects of the 
evolution of the American commons within the 
framework of the heritage of western civilization. In 
large part, the core of this history is the heritage of 
beliefs and practices that evolved from the ancient 
world of the Mediterranean through medieval Europe 
and was transported to the Americas where it took new 
and distinctive shape. This main theme has an 
incredible number of counterpoints that also need to be 
developed, but that limits of space and the author’s 
limited vision preclude considering here.  
In broad outline, the gist of the argument is that a 
civilization and its main features -- cultures, 
languages, technologies, arts, religions, games and 
sports, as well as the organizations that tend bodies of 
knowledge including philosophies, religions and 
sciences, conform in important respects to the 
characteristics of commons. Successful civilizations, 
in contrast with empires and totalitarian regimes, 
evoke in very fundamental ways a level of voluntary 
compliance from those who inhabit them. One can be 
ordered to write music or watch the stars, but the 
highest levels of human achievement associated with 
the triumphs of any civilization cannot be coerced. 
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Moreover, the resources of language and culture, as 
well as fundamental senses of purpose, a sense of 
mutuality and ‘fellow-feeling’ and basic standards of 
justice and fairness are all implicit in what we mean by 
a civilization. The distinct forms these commons take 
in modern liberal democracies are variants on larger, 
older and broader themes. 
Civilization is as much a product of human effort as 
any other aspect of economic, social and political 
development. The total social product of a society is 
not simply measured by its GNP. The development of 
any of the components of civilization beyond its 
present state is dependent upon the uses that are made 
of the social product of society. This is as true of the 
cultural achievements of a civilization as of outputs of 
material products.  
 
Civilization And Development 
Focussing on civilization in this way allows us to point 
up the critical role of social surpluses and the leisure 
classes who control them as important aspects of the 
relation between the economy and the commons. For 
example, connections can be shown between the 
leisure time cultural and associational activities of 
workers in Europe between 1590 and 1914. (Yeo and 
Yeo, 1981) The real product of any society is formed 
in its leisure as well as its labor, and includes its 
sciences, arts, literatures, music, philosophies and 
religions as well as the techniques and practices of 
daily living that make up its "way of life", and the 
many other artifacts that together compose its culture.  
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To be sure, a portion of the social product of all 
societies must be devoted to assuring the survival of 
members of the society and the continuation of its 
basic infrastructure of social institutions. Action to 
assure survival and social reproduction is the real 
meaning of labor in an economic tradition running 
from Aristotle to Adam Smith and Karl Marx. (Arendt, 
1958 )  Another portion of the social product, together 
with the natural resources controlled by the society, 
provides the basis for organizing future production. In 
an affluent society, several broad alternatives emerge 
for use of the remaining social product after the basic 
survival needs of the society are assured: Surpluses 
that might be directed back into increased production 
can also be employed to support personal leisure or 
dedicated to the pursuit of public goods, as diverse as 
the building of empires, public welfare, defense of 
civil rights and liberties, or construction and 
maintenance of highways. A third option, even in 
relatively poor economies at levels of development 
barely above subsistence is support for the 
unproductive labor of distinct leisure classes -- priests, 
scholars, poets, scientists, artists, musicians and 
others.  
 
Prehistory 
Preliterate cultures don’t leave documents and “lost” 
civilizations don’t leave audio or video recordings. As 
a result, we typically know a good deal more about the 
material aspects of prehistoric cultures than we do 
about their intangible, symbolic practices, beliefs and 
social structures. Nonetheless, within the limits of the 
existing evidence, it is quite plausible to suggest that 
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many ancient civilizations knew and practiced the 
uncoerced participation, sharing of purpose and 
resources, experiences of mutuality and mutual regard 
and fairness we associate with the commons. 
(Lieberman, 1991) The anthropologist Adolph 
Bandelier’s 1890 novel, The Delight Makers  offers a 
convincing picture of clan associations and kiva 
societies within the complex community life of early 
communities of the American southwest. In all 
likelihood, such practices reach deep into the past of 
many pre-literate cultures and suggest that caring, 
concern and community are anything but signs of 
modern progress. Indeed, the primitive selfishness and 
greed found by Colin Turnbull are more likely the 
products of social disorganization than the “brutish 
nature” projected upon the past by social theorists in 
the tradition of Hobbes. 
Evidence of primitive commons is at least as ancient 
as that of markets and states, and may, in fact, predate 
both. Artifacts suggesting unproductive labor, for 
example, are evident in the remains of a great many 
neolithic and earlier archaeological sites. The earliest 
hunter-gatherers making the transition to agriculture 
did not just fashion available materials into productive 
tools like axes and digging sticks. They used the same 
knowledge and skill to develop tools used for cave 
painting, carving images, prayer sticks, totems and 
other religious objects. 
Moreover, primitive life is seldom the unrelieved 
struggle for survival projected by modernists. Sahlins 
(1972) has argued that primitive man may have had 
relatively large amounts of leisure time punctuated by 
occasional periods of hunting and gathering to assure 
survival. This fits the portrait painted by Herman 
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Melville in his early novels Typee, Omoo and Mardi  
based on first hand observations of Polynesian life. 
Even minimal levels of affluence are capable of 
producing leisure. It is quite plausible that most 
primitive humans knew leisure from a very early date, 
and also plausible that portions of their leisure went 
into the unproductive labors of religion, games, 
decorative arts, myths and storytelling and other 
common goods. Preliterate peoples must have spent 
substantial amounts of leisure time developing, 
learning and performing myths, rituals and 
ceremonies, in order to produce the artifacts that have 
already been discovered and to sustain the legends and 
traditions that have come down to us. 
Commons, characterized by uncoerced participation, 
common purposes, shared resources, mutuality and 
fairness, can arise under conditions of even relatively 
modest affluence. None of the required elements 
assumes high levels of social and economic 
development. An indicator of the extent of prehistoric 
leisure is the presence of one or more classes free of 
the necessity of producing their own food. (Lenski and 
Lenski, 244) To the extent that such unproductive 
classes are found, the potential exists for the 
emergence of characteristic prehistoric commons: 
temple cults, priestly and shaman clans. When a 
distinct leisure class emerges to devotes itself to 
unproductive endeavors, a commons of some type is 
almost certainly present. The resulting leisure classes 
are defined or characterized by their degree of release 
from the burdens of labor, and are an intrinsic part of 
the division of labor. Right up to the present day, 
leisure classes are possessed of varying degrees of 
leisure from the complete idleness of the courtier and 
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industrial age plutocrat to the sabbath (“day of rest”) 
of agricultural peasants and laboring classes.  
Among prehistoric societies, evidence of such 
emergences is clearest through studies of ritual. 
Initiation rituals are a nearly universal form of 
commons among prehistoric peoples. For example, 
Shaw (1991) reports a study of the Samo people of the 
East Strickland plain of Papua New Guinea focused on 
the enactment of Samo cultural values during kandila, 
an elaborate three day initiation ceremony preparation 
for which takes two years. Any people on the brink of 
subsistence, would be unable to tolerate the kind of 
sustained “wealth” of leisure time and surplus 
resources to organize and carry out rituals over such 
extended periods of time. 
Some portion of primitive commons may have 
evolved out of the projection of family life into the 
community. Marriage feasts and bridal dowries are 
consistent evidence of levels of affluence. The same 
can be said for funerals and elaborate grave sites. 
Existing knowledge of these aspects of primitive 
cultures offer detailed and elaborate testimony of their 
role in creating and sustaining the social solidarity of 
communities. We recognize the similar potentials of 
nonprofit institutions such as charities, arts and 
religion for creating and sustaining community 
solidarity. (Van Til,  ) Yet, we have largely ignored the 
obvious functional parallels between primitive and 
modern commons. 
Ritual feasting is another common activity widely 
evident in primitive societies. Sherman and Sherman 
(1990) investigate the ritual significance and political 
economy of feasting among the Samosir Batak of 
Sumatra. Feasts are, by definition the creations of 
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affluent peoples and show many of the signs of 
mutuality, pooling, and the “voluntarism” of the 
commons. Typically, participation in ritual feasting 
would be “voluntary” (at least, any coercive pressures 
to participate are likely to be subtle and not overt); 
mutual, with shared purposes and resources; and 
implicit or explicit rules of fairness (order for 
receiving food, choice of pieces, etc.) 
In some instances conspicuous display of wealth was 
central to the purpose of the feast. It may also have 
been an element in evolving distinctions between 
“public” and “private”. For example, Wilson (1989) 
examines how the development of permanent 
settlements during the Mesolithic period and the 
division of space into public and private areas 
encouraged tendencies to both conceal and display. 
Display in this sense approximates the concept of 
presentation in the theory of the commons. As such, 
the emergence of patronage in the commons discussed 
below signifies a series of major historic shifts in such 
displays -- of wealth, of virtue and much more. 
Patronage of temples, public spectacles and other 
commons constitute historically significant, shift away 
from conspicuous displays of wealth in the grandiose 
private consumption of ritual feasting and the 
substitution of common goods.   
The significance of ritual and its connections to 
common goods is not limited to prehistoric and 
primitive cultures. The distinctive patterns of ritualized 
friendship among ancient Greeks may be directly 
related to the patterns of patronage and philanthropy 
that developed there. (Hand, 1968; Morris, 1986) 
Herman (1987) describes a network of such ritualized 
friendships among the elite of ancient Greek cities. 
Among contemporary societies, Japan is noteworthy 
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for the continuing importance of similar ritual, 
ceremonial and symbolic behavior. Jeremy and 
Robinson (1989) concluded that ceremony and symbol 
are much more important in all aspects of Japanese 
society than they are in the contemporary west. One 
should expect, as a result, to locate the Japanese 
commons in its tea ceremonies, serene gardens and 
road side Shintu shrines as well as more familar forms.  
Two of the most universal categories of material 
artifacts of the ancient worlds are those various 
monumental structures we know as stella and temples. 
Even simple stellae and surviving ritual objects 
suggest the existence at one time of skilled stone or 
wood carvers and builders not exclusively engaged in 
tool-making. Temples suggest not only architects and 
builders but also classes of acolytes and priests.  
Understanding of American nonprofit and voluntary 
action might also be considerably advanced by closer 
examination of its ritual aspects. Mary Jo Deegan 
(1989) uses dramaturgical theory to examine 
American ritual behavior in settings such as football 
games and singles bars. Lincoln (1989) explores ways 
in which myth, ritual and classification hold societies 
together, and how in times of crisis they can also be 
used for social reconstruction. These and other 
perspectives on ritual should readily be applicable to a 
broad range of nonprofit and voluntary action in 
commons. 
In addition to artifacts and rituals, another major 
category of interest with regard to the commons of 
prehistoric societies are the various stella, megaliths 
and monuments that survive and continue to fascinate 
us. The gigantic stone statues of Easter Island, for 
example, must have had some type of religious or 
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ceremonial significance. Likewise, the rock temples of 
Petra, (including the one that was made famous as a 
backdrop in the movie Indiana Jones and the Last 
Crusade). Collins (1988) recently identified the 
iconography and ritual associated with relief 
sculptures inside the cave temple of the Hindu god 
Siva on Elephanta, a small island in the Bombay 
(India) harbor. Meanings and rituals this elaborate and 
detailed imply leisure to develop, sustain and to 
understand. They also imply common project of large 
numbers of people acting jointly. And thousands of 
such examples survive from prehistory.  
Various of the identified megaliths of prehistoric 
Northern Europe, including Stonehenge, are thought to 
have been the monuments of stone age craftsmen. 
Likewise, Egyptian rulers constructed a series of vast 
desert pyramids whose purposes are not entirely clear 
and in the Americas, various ancient Mesoamerican 
peoples constructed elaborate “urban” temple 
complexes whose functions and uses are still not well 
understood. (Childe, 1950; Encyclopedia of Social 
Sciences;  Hardoy, 1968)  We are inclined to view 
such monuments as the constructions of enslaved 
peoples laboring under tyrannical rulers. It may be 
more consistent with the precision and spirituality we 
see in such megaliths that they were the products of 
voluntary labor, possibly inspired by religious ecstacy. 
We already know that similar enthusiasms played a 
role in the human sacrifices of Aztec and Maya temple 
cults that utilized these particular megaliths.  
Meanwhile, in eastern North America, various 
woodland Amerindian populations developed their 
own unique forms of mounds, some of which are 
sculpted into fantastic animal shapes. Even the debates 
over the functions of these mysteries tends to point 
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toward the existence of ancient commons of one type 
or another. Whether these various monuments served 
primarily religious purposes, as some would have it, or 
scientific (astronomical, mathematical and calendrical) 
purposes as others have suggested is not especially 
important when we realize that both religious and 
scientific purposes are subsumed by the concept of the 
commons: These were the projects of civilized and 
affluent leisure classes, and by their very existence, we 
can infer the existence of distinct types of commons in 
the prehistoric world.  
Further studies of prehistoric ritual and monument 
under the rubric of the commons may shed some 
interesting light upon current interest among nonprofit 
and voluntary action scholars in the institutional 
relationships between the market, the state and the 
commons. Archaeological and anthropological studies 
of the village peoples (“pueblo indians”) of the 
American southwest, for example, point toward a 
civilization of settled communities lacking a political 
state until very recent times. Evidence also points 
toward the existence of elaborate and extensive 
networks of “voluntary associations” (for example, 
kiva societies and clans) in these communities, and a 
monumental architecture of great subtlety and 
aesthetic originality, linking kivas and pueblos into an 
organic whole with nature. (Sculley, 1975)  We find 
among these same village peoples extensive and 
elaborate mythologies (for example, The Hopi Way), 
rituals (for example, corn dances) and ritual objects 
(for example, kachinas). The assertion that some 
measure of affluence and leisure are essential, but that 
great wealth is not essential is well illustrated by the 
rich commons of these village peoples, that arose out 
of the meagre social surpluses of communities forced 
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to scratch a living out of the “dry farming” of the 
southwestern desert region. 
 
Civilization and Urbanization 
However pervasive commons may have been prior to 
the dawn of civilization, the urban revolution and the 
development of cities was certainly a hallmark in the 
evolution of commons. Arnold Toynbee argued that 
the presence of a leisure class is consistent evidence of 
a civilization. (Toynbee, 1967, 13)  The agricultural 
and urban revolutions at the dawn of civilization must 
have had profound implications for commons, 
especially in dramatically increasing the possibilities 
for the range of activities of urban leisure classes freed 
from the necessity of their own subsistence. Not only 
do we see dramatic increases in the size and scale of 
urban monuments in the cities of Mesopotamia, the 
Middle East, China and elsewhere, but also the 
proliferation of entirely new unproductive urban 
occupations and professions: priests, artists, scholars, 
and performers (athletes and actors). In pre-
agricultural and pre-urban cultures, performers of 
ritual and builders of monuments were most likely 
part-time amateurs devoting their leisure to such 
pursuits, as we say, “after work”. In cities, we see the 
emergence of leisure class occupations. 
Spates and Macionis (1986) believe that the key to 
understanding cities as a major social phenomenon is 
to examine them in historical, cross-cultural, and 
interdisciplinary context using major theories for 
analysis. The basic approach taken in the remainder of 
this chapter is to examine the growth of civilization 
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and urban development through the theoretical lens of 
the theory of the commons.  
Temples also suggest surpluses of food, spices and 
other substances to be used in sacrifices and ritual 
observances. Finally, inferring from historical 
knowledge, we can say also that monuments and 
temples probably also imply a patron, or group of 
patrons. Such patrons are generally necessary for 
financing, legitimacy, protection, labor supply and 
numerous other purposes. Sometimes, as in the case of 
Kings Solomon, Asoka, and Agamemnon (sp), Queen 
Cleopatra, Pericles, Alexander the Great, the Ptolemies 
and others, specific patrons are known to us. In other 
cases, we can only infer such patronage.  
Thus, we can surmise that there may have been 
patronage by the rulers and at least an elemental 
commons associated with the Ziggurat in the city-state 
of Ur in ancient Mesopotania, for example, even 
though we know almost nothing about the cult 
practiced there. We know somewhat more about the 
role of royal patronage in the construction of the 
Egyptian pyramids, although we still know little about 
their use. The First and Second Temples at Jerusalem 
are particularly important in this respect. Not only are 
they important in the development of both Judaism 
and Christianity. We also know a good deal about the 
construction, financing, organization and cult practiced 
there, as well as their relationships to other subordinate 
Hebrew temples. (deVaux, 1965) 
 The patterns of urban commons of the ancient middle 
east are also repeated elsewhere. When the imperial 
Chinese capital of Changan grew into the largest city 
in Asia during the 8-9th centuries, it had an estimated 
population of a million people, and more than 100 
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Buddhist, Taoist, Zoroastrian and Nestorian Christian 
temples were among its institutions. (Wright, 1967)  
One of the contested points in the theory of civilization 
involves the role of writing: Is writing the central 
indicator of the rise of civilization? And did writing 
emerge for largely utilitarian, business purposes or for 
some other reason?  In Asia, perhaps more so than 
elsewhere in the world, the development of writing 
very early attained not only a utilitarian, but also a 
common importance. Scribes, scriptoria (or hand-
crafted “copy centers”) have also been part of the 
division of labor of even minimally affluent literate 
societies from very ancient times. Thus, near Taegu, 
Korea, for example, a Buddhist monastery has 
maintained the entire Buddhist canon on a set of more 
than 80,000 wooden blocks important in the 
development of printing for the past 800 years. (Woo-
Keun, 148) Similar examples can also be found in the 
west: During the so-called “Dark Ages” of western 
civilization, virtually the entire canon of ancient Greek 
and Roman texts was maintained -- and recopied from 
one generation to the next -- at a handful of isolated 
Irish monasteries. (DePaor, 1958) 
It should be clear from the above that commons can be 
traced into early human prehistory, and tied directly to 
the emergence of leisure classes and the development 
of some type of norms emphasizing common display 
(“for the good of us all”) over purely private 
ostentation. Moreover, the evidences of prehistoric 
commons in the diverse forms of rituals, monuments 
and ritual objects, are sufficiently widespread to justify 
the speculation of multiple origins of common 
practices as well as their virtual universality as a 
human form.  
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Athens 
Ancient Greek and Roman civilizations both 
incorporated distinctive philanthropic practices and 
institutions.(Finlay, 1974; Hand, 1968; Gold, 1982; 
Gold, 1987; Wiseman, 1982) In fact, classical Greek 
commons were so extensive that it would require an 
entire monograph to cover the subject completely. In 
this discussion, we can only hope to point up some of 
the highlights and link them to our principal concern 
with the theory of the commons. 
The evolution of the Ancient Greek commons is a 
record of the emergence of distinctive patterns of 
philanthropy and associations within the Homeric 
leisure class of prehistoric Greece; the transformation 
and diffusion of aristocratic practices in the democratic 
context of the Athenian polis; and the rediscovery of 
these practices in the classicism of the West in the 
18th century. The exact origins of the earliest Greek 
philanthropic practices are lost in the mists of history. 
They probably parallel to a considerable extent the 
prehistory of primitive common practice noted above. 
According to Parker, “(G)ift giving was perhaps the 
most important mechanism of social relationships to 
Homeric society.” (1986, 265)  Homeric and classical 
Greek giving was an expression of peer-oriented 
“reciprocal friendship” and mutual aid among 
aristocrats quite unlike modern notions of philanthropy 
and charity. Homeric gift giving may well have been 
the survival of ancient village mutual aid in the new 
circumstances of an emergent urban elite with vastly 
increased wealth and power. In this respect, it 
resembles the emergence of an American 
philanthropic elite in the “Gilded Age” plutocracy of 
19th and early 20th Century America. 
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Gradually, reciprocal norms of Greek village gift 
giving may have evolved into the ritualized aristocratic 
patronage obligations known as liturgia. (Finlay, 
1974; Hornblower, 1986)  Pericles is credited as the 
founder of classical Athens, by virtue of his role as 
patron of the Athenian Parthenon and other structures 
of the Acropolis. (Bowra, 1967) Pericles’ patronage 
was accomplished by redistributing League funds 
contributed by other Greek city states for war against 
Persia. (Boardman, 1986, 298) Although the method 
and the size of funds was somewhat unique, Pericles’ 
act of patronage was not. Hornblower (1986) 
concludes that “aristocrats such as Cimon and Pericles, 
by their political and military leadership, brought in 
the public wealth that subsidized the buildings and 
sculptures of Phidias, Ictinus, and Mnesicles on the 
Acropolis; and by making available their private 
wealth for public purposes, they financed the festivals 
and dramatic productions that gave classical Athens its 
attractive power. (This was the liturgy system, a tax on 
the rich that conferred prestige when taken beyond 
what was obligatory.) Pericles’ first known act was to 
pay for Aeschylus’ great historical opera, the Persae. 
We know this...from a list carved on stone.” (127) The 
archaic Greek ethical model of philanthropy as 
obligatory at a minimal level and status-conferring at 
higher levels appears to have important ramifications 
that have not yet been discussed in the context of the 
commons. 
The Peloponnesian War of 431 BC, destroyed the 
power and influence of the original aristocratic class of 
Athens and undermined its philanthropic activity. 
However, the citizens of the emergent democratic city 
state followed the example of the aristocratic 
obligations of patronage and reciprocity, with notable 
result. Hornblower credits Athenian democracy and 
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aristocratic patronage of culture (paideia) as important 
in the emergence of Athens as the premier Greek city 
state. (131) Classical Greek patronage extended very 
broadly to include construction and operation of vast 
numbers of temples, comic, tragic and choral theatres 
(Levi, 156-7); public hospitals (Levi, 163); oracles at 
Delphi and elsewhere; sporting events and games at 
Olympia (Finlay and Pleket, 1976); and a broad range 
of other community affairs. These were not public (in 
the modern sense of tax-supported ) events or 
facilities, but were instead supported, as in the past, 
through the liturgical system of patronage. 
Liturgical patronage, however, was not the only 
feature of the Greek pursuit of common goods. Many 
modern forms of association also have counterparts in 
Greek life. The democratic political organization of 
the polis was essentially an association of adult males. 
(Murray, 207) As such, it was one of several major 
forms of association prominent in Athenian life. The 
symposium was a kind of private drinking club. Every 
male Athenian citizen belonged to a phratry  (from 
which the modern term fraternity derives). Originally 
aristocratic warrior bands, such phratries were 
involved in all the main stages of a man’s life and the 
focus of his social and religious activity (Murray, 
208). There are, in fact, certain intriguing similarities 
between the Athenian phratries the kiva societies of 
the American pueblo indians and other similar urban 
male associations. The probable emergence of such 
“brotherhoods” from essentially military origins might 
take many other forms as well. For example, the 
syssitia, or mess groups of Sparta were the basis of the 
entire social and military organization of that city-
state. 
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In ancient Greece the civil society of the commons 
was largely male-dominant. Greek dieties of both 
genders were abundant, but social participation by 
women in commons figures in only tangentially and 
occasionally (as with the Vestal Virgins). 
 Other types of association were common in other 
Greek cities as well. In Athens, there were also 
aristocratic religious groups called gennetai, whose 
members claimed descent from common ancestors and 
monopolized the priesthoods of important city cults. 
Gymnasia were not merely physical facilities, as 
today, but also the sporting clubs who used them. 
“There were benefit clubs and burial clubs and clubs 
associated with individual trades and activities. There 
were religious and mystical sects and intellectual 
organizations such as the philosophical schools of 
Plato and Aristotle.” (Murray, 209) 
The philosophical schools of Ancient Athens also 
belong within the profile of what we are calling 
commons. Plato's Academy existed for centuries as an 
educational common. Like so many other commons 
prior to the modern democratic era in philanthropy, the 
Athenian schools probably had rich aristocratic or 
royal patrons. Plato was, quite probably, a wealthy 
man who began the Academy within his own 
household a few miles outside of Athens. As such, he 
may either have been his own patron, or he might have 
had help from others.  
 Aristotle, however, was not independently wealthy, 
and required philanthropic patronage to launch his 
own philosophical school. He was trained at the 
Academy and later set up his own philosophical 
school, the Gymnasium, with the help of Philip of 
Macedon, father of Alexander the Great, whom 
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Aristotle had tutored. Some authorities speculate that 
Aristotle may have left Plato's Academy after being 
passed over as Plato's successor. In any case, other 
philosophers followed similar paths, and philosophical 
schools become numerous enough in classic Athens 
that it is reasonable to suggest a regional concentration 
of schools, akin perhaps to well known American 
service clusters such as the insurance industry 
concentration in Hartford, the movie industry in 
"Hollywood", or the computer industry concentrations 
in Silicon Valley and Route 128 in Boston or the 
Research Triangle in North Carolina. 
It is important to remember that Greek philosophical 
schools were not all merely centers for contemplation 
and Socratic dialogue. Aristotelian science, in 
particular, was more akin to a modern scientific field 
work, and the Lyceum may have had something of the 
air of a modern nonprofit research laboratory or 
institute. One authority estimates that at one time 
Aristotle may have had over a thousand researchers in 
the field throughout the Mediterranean region. The 
logisitics of support for such an army of investigators 
would challenge the resources of any modern 
nonprofit. 
Another important off-shoot of the Athenian 
philosophical movement of great importance to the 
rise of modern science centuries later was diffusion of 
the concepts of science and philosophy: Ancient 
libraries and scriptoria at Alexandria, Toledo, and 
other sites collected and duplicated an astounding 
wealth of knowledge and information and kept it alive 
for hundreds of years. Under the Ptolemies, Greek 
rulers installed by Alexander, the Greek city of 
Alexandria in Egypt became headquarters of what we 
might today call a private university -- a scientific and 
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philosophical complex centered on the famous Library 
of Alexandria. (Forster, 1961) In this setting, 
important ancient discoveries regarding Euclidean 
geometry, solar and astronomic calculations, and 
detailed knowledge of animal and plant taxonomies 
were preserved and passed on. Later, monastic 
libraries and scriptoria in Cordoba, Celtic Christian 
Ireland and elsewhere forged the essential links 
between the knowledge of the ancient and modern 
worlds. The modern world would know nothing of 
Greek philosophy, science, medicine, drama or poetry 
without these links. Each was, in all probability, an 
endowed institutions with one or more wealthy patrons 
and a class of attendants and functionaries devoted to 
its operations in a manner not inconsistent with 
modern nonprofit research libraries and laboratories. 
In each of these cases, public recognition and 
affirmation of patrons must have been an important 
consideration of some importance. The previously 
discussed ethics of liturgy would suggest as much, as 
would the frequency with which patrons were 
memorialized on stella. Meritt, Wade-Gery, and 
McGregor (1939) collected a four-volume catalog of 
English translations of the inscriptions on all of the 
various Athenian tribute stellae that had been located 
to that point.  
In sum, we find in ancient Greece a complex variety of 
commons: festivals, temples, liturgia and paideia, 
ampitheatres, spectacles, hospitals, oracles, games, 
stadia, the polis association itself, symposia, phratries, 
syssitia, gennetai, gymnasia, academies, lyceums and 
libraries. In addition, the legacy of Greek commons 
also includes the bi-level ethic of obligation and 
recognition already mentioned and the original legal 
principle of autonomy upon which the assumption in 
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chapter 3 is based:  ‘If a deme or phrateres or 
worshippers of heroes or gennetai or drinking groups 
or funerary clubs or religious guilds or pirates or 
traders make rules amongst themselves, these shall be 
valid unless they are in conflict with public law.’ 
(Murray, 209) 
 
The Hellenistic Age 
The Hellenistic Age generally refers to the period after 
the classic age of Athenian Greece, and to the process 
of Greek culture disseminating throughout the 
Mediterranean region. An important element in this 
diffusion was the continuing norm of aristocratic 
responsibility for patronage of at least some Greek 
commons. Most Hellenistic cities, for example, had 
temples and amphitheaters that housed subsidized 
productions of Greek drama. Further, the Hellenistic 
period was “the golden age of Greek science...” 
(Barnes, 381) Among the sciences, astronomy and 
medicine were particularly strong. (Barnes, 383) It 
seems reasonable to assume that as Greek arts and 
sciences were disseminated, the practices of support 
for them (liturgia and paideia ) were disseminated 
with them.  
“We know most about (Hellenistic) patronage in 
Alexandria, where the Ptolemies’ record was 
important but limited: the literature they patronized did 
not produce major talents in history and philosophy. 
They had an alphabetical list of pensions, a museum 
and two libraries. They had a serious need for a royal 
tutor to teach the little princes and a royal librarian to 
preside over the growing arsenals of books. Long-term 
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patronage was for useful industry: tutoring, science, 
the library and textual scholarship.” (Price, 349)  
In the following, Price summarizes the character of 
Ptolomeic patronage: “All the (Hellenistic) courts had 
libraries, even on the Black Sea, but Alexandria’s are 
the most famous. Followers of Aristotle had settled in 
that city with memories of their master’s learned 
society and great collection of books. Probably they 
suggested the idea of a royal museum and library to 
the first Ptolemy. They royal library was probably 
attached to the colonnades and common room of the 
museum and served more as a vast arsenal of books 
than as a separate set of reading rooms. Nearly half a 
million book-rolls are alleged to have been stored 
inside, while another 42,000 are said to have lived in a 
second library attached to the temple of Serapis. Texts 
became hot royal property. When ships landed in 
Alexandria they were searched for books. Any found 
on board had to be surrendered for royal copying in 
scrolls stamped with the words ‘from the ships’. The 
‘borrowing’ of the master-scrolls of the great 
tragedians from the Athenians was one of the sharpest 
coups of Ptolemaic diplomacy. Pirating, in our modern 
sense, was a Hellenistic invention. As demand was 
insatiable, supply rose to meet it, aided by plausible 
forgery. ... 
“Why did the kings bother? As the Aristotelians had 
no doubt explained to a willing Ptolemy I, libraries 
and scholarly studies kept a king abreast of man’s 
understanding of the world. The Ptolemies had had 
good tutors and they did not lose interest in 
learning....Royal extravagance inflated these tastes, 
and when others entered the race, book collecting 
became a mad competition....” (Price, 341) 
  136 
Hellenistic cities also developed a distinctive variation 
on the gymnasion in which sports training was 
combined with libraries and lectures. (Price, 343) 
Another form of Hellenistic association that were a 
variant on the symposia were societies in which 
members would dine and patronize recitals (perhaps a 
kind of early dinner theatre). It is possible that other 
Hellenistic cities may also have developed additional 
common innovations in this period.  
Ancient Greek culture and the Hellenistic period in 
particular also saw development and refinement of 
another form of association familiar to modern 
readers: Military federations or leagues of cities were a 
common feature known to the Greeks and used for 
common defense. It was from such a league, for 
example, that Pericles purloined the funds used for the 
Athenian Acropolis. Another multicity association 
known as the Delphic amphictyony long served as an 
international panel that controlled the affairs of the 
shrine of Apollo, home of the famous oracle of Delphi, 
with its power to declare ‘sacred wars’. (Hornblower, 
129)  Such leagues took on renewed importance with 
the decline of Athens as the single most powerful 
center of Greek culture.  
The ancient Greeks appear to have had a broad and 
subtle grasp of the potentials and possibilities of 
commons and common goods and applied their 
knowledge to a broad variety of situations. Ancient 
Greece also represents an important historic point of 
evolution from the prehistoric commons to the modern 
association. An important, but largely unanswered 
question, is whether the Homeric Greeks developed 
the basis of Greek commons on their own or learned 
them from other earlier cultures.  
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Rome 
While cities from Ur to Athens incorporated common 
elements from the very earliest times, perhaps no city 
in human history is more reflective of the range and 
diversity of the commons than Rome. From the days 
when it was the center of the Roman empire, through 
its medieval role as the center of Christianity down to 
the present day, Rome was a city built on grants. 
(Boulding, Pfaff and Hovarth, 1972) It was also a city 
in which leisure figured importantly. (Balsdon, 1969) 
Rome constitutes a unique exception to generalizations 
about the economic basis of city life. Rome was never 
at any point in its history an important manufacturing 
or trading center. (Girouard, 118) The economic 
foundations of the city have, from the earliest times, 
been built on tribute and devotion, on donations and 
pilgrimages, and on the “unrelated business income” 
of the farms, factories of imperial and papal holdings. 
“Its dual role as the capital of western Christendom 
and the successor of Imperial Rome made (the 
medieval and modern city) a center for politics, 
finance, education, science, art, archaeology, tourism, 
entertainment and pleasure, as well as religion.” 
(Girouard, 132) In Rome, perhaps more than other 
world city, the commons holds the dominant position 
over market, state and (due to celebacy) the family. 
Rome is as important as Greece for modern 
philanthropic, charitable and other common 
innovations derived from Roman practice. Between 
1895 and 1900, Waltzing produced a four-volume 
study in German of Roman associations and 
corporations. Medieval and modern western 
  138 
fundraising practice built upon a Christian religious 
and ethical basis is attributable to Roman origin. In 
321 AD, Constantine permitted donations and 
bequests to the church and from then on substantial 
ecclesiastical endowments began to grow in the city 
and throughout Christian Europe.  
In classical Rome, we see the evolution of a system of 
patronage quite different from the Greek pattern, a 
difference with implications for all of medieval 
Europe. In both aristocratic and democratic variations, 
Greek patronage stressed the “horizontal” obligations 
of the giver to peers. By contrast, the Roman 
emphasis, particularly during the Middle Era was upon 
the “vertical” obligations of clientela, that stressed the 
obligations of the recipient to the giver. On this basis, 
clientela were to become traditional, often inherited 
relationships of dependence of one person on another 
and the principal integrating factor in Roman society 
of the middle Republic. (Crawford, 407)  
According to Gold, “ancient and modern notions of 
patronage are quite different. There was indeed no one 
word in Greek or Latin for ‘patron’;  the Latin 
patronus means quite specifically an advocate or the 
former master of a freedman. A supporter of another 
man in any situation was often called 
simply...amicus.” (or “friend”) (5) Gold, whose 
principal interest is the analysis of literary and poetic 
patronage, notes also that an understanding of Roman 
politics is not possible without understanding the 
Roman concept of clientage. Reciprocity is an 
important concept in both Greek and Roman 
patronage. However, Greek patronage of all types was 
much more equitable among peers, whereas Roman 
patronage seems to be tied into social hierarchies of 
status and power through which the cliens were 
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dependent on their patrons for support and social 
position.  
Other important Roman innovations were the annona 
civica (civic foundations) and fideocommisia (trusts) 
that figure importantly in Roman law. (Johnson, 1989) 
Roman trust law is an important, if not well 
understood, topic for contemporary nonprofit and 
voluntary action research for a number of reasons. 
German, French and other European commons have 
grown up within the tradition of Roman law, while 
American and British commons have grown up within 
the tradition of English common law.  Roman law is 
most important, however, as the base out of which the 
religious commons of medieval Christianity evolved. 
 
Ancient World: Summary 
What can be said, by way of summary, about the role 
of commons in the ancient world? Purcell summarizes 
the matter thus: 
“The reciprocal relations of benefaction, competition 
and prestige among those who controlled the resources 
of the ancient world are found throughout antiquity, 
from the aristocracies of the archaic Greek cities to the 
Roman Emperors. In these relations were included the 
whole range of ancient cultural activities, from 
architecture and utilitarian building to the patronage of 
literature, music, and painting -- also to the 
entertainments of the circus and the ampitheatre and 
the religious festivals that were the setting of almost 
all of these forms of display. This characteristic aspect 
of ancient society produced a type of bond between the 
élite and the peoples of the cities that was unique -- a 
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major source of the stability and continuity that we 
associate with the Greek and Roman world. 
“Unfortunately, ancient culture had never rid itself of 
its uneasy companion, warfare. In the end this aspect 
came to be dominant... At that point the end of the 
ancient world was in sight.” (Purcell, 590) 
 
Arab Civilization 
It is conventional in American treatments of the 
development of western civilization for a discussion of 
medieval civilization to follow directly after a 
discussion of ancient Greece and Rome. Most of us are 
only dimly aware of the Arabic urban cultures that also 
arose out of the mixture of classical and Islamic 
influences in the Arabic world during the so-called 
“Dark Ages” of Western Europe, and made important 
contributions to logic, mathematics, science and other 
fields. (See, for example, Netton, 1991) 
This civilization evolved distinctive forms of Arab 
urbanism in an archipelego of cities stretching from 
Casablanca in the west, to Baghdad in the east and as 
far north as Cordoba in the west, Istanbul in the East 
and south to Khartoum. (Arberry, 1967; Hourani, 
1991)  This was a world of affluence and high culture, 
and a world in which commons figure in important 
ways.  
In general, however, the subject of the Arabic 
commons is too little understood and documented 
outside specialized scholarly circles to explore 
thoroughly here. (Bishai, 1973; Blanchi, 1989)  What 
is clear, however, is the impact of Islam on the Arabic 
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commons. Indeed, two of the five “pillars of Islam” 
speak directly to common goods: One of these is the 
common institution of the pilgrimage, or sacrificial 
journey to a sacred or holy place for a purpose such as 
purification or enlightenment. For the faithful affluent 
enough to afford it, at least one pilgrimage to Mecca in 
a lifetime is an expectation. An Islamic (or other 
religious) pilgrimage meets all of the criteria of the 
commons, and is, in the context of world history an 
important and distinctive form of common good.  
In the development of Islam, the city of Mecca (the 
home town and base of operations of the prophet 
Mohammed) rapidly emerged as the premier sacred 
site, and has remained the focus of Islamic 
pilgrimages. Even today, Mecca remains closed to 
non-Muslims. Religious pilgrimages by people of 
other religions are important and distinctive forms of 
common action. Yet, there are no studies of the 
economics, social organization, history, or other 
aspects of the pilgrimage as a form of common action.  
The second Islamic commons to be noted here is 
another of the pillars of Islam -- the distinctive set of 
charitable practices associated with zakat, or Islamic 
charity. Closely related to this is the distinctive Islamic 
foundation, or waqf. (Hourani, 1991; Coulson, 1964, 
264; McChesney, 1991; Simsar, 1940) While the 
history of Islamic commons may be well known to 
Islamic scholars, (the majority of whom are not 
English-speaking,) an English language scholarly 
study of this topic would represent a significant 
contribution to further understanding of the commons 
in its full multicultural and historical context. 
Incidental evidence on this is suggestive that more is 
to be found. Simsar (1940) discusses a waqf in Turkey 
that survived from the 16th into the 20th century. 
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Moreover, the waqf is not the only indication of 
common activity in moslem countries. Khairi (1984) 
found evidences of gift exchanges among family and 
friends in modern day Amman, Jordan. Daniel (1970) 
reviews modern American philanthropic efforts in the 
region since 1820.  
 
Medieval Europe 
Several important types of commons are also to be 
found in the history of medieval Europe: the role of 
monasteries, cathedrals and universities as medieval 
commons within the dominant Christian civilization; 
the medieval system of charity; the emergence of 
synagogues and Jewish communities as alternative 
commons in the same civilization; and the common 
aspects of two distinctive medieval institutions: guilds 
and fairs.  
Synods/Conferences 
In contemporary religion, the term synod is used by 
some protestant denominations (Lutherans, for 
example) to describe a commons that is, at the same 
time a league, or association of associations (or 
congregations) and an annual conference held by 
members of the association for purposes of dialogue 
and debate. Other protestant denominations have other 
terms for the same phenomenon. Methodists, for 
example, use the term “annual conference” to refer 
both to the annual convocation and the association of 
all those who convene. Within the Roman Catholic 
church, such convocations are much less frequent, but 
serve similar purposes. The last Vatican Council was 
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convened in 1960’s, and is still famous (infamous, in 
some circles) for its doctrinal and ritual revisions.  
Regardless of title, the Christian precedent for such 
events was the remarkable series of convocations -- 
synods or conferences -- held in Rome, Corinth, Nicea, 
Caesurea and other Mediterranean cities in the earliest 
Middle Ages. ( Marty, 1959; Chadwick, 1990) It was 
at such convocations where the fundamental structures 
of the Christian Biblical canon and the distinctive 
doctrines of Christianity were accepted. It is a matter 
of faith for most Christians that these convocations 
were guided by divine inspiration. It is a matter of 
historical fact that these assemblies, sometimes 
embracing hundreds of participants, resemble modern 
religious, scientific and professional conferences in 
many ways.  
Christianity took shape as a coherent religious 
organization within the dialogues of these 
convocations. Even more remarkable to the modern 
analyst accustomed to thinking of early Christian 
congregations as small, beleaguered bands of the 
faithful, is the fact that attendance at many of these 
synods numbered 500 or more “bishops” or local 
leaders. These convocations conform in all respects as 
commons. 
Monasteries, Cathedrals and Universities 
Although the synod may be the most characteristic 
commons of early Christianity, three other common 
institutions are much more characteristic of western 
Christian civilization as it evolved. One of these, 
monasticism, is an important exception to the 
correlation between commons and urbanism, while the 
other two were closely associated with medieval cities.  
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Cathedrals 
By the eleventh century, the combined forces of 
urbanization and trade created sufficient 
concentrations of common wealth and architectural 
insight to enable construct, maintenance and operation 
of the Gothic cathedrals. These imposing edifices were 
not, for the most part, the product of states, like castles 
and palaces, nor utilitarian structures, like the 
marketplaces of Ghent and Flanders. They were 
essentially private religious associations--the 
archdioceses of such cities as Canterbury, Rheims, and 
Paris. Indeed, the Gothic Cathedrals of Europe may 
represent the most dramatic and concrete examples 
ever constructed of the expressive and presentational 
principles of the medieval commons. 
A major cathedral is a much more complex 
organization than the simple assembly or membership 
association of a local parish. Medieval and modern 
cathedrals (which must incorporate associations 
devoted to preservation and/or restoration as well as 
other traditional modes of cathedral organization) 
constitute a bewilderingly complex pattern of 
overlapping, competing, cooperating and functionally 
specialized associations and groups: societies devoted 
to the care and maintenance of many different altars, 
chapels and chantries, choirs, fundraisers, and guilds 
associated with the numerous crafts uniquely 
associated with cathedral construction (for example, 
stone masons and stained glass window makers) are 
just a few of the many associations in the cathedral. 
Separate associations and guilds may also be 
responsible for staging particular festival or holiday 
observations, bells and musical instruments, banners 
and flags, oversight of cripts and cemeteries. 
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Contemporary auxiliaries are devoted to conducting 
tours and illustrated lectures on topics of cathedral 
history, and there is no reason to doubt that similar 
groups existed in the middle ages, particularly given 
the importance of cathedrals as destinations in 
medieval pilgrimages. 
Medieval guilds, societies and confraternities are 
voluntary associations to one degree or another and 
conform to the other criteria of the commons. 
Complexity and division of volunteer labor are as 
much characteristic features of cathedral organization 
as they are of modern local governments. Because of 
this diversity, it is inaccurate to think of cathedrals as 
single organizations. The many associations affiliated 
with a cathedral resemble the nonprofit sector of an 
entire modern community more closely than they do 
an organization in the modern sense. 
Furthermore, there is an important intergenerational 
aspect to cathedrals as commons. Many (perhaps 
most) took 50-100 years or longer to finance and 
construct. In the case of the last medieval gothic 
cathedral, the Washington DC Cathedral completed in 
1990, construction was frequently halted until 
additional funds were raised. Murray (1986) traces 
campaigns for the construction of the French Troyes 
cathedral from the 13th to the mid-16th century. 
Also, because this span of time exceeds the working 
life (and frequently the entire life) of single 
individuals, enduring, intergenerational organizations 
for training, and apprenticeship are an essential 
characteristic of cathedral organization. 
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Monasteries 
Another type of medieval commons figures 
importantly in the growing wealth and influence of the 
medieval Christian Church.  The original Christian 
monastic movement among coebic and aramite monks 
in the Egyptian desert and the solitary Celtic monks of 
fourth century Ireland was largely individualistic in 
character. Medieval monasticism gradually took on an 
increasingly communal organization, and through the 
eleemosynary practices endorsed first by Constantine 
the great medieval monastic orders--Benedictine, 
Clunic, Dominican, Franciscan, Jesuit and others were 
built. In the process, they amassed wealth unparalleled 
in private associations until the rise of the modern 
business corporation. Medieval monasteries may have 
controlled as much as one third of the wealth of 
medieval Europe at one time.  
Western monasticism did not grow up 
indiscriminately. Monastic “orders” displayed their 
own unique and distinctive patterns of organization 
and authority. Monastic order was premised upon 
rules, or constitutions laid down by founders, and 
consisting of manuals of conduct, such as the Rule of 
Benedict of Mercia or the Rule of St. Augustine, and 
the patronus of leaders (abbots) authorized to enforce 
the Rule. (Ross, 1974a)   
Few monasteries functioned as independent 
associations, but were instead incorporated in complex 
leagues or federations of superior, subordinate and 
equivalent institutions termed “orders”. Quite similar 
patterns are evident in the organization of medieval 
Buddhist monasteries in Japan during roughly the 
same time period. (Lohmann and Bracken, 1991) 
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 Cluny was founded on observation of the Rule of St. 
Benedict of Nursia. The Clunic reformation began in 
910 when Duke William I (the Pious) of Aquitaine 
endowed the monastery of Cluny in Burgundy. Cluny 
is significant in part because of its role in the 
emergence of self-governing monastic communities. 
Duke William granted the land in perpetuity and said 
the monks were free to pick their abbot without secular 
influence (Previte-Orton, The Shorter Cambridge 
Medieval History, 471).  
Monastacism as a social movement remains in a much 
diminished form today, in large part because of active 
suppression efforts carried out by rising nation states 
in England, France, Germany and elsewhere. (Gray, 
1967; Woodward, 1966) 
Universities 
A third major component of the medieval commons 
are the universities that began to emerge into 
importance in the 12th century. Universities at Paris, 
Bologna, Oxford, Cambridge and elsewhere, were 
founded in this period, and devoted to learning and 
science. Medieval universities carried on common 
traditions in philosophy and science with important 
connections to the Greek philosophical schools 
through the urban Moslem schools of Baghdad, 
Ahman and other Arab cities. (Hourami, 1991; ) 
One of the medieval donative practices that holds a 
certain mythic importance among contemporary 
college faculty is the practice at the University d’Paris 
in the thirteenth century of students paying faculty 
directly for lectures. The organization of the 
University of Paris into faculties of theology, 
philosophy, law and medicine is also important in the 
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history of modern professions, an important form of 
modern commons. (Douglas, 1967) 
Chantries 
A unique form of medieval commons virtually 
unknown in the modern world was the chantry, 
devoted to the constant repetition of prayers, usually 
on behalf of the founder or patron. In a straightforward 
ecclesiastical transaction, chantries were financed 
through the gifts and donations of wealthy patrons, on 
whose behalf the prayers were said. In this respect, 
chantries represent an excellent example of an offering 
transaction, as discussed in chapter eight. 
Medieval Systems of Charity 
Modern social welfare scholars are only beginning to 
come to fully understand the common organization of 
medieval charity. We can locate medieval systems of 
charity approximately at the convergence of Greco-
Roman philanthropic practices and associations with 
Judeo-Christian ethics in the Middle Ages. (Morris, 
1986) Out of this convergence of values, a substantial 
network of distinctively medieval charities arose. This 
network included not only monastic hostels for the 
refuge of travelers, and household almoners in castles 
and monasteries, but also a broad range of urban 
charity associations.  
Many of these associations were formed in x reaction 
to specific plagues and epidemics or religious 
movements and survived for long periods of time by 
acquiring permanent endowments or combining their 
charity work with a range of other social and 
recreational activities.  
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In Venice, a network of charitable confraternities, or 
schuole  grew up in the thirteenth century as an off-
shoot of the flagellant movement. Through bequests, 
many acquired large amounts of property and by the 
fifteenth century some were extremely rich. Each was 
affiliated with a church or religious house, but 
eventually acquired their own buildings. Although 
they spent the majority of their income on charity, 
most had resources left over for feasting and 
pageantry. (Girouard,  )  
Such developments were by no means restricted to 
Venice or the Italian peninsula. The number and range 
of studies of medieval charity is growing steadily, and 
with it comes an increasingly complex picture of 
activity over longer and longer periods of time. 
Flynn’s Sacred Charity: Confraternities and Social 
Welfare in Spain, 1400-1700 is a study of medieval 
and early modern charitable activities and lay religious 
culture among Spanish Catholics in the city of 
Zamora. Norberg (1985) examines relations between 
rich and poor residents of the French City of Grenoble 
over two centuries, with particular attention to the 
charitable activities of residents. Rubin (1987) 
examines demographic and economic factors 
underlying charity in Cambridge England and the 
forms in which it was offered. 
In an age when travel was often difficult and 
dangerous, hospitality, food and shelter for travelers 
was afforded much higher status as charitable 
endeavor than it currently enjoys. Heal (1990) 
explores changes in the ideal and practice of the social 
virtue of hospitality from 1400-1700.  Medieval 
monasteries, in particular, frequently extended 
hospitality to travelers. 
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Another of the components of charity in the medieval 
period were organized responses to the social 
consequences of urban plagues and epidemics. After 
1350, for example, the Black Death cut the population 
of Florence roughly in half. (Girouard, 33) Other 
estimates suggest that the Black Death in particular 
may have reduced the entire population of Europe by 
25% in a single year. 
One of the more unusual forms of commons in 
medieval Europe were the “tower societies” that grew 
up in Italian cities in the 12th century. These 
associations consisted of networks of families living 
together in neighborhood complexes of buildings and 
bound together by articles of association that specified 
how the complex was to be shared. The affinity to 
urban street gangs is unmistakable.  
The first such articles of clan association date from 
1177. Many clan associations constructed private 
towers (essentially urban castles) for defensive 
purposes. As such, they constituted “protective 
associations” as that term is used in Chapter 9, and are 
at least distantly related to modern street gangs. At one 
time, the phenonenon was widespread in the Italian 
peninsula. In Bologna, for example, there is evidence 
of the existence of nearly 200 such towers built 
between the 12th and 15th centuries. (Girouard, 38-39, 
51)  
The articles of Italian tower societies may represent a 
much broader phenomenon of explicit social contracts 
for protection and mutual aid drawn up by local 
communities. One would expect to find similar 
artifacts for the Hanseatic League and other 
autonomous city-states, for example. Within the 
American experience, the line from the Mayflower 
  151 
Compact to the modern, suburban neighborhood 
association is clear and direct. Such local associations 
are by no means limited to the west. In the sixteenth 
century, Confucianist scholars in Korea advanced the 
science and art of public administration by codifying 
traditional understandings of village and clan 
association into “village codes” that included explicit 
provision for social welfare. (Hahm, 1991)  
Medieval associations were also organized for 
purposes other than religion and charity. Archery 
companies composing civil militia used common 
grounds near city walls to practice with longbows 
(often under the patronage of St. Sebastian) or 
crossbows (under the patronage of St. George). 
(Girouard, 70)  Not all medieval associations were 
religious or for defense purposes, however. The 
Society of the White Bear (Société noble et 
chevaleresque de l’Ours Blanc) originated in Bruges in 
1320 as a jousting society. Jousting was the most 
expensive and prestigious sport of the Middle Ages. 
Another Bruges society, the Poortersloge was, “in 
modern terms, the Polo Club as well as the 
Conservative Club of Bruges.” (Girouard, 98) It was 
also not unusual for medieval bridges to be built with 
donated funds, and they sometimes contained chapels, 
complete with a staff of priests, and were maintained 
either by endowments or collections of user-fees. 
(Girouard, 56-57)  
Inevitably, the patterns of donations and the duration 
of foundations in Roman law meant that the Church 
eventually became the biggest property owner in every 
medieval European city. (Girouard, 42) And by the 
late Middle Ages, endowed ecclesiastical buildings 
were the finest and most impressive in most cities. 
(Girouard, 41)  It was this pattern of economic 
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hegemony that was a principle target of emerging 
nation states beginning in the 16th century. Henry 
VIII’s seizure of English monastic properties in 1538 
was only the best known of several major conflicts 
between the state and medieval commons that signaled 
the end of medieval commons, per se. Henry also 
seized monastic properties in Ireland. (Bradshaw, 
1974) Similar developments occurred in France, 
Germany, China, and elsewhere at various points. In 
fact, the Japanese government takeover of Buddhist 
monastic properties in the Meiji Restoration of 1868 
may well have been the latest example of a worldwide 
trend toward supremacy of the nation-state over the 
medieval commons. (Lohmann and Bracken, 1991) 
However, the pattern of the medieval Christian 
commons was more complex than simply official 
church ownership of properties. One of the more 
fascinating and variegated commons were the various 
Christian lay organizations, formed for diverse 
charitable purposes. In some cases, as in medieval 
Bruges this took the form of communes: “the 
distinctive settlements of the Beguines and the 
Bogards, communities of poor spinsters or bachelors 
working together at spinning or weaving under a 
religious rule....(T)he outer areas were, on the whole, 
the poor ones, and as a result the hospitals, almshouses 
and pawnshops were to be found there.” (Girouard, 
92) In a somewhat similar vein, Bilinkoff (1989) 
discusses the economic and social history of sixteenth 
century Avila in Castile as a center for many 
influential religious mystics and reformers. Like 
modern social movements, medieval communes 
frequently combined the major features of a commons 
with shared residential living. More typically medieval 
than such communes were religious confraternities of 
middle and upper class members of the laity:  
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Commoners were equally active, if on a smaller scale, 
in making new foundations, rebuilding old ones, or 
enlarging them with chapels dedicated to the use of 
guilds, fellowships and other organizations, or to the 
saying of masses for individuals who were usually 
buried in them. Their bequests went to endow a variety 
of functions, for it was accepted that education, health 
and everything else that today would be lumped under 
the heading of social services were the province of the 
Church.”  (Girouard, 42) 
Some hospitals (The label itself is a generic medieval 
term for charitable institutions of all types) were run 
by lay confraternities such as the Order of the Holy 
Spirit, founded by Guy de Montpellier, in the late 
twelfth century and endorsed shortly thereafter by 
Pope Innocent III, who gave it a headquarters in the 
hospital of Sto Spirio in Sassia in Rome. (Girouard, 
45) 
Russell-Wood divides medieval associations into two 
categories: Artisan groups (jurés, scuole or Zünsste) 
served primarily as professional or craft associations 
and confraternities. The first are the famous medieval 
guilds. Members were obliged to attend mass in the 
corporation’s church, he says, and the annual 
celebrations in honour of the patron saint. Mutual aid 
to members might include dowries or alms, with some 
groups maintaining their own hospitals. 
Confraternities, by contrast, were for members of all 
classes who wished to perform acts of charity. 
Confraternities were governed by boards of elected 
directors who served one year terms, and benefits to 
the needy might include dowries, alms, prison aid, 
hospital treatment or burial. Some confraternities 
specialized in a single function, such as the 
Confraternity of St. Leonard at Viterbo, that operated a 
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famous Portugese hospital, or the Confraternity of S. 
Giovanni Decollato of Florence, that specialized in 
accompanying condemned to the scaffold and 
subsequent burial of their bodies. Such medieval 
confraternities operating under the generic name of 
Misericordia  were imported to Brazil and other 
Portugese colonies in Central and South America in 
the 15th and early 16th centuries. (Russell-Wood, 
1968) 
Synagogues and Jewish 
Communities 
Any picture of medieval commons would be 
incomplete without considering the role of medieval 
European Jews. The original temple at Jerusalem was 
a distinctive commons, and the chamber of whispers 
symbolizing the importance of anonymity in Hebrew 
charity (zedakah). (deVaux, 1965; Goldberg and 
Rayner, 1989; Ross, 1974) Throughout the history of 
Western Civilization, independent Jewish 
congregations existed as independent commons in 
Europe and the middle east with none of the official 
stature or broad cultural support of Christian churches 
or Moslem mosques, and often in the face of official 
opposition and hostility and active anti-semitism. 
(Goldberg and Rayner, 1989)  The synagogues of both 
Christian and Moslem medieval cities were clearly 
private, nonprofit endeavors. Further, the Jewish 
communities supporting these synagogues are major 
examples of the concept of the commons as it is 
utilized here.  
Jewish schools and institutes were found in many 
cities and were supported by patrons in a manner 
similar to Greek philosophical schools and early 
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Christian and Moslem ones. In one of these, a 12th 
century Jewish scholar in Cordoba, Maimonides, was 
responsible for codification of an eight-level, 
heirarchical classification of “degrees of charity.” 
(O’Connell, 1989). Comparative study of the 
eleemosynary schools of Greece and Rome, the 
Moslem, Christian and Jewish schools of the middle 
ages (and similar schools found in the Jain, 
Confucianist, Hindu and Buddhist religious traditions) 
should yield important insights into the universal and 
historical qualities of commons.  
Fairs and Holidays 
One of the seeming anomalies of the contemporary 
classification of nonprofit corporations in most state 
law and tax policy in the United States is the 
organization of fairs, carnivals and festivals as 
nonprofit activities. Even more curious to the modern 
eye may be the suggestion that holidays and the 
organized activities associated with them, such as 
Carnivale in Rio and Miami, or Mardi Gras in New 
Orleans also constitute commons. (Orloff, 1980) 
Neither suggestion would have appeared at all unusual 
to the medieval eye, accustomed to all manner of fairs, 
festivals, pageants and celebrations. 
Fairs and carnival and festival commons were often 
associated with market days in medieval Europe. The 
right to hold a market or fair was one of the most 
valuable privileges acquired by religious institutions in 
medieval cities. (Girouard, 43) Several of the religious 
houses of medieval Paris were granted the right to hold 
fairs by French kings. One of the most famous and 
longest lasting of French fairs was the six-week Foire 
de St. Germain, held by the Abby of St. Germain-des-
Pres. It acquired its own permanent buildings, and like 
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most fairs, had its own court and jurisdiction during its 
six-week run. (Girouard, 50) 
The economic importance of medieval fairs is well 
known. Braudel argues that the entire system of long-
term trade in the medieval economy of Europe at one 
time hinged upon a circuit of annual fairs held in the 
Champagne valley. (1986, 82-94)  In the 13th century, 
the twice-annual arrival of the Genoese and Venetian 
fleets into the ports of Bruges and Flanders brought 
the decline of the Champagne fairs into insignificance. 
(Girouard, 87) 
Medieval fairs were usually associated with markets, 
and thus had significant place in the medieval 
European economy. (Braudel, 1986, 82) They were 
also typically associated with feast days and were thus 
occasions for miracle plays, football matches, horse 
races, tournaments, animal baitings, fireworks, clowns, 
jugglers, processions and banquets. (Girouard, 77) 
Examination of modern holidays should not be limited 
just to the standard set of “days off” from work. 
Uncommercialized religious holidays (such as Good 
Friday, Passover, Ramadan, or Kwanzaa), national 
holidays observed by ethnic groups (for example, 
Latvian Independence Day, Simon Bolivar’s birthday) 
and other similar common group observances probably 
reflect more clearly and less ambiguously the 
significance of holidays as defining events in the 
constitution of commons. 
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Byzantium 
Prior to the the division of Christianity into the Eastern 
or Byzantine and Western or Roman realms, the 
Byzantine empire had already created some major 
Eastern commons. Possibly the single most impressive 
and inspiring Christian monument (now a mosque) 
was Santa Sophia in Constantinople, constructed in the 
early fourth century.  
Also important in the transition from ancient to 
medieval worlds was the empire of Byzantium 
controlled by Rome’s challenger to the East, 
Constantinople. Usually noted in the social science 
literature only as a symbol of bureaucracy, the 
Byzantine empire created an incredible range of 
philanthropic and charitable operations including 
“nursing homes”, (gerocomeia); xenones (hospices); 
orphanages, ptocheia (alms houses) xenotapheia 
(cemeteries), homes for the blind and houses of 
correction for reforming prostitutes. (Constantelos, 
1968; Geanakoplos, 1985; Morris, 198; Lewis, 1988) 
Some of the earliest evidences of specialized 
charitable institutions occurred within the Byzantine 
Empire. A renowned asylum was founded by St. Basil 
in Cappadocia in 369 C.E. It was said to be a miniature 
city with special housing for each kind of need 
including the blind. (French, 1932, 44) 
By the beginning of the fifteenth century, the 
Byzantine empire was reduced to a city state of less 
than 100,000 in Constantinople and its immediate 
surroundings. When the city was taken over by the 
Turks in 1453, there was a major transformation of its 
common institutions from Christian to Moslem by the 
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Ottoman Turkish state. The name of the city was 
changed to Istanbul and large numbers of Greek 
residents were expelled, and replaced by Turks from 
Anatolia. Markets were transformed into bazaars, and 
Christian religious buildings were converted to 
Moslem use.  
Interestingly, strategic use of one of the central 
elements of the commons -- the endowment (a.k.a., the 
foundation or trust fund) was a major element in the 
radical transformation of the city. Much of the 
property in Istanbul was converted to religious 
endowments (waqf in Arabic; or in Turkish, vakif) to 
support the Islamic mosques, schools and other 
institutions. (Brunn and others, 1983. 307; Runciman, 
1967) The Waqfizah of 'Ahmed Pasa is a Turkish 
endowment of the sixteenth century that is said to have 
continued at least into the 1940’s (and could 
conceivably still be in existence today). (Simsar, 1940) 
Other Arabic cities, and particularly Baghdad and 
Damascas, are also of major importance to a complete 
understanding of the commons. Whether it is the 
charitable institutions of zakat, the religious 
observances like Ramadan, pilgrimages to Mecca that 
originated there and in the endowments of waqf, or 
other characteristics yet to be identified, it should be 
clear to the reader that the Islamic world is, like those 
of the other world’s religions, characterized by 
distinctive and indigeneous common institutions. Such 
indigeneous Islamic practices lend further support to 
the claim of the universal occurrence of the commons.  
 
Renaissance 
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The Italian Renaissance of the 15th century was 
brought about in no small measure by a dramatic 
upsurge in wealth due to the increased trade activities 
of the Italian city states, and eleemosynary 
transformations of considerable portions of that wealth 
into commons. While the economic growth of 
Florence was less dramatic than that of Venice and 
Genoa, the Florentine renaissance stands high, in 
considerable degree to three generations of a single 
family of patrons (the Medicis) and their incredible list 
of clients. (Action, 1967) 
Nor were the Medicis exclusively patrons of the arts. 
One of the architectural masterpieces of renaissance 
Florence subsidized by Cosimo de’ Medici is a 
children’s home or orphanage known as Ospedale 
degli Innocenti. In Charity and Children in 
Renaissance Florence, Pavitt (1990) argues that this 
facility came about partly because a shift in 
Renaissance public opinion led rich Florentines to 
begin to give less to religious orders and more to 
institutions addressing specific social needs like this 
institution for homeless children. Such “private” 
charity was already well known in Florence before the 
Renaissance. For several centuries prior to the 
Renaissance, the cities of northern and central Italy, 
had been hotbeds for organizing lay confraternities. 
Venice, Milan and Florence are said to have had 
hundreds of such confraternities, or misericordia. 
(Hale, 1967; Russell-Wood, 1968, 3) 
Patronage of individual artists and charity were not the 
only forms of common activity of Renaissance Italy. 
Palisca (1989) discusses The Florentine Camerate, an 
informal interdisciplinary group that prefigures some 
of the royal societies and academies discussed below. 
The Camerate met at the palace of the scholar and 
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music patron Count Giovanni Bardi in Florence during 
the latter part of the sixteenth century. 
Medieval and Modern Commons 
The transition from medieval to modern in the 
commons is not nearly as distinct and abrupt as similar 
transitions in states or markets. There is nothing in the 
history of the commons to correspond with the rise of 
the modern nation-state or the rise of capitalism and 
the industrial revolution. Nevertheless, transformations 
of the state and market left their mark upon the 
evolving commons, as did the protestant reformation, 
the counter-reformation, rationalism, science, 
humanitarianism, and European conquest of the 
Americas.  Common traditions of participation, shared 
purposes and resources, mutuality and fairness 
reaching deep in ancient and medieval worlds have 
been modified, but not fundamentally transformed in 
the modern world.  
 
Reformation Europe 
The Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century is 
often regarded more in terms of changed beliefs and 
religious values and changes in markets and states than 
in terms of its impact upon commons. Commons 
figure prominently in both the protestant reformation 
and catholic counter reformation. While the emerging 
Lutheran, Calvinist and Episcopal churches largely 
substituted one form of ecclesiastical authority for 
another, later movements, including the Puritans, 
Quakers, Anabaptists and Methodists contributed very 
directly to the evolution of group-centered, common 
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authority of religious authority whose implications for 
nonprofit and voluntary action are widely suggested by 
nowhere clearly explicated. (Weber, pp? Brinton, 54-
81 although somewhat dated is still a good read.) 
Something of the emerging differences in commons 
can be seen in the contrast of Amsterdam and Rome in 
this period. Sixteenth century Amsterdam was a 
protestant city devoted primarily to commercial 
activity. The city had no monasteries, cathedral, great 
castle, university or college of any great importance 
and the public squares were devoted primarily to 
commercial activity.  Similarly, there were no 
joustings, masques or giant processions on feast days. 
Yet, Amsterdam exhibited a great deal of common 
activity, some of that illustrate the historical 
relationship of municipal institutions and the 
commons. (Girouard, 161-163) 
Among the associations of Amsterdam was the civic 
guard, a civilian militia that had grown out of 
medieval guilds of long bowmen and cross bowmen, 
and took on a significance as much social as military 
by the sixteenth century. The guard had clubhouses 
and practice fields. (Girouard, 163)  When the city 
became officially protestant in the 17th century 
hospitals, orphanages, almshouses, prisons, schools, 
inns and a lending bank that had been operated by 
religious orders came under control of the city council. 
The city council also handled food and fuel 
distribution to the deserving poor and operated the 
house of correction. There were few beggars and little 
serious poverty in 16th century Amsterdam. Solid 
sewage and garbage were collected by the city and 
sold for fertilizer with revenues supporting the city 
orphanage. (Girouard, 163-165) 
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Counter-reformation Rome offers a marked contrast 
with Amsterdam. Household revels, including operas, 
plays and other entertainments were frequent in lavish 
dinner parties at colleges and palaces. Since there were 
no permanent opera houses or theatres, public 
performances were staged on carts or platforms in the 
streets during feasts and festivals. Bullfights and 
tournaments took place in public squares. The Vatican 
library, one of the greatest libraries in the world, was 
freely available to all. There were no museums; but the 
collections that filled the galleries and courtyards of 
the villas were almost all open to visitors, along with 
their gardens. Donations of classical antiquities to the 
Palazzo dei Conservatori formed an open collection, 
housed after 1645 in the building on the third side of 
Michelangelo’s courtyard, that became the world’s 
first public museum. (Girouard, 129) 
Rome has long been an important center for 
pilgrimages, and the city created a number of new 
counter revolutionary commons, hospitals and 
hospices for visiting pilgrims, and at least seventeen 
confraternities were devoted to pilgrims in the 16th 
century. The pilgrimage figures rose to new heights in 
the last decades of the century. In 1575 the number of 
pilgrims was probably about 400,000. By 1600 there 
were probably more than 500,000 visitors. (Girouard, 
117) 
 
Classicism and The Age of Reason 
Many traditional medieval festivals continued in most 
European cities into the eighteenth century. Indeed, 
some like the Pallio in Ciena have continued to the 
present. Fairs, like St. Bartholemew’s in London, 
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gradually became more important as recreation and 
leisure activities as their commercial significance 
declined. Eventually, “puppet shows, plays, rope-
walkers, waxworks, menageries, fire-eaters, jugglers 
and Punch and Judies took over” giving the term fair 
its current meaning. (Girouard, 184) 
Another important line of development in European 
commons was a social movement for founding 
academies and institutes that provided much of the 
organizational basis for the Renaissance as well as the 
spread of science in the seventeenth century and the 
Age of Reason in the eighteenth century. 
 
Academies of Art, Science and 
Literature 
In the fifteenth century in Italian cities and villas in the 
countryside, groups with an interest in classical 
literature and art began to meet. Many called 
themselves academies in self-conscious emulation of 
Plato’s philosophical school. Members met to 
compose, write and read their own poetry, to read and 
discuss the classical authors, to read addresses on 
ethics or other subjects, to act plays or to perform 
music. Initially, these academies had no organization 
and no special buildings of their own. By the sixteenth 
century, they began to organize formally and develop 
rules. Membership grew and, for some, buildings were 
acquired. Academies began to specialize in law, 
sculpture, painting, language, archaeology, natural 
history, chemistry and even “leisure arts” like fencing, 
riding, dancing, playing cards and shooting. In the 
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, such 
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academies spread throughout Europe, and sometimes 
acquired powerful patrons. Kings and rulers began to 
take an interest in the academy movement and 
patronize what thus became “royal academies”.  
Academies or societies for the cultivation and 
development of German and French were set up in 
1617 and 1635, respectively. Louis XIV of France 
became a major founder of academies: the Académie 
de Danse in 1661; the Académie de Musique, that was 
in effect a royal opera company, in 1666, the 
Académie Royale des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres in 
1663, the Académie Royale de Peinture, on the basis 
of an earlier group in 1667, the Académie Royale des 
Sciences in 1666 and the Académie de l’ Architecture 
in 1671.  
Anyone familiar with the development of modern 
science is aware of the role of academies and scientific 
societies in early scientific research in physics, 
chemistry and biology. In the seventeenth century, 
Rome, Paris and London became major centres of 
academies of scientific research and discovery. An 
informal scientific Accademia dei Lincei  was founded 
in Rome in 1603, but collapsed after Galileo’s 
prosecution by the Inquisition in 1632.  
The associational character of such societies in many 
different societies and cultures is unmistakable. 
(Ellsworth, 1991) The French Académie des Sciences 
gave royal patronage to a group of scientists including 
Descartes and Pascal first organized in the 1640’s. 
Similarly, the Royal Society (‘for improving Natural 
Knowledge’) was founded in London in 1660 and 
given a charter by Charles II in 1662, on the basis of 
an informal group that was first organized in London 
in 1645.  (Girouard, 206-8) Lux (1989) traces the brief 
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history of the Académie de Physique de Caen, a 
scientific institution founded in 1662 in the 
northwestern French city but forced to close in 1672. 
European academies and royal societies of architecture 
also exercised important influences urban design in the 
eighteenth century. L’Enfant’s original plan for the 
Washington Mall, for example, called for it to be “a 
place of general resort....all along side of which may 
be placed play houses, room of assembly, accademies 
and all such sort of places as may be attractive to the 
learned and afford diversion to the idle.” (Girouard, 
253)  Baron Hauptman’s plan for rebuilding Paris and 
the Ringstrasse in Vienna are other examples of the 
same trend.  
 
Rationalism and Humanitarianism 
Traditional medieval charitable practices began to 
show the influences of rising humanism and 
humanitarianism in the eighteenth century. Sherwood 
(1989) offers a study of Inclusa, an eighteenth century 
foundling hospital that was originally set up to protect 
families from the shame of illegitimate birth. Ransel 
(1988) describes the origins and operation of two 
foundling homes established by Catherine the Great in 
Moscow and Petersburg in midcentury. Risse (1985) 
examines the care of poor patients at the Royal 
Infirmary of Edinburough during the Enlightenment 
and its program of clinical instruction for apprentice 
surgeons and medical students. 
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Socialism and The Labor Movement 
Voluntary mutual insurance funds were widespread in 
Europe by the end of the 19th century, but disappeared 
rapidly with the advent of social insurance. (deSwaan, 
1986; Kropotkin, Chapter VI, undated) 
 
Commons in the Americas 
The European exploration of the Americas that began 
in the late 15th century was followed by a period of 
intense colonization. Too little is currently known of 
the commons of the indigenous populations resident in 
the Americas when the Europeans and their 
involuntary African slaves began arriving. What we do 
know is intriguing: Aztec and Maya societies may 
have incorporated a variety of leisure class groups and 
occupations. Among the Maya, in particular, these 
groups appear to have achieved subtle and 
sophisticated knowledge in astronomy, mathematics, 
and other fields. Town (pueblo) life in the North 
American southwest incorporated sodalities as well as 
clans based on kinship. (Hill, 1970, 42-45) Among 
plains and woodlands peoples bands were organized 
into confederations and both were treated as voluntary 
membership organizations, with immigration open to 
all. (Brandon, 1961, 148) 
No one single avenue of dissemination serves to 
single-handedly explain the remarkable growth of the 
American commons in the centuries following the 
European advent. The Portugese imported 
confraternities (misericordia ) to Brazil in the late 
sixteenth century. (Russell-Wood, 1968) Scottish 
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immigrants to Boston formed the first ethic mutual aid 
society in 1657, initiating a trend that continues today 
for virtually every ethnic, racial or nationality group. 
(Bremner, 1988; Trattner, 1989, 33) A French 
religious order founded the first American orphanage 
in New Orleans in 1718. (Trattner, 1989, 108)  
Residents of Williamsburg and Philadelphia founded 
early mental hospitals. (Trattner, 1989) One of Cotton 
Mather’s most lasting contributions to American 
literature was his consideration of the nature of 
benevolence. (Mather, 1966) 
Indeed, what Tocqueville observed in the 1840’s was 
at least partly the result of the transplanting of 
traditional European commons in the new world. This 
process occurred in two distinct ways: On the one 
hand, immigrants of all types brought with them 
traditional patterns of ecclesiastical organization and 
mutual aid. Thus, puritans, quakers, anabaptists, 
catholics and the miriad other religious groups coming 
to America followed established organizational 
principles and practices . Indeed, the ability to do so 
was one of the much-remarked upon (and sometimes 
overstated) qualities of life in the new world. 
Throughout the colonial period and well into the 
nineteenth century, a number of important commons in 
the Americas were shaped by conscious emulation of 
European models. From the earliest beginnings, 
Spanish and Portuguese colonists in Central and South 
America sought to found cities on European models. 
(Picon-Salas, 1971)  New England puritans, Virginia 
planters and Dutch colonists in New York and New 
Jersey all adopted church-based relief committee 
systems as the basis of colonial welfare systems. Only 
gradually did the New England puritan towns move to 
more civil welfare administration. Although religious 
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voluntary associations date from the earliest settlement 
of New England, the emergence of more secular 
associations of charitable and mutual aid societies, fire 
brigades, lodges and professional societies emerged 
later, centered mainly in Boston. (Brown, 1973)   
Boston Brahmins, Virginia planters and later the 
newly rich plutocrats of industrial New York and 
Chicago often also consciously emulated European 
aristocratic commons. One place where this is very 
evident is in the emulation of European beau monde 
“society” still evident today in charity balls and other 
fundraising practices.  
 
The Great Awakening 
The aspect of American commons that Tocqueville 
found most fascinating was not part of the immigrant 
experience or concious emulation. Before the 
American revolution, American commons took the 
radical departure noted by Tocqueville and others in 
the democratization of the commons that accompanied 
the nineteenth century Age of the Common Man. In 
one generation, private action for the common good or 
philanthropy was extended from its position as a 
traditional prerogative of the wealthy and powerful to 
the discretion of every man. (Minimizing or 
neutralizing the gender beyond white men was, 
regretably, left to a later time.) 
Consistent with the themes stated previously, we can 
speculate that the scarcity of labor in the colonial era 
was translated into an increasingly favorable economic 
position of the common man in late colonial America. 
By the time of the Great Awakening of the 1760’s, 
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increasing wealth and leisure of the lower classes were 
already evident. Through this important religious 
movement, the American revolution and Jacksonian 
populism in the early 1800’s, one can discern the 
growing importance of middle and lower class 
commons in American life. Closely related to this is 
the rapid growth during the revolutionary era of anti-
Calvinist religious sects emphasizing democratic 
equality rather than the election of the few. (Brown, 
1971, 38) 
We will discuss several aspects of this trend in the 
chapter on charities below. Another of the places 
where this record is clearest and most tracible is in the 
phenomenon of voluntary cemetary associations. The 
New Haven Burying Ground in Connecticut, created 
in 1796, was the first voluntary, nonprofit cemetary 
company. Mount Auburn Cemetary, founded on a 72-
acre site 10 miles out of Boston in 1831 incorporated a 
planned landscape of lakes, winding roads, and vistas 
into a setting that appealed to American sense of the 
picturesque nature. (Biemiller, 1991; Sloane, 1991). 
The issue of ownership of Amerindian grave goods 
offers a very real and difficult policy problem that 
might be approached in a new way using the 
distinction between public and common goods offered 
in this work. (Price, 1991)  
“Polite Society” 
A status revolution in seventeenth century European 
cities that has had important implications for the 
development of the modern commons was the 
emergence of the distinctive socioeconomic leisure 
class known as “polite society”, beau monde, “the 
elite” , the upper class and sometimes, simply 
“society”.  Consisting essentially of loose associations 
  170 
(“communities”) of the idle rich, “society” in this 
sense assumed important roles in defining standards of 
“taste” and trends in fashion in the emerging urban 
marketplace. Courtiers, land-owning families residing 
in the city and “the urban establishment” -- wealthy 
businessmen, lawyers, judges and others -- made up 
the core of society in most European cities. The 
resulting informal association was tremendously 
important for the shops, clubs, race courses, coffee 
houses, theatres, restaurants and other commercial 
establishments its members frequented. 
 Members of European society gradually took on roles 
reminiscent of the Greek aristocrats discussed above in 
their sponsorship and patronage of philanthropic and 
charitable projects for the entire community.  Newly 
emerging economic and commercial elites in 
American cities since the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries self-consciously modeled 
themselves on the European beau monde and in this 
way set down patterns of behavior and expectations 
that continue to exercise major influences on 
fundraising, the composition of boards of directors and 
special events.  
Modern fundraising theory is, to a considerable extent, 
built upon the model of beau monde society. A 
successful campaign is expected, for example, to 
identify a chair who is a member of elite society and 
willing to solicit from other members. (Seymour, 
1966) One of the most distinctive common institution 
of society in many contemporary communities is the 
charity ball. Indeed, the “debutante ball” or cotillion at 
which young women are “presented” to society is still 
conducted in several American communities. 
Debutante balls are, at least nominally, charitable 
events.  Town and Country magazine features a 
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regular monthly listing of such events in American 
cities.  
In much of 19th and early 20th century America, 
fraternal organizations were an important means of 
social integration, particularly in predominantly rural 
areas. (McWilliams, 1973) They has since diminished 
considerably in importance. (Schmidt and Babchuk, 
1972, 51)  
 Conclusion 
From Homeric Greece to contemporary America, the 
history of western civilization offers a continuous 
parade of many different types of commons, a portion 
of which are discussed in this chapter. Two things 
should be evident to the reader from this cursory 
historical overview: Common institutions, like liturgia 
and associations as diverse as symposia, gymnasia and 
the philosophical academies were as characteristic of 
ancient Greece as of modern Los Angeles. Even 
earlier, it may be as accurate to hypothesize common 
behavior (religious enthusiasm, perhaps) in the ancient 
world of Babel, Ur and Egypt as it is to attribute the 
construction of ziggarats and pyramids to oppressive 
totalitarian rulers. In Roman law, in Byzantine and 
Arabic cities, in medieval Europe and in the practices 
of diverse ethnic groups immigrating to the Americas, 
one finds many manifestations of what is a continuous 
and unbroken aspect of western civilization. 
Further, in almost all of its divergent European and 
American branches, western civilization is 
characterized as much by donation, association, 
foundation, and other manifestations of commons as it 
is by the institutions of market, state or family. 
Moreover, whether through diffusion or indigenous 
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development, other civilizations with which have 
come into contact with the west (most notably the 
Arabic and Islamic) also show clear evidences of their 
own common institutions. 
Much work remains to extract a more complete 
historical portrait of the type called for by the 1972 
voluntary action task force. Fortunately, much of the 
necessary evidence for at least a schematic view is 
already scattered throughout the existing body of 
historical writing, and the initial challenge is to extract 
it. 
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We make associations to give entertainments, to found seminaries, to build inns, to 
construct churches, to diffuse books, to send missionaries to the antipodes; in this 
manner, we found hospitals, prisons and schools. 
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 
 
 
 
   
 
5. Structures of Common 
Action 
umerous commentators have observed the 
relative absense of social theories of nonprofit 
and voluntary action beyond the level of 
simple description. For example, in their 1970 
review of voluntary association literature, Smith and 
Freedman concluded that “the term theory has to be 
applied to the study of voluntary associations with 
care, since very little theory, in any strict sense of the 
word, has yet been developed in the field. There is no 
grand, all encompassing, and generally accepted 
theory of voluntarism, or even a respectable middle 
range theory.” (1) Regrettably, this assessment is still 
largely true today, although a number of additional 
provocative hypotheses, definitions and propositions 
have been advanced as “theories” in the interim.  
N 
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Unfortunately, too many of these hypotheses continue 
to be guided by an over-simplified metaphor of 
profitable exchange, characterized by utilitarian 
exchange, dualistic transactions between benefactors 
and beneficiaries, very narrow and short-term notions 
of self-interest, and simplistic cost-benefit 
calculations. In the remaining chapters of this work, 
we will attempt to build up an alternative conception 
of social exchange as it relates to the central issues of 
social organization, the state, the economics of 
common goods and charity. 
 
Benefactories and Social Exchange 
To date, we have suggested benefactories as the 
characteristic form of organized endeavors in the 
commons, and identified three principal roles 
(donor/patron, beneficiary/client and 
intermediary/agent). Moreover, we have suggested 
repeatedly that the positive consequences (“benefits” 
or common goods) arising out of beneficiary action 
draw upon the resources of the society or community 
(in the quite distinct forms of surplus wealth and 
leisure and the cultural heritages of accumulated 
civilization).  
It remains now to ask on what basis do organized 
benefactories arise out of the spontaneous behavior of 
any of the individuals involved? More specifically: 
1) Why do people organize commons? 
2) Why create a formal organization? 
3) Why incorporate? 
Why Organize? 
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Why would reasonable persons who were members of 
families, able to buy and sell in the marketplace, and 
assured of at least minimal affluence, protection and 
civil order by the state be interested in engaging in the 
social action of the commons?  For the simplist answer 
to this question we resort to the definition of a 
commons offered in Chapter 3: An aggregate or 
plurality of persons, aware of shared interests or 
purposes might wish to associate with one another to 
discuss the depth and range of their common interest; 
to pool their resources (whether to utilize directly in 
furthering their common purposes or to seek additional 
resources); to reinforce or sustain their feelings of 
mutuality or to establish procedures assuring fair 
treatment of one another. 
To Associate 
Overall, the most satisfactory single answer to the 
question of why people would organize a commons is 
simply that they wish to associate with one another for 
some particular reason. Thus, the terms associate and 
association are probably the best general descriptors of 
the process of common organization. If people join 
together informally and without benefit of any 
affiliation agreements or formal rules, we would 
ordinarily characterize their association as a group. 
Such characterizations cover not only peer groups, 
friendship groups, support groups and other 
elementary associations, but also many other types of 
“informal organization” occurring within work settings 
and bureaucratic organizations. They also cover 
mutual aid groups and support groups.  
We might further inquire as to why people would wish 
to associate. One range of answers that pops up with 
some regularity involves benefits derived from 
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association itself. In this sense, the ends of voluntary 
action and the means of nonprofit organization are 
identical. A second set of answers involves the options 
of problem-solving and presentation discussed in 
chapter 3. (See also MacAloon, 1984) 
Why create a formal organization?  
What circumstances would bring these same associates 
to a sufficient level of dissatisfaction with the present 
level of organization of their group to formalize it into 
a more formal association or organization? For these 
purposes, a formal organization may be said to be an 
association with one or more of the following traits: 
formal affiliation procedures, whether in the form of 
memberships, dues, or any other form of distinction 
between participants and participants; a formal 
division of labor and accompanying status 
differentiation; and written, stated or agreed upon rules 
for common action.  
Participants might choose to associate formally for a 
number of reasons: They might seek to advance or 
publicly affirm their common interest or purpose, 
whether to proclaim their identification with it, to seek 
to attract others to join with them or for some other 
mutually agreed upon purpose. They might also do so 
because some aspect of less formal interaction may 
prove problematic (such as the relation between the 
group leader and the other participant to act as leader 
in her temporary absence). They might also do so to 
prevent or deal with false claims of membership or 
participation by nonmembers, that are detrimental to 
the group’s interests or purposes. Further, they might 
do so to prevent or minimize misunderstandings: about 
the interpretation of shared purposes (for example, the 
doctrinal and theological controversies of religious 
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groups); about the handling of shared resources (who 
will manage dues, and control the scheduled access to 
shared facilities?) Finally, they may formalize rules 
and roles to create or enhance a patina of authority or 
justice where none otherwise may exist. When 
associates bring with them clear shared models of 
status and authority, no formal structure may be 
needed to resolve such practical questions as speaking 
order, veto powers, etc. The eldest, best educated, 
most powerful, best hunter, etc. may be mutual 
consent carry the greatest authority. However, when 
(as in new groups) such norms may not yet have been 
fashioned, or (as in pluralist groups) two or more 
equally plausible, but conflicting norms exist, formal 
ratification of agreed upon rules may be the wisest 
course.  
 
Leadership, Boards And the 
Problem of Oligarchy 
When the decision is made to formally organize, some 
arrangements must also be made for formalizing the 
informal (charismatic?) leadership of an association. 
The most common term for the formalized leadership 
group of any type of commons today is the board of 
directors, derived from the corporate model. Inherent 
in formalizing the division of labor is the problem of 
oligarchy that might be thought of as creation of a 
preferred, more selective or narrowly defined 
commons within an existing commons. To some 
analysts, the problem of oligarchy is inevitable. 
(Michels, 1949)  
Why create a legal corporation? 
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Why would any group that already had formal 
affiliation, a formal division of labor and stated rules 
seek the additional step (where it is available) of legal 
incorporation (or, other, similar legal protections or 
state sanctions such as the Islamic waqf)?  There are 
two general answers to this issue:  The social bonds of 
mutuality or affiliation may not be sufficiently strong 
or satisfactory in all cases. Thus, less trusting affiliates 
of an association, unconvinced of the protections of 
the association’s own operating rules, may demand the 
additional protection of the non-distribution constraint. 
On the other hand, members of the group or 
association may desire a relationship or status (tax 
exemption, a grant or contract) with some external 
entity that is conditional upon legal incorporation. 
Thus, for a large number of existing nonprofit social 
service agencies, for example, incorporation was a 
necessary precondition to qualifying for various grant 
programs from which they seek funds. Finally, some 
external authority (like the IRS) may demand or 
expect incorporation as a condition of some priviledge 
or benefit (like tax exemption) in which the group has 
an interest. 
The same characteristics of a commons -- uncoerced 
participation, shared purposes and resources, mutuality 
and fairness -- can be manifested at any level of 
organization, informal groups, formal associations or 
incorporation. Thus one can expect to find related 
commons at any of these levels of organization. 
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A Partial Typology of 
Benefactories 
Association 
By far, the most widespread form of organized 
commons is the association. An association might be 
any group of persons not related by kinship ties, not 
engaged in profitable exchange (buying and selling 
from one another) and not engaged in the exercise of 
coercive control who affiliate, join together or 
regularly interact with one another in some organized 
or predictable manner. Thus, in the broadest sense, a 
business firm or “company” is also a type of 
association. In the firm, however, the priority of the 
shared objective of profit seeking may place 
constraints on non-owner participation, limit sharing 
of purposes and resources, substitute a labor-
management heirarchy for mutuality or discount 
fairness as an element of social relations. Therefore, 
we are only concerned in what follows with common 
associations demonstrating all five characteristics. 
Common associations are known variously as groups, 
clubs, groups, societies and by myriad other labels.  
Even in the case of the most extreme and 
problemmatic forms of solo trusteeship, it takes a 
temporary association of three to seven 
“incorporators” to bring a nonprofit corporation into 
existence. According to Finlay, "Obviously, no single 
word will render the spectrum of koinoniai. At the 
higher levels, 'community' is usually suitable, at the 
lower perhaps 'association', provided the elements of 
fairness, mutuality and common purpose are kept in 
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mind." (1974, 32) The “krewes” (clubs) of costume- 
and float-makers who constitute the traditional 
backbone of Mardi Gras in New Orleans and Carnival 
in Rio are clearly associations, as are the Pueblo kiva 
societies; the pan (pronounced “pon”) bands of 
Trinidad; inner city and suburban “pickup bands” of 
musicians and street gangs. (Grady, 1991) 
Agency 
For purposes of the theory of the commons, an agency 
is an association in which volunteer or employed 
agents, who are usually not members themselves of the 
patron class, are designated by patrons or their 
representatives (for example, a board of “trustees” or 
designated “staff”) to act for the benefit of clients, who 
are also generally not members of the patron class. 
(Kramer, 1966; Kramer, 1982) Such acts occur 
without fees, user charges or other revenues from 
clients metering the level of such activity. 
Legally, agency is action on behalf of another. (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983)  In this sense, most state nonprofit 
laws enable boards of directors to employ paid agents 
to conduct their affairs. (Oleck, 1986, pp?) In the case 
of the “social agency” the legal notion has been 
generalized and institutionalized into a commons of 
patrons, agents and clients. The organized social 
agency as commons encompasses a structured set of 
relations between patrons, clients and paid staff 
intermediaries that emphasizes the dual roles of 
intermediaries as agents of patrons and trustees for 
clients. The agency as a social organization is defined 
by the unique nature of authoritative communication 
and dialogue between these classes of participants that 
results from such dual responsibilities. As a 
communications network, the typical social agency 
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can be construed as a “node” linking two distinct 
“information streams”. It is in social agencies where 
the networks of conversations and information 
regarding client needs, wants and desires intersect with 
various networks of information regarding available 
and esoteric resources for solving problems and 
improving the life chances of clients. (Lohmann, 1990) 
Formally, the board of directors is ordinarily entrusted 
with primary responsibility for managing the agency, 
including establishing its mission and programs, and 
hiring and evaluating employees. This classic form can 
be termed the “group trusteeship” model. In a number 
of cases, group trusteeship is undermined or 
completely overturned by a single strong, dominating 
patron or staff member (or even, conceivably a client). 
While such “solo trusteeship” is frequently presented 
in the nonprofit management literature as a serious 
deviation from sound practice, it may simply be a 
variant form of common behavior.  
Group Agency 
 The conventional, indeed archetypal, form of 
social agency is group trusteeship in which the agency 
operates for a stated common good under the control 
of a group of trustees. This is the normative model of 
agency assumed by most nonprofit corporation 
statutes, the “stewardship” assumption of nonprofit 
accounting, and in the IRS tax exemption process. ( ) 
Recent research evidence, however, suggests that this 
model may be honored more in the breach than in the 
observance. (Middleton, 1987; ) 
 The model of group trusteeeship requires a 
board of directors, entrusted with the management of 
the affairs of the organization, and implies a 
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constituency or “community” of interested others to 
whom the board is, in some manner, accountable. The 
role of “the principal paid agent”, principal operating 
official or staff director receives minimal attention in 
the traditional model. This is in glaring contradiction 
with the realities of the managerial revolution that has 
occurred in the nonprofit world in recent decades. 
Solo Agency 
One of the more challenging issues of conventional 
organizational analysis in nonprofit and voluntary 
studies involves the proper treatment of nonprofit 
corporations that depart from the norm of group 
trusteeship. The problem of organizational oligarchy 
made famous by Robert Michels, example, is one 
significant departure. The commons controlled by a 
single key decision-maker is another (whether control 
is exercised by a board member of officer, executive 
director or principal patron ). Such key figures place 
themselves in a position that might be termed “solo 
trusteeship.”  Achieving such a dominant position in a 
common organization is not always simply a matter of 
the exercise of power. Board members, staff members, 
clients and others involved may simply acquiese to 
such a “locus of control” rather than resisting or 
contesting it. In other instances, a high degree of 
interest and involvement on the part of a single 
individual, coupled with disinterest or apathy by others 
can produce the same result. For whatever reasons, 
recent research has documented that such solo 
trusteeship has become extremely pervasive, perhaps 
even characteristic of common agencies. (  ) 
The growing body of evidence makes it increasingly 
more difficult to simply dismiss solo trusteeship as 
deviant and undesirable. In fact, the history of modern 
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social welfare reform is also punctuated by such solo 
practitioners. 
Jane Addams did not begin Hull House by forming a 
board of directors, and even after one was formed the 
board had almost no role in Hull House programming. 
In fact, Hull House was not incorporated and a board 
formed until the settlement had been in operation for 
more than five years, and Ms. Addams served as 
President of the board and principal agent (head 
resident) from incorporation in 1895 to her death in 
1935. (Lohmann, 1990) 
Ms. Addams certainly is not unique in the annals of 
common action. In fact, one is sorely tempted to 
conclude that in virtually all cases of charismatic 
leadership,  
A major challenge facing the theory of the commons is 
to explain how, and under what circumstances, such 
examples of solo proprietorship might be acceptable. 
The best answer is derived from the first characteristic 
of the commons: uncoerced participation: So long as  
Campaign 
A campaign is another particular form of association 
characteristic of commons. Campaigns can be defined 
as time-limited, goal-oriented single-purpose 
commons in which a relatively smaller “core” of 
organized participants seek to reach out to and enlist 
the appropriate participation of a broader “mass” of 
potential participants. (Van Vugt, 1991) Campaigns 
may be carried out for a bewildering variety of 
purposes. Medieval crusades were campaigns. (Riley-
Smith, 1991) So also are certain other types of military 
action. Although military campaigns generally lack the 
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degrees of voluntarism usually associated with the 
commons, there are two important exceptions: militia 
and “all-volunteer” armies and guerilla and insurgency 
movements possess many, but not all of the 
characteristics of common campaigns. Crusades and 
military actions are not generally the main concern 
here, however, since they represent rather extreme 
examples of the common tendencies of the campaign. 
Three other types are of much more central interest in 
examining the general social organization of 
commons. They are political and fund-raising 
campaigns and community organizing episodes.  
General understanding of campaign organization is not 
well developed. Etzioni’s (1968) analysis of the 
“active society” was a step in that direction: 
Campaigns typically involve the common pursuit of 
“projects”, or shared programs of action.  Thus, civic 
improvement projects, reforms and other similar 
ventures almost always take the structure of a 
campaign.  
Campaigns are probably best known in contemporary 
terms as political and fund-raising organizations. In 
politics, campaign organizations are often maintained 
separately from party organizations, per se. In fund-
raising, the same tends to be true of “capital 
campaigns” and various other major fundraising 
ventures including telethons, United Way campaigns, 
etc. (Van Doren, 1956) 
While it may be customary to think of campaigns as 
organized sub-units of formal organizations, there are 
other instances in which the formal organization 
(bureau, committee, association) it itself a subunit of a 
campaign. In major social change episodes, specific 
identifiable campaigns often provide the structure of 
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more amorphous “movements.” Thus, in the operation 
of the Civil War era Sanitary Commission, the west 
coast campaigns and in particular the San Francisco 
campaign stand out as particularly successful fund-
raising episodes. (Bremner, 1980) In the American 
Civil Rights movement, each of the major 
organizations conducted its own campaigns, each with 
their own organization, strategy, tactics, funding, 
objectives. Thus, the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference, for example, carried out major campaigns 
in Albany Georgia, Birmingham and Selma Alabama, 
Chicago and Memphis. The 1963 March on 
Washington was a campaign organized and carried out 
by a coalition of major civil rights organizations. 
(Fairclough, 1987) 
 
Common Places 
One of many interesting aspects of the commons is the 
existence of specific places dedicated or set aside for 
common action. In general, there is presently no 
satisfactory English language term to characterize such 
places generically, although there are a large number 
of specific terms: fraternity houses, lodge or grange 
halls, club houses, temples, churches, kivas, and many 
more. One of the practices is to refer to some of these 
places (museums, for example) as “institutions” 
leading to unending confusion.  
The largest and most clearly defined class of common 
places is temples, each with its association of priests 
and ritual specialists. The term temple is unsuitable for 
this entire class of common places, however, because 
of its explicitly religious connotations. Each of the 
world’s major (and many minor) religions involves the 
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use of dedicated buildings and natural spaces. Even the 
quaisi-mythical Celtic druids about which relatively 
little hard factual information exists, are associated 
with their “sacred groves.” (Chadwick, 1971; Herm, 
1975, 55-57) 
Terminology for common religious places is highly 
variable. In Jewish tradition, a temple is denoted as the 
site of sacrifices, while synagogue is the term for a 
gathering of the people. (de Vaux, 1965)  In the 
Islamic world, a mosque is a space for common 
prayers. Christians have a bewildering variety of terms 
for their common places: churches, chapels, 
cathedrals, houses of prayer, meeting houses, camp 
grounds, revival centers and more. Another large class 
of common places are the monuments, shrines, altars, 
stella and various pilgrimage sites.   
Because of the enduring legacy of classicism in civil 
society, a great many American common places have 
been given Greek or Latin names: academy, coliseum, 
gymnasium or forum, auditorium and lyceum are all 
examples of such common place names. A unique 
form of common place that has been important in India 
is the ashram, or religious retreat. The ashram is 
associated with Mohandas Ghandi and the Indian 
democratic revolution is important because it was so 
clearly the “staging area” from which the revolution 
was discussed, legitimated, organized and led. (Mehta, 
1976)  
 A controversial public policy doctrine of common 
places as sanctuaries has generally received 
insufficient attention. Churches have frequently sought 
special status as sanctuaries from the 10th century 
Peace of God movement through the martyrdom of 
Thomas Becket to contemporary Latin American 
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liberation theology and the domestic sanctuary 
movement sheltering illegal aliens. (Lorentzen, 1991) 
For purposes of a formal model of the commons, it is 
useful to distinguish discursive common places 
(literally, places of discussion) from presentational 
places devoted to ritual and other forms of 
presentation. A forum for public debate, is functionally 
distinguishable from a theatre or concert hall used for 
presentations in certain cases, common places like 
Carnegie Hall can serve multiple purposes.  
Carnegie Hall 
In addition to being one of the great cultural 
establishments in American life, Carnegie Hall in New 
York City represents an interesting historical case 
study of a major American common place. Carnegie 
Hall, like Hull House, the Russell Sage Foundation, 
like certain other charitable and cultural 
establishments, is an interesting transitional link 
between earlier patterns of philanthropy and 
contemporary ones. 
The place of Carnegie Hall in American cultural life, 
and its status as a commons are beyond question: Peter 
I. Tschaikovsky conducted at the opening festival. 
Paderewski, Sarah Bernhardt, Lillian Russell, 
Frederick Douglas, Antonin Dvorak, Artur 
Rubenstein, Theodore Roosevelt, Booker T. 
Washington, Victor Herbert, Albert Einstein, Frank 
Sinatra and the Beatles are among the thousands of 
important figures in music, literature, philosophy, 
politics, religion and science who have appeared there 
in concerts, speeches and other presentations in the 
past century.  
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Carnegie Hall is not simply a performance venue. The 
building (and the institution) also embrace a maze of 
practice rooms, studios, and hallways that 
choreographer Agnes de Mille characterized in a 
television special on the hall as alive with "the 
intensity of the student/worker". The American 
Academy of Dramatic Arts was housed at Carnegie 
Hall for 60 years. 
Prior to 1960, Carnegie Hall existed as a privately 
held, tax-paying company, whose annual operating 
deficits were absorbed personally by a series of owner-
patrons. In this sense, Carnegie Hall is an important 
link with the past and the personal patronage that 
enabled it bears more than a little resemblance to the 
Greek pattern of liturgia, the religious, literary and 
artistic patronage of the medieval and renaissance 
European nobility and the festival-sponsorship of 
Latin American majordomia.. In such cases, the 
absence of legal organizational forms such as 
nonprofit corporations entitled to own property, and 
exempt from some or all taxes, ownership and liability 
are vested in an individual or group of individuals who 
function as patrons of the commons in a particularly 
personal way.  
The initial patron of Carnegie Hall was its namesake, 
Andrew Carnegie. In 1889, Carnegie contributed $1.1 
million toward the construction of a music hall in New 
York City. However, as was his custom, Carnegie’s 
contribution only covered a portion of the total cost of 
creating Carnegie Hall. He refused to endow the hall, 
believing this to be the responsibility of the 
beneficiaries of his gift. (73) The remainder of the cost 
was therefore borne by a newly created Music Hall 
Company of New York, a joint-stock corporation, 
largely through mortgages on the land and building.  
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The architect and suppliers of the new building were 
paid in stock in the corporation. The budget for 
construction and equipment was set at $763,531, 
($550,000 of which was mortgaged). The budget 
included $20,000 for decoration and $18,000 for 2,500 
seats. Purchase of the land (8.5 lots) was financed with 
an additional mortgage of $300,000 from the Bowery 
Savings Bank, but records of the price of the land have 
been lost. 
Carnegie continued in his role of patron throughout his 
life, making up annual operating deficits of $25,000, 
so that by his death, he had contributed nearly $2 
million to the hall. After his death, the role of principal 
patron for Carnegie Hall was assumed by Robert E. 
Simon, a Manhattan realtor, who purchased the Hall 
from the Carnegie estate in 1925, reportedly for $2.5 
million. His son, Robert Jr. inherited the Hall ten years 
later and held it until it was sold to the city of New 
York in 1960. The Simons, father and son, were of 
course not the only patrons of Carnegie Hall. Many 
others gave substantial sums in donations over the 
years, principally to support the many programs 
undertaken there.  
Only after nearly 70 years of existence under this 
classic form of patronage, did Carnegie Hall take on a 
more conventional “nonprofit” form. Apparently, the 
beneficence of this form of private patronage was 
eventually exhausted, and in 1960, the Carnegie Hall 
site was to be sold to a private developer for the 
construction of what was described as a “red brick 
skyscraper.” The violinist Isaac Stern assumed a 
distinctly modern, middle class role of patronage and 
spearheaded a Committee to Save Carnegie Hall. The 
City of New York eventually purchased the Hall for $5 
million, and leased it to the newly created nonprofit 
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Carnegie Hall Corporation for $183,600 a year. The 
city purchase required explicit enabling legislation by 
the New York state legislature.  
In 1990, roughly 60 percent of the operating costs of 
the hall were recovered in rents, that ranged from 
$6,300 on weekdays to $7,200 on week ends. (Ushers, 
rehearsal time and ticket printing were extra.) The 
remainder of the operating budget was made up with a 
variety of grant income from foundations, state and 
federal governments and private donations.  
Repeated efforts to have the facilitate designated as a 
tax-exempt educational institution failed. New York 
State nonprofit law was apparently quite unclear at the 
time and creating a modern tax-exempt establishment 
of this type (particularly one generating substantial 
sums in ticket revenues) was a complex task. When 
the Russell Sage Foundation was created in 1907, the 
founders elected to seek a special act of the New York 
legislature to cut through the vagaries of New York 
State law, and the founders of several other important 
national foundations chose the same path. 
The issue of local taxation of commons has long been 
particularly acute in New York City, with the 
headquarters of a large number of national charitable 
and philanthropic establishments located there, all of 
them seeking exemption from local taxes. Carnegie 
Hall operated for roughly 70 years, in essence, as a 
private business. faced with significant tax liabilities: 
$10,000 in the first year alone. By 1925, the facility 
was valued at $1.85 million and the tax bill was 
$49,765.  
In choosing to function as personal patrons of 
Carnegie Hall over a 35 year period, the Simons 
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provide important modern exemplars of the operation 
of a critical portion of the theory of the commons:  
Under a condition of sufficient personal affluence 
(how much exactly is a matter of no importance), they 
were able to ignore or resist what must have been 
abundant inducements to maximize their profits.  
Committee 
One of the most universal, and at the same time, one of 
the most difficult forms of common social 
organization is the committee. We saw above that the 
public bureau could in fact be constituted as a 
commons -- thereby assuring the pentration of the 
commons into the precincts of the state. (See Harris, 
1989) Much the same is true of that ubiquitous 
temporary social organization, the committee. Not 
only does one find committees in community life (that 
is to say, in the commons and the public sector. One 
also finds business and corporate committees as 
common infiltrations of the commercial world of the 
marketplace. In some cases, as with extended families 
engaged in “production” of family reunions or other 
family rituals, one can even find committees in family 
life. In another case, many family foundations that do 
not have paid staff may carry out more mundane 
aspects of their business that do not require official 
trustee action through informal committees.  
At some level, participation in a committee is 
inevitably voluntary. One can be coerced to be a 
committee member, “baited” with various 
inducements and threats, and still retain a large 
measure of discretion over one’s conduct in 
committees. 
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Conference 
Another highly important form of the social 
organization of the commons is the conference. Other 
terms for approximately the same phenomenon are 
convocation, convention, synod. Indeed, many 
professional groups that take a nominal association 
form are, in fact, fundamentally conferences. A 
conference can be defined as a periodic commons in 
which the members or participants “confer” on a 
regularly scheduled basis for purposes of discussion, 
debate, resolution of common problems, and adoption 
of common positions.  
Following the conference, members typically expect to 
go their separate ways and guide their actions in the 
interim until the next conference on the basis of 
positions adopted at the conference. Whether it is 
political candidates guided by a platform adopted at 
the party convention, scientists designing new research 
on the basis of findings presented at a scientific 
conference, or religious delegates at a synodical 
conference, guidance in the post-conference interim is 
the normal expectation of conference participation. 
There are few forms of organized commons that 
display the dialogical basis of all commons more 
clearly and distinctly than the conference. The purpose 
of a conference -- scientific, religious, professional, 
community or other conference -- is talk in all forms: 
speeches, discussion, debate, negotiation. One attends 
a conference to speak, and to listen; to be heard and 
understood and to understand.  
No other type of commons displays more clearly also 
the underlying relationships between such dialogue 
and the involvement and commitment of participants. 
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It is because one understands, speaks and is 
understood by one’s peers; because one’s questions 
can be assigned proper importance, and one’s doubts 
be seen as well founded that one truly is a physicist or 
a social worker, a Methodist or a folklorist, a 
Republican or a feminist. It is in conference that 
theologies are hammered out, and scientific paradigms 
shaped and molded. Conferences signal the existence 
and the resolution (or abandonment) of social 
problems, and preferred policies.  
Unfortunately, most work on conferences in nonprofit 
and voluntary studies to date has addressed only the 
pedestrian and mundane aspects of conference 
organization. From this base, much more work needs 
to be done on the role of this distinctively important 
form of commons. One area that is particularly 
promising is the examination of the conference-like 
aspects of democratic parliaments, congresses, 
councils and other legislative bodies. The manner in 
which the authoritative actions of the democratic state 
are “produced” out of the dialogical environment of 
legislative “conferences” is one of the most amazing 
and profound examples of the commons as a general 
form of social organization 
Cooperatives 
Both general and specific social processes of 
cooperation has been important in understanding 
nonprofit and voluntary action (Argyle, 1991; Elkin 
and McLean, 1976) Producer and consumer 
cooperatives are another fundmental and distinctive 
form of benefactory in which economic functions are 
mixed with social cooperation. (Ben-Ner, 1987; 
Wertheim, 1976) In general terms, the theory of the 
commons seeks to downplay the ideological aspects of 
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the long-standing economic and political debates over 
“individualism” and “collectivism.” (Attwood and 
Baviskar, 1989; Blanchi, 1989; Clayre, 1980; 
Furlough, 1991; James and Neuberger, 1981; Jones 
and Moskoff, 1991; Pauly and Redisch, 1973)  
Coops have long been a feature of certain American 
campuses, where student cooperative book stores 
continue in operation after decades, and American 
agriculture, with its coop grain elevators, feed and 
supply stores, electrical suppliers and milk and other 
commodity-producing cooperatives. (Attwood and 
Baviskar, 1989) More recently, consumer groups, 
proponents of “organic” foods, holistic health and a 
broad range of “new age” and environmental causes 
have also found the cooperative an advantageous form 
of economic and social organization. (Furlough, 1991)  
Some have even suggested that university departments 
and hospitals might be regarded as cooperatives. 
(Hunter, 1981; James and Neuberger, 1981; Pauly and 
Redisch, 1973) 
The similarities between nonprofit corporations and 
cooperatives are highly suggestive, but largely 
unexplored. (Jones and Moskoff, 1991; Oleck, 1991, 
131) Those analyses that have been done have not 
been incorporated into the corpus of nonprofit and 
voluntary action studies (for example, Clayre, 1980). 
Yet, contemporary non profit and voluntary action 
theory would be hard pressed to deal adequately with 
cooperatives or the enduring cooperative movement.  
Discipline 
In general terms, “disciplines” may be defined as a 
genus of commons, composed of several distinctly 
identifiable species. The term itself is applied most 
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commonly to academic disciplines, or fields of study 
that may have in common their intellectual history, 
shared theory, common problems, common methods, 
and other features. It applies equally well to religious 
orders, that by tradition share the discipline of 
common rules, and professions, unions and guilds that 
seek to extend the discipline of self-governance of an 
association to the members of an entire occupational 
group. (Northrup, 1965; Snow, 1959; Van der Veer, 
1989) 
In general, terms like order and discipline point to 
underlying problems of social control and normative 
compliance that every viable commons must resolve.  
Academic Discipline 
In many respects, academic disciplines (as opposed to 
the formal associations representing those disciplines) 
conform to the form of social organization we are 
characterizing as a commons. Scientific disciplines 
like physics and biology, humanistic disciplines like 
literature, art history, and “interdisciplines” and 
“multidisciplinary fields like gerontology, peace 
studies and nonprofit and voluntary action studies 
conform to most of the characteristics of a commons.  
Wilson, 1990 is a study of the evolution of American 
philosophy as an academic discipline, with particular 
attention to John Dewey, C.S. Pierce and Josiah 
Royce. American philanthropic foundations have 
played an important role in the development of several 
disciplines. Stanfield (1985) discusses the Tuskegee 
program, the Laura Spellman Rockefeller Memorial, 
the Rosenwald Fund and the Carnegie Corporation and 
their support of the sociologist Robert Park. Sontz 
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(1989) identifies a similarly important role in the 
growth of gerontology. 
At the level of formal organizations, universities may 
be organized into departments by discipline, but most 
modern universities also feature a variety of “centers”, 
“institutes” and “programs” whose participants, in 
effect, form commons that does not conform to the 
existing formal organizational structure of the 
university. Indeed, nonprofit and voluntary studies is 
such a topic -- drawing scholars from dozens of 
different academic disciplines.  
Since commons are voluntary, they are much easier to 
form, sustain and change than any type of formal 
organizational entity, and therein lies what may be the 
most profound, enduring and chronic problem of 
organization in the modern university. New commons 
are continually being formed out of the interests and 
enthusiasms of faculty, and such commons constitute 
an on-going challenge and headache for those 
responsible for the formal organization of the 
university. It is no easy task deciding when 
gerontology, or women’s studies or peace studies 
should be given formal recognition, budget authority, 
and other accoutrements of formal organizational 
status.  
In general, it is communication and dialogue within 
the framework of the “discipline” imposed by adhering 
to agreed upon methods and procedures (of search, 
problem-solving and presentation) that characterize 
disciplines. Another way of saying this is that shared 
intellectual or theoretical problems or shared problem-
solving methods are at the heart of most scientific 
disciplines, while shared aesthetic or other criteria for 
the assessment of performances of various types are at 
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the core of many humanistic disciplines, while 
professional disciplines, like law, medicine, 
engineering and social work tend to place emphasis on 
both common problems and performances.  
The past century has been a period of particular 
activity with respect to the formation of new 
disciplines. Silva and Slaughter (1984) discuss the 
formation of the American Economic Association 
(1895), the American Political Science Association 
(1903) and the American Sociological Society (1905) 
and their displacement of the American Social Science 
Association. Numerous other studies of disciplinary 
formation also are found in the disciplinary social 
science literature. 
Order 
The term order can have several meanings. It is 
frequently used to describe the principals, 
characteristics or social behavior that give 
predictability and coherence to social processes (for 
example, social order) or to describe the objectives or 
results of social control. Modern attention to the 
Hobbesian social order problem arising from 
unconstrained self-interest has been a major 
preoccupation of contemporary sociology. 
Orders as religious, fraternal, chivalric or other 
commons have received relatively little attention in the 
nonprofit and voluntary action literature. Yet, for more 
than 1,000 years in the history of Western civilization, 
various form of Christian monastic and lay orders 
were principal forms of commons, and many continue 
in existence today. Much the same can be said for the 
Islamic world, where various orders were long the 
principal basis for the civic organization of Islamic 
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cities and the political organization of Islamic states. 
(Hourani, 1991)  An understanding of Islamic orders 
may be one key to understanding the organizational 
dynamics of resurgent “Islamic fundamentalism” in 
Iran and elsewhere. (Ayubi, 1991) 
In both of these cases, the order is a form of social 
organization closely associated with normative 
compliance structures and traditional authority. 
Whether such orders are an archaic form of social 
organization, or new and contemporary forms of order 
will arise remains to be seen. 
Profession 
In modern society, professions (including the newer, 
or what are sometimes called the “semiprofessions”) 
are a much more pervasive form of occupational 
commons than orders. It is worth noting that many (if 
not most) aspirants to the status of profession are 
actually clusters of many related formal and common 
organizations: incorporated national associations 
incorporated in some state as nonprofit corporations, 
an elected board of directors, a variety of 
unincorporated committees with appointed members 
responsible for annual conferences, publications, 
budget, credentialing, and a host of other matters. 
Most modern professions also have an educational 
“wing” of one or more academic disciplines, and  
Guild/Union 
Guilds and labor unions ordinarily seek to impose a 
different type of discipline upon their members. The 
modern labor movement refers to this as “solidarity” 
and it typically involves the discovery and embrace of 
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the collective economic self-interest of a group or 
class of workers. Such solidarity represents a kind of 
coercive economic power that comes to the members 
collectively when they take an “all of us or none of us” 
approach. One of the interesting aspects of trade 
unionism is the use of family terms and imagery to 
symbolize the common bonds of members. Thus, 
many unions are “brotherhoods” whose members refer 
to one another as “brothers” and “sisters.”  
Within the social sciences, differing political 
ideologies and organizations agendas may account for 
the divergence of “labor studies” (that frequently have 
a pro-labor slant) from other organizational studies 
(that frequently have a pro-management slant).  
Fiesta 
A major class of common social organizations with 
both historical and contemporary significance are the 
numerous fairs, festivals, fiestas, parades, fire works 
displays and other similar events that have marked the 
Euro-American landscape at least since the Middle 
Ages. (MacAloon, 1984; Orloff, 1980; Steinberg, 
1989)  The number of such events occurring annually 
in the United States (and the organizations sponsoring 
them) probably numbers between 5,000-10,000.  
Almost all modern American fiestas or festivals will 
be found to have a nonprofit corporation at or near 
their core. Outside the United States, rotating systems 
of individual patrons similar to the Athenian model 
(known in central America as majordomos) may be of 
greater importance. (Smith, 1977) Further, there are 
frequently healthy doses of entrepreneurial profit-
seeking, civic boosterism and diverse other 
manifestations of self-interest, promotion and 
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aggrandisement associated with many such events. 
Undoubtedly, fiestas are “good for business.” Yet the 
Fair Boards, Chamber of Commerce committees, 
Veterans’ organizations and other civic groups and 
quaisi-governmental bodies that act as official 
sponsors of such events seldom account for the full 
range and scope of the these events.  
Virtually every large city, and most of the smaller ones 
have their Mardi Gras, Winter Carnivals, Strawberry 
Festivals or Rose Parades. And, seldom is this 
exclusively an activity solely restricted to the 
association or corporation sponsoring the event. The 
millions of people filling the streets of New Orleans at 
Mardi Gras, as well as Miami and Rio for Carnivale 
and Ciena and other Italian cities for Pallio are not 
simply crowds. Whether we look at the traditional 
African-American “indian tribes” of Mardi Gras, the 
motorcyclists of a local Shriners’ organization 
performing in a street parade, the neighborhood and 
block clubs that sponsor competing horses and jockeys 
in the pallios, or the pan (pronounced pon) bands of 
Trinidad, we see the same thing. Most genuine 
festivals are, at one level, composed of clusters or 
networks of groups, clubs and associations whose 
primary exclusive reason for organizing is to see and 
be seen in the fiesta.  
Presentation -- to see and be seen -- is as fundamental 
an object of the fiesta as talking and listening is of the 
conference. At an agricultural county fair, children 
take their 4-H projects to be seen by all, and critically 
evaluated by judges who award prizes to the best 
entrants. There are over 3,000 counties in the U.S., and 
in a considerable portion of them the annual fair or 
festival is formally titled an “exposition”, highlighting 
the presentational (expository) quality of the event. 
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Seeing and being seen is not a characteristic limited to 
the associations and organized segments of a fiesta, 
however. In a manner reminiscent of emerging beau 
monde society discussed in Chapter 5, promenading, 
or strolling the grounds for the primary purpose of 
seeing or being seen, is an important characteristic for 
everyone who attends such an event. 
Many anthropological studies of feast days and 
festivals are available. For example, Sherman and 
Sherman (1990) discuss the ritual significance and 
political economy of feasting among the Samosir 
Batak of Sumatra. 
Foundation 
Both the term and the concept of the foundation date 
back at least to the Romans, and probably to the 
Greeks. (Johnson, 1989)  The modern foundation is a 
financial instrument, sanctioned by the state, with a 
governing organization (usually a committee or board 
of trustees) and with or without an accompanying staff 
organization. In certain important respects, the modern 
American philanthropic foundation is an intellectual 
product of Andrew Carnegie’s “Gospel of Wealth” .  
The modern American foundation is also a product of 
John D. Rockefeller’s employment of the Rev. 
Frederick T. Gates as his philanthropic advisor, and 
the Russell Sage Foundation... 
An important distinction among foundations would be 
between those that are large enough to employ paid 
staff members and those that rely instead solely upon 
their trustees. Robert Payton’s characterization of 
philanthropy as private action for the public (or, in our 
terms, common) good offers a particularly apt 
characterization of the modern foundation. Because 
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they are essentially private financial instruments, 
foundations have been a target of social critics at least 
since  
Journal 
In a number of important cases, periodical publications 
ordinarily called journals (or professional journals or 
trade journals) are associated with sciences, 
disciplines, professions, or other commons or 
independently develop into a type of commons on 
their own. One of the clearest cases of this, for 
demonstration purposes, is Survey Associates, that 
was for more than 40 years a membership association 
and publisher of Survey and Survey Graphic, the 
leading magazines in the field of social reform for over 
four decades until their demise in the early 1950’s. 
(Chambers, 1971)  
In a few cases, however, the social organization of 
those who produce and control the journals themselves 
can be transformed into an important and independent 
commons. This is particularly the case with various 
reform caucuses and change oriented endeavors. Thus, 
for example, the writers and editors of the Partisan 
Review gave voice to a political, intellectual and 
artistic movement in post-war New York, just as the 
Village Voice did in the 1960’s, and the “little 
magazines” of the 1920’s. In their own ways, The 
Masses and The New Republic both served in this way 
as centers of political commons associated with the 
movement of social liberalism. It is not entirely 
unheard of for commercial magazines to attempt to 
create a journal commons. Rolling Stone and Playboy 
are mass circulation publications that have endeavored 
to cast themselves into a reformist mode, vis a vis rock 
music as a platform for social change, and hedonism 
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as a life style (for example, the notorious “Playboy 
Philosophy” series by Publisher Hugh Hefner).  
In eighteenth century England, the journalism of 
Addison and Steele gave political voice to public 
opinion formed in the English coffee houses. In 
nineteenth century America and Europe, newspapers 
were frequently the organs of particular political 
parties, factions or splinter groups.  
In the American context, ethnic groups seeking to 
discover or retain a sense of common identity have 
frequently done so through the medium of journals. 
Jewish, Black and Spanish-speaking communities 
retain important journalist outlets in many major 
metropolitan areas, for example. Most American 
ethnic groups have, at one time or another had 
newspapers or magazines directed specifically for 
them, and many such publications continue to exist 
today. 
Party 
Political parties of all types (including, to some 
degree, parties like the totalitarian Communist parties 
of Eastern Europe that until recently held monopoly 
control of the state and defined it as the dominant 
institution in society) conform to a considerable degree 
to any definition of commons. (Garcia, 1991; Gluck, 
1975; Goldman, 1990; Kayden and Mahe 1986; 
Schlesinger, 1975; Schwartz, 1990; Valelly, 1989; Van 
Doren, 1956) 
 In terms of the theory of the commons, the defining 
characteristic of the political party may be that it is -- 
quite literally -- an embryo state. That is, the 
distinctive purpose of the political party is to capture 
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control of the state and shape the latter to its view. To 
become, in the terms introduced below, the dominant 
political association. As such, the commons must be 
seen as an important political staging area for state 
formation in democratic society. In colonial India, for 
example, parties like the Madras Native Association 
were an important ingredient in the emergence from 
colonialism. (Suntharalingam, 1967) 
In democratic polities, the process of capturing control 
of government is through the electoral process, in 
which parties offer candidates for election. Thus, the 
recruitment, screening and support of party candidates 
becomes a major component of party activity. In 
Parliamentary democracies, these electoral processes 
are particularly straightforward. In much of Latin 
America, the peculiar histories and political traditions 
of the region often mean that virtually all forms of 
civil association are politicized, with the result that 
most Latin American countries operate within multi-
party systems in which there are very few nonpolitical 
civic associations.  
 
Pilgrimage 
Religious and other pilgrimages, or sacred journeys, 
are one of the most fascinating and enduring forms of 
commons, despite their relative absence in modern 
American life. (Neville, 1986; Nolan and Nolan, 1989)  
We have already made reference above to the cities of 
Mecca and Rome as the foremost pilgrimage 
destinations in Islam and Christianity. The pilgrimage 
was also an important part of medieval Christianity, as 
for example, in the group of sojourners portrayed by 
Chaucer in The Canterbury Tales. Pilgrimages have 
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also played an important role in Hindu religion, where 
the river Ganges is one of many pilgrimage sites. Also 
worthy of note here is the frequency with which 
American Jews travel to Israel and American ethnic 
groups of many types place a high premium on travel 
to Europe, Africa and Asia. Senior citizen travel tours 
may be the closest approximation in American society 
to a genuine pilgrimage. 
As a commons, the pilgrimage may be most similar to 
the campaign and the committee in its time-limited, 
goal-oriented and single-purpose nature. Neville 
(1987) argues that the Catholic custom of pilgrimages 
to sacred shrines has been replaced by protestant 
culture by camp meetings, church homecomings, 
family reunions and grave decoration. 
Research Institute 
A research institute is a commons devoted to scientific 
investigations. The National Geographic Society, 
publisher of a highly successful periodical, any 
sponsor of a variety of research endeavors is an 
example of such an institute. In the economic 
vernacular, many research institutes might be 
characterized as “researcher’s cooperatives.”  
The term institute has many different shades of 
meaning, yet almost all of them share connotations of 
common association for research, scientific or 
knowledge building or dissemination purposes. 
Perhaps the most distinctive form of institute is the 
free-standing institute, not part of any other larger host 
institution. Two other distinctive examples of this are 
Consumer’s Union, a nonprofit consumer group that 
also produces a monthly periodical reporting its 
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findings in the area of product research and The 
Brookings Institution, that has been publishing 
independent policy-research for more than 50 years. 
(Peschek, 1987)  The Urban Institute is another more 
recent policy research institute with an admirable track 
record.  
Secret Society 
One of the more intriguing forms of commons is the 
secret society, in which membership, resources 
(perhaps including patrons, rituals, common goods and 
objectives) or other details are intentionally held in 
confidence among members, for reasons of protection 
or group solidarity. Simmel (1906) and Wedgewood 
(1930) both concluded that membership in secret 
societies added to social prestige because of the belief 
that members were in possession of special knowledge 
not available to nonmembers. 
Another major category of secret societies are those 
whose membership and activities remain secret in 
order to avoid publicity or detection by the state. Some 
of these secret societies, like the Mafia or Cosa Nostra 
and other “crime families” remain secret in order to 
engage in criminal misconduct. Yet other secret 
societies are secret in order to carry out an organized 
program of political opposition of some sort. One of 
the more enduring and infamous examples of this in 
American history are the Ku Klux Klan and the 
American Communist Party.  
Other quite different examples of secret societies 
opposed to state action are the contemporary 
Sanctuary Movement, dedicated to sheltering illegal 
aliens from central America, and the abolitionist 
Underground Railroad, devoted to aiding escaping 
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slaves prior to the civil war upon which it is based. 
Fitzgerald (1989) focuses on Alabama and Mississippi 
in a study of the Union League, a 19th century secret 
society led by a coalition of blacks and whites, whose 
goal was the promotion of political participation 
among black freedmen.  
Wars and war-like conditions inevitably encourage 
various secret and semisecret resistance movements. 
Virtually every European country occupied by the 
Nazi’s during WWII had an organized resistance 
movement, and a more recent example of similar 
efforts was the Kuwaiti resistance that operated 
throughout the Iraqi occupation of 1990-91. In such 
cases, maintaining secrecy may be the key, not only to 
effective operations, but also to survival. 
By their very nature, some types of secret societies are 
associated with myth and mystery. Collegiate 
fraternities and sororities are organized as rather 
harmless secret societies, with all manner of secret 
rituals, oaths, paraphernalia, code words and the like. 
The linguist and novelist Umberto Eco has recently 
revived one such myth in his Foucault’s Pendulum, 
which is a tale of the alleged secret society of the 
Knights Templar, supposedly reaching back to the 
time of the Crusades. Secrecy surrounding the 
Masonic Order has long been an object of suspicion in 
some circles. (Rosenzweig, 1977) Demott (1986) 
examines the history of the masons, their place in the 
formation and preservation of America, the philosophy 
of the fraternity and their place in contemporary life. 
Chrisman (1974) reports on the structure and ritual 
sysem of a fraternal secret society he calls the 
Badgers.  
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By their very inaccessibility, secret societies generate 
continuing interest. Secret societies are often at the 
center of conspiracy theories of various sorts. Secret 
cabals of Jewish bankers, for example, have been a 
common feature of anti-semitic propaganda for 
hundreds of years, and conspiracy theories of capitalist 
domination are standard fare on the political left. At 
least one American social scientist, William Gamson, 
has attempted to identify a conspiratorial secret society 
which, he argues, is at the apex of the American power 
elite.  
 
Science 
Another category of commons at the opposite pole 
from secret societies are sciences, used here in the 
sense of a group of interacting investigators or 
researchers engaged in the investigation of research 
issues or questions that they share in common, 
ordinarily through the use of shared or agreed upon 
methods of inquiry. (Barnes, 1986; Fisher, 1980; 
Olesko, 1991; )  
Recent work in the philosophy and sociology of 
science has placed important emphasis on the social 
processes of cooperation and competition in the 
evolution of scientific knowledge. (Bernstein, 1983; 
Hull, 1988; Latour, 1986; Lederman, 1984; Lux, 1989; 
Wilson, 1990) Uncoerced participation is a central 
characteristic of any commons claiming to be a 
science. There is a traditional meaning of the term that 
might be interpreted as the interests of a group 
gathered around a common set of interests. Thus, there 
are those that hold that philosophy, philology and 
rhetoric are sciences in this sense. The defining 
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characteristic of science in the modern sense is the 
public criterion of “intersubjective testability.”  To 
qualify as a science in this sense, the methods used to 
investigate a question as well as the findings must be 
subjected to the common scrutiny of peers and 
colleagues.  
In our business civilization, the predominant category 
of support for "science" is actually support for applied 
research and development--discovery of new 
techniques and applications of basic knowledge to 
product development. Particularly important are the 
categories of military, bio-medical and engineering "r 
& d". Research and development articulates well with 
the market model of microeconomics. However, the 
other basic category of scientific work--often called 
"basic" or "fundamental" science--involves alleged 
cultural or "amenity" benefits that are--like the other 
community services--considerably more difficult or 
impossible to measure exactly. 
While the benefits of "practical" scientific ventures 
such as constructing a newer, safer automobile, or 
curing a particular disease can be measured fairly 
exactly, basic scientific work often has an 
impracticality and lack of precise outcomes that is 
very similar to other common goods. It is as hard to 
place a utilitarian gloss on such fundamental science 
issues as astronomical research toward locating the 
edges of the universe or the search for prime numbers 
as it is to determine the economic value of art or 
religion.  
Writing in Scientific American, Lederman (1984) 
estimates that perhaps 95 percent of all public support 
for "scientific" research is directed toward applied 
research and development work with what he calls 
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"fundamental science" attracting only about five 
percent. Such figures, however, are seriously skewed 
by the economic importance of defense related R and 
D, and can easily lead us to undervalue the 
fundamental importance of basic science to Western 
culture and society over the past three centuries.  
Lederman does set forth a familiar "cultural" argument 
for fundamental science irrespective of its payoff: 
“Society must care about science in the same way as it 
must care about its other creative intellectual activities, 
such as art, music and literature. Science, like art, 
manifests its deep cultural influence when its basic 
principles or is way of viewing the world is 
appropriated and applied to a larger social context.” 
(41) 
There are, he says, two important cultural effects of 
fundamental science: The cultural appeal of science, 
that has attracted some of the best minds in society and 
the role of fundamental science in maintaining the 
esprit of the scientific community.(42)  Even these, 
however, articulate closely with an economic view of 
the world. The first criterion offers a "human capital" 
argument and the second corresponds closely with the 
human relations approach to management, and its 
argument that good morale improves productivity. In 
basic science, as in most of the contemporary human 
services, we have grown accustomed to a kind of 
duplicity: We value these activities as ends in 
themselves, while at the same time justifying them in 
largely economic terms.  
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Conclusion 
Researchers interested in nonprofit and voluntary 
action studies have shown great interest in some types 
of common social organizations, such as the 
association, and the nonprofit social service agency. 
They have, on the whole, shown remarkable little 
interest in many other types of common organization 
such as those discussed in this chapter, and other 
additional forms of organization discussed in the 
chapters that follow. Not only has this resulted in a 
somewhat constricted view of the true range of the 
commons, it has also meant that many valuable 
opportunities have been neglected for increased 
understanding of the mechanisms of social bonding, 
participation, commitment, compliance and the host of 
other questions that have interested these researchers. 
One can only hope that future research efforts are 
addressed more broadly in an effort to capture the full 
range of common social organization. 
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A people among whom individuals lost the power of achieving great things single-
handed, without acquiring the means of producing them by united exertions, would 
soon lapse into barbarism. 
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 
 
 
 
6. Voluntary Action, Volunteer 
Labor and Common Goods 
his chapter explores several implications of the 
theory of the commons for the emerging field 
of nonprofit economics. In particular, three 
basic issues are addressed: 1) The commons as 
unanalyzed economic phenomenon; 2) An expanded 
concept of volunteer labor; and 3) Common goods as 
an alternative to public goods and marketable goods 
and services as output measures of nonprofit and 
voluntary action. All of this is circumscribed within 
the perspective identified as endowment theory. 
Modern economics, according to a widely accepted 
definition by Lionel Robbins, is the study of the 
allocation of scarce means among alternative ends. 
(Robbins, 1962) Economics is both an empirical and a 
normative science dealing with decision and practical 
action. Recently, a number of economists and scholars 
in related fields such as law, management and 
accounting have begun to address nonprofit economic 
T 
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issues. (Anthony, 1978; Wagner, 1991; Steinberg; 
Weisbrod, 1977; 1988; Hansmann, 1981; Weinstein, 
1980) 
Their principal project has been to explain the 
existence and relative advantages of the nonprofit 
sector within conventional utilitarian rational choice 
models and microeconomic assumptions like 
production, maximization and optimality. The doctrine 
of relative advantage figures importantly in nonprofit 
theoretical approches. A recent debate in the economic 
literature, for example, focusses on whether “not-for-
profit” hospitals return more benefit to society than 
for-profit hospitals. (Arrington and Haddock, 1990; 
Bays, 1983; Cleverley, 1982; Herzlinger and Krasker, 
1987; Pauly and Redisch, 1973) Another similar 
debate has been raging for years in the field of aging 
over the effects of ownership of nursing homes. 
(Ulmann, ; Krivich, 1990) 
Analyses of the economics of the arts have been 
another major interest in this area. (Baumol and 
Bowen, 1968; Berleant, 1979; Blaug, 1976; Blaug, 
1983; Cornwall, 1979; Crosby, 1982; Cwi, 1979; Das, 
1979; Edwards, 1983; Frankel, 1979; Hansmann, 
1981; Kratchadourian, 1979; McFate, 1981; Moore, 
1968; Nelson, 1983; Russell, 1979; Schwartz, 1981; 
Van den Haag,1979) 
There are at least two economic theories of the 
nonprofit sector: market-government failure theory 
and voluntary failure theory. (Winkle, 1990) The first 
suggests that the nonprofit sector develops when both 
market and government fail to provide needed 
services. Hansmann (1980; 1981; 1987) offers a close 
analysis of the phenonemon of “contract failure” that 
emphasizes the residual role of the nonprofit sector in 
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compensating for the deficiencies of market exchange 
under conditions of information assymetry. Weisbrod 
(1978; 1988) characterizes government as providing 
public goods only at levels demanded by the median 
voter, so that people with demands higher than the 
median are underserved by government and must look 
elsewhere.  
Salamon (1987A; 1987B) reverses Weisbrod’s 
formula, and suggests that it is the nonprofit sector, 
not government that is likely to respond first, and that 
government is likely to compensate for the 
deficiencies of the nonprofit sector, instead. Salamon 
identifies four general types of philanthropic failures 
leading to government action, that he labels 
insufficiency of resources, particularism, paternalism 
and amateurism.  
 Each of these approaches represents a type of failure 
theory in which relative advantage is the anchor for 
explaining one set of social institutions in terms of 
their dissimilarity to another. In a chapter in The 
Nonprofit Economy, Weisbrod (1990) is particularly 
explicit about the nature of this theoretical project. 
Elsewhere I have expressed doubts about the value of 
this style of argument by negation. (Lohmann, 1988) 
Nonprofit economics grounded in failure theory treats 
nonprofit organizations by analogy with (“as if” they 
were) the profit-oriented firms of microeconomics. 
(Crew, 1975) Adam Smith’s distinction between 
productive and unproductive labor discussed above is 
ignored or overturned in the contemporary concept of 
“volunteer labor”. (Weisbrod, pp. ) Such an approach 
is defensible in the analysis of revenue-generating 
nonprofit firms, like hospitals, nursing homes, and 
ticketed museums, theaters and concert halls where 
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clearcut prices are changed for recognizable products. 
However, the rationale for treating “unproductive” 
(non-revenue) membership clubs, donative charities, 
and a broad range of other religious, scientific or 
artistic commons “as if” they were commercial firms 
is highly questionable. Yet, because of the widespread 
commitment of nonprofit economics to the market 
firm analogy, no other economic models of the 
commons have received seriously consideration.  A 
major project confronting nonprofit and voluntary 
action researchers, therefore, is to begin the 
construction of a genuine economics of common 
goods premised on more plausible and relevant 
assumptions.  
Some interesting preliminary work along these lines 
has already been done. (See, for example, Frohlich and 
Oppenheimer, 1984; Gassler, 1990; Krishnan, 1988; 
Mingione, 1991; Steinberg, 1987; Sugden, 1984, and 
others)   Wagner (1991) provides an economic 
analysis of “collective goods” and the “share 
economy” in terms quite consistent with the analysis 
of common goods and the commons offered in this 
work. Clayre (1980) offers an economic analysis of 
“the political economy of cooperation and 
participation.”  
 
The Unanalyzed Commons 
An adequate economic model for analysis of the 
commons ought to begin by studying actual common 
economic institutions like donations and endowments, 
and by adjusting or suspending three conventional 
economic assumptions: scarcity, production and 
maximization. The economics of common goods does 
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not require rejecting scarcity entirely. However, 
acknowledgement of the moral and rational 
consequences of affluence or social surplus is 
important. The most important form of scarcity in 
terms of its impact upon common action might be 
termed existential  (or weak) scarcity; the recognition 
that all human resources and potentials are finite. This 
is the basis of the necessity of choice in human affairs 
generally.   
Existential scarcity is morally distinguishable from 
thetriage (or strong) scarcity, or insufficiencies that 
threaten the existence or well-being of some or all 
members of the community, that have interested 
economists since Malthus. Self-interested action to 
assure survival under triage conditions is justified on 
both moral and rational grounds. Although we might 
praise the altruist who sacrifices her life to save others, 
neither reason nor ethicsdemand  such sacrifices of 
anyone.  
It is the voluntary choice of altruism or other common 
goods that gives them their special character. On the 
hard ground of triage scarcity economic rationality 
and policy converge upon self-interest as a morally 
preferred option. Not only is self-interest the preferred 
position in this case, productive efforts under triage 
scarcity are morally preferable to other (leisure) 
pursuits, and efficient  production is also morally 
desirable. Thus, the scarcity, production and 
maximization assumptions are bundled with self-
interest to make a morally resilient position, the anchor 
of which is threats to survival or well-being. (See 
Arendt’s (1958, 85) distinction of labor, work and 
action.) 
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Under conditions of affluence when productive 
surpluses are sufficient and survival is not threatened, 
the powerful rational and moral arguments linking 
triage scarcity and self interest lose much of their 
power. The distinction made between instrumental and 
expressive (or, as they are termed here, problem-
solving and presentational) actions in the voluntary 
action tradition does not attempt to shoulder the heavy 
moral burden that scarcity places upon the self-
interest/altruism dichotomy in the rational choice 
tradition. (Smith, 1981) 
Under affluence we must discover new rational and 
moral grounds for leisure action: Self-interest loses its 
priviledged position as an obligation and is equated 
with other-interest as equally plausible choices. When 
survival is not endangered, it is no more rational to 
pursue one’s own (or one’s group) advantage or gain 
than it is to be indifferent or even averse to profit-
seeking. Persons are, in other words, fully free under 
existential scarcity to allocate any additional 
increments of leisure in their control to self-interested 
or other-interested endeavors as they see fit. 
Growing out of this insight is recognition of the need 
to suspend the production assumption as well. 
Production is not a morally preferable form of social 
action under existential scarcity. Moreover, the recent 
line of economic thought that equates all types of 
human behavior with production must be explicitly 
rejected in the case of the commons. (Alhadeff, 1982; 
Becker, 1976)  At the very least, nonprofit economics 
should attend more closely to the productive “means” 
arising out of shared purposes and the intangible 
outputs of information, meaning and understanding 
that are nearly universal in the commons. Doing so 
inevitably brings one up against the recognition that 
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production in the commons cannot be easily 
distinguished from consumption; that the distinctive 
economic action of the commons is some type of 
“coproduction”. Rudney (1987, 63) discusses the 
treatment of nonprofits as consumption in 
macroeconomics. While analyses of volunteer 
coproduction by Brudney and others have been 
primarily concerned with policy and practical 
concerns, extending these concerns to nonprofit 
economics of the type called for here should be 
straightforward. (Brudney and England, 1983) 
“Coproduction” of intangible commodities (“services” 
in the noneconomic sense) is ordinarily 
contemporaneous with the “consumption” of those 
services. The term rendition is used here to denote 
such simultaneous production and consumption. This 
is consistent with conventional usages and highlights 
the significance of aspects of presentation discussed 
previously in Chapter 3. In a religious observance, for 
example, one might note the traditional rendition of 
ritual prayers, and at a scientific conference, the 
rendition of research results in the context of prior 
work.  
Finally, if the surrounding theoretical matrix sustained 
by scarcity and production is removed, maximization 
(whether in terms of profit, surplus, “goal-attainment” 
of some other value) loses its privileged position as an 
economic end of common action. Failure to recognize 
the legitimate limits of production and applying 
maximizing to commons can produce amusing and 
reductionistic conclusions such as the conclusion that 
rational individuals engaged in religious endeavors are 
seeking to maximize their salvation. In the language of 
variable analysis religious salvation, like many other 
common ends, is not an interval variable and thus not 
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amenable to the kind of degrees or increments of 
attainment implicit in the concept of maximization. 
Raising doubts about the coherence of current 
economic theory as it applies to the commons is 
primarily a theoretical concern. The practical 
economic implications of nonprofit organizations, 
voluntary associations and commons will continue to 
represent an interesting topic in themselves. (Ginsberg 
and Vojta, 1981; James, 1948)  It will be interesting to 
see, however, whether the current preoccupations of 
nonprofit economics with revenue-oriented “nonprofit 
production” will eventually spill over into the equally 
interesting and less analyzed domains of common 
action. 
The fundamental question that forms a plausible 
starting point for an economics of the commons is how 
(and why) societies choose to allocate portions of 
surplus social product to ends other than increased 
production, household consumption and public goods. 
Robert Paul Wolff suggests that all of classical 
economics be viewed as an attempt to provide 
theoretically sound answers to the questions of who 
gets the surplus of physical production, how the 
surplus-getters get the surplus and what do they do 
with the surplus? (Wolff, 1985,14-15) Current 
economic perspectives tend to view the only practical 
answers as three: surplus wealth can be reinvested in 
capital expansion, spent on higher taxes to support the 
continued further expansion of the state, or spent on 
growing mountains of consumer goods. From this 
perspective, it is mere common sense that nonprofit 
firms are engaged in a form of production, rather than 
state action or consumption. 
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A common goods economics might suggest a fourth 
option–the application of social surpluses for the 
rendition of common goods. Investments in 
civilization sounds terribly pretentious and yet this is 
precisely the implication that many observers have 
drawn. A 1985 advertisement for the National 
Corporate Theatre Fund in Newsweek magazine, for 
example, was headed “WE'RE LOOKING FOR 
MORE CORPORATIONS TO INVEST IN 
LAUGHS...TEARS...MAGIC... Your investment in 
the National Corporate Theatre Fund will bring an 
enormous return, not in dollars...but in 
laughter....tears... magic.”   
Calling corporate or any other donations 
“investments” and suggesting that returns on 
investment are measurable in nondollar terms is at one 
level a clever and devious advertising ploy. What 
rational investor would seriously consider laughter and 
tears a return on investment? Yet, at another level, the 
underlying message of this ad is entirely compatible 
with the thrust of widely shared visions of the 
commons. The challenge for a genuine economics of 
common goods is how to take the objectives of the 
commons -- religious, scientific, social, political, 
athletic and others -- seriously on their own terms, and 
not treat them as rather odd, intangible and inefficient 
forms of productive enterprise. (Segelman and 
Bookheimer, 1983) 
The leisure classes who studied Greek philosophy, 
fashioned the Christian bible, engaged in the charities 
of zedakah, zakat, xenedochia, medieval hospitals 
associations and societies devoted to art and science, 
and miriad other common activities of human history 
both drew upon the “capital” of their heritage, in the 
art, ethical principles, philosophical and scientific 
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knowledge, and other accoutrements of civilization, 
and left their own legacy of “surpluses” for others to 
learn, adapt and utilize. Such endeavors whether in the 
past , present or future, are as real and consequential as 
any material production. Yet, they require a distinctly 
different theoretical language. This is the challenge of 
a common goods economics.  
 
Inputs: Volunteer Labor 
One of the theoretical perspectives exercising 
considerable influence in contemporary nonprofit 
economics is the model of nonprofit activity as the 
private production of public goods through volunteer 
labor. (Weisbrod, 1988; Weisbrod, 1977) In this 
model, volunteer labor is a primary input, or factor of 
production, and public goods are the principal output. 
Both concepts require some further examination. 
 An initial distinction of great importance is between 
“free labor” as that concept has traditionally been dealt 
with in economics and “volunteer labor”. The freedom 
of free labor is the very special quality of being able to 
bargain in labor markets for wage rates. (Indeed, in 
competing for employees, nonprofit organizations are 
more clearly enmeshed in markets than in any other 
single case.) Nonprofit employees are “free laborers” 
in the important sense that they are not conscripts or 
slaves.  
By contrast, volunteer labor refers to unpaid or 
donated work. Volunteer labor refers not only to 
services delivered by unpaid service workers, but also 
to the donated services of board members, fund-raising 
soliciters and others.  
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The services (donations of time) of patrons also appear 
to constitute a form of volunteer labor, as do the acts 
of prosocial behavior reviewed in Chapter 10. 
Altruism, empathic responses, disaster and bystander 
behavior, free riding, political parties, interest groups 
and other forms of civic action, support and mutual aid 
groups and all of the various forms of common 
behavior discussed in this work constitute volunteer 
labor in so far as they have economic implications for 
the allocation of resources. Thus, in its fullest context, 
volunteer labor is nothing short of the individual 
contributions to the social action creating and 
sustaining civil society. Voting behavior and other 
expressions of democratic citizenship are likewise 
forms of volunteer labor. When we factor out the 
social action of the marketplace, the state and the 
private behavior of the household, what remains is 
volunteer labor.  
 
Outputs: Public Goods and Common 
Goods 
The concept of public goods arose within the subfield 
of economics known as welfare economics, also 
known as normative microeconomics. (Sassone, 1982)  
Pigou's famous "measuring rod of money" is one of 
the fundamental reasons often cited for the desire to 
apply economic reasoning to the analysis of nonprofit 
economic decision-making. The presumption is that 
money is the one obvious measuring instrument 
available in social life.  The limitations of such a 
perspective should be obvious for the commons, where 
1) monetary data is largely; and 2) the flow of money 
only “meters” the flow of important resources in cases 
  
  
223 
of fee-based and other revenue-generating activities. 
The absence of a stable metering relationship has led, 
among other things, to the necessity of distinguishing 
between "outputs" and "outcomes" in various 
nonprofit approaches. (Anthony, 1978) 
In considering the application of the "measuring rod of 
money" to nonprofit economics, one is reminded of 
the observation by Robert MacIver: "There are things 
we can measure, like time, but yet our minds do not 
grasp their meaning. There are things we cannot 
measure, like happiness and pain, and yet their 
meaning is perfectly clear to us." (MacIver,19,1951)   
Certainly, one of the most difficult aspects of common 
goods economics is activities that we cannot measure, 
but that are nonetheless perfectly clear to those 
engaged in them. This inevitably raises the issue of the 
extent to which economic analysis of commons is 
value-free, or whether economists engaged in analysis 
of the commons should be construed as reform-
caucuses seeking to capture or control commons 
externally through analysis.  
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Can Analysis of Commons Be 
Value-Free? 
Amartri Sen, in particular, takes issue with the premise 
that welfare economics can be value free: “Welfare 
economics is concerned with policy 
recommendations...It is obvious that welfare 
economics cannot be 'value-free', for the 
recommendations it aims to arrive at are themselves 
value judgments. In view of this it must be regarded as 
somewhat of a mystery that so many notable 
economists have been involved in debating the 
prospects of finding a value-free welfare economics. 
....For reasons that are somewhat obscure, being 
'value-free' or 'ethics-free' has often been identified as 
being free from interpersonal conflict. The implicit 
assumption seems to be that if everyone agrees on a 
value judgment, then it is not a value judgment at all, 
but is perfectly 'objective.'“ (Sen, 1970, 56-7) 
It is preferable, he says, to make a distinction between 
"objectivity" or being value-free and unanimity of 
judgment (consensus or agreement). (57) He goes on 
to partition value judgments into two classes: "A value 
judgment can be called 'basic' to a person if the 
judgment is supposed to apply under all conceivable 
circumstances, and it is 'non-basic' otherwise. (59) He 
continues: Nonbasicness of a judgment in someone's 
value system can sometimes be conclusively 
established, but the opposite is not the case, and to 
take a given value judgment to be basic, is to give it , 
at best, the benefit of the doubt. It seems impossible to 
rule out the possibility of fruitful scientific discussion 
on value judgments." (64) 
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Can Voluntary Action Be 
Optimal? 
One of the principal uses of the public goods theory is 
reliance upon Pareto optimality as an allegedly value-
free criterion for the evaluation of common action. A 
decision alternative is said to be optimal when it 1) 
does not detract or take away from the welfare of any 
member of society; and 2) enhances the welfare of at 
least one member. Pareto optimality is a standard 
criterion in economic analyses of the non-profit sector.  
There is, Sen notes, good reason not to be overly 
committed to the single criterion of Pareto optimality 
as an ultimate standard for assessing decisions: 
“"...there is a danger in being exclusively concerned 
with Pareto-optimality . An economy can be optimal in 
this sense even when some people are rolling in luxury 
and others are near starvation as long as the starvers 
cannot be made better off without cutting into the 
pleasures of the rich. If preventing the burning of 
Rome would have made Emperor Nero feel worse off, 
then letting him burn Rome would have been Pareto-
optimality. In short, a society or economy can be 
Pareto-optimal and still be perfectly disgusting." (p. 
22) 
 
Collective Choices and Public 
Goods 
In recent years a growing interdisciplinary group of 
economists, analytical philosophers, sociologists and 
others , seeking to resolve some of the problems 
  
  
226 
pointed to above, have collaborated on a project 
usually known as collective choice theory. Rigorous 
logical analyses of gifts, charity, cooperation and other 
common goods have been a central preoccupation. 
(Ireland and Johnson, 1970; Sen, 1970; Hechter, Opp 
and Wippler, 1990; Knoke, 1990) 
Sen (1970, vii) says that the theory of collective choice 
belongs to several economic and non-economic 
disciplines, including the theory of the state and the 
theory of decision procedures in political science and 
ethics and the theory of justice in philosophy as well 
as welfare economics, planning theory, and public 
economics.  
The basic project of collective choice theory is to 
formulate models of rational collective (as opposed to 
individual) decision-making. Some highly interesting 
results have emerged from this project: The concept of 
public goods that has emerged from this work has 
proven highly useful in the analysis of public policy, 
and is often being applied to nonprofit economics as 
well. (Weisbrod, 1988)  Much of the work on the free-
rider problem has also emerged from work in this 
field. 
 
Public, Private and Common 
Goods 
In collective choice theory, no distinction is generally 
made between productive and unproductive labor, but 
the dichotomy between public and private goods is 
treated as fundamental and exhaustive. (Knoke, 1990, 
31-35) Others have sought through a variety of means 
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to identify a third category, identified by a number of 
labels such as collective goods and shared goods. The 
label employed here for this third category is common 
goods. 
A private good is one whose benefit can be restricted 
to those who have paid for it. (Heath, 1976, 30) A 
private good is “a good whose subject and object is the 
individual. It could be enjoyed and possessed by an 
individual. Its primary aim is the satisfaction of the 
individual’s desire and interest.” (Udoidem, 1988, 
100)  By contrast, a public good is one that, if it is 
available at all must be available to everyone 
regardless of whether they have paid. Thus, a public 
good possesses two properties: It is indivisible and 
universal. As a result, it costs no more to provide a 
public good to all persons than it does to provide it to 
one; and any one person's enjoyment of the good in no 
way infringes upon or interferes with that of others. 
Conversely, we speak of public goods as indivisible 
and universal and private goods, as divisible and 
particular. (Heath, 1976; Knoke, 1990; Olson, 1965) 
 
The Free-Rider Problem 
One of the principal theoretical implications to arise 
from this line of analysis to date is the so-called free-
rider problem. The argument for the emergence of 
free-riding is lengthy and complex, but can be 
summarized: In the case of public goods, rational 
consumers will know that they benefit uniformly 
regardless of their contribution, and therefore be 
inclined to contribute only when it makes a difference 
to the overall success of the venture. (That is, when the 
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"stakes" involved are the presence or absence of the 
public good, since its size is a matter of indifference.) 
In the absence of three special conditions, Olson notes, 
rational, self-interested individuals will, therefore, not 
act to achieve common or group goals. (Olson, 1965, 
2) The special conditions, he notes are, first of all, 
selective incentives (private goods within the public 
good that stimulate group action); secondly, a 
disproportionate distribution of the public good, so 
that some members benefit more than others, and are 
thus induced to encourage the participation of others; 
and thirdly, if the number needed to provide the public 
good is small.  
Selective incentives must be selective in such a way 
that group members benefit while non-members do 
not. When this is not the case, they function instead as 
disincentives, or "costs". Thus, protection of job 
security for union members offers one such selective 
incentive. Likewise, a large landowner may find that 
the benefits to him for a new highway will be so great 
that he will mount a campaign for it even though it is a 
public good from which all will benefit. The third 
point means, according to Olson, that the larger the 
number of people needed to participate in a public 
good the less likely they are to do so. 
This leads to the free-rider problem--the inequities 
resulting from those who benefit from public goods 
without paying for them. Strictly from the standpoint 
of individual utility, persons have an equal 
disincentive against contributing to the cost of the 
public good unless they can be assured that all others 
will also contribute, because otherwise those who pay 
risk subsidizing the non-paying free-riders. While the 
free-rider problem is very real, complex, and difficult 
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to deal with, it is an important question for theory only 
to the extent that actors are rationally self-interested. 
To the extent that sharing of resources and purposes, 
mutuality and fairness that are the defining 
characteristics hold sway, one would expect the impact 
of free-riding to be minimal. Further, to the extent that 
participants in a commons become rational individuals 
in this narrow sense and begin calculating their 
individual utilities, the fundamental, defining 
condition of social order in the commons would 
appear to have broken down.  
Analysis of individual, rational choice of this type may 
be an interesting and timely issue, but it hardly 
represents the final word on the subject. 
 
Grant Economics 
Another approach with interesting implications for 
common goods economics is "grant economics". 
(Boulding, 1973; Boulding, Pfaff and Horvath, 1972) 
Kenneth Boulding is generally credited as the initiator 
of the grants economics approach. In an engaging 
work called The Economics of Love and Fear (1973), 
Boulding suggests that human motives other than 
profit (and particularly two motives he calls "love" and 
"fear") deserve consideration by economics. He goes 
on to associate these motives with two types of 
unilateral transfers, or grants that he calls "patronage" 
and "tribute".  
In keeping with this theme, grants are defined as "a 
broad assortment of subventions (subsidies, bounties, 
favoritism) on the one side, and a broad assortment of 
tributes (underpayments, extortions, dispossessions) 
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on the other side." (Hovarth, 458) Horvath (458) 
defines a grant as "an unmatched transaction where the 
net worth of one party--the grantor--diminishes while 
the net worth of the other party--the grantee -- 
increases." Grants, in this sense, correspond closely 
with gifts, as that concept has been developed in 
Chapter 8. However, some of the the expanded 
possibilities of reciprocity found elsewhere in the 
literature may be lacking in this dualistic view of 
exchanges.  
An important issue raised by grant economics is 
whether the twin bonds of love and fear (and resultant 
grants of patronage and tribute) adequately account for 
the kinds of exchanges that arise in nonprofit and 
voluntary action. One’s sense is that they do not, and 
were not intended to. In Boulding’s analysis, they are 
presented as primarily illustrative of the many possible 
motives that may be associated with grant transfers. 
They are suggestive, therefore, of two compatible 
approaches: Further identification of other companion 
motives, and identification of a general summary 
concept that ties together all such motives, for 
example, utility. A related question is whether love 
and fear may be said to constitute 'utilities' in an 
economic sense, so that the formal logic of the utility-
maximization model can be appropriately applied to 
them in the manner of grant economics.  
Even so, grant economics has blazed some pioneering 
trails in examining the kinds of rational choice models 
that may be most appropriate for the study of nonprofit 
and voluntary action theory.  It is also slowly finding 
its way into the literature of nonprofit and voluntary 
studies. (Galaskiewiscz, 1985) Given the insights 
rendered by grant economics, we should ask whether 
there other parts of modern economics that have 
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similar contributions to make to an understanding of 
the economics of nonprofit and voluntary action? 
 
Common Goods 
One of the most powerful criticisms of the application 
of the public goods orientation to common (nonprofit 
or voluntary) actions is that most commons fail to fit 
the definition of a public good:  Church services, lodge 
meetings, food pantries, scientific meetings, amateur 
athletic events along with most other commons are 
available to some (members and participants) without 
being available to all. Thus, the fail to meet the 
criterion of indivisibility, that is one of the defining 
characteristics of public goods.  
Yet, many of the goods -- desired or preferred ends or 
objectives -- of common action are clearly not private 
goods either. They cannot be fully alienated and 
controlled exclusively by particular individuals 
without ceasing to be what they are. There is an 
undeniably other-oriented quaility to any religious 
ritual, scientific finding or artistic expression, for 
example. Yet this “public” quality of many, perhaps 
most, goods of the commons stops well short of the 
universality demanded of public goods. The 
mathematical standing of calculus, for example, is not 
conditional upon its universal understanding or 
acceptance. It is sufficient that calculus be understood 
and accepted by the body of mathematicians, who 
constitute a disciplinary commons as noted in Chapter 
8. Calculus is, in this way, what we are calling a 
common good.  
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The concept of the common good has been used 
frequently in democratic political theory. For example, 
Jordan entitled his 1989 study of the relationships of 
the political implications of citizenship, morality, and 
self-interest  
The Common Good. Sherover (1989) proposes time, 
freedom and the common good as the central concepts 
of a free society. Riley (1986) discusses the 
transformation of the theological notion of God's 
'general will' to save all men into a political concept of 
the citizens' 'general will' to place the common good 
above his 'particular will' as an individual. He ascribes 
a pivotal place in this transition to Rosseau. It’s use is 
also not entirely unknown in political economy. For 
example, Raskin (1986) and Daly and Cobb (1989) 
incorporate the concept of “the common good” into 
their economic and social critiques. Raskin’s model 
makes explicit place for nonprofit institutions in what 
he terms “zone four” of a reorganized economy. 
Most of these ideas are ultimately tracable to Aristotle, 
who said that politics is the science of the provision of 
good for everyone. (Aristotle, Book I, Nicomachean 
Ethics) and to Plato, who identified the common good 
with the political virtue of the entire community. 
(Udoidem, 1988, 91)  St. Augustine insisted that “the 
bond of a common nature makes all human beings 
one” and therefore defends peace as the common 
good. (Udoidem, 1988, 91) Thomas Aquinas declared 
the common good as the end of law and government. 
(Udoidem, 1988, 91) 
In all of its many connotations, it is central to the idea 
of democratic community that a plurality of people 
share, without coercion, their experiences, outlooks, or 
purposes in some way. The democratic community of 
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all citizens who have voluntarily accepted a dominant 
protective association is one expression of such 
mutuality. Internal democracy within organizations in 
democratic states is ordinarily seen as a microcosm of 
the larger social condition. (DeVall and Harry, 1975; 
Peterson, 1976)  
Udoidem (1988) provides an excellent introduction to 
the concept of the common good in social and political 
philosophy. “A good is common when it is available, 
accessible and desirable by all.” (Udoidem, 1988, 90) 
He says the notion of a common good combines two 
sense of the term common: 1) a good that is ordinary, 
simple and natural, as opposed to a good that is 
extraordinary and complex; and 2) a good that is 
available and accessible as opposed to a good that is 
scarce and difficult to achieve.  
This employs much of the same idea, but stops short 
of the explicit universality and indivisibility of public 
goods. Also there is an affinity between the state as a 
dominant protective association and the other 
associations in a democratic society, whether they are 
“political” (parties and interest groups) or “civil” .  In 
this context, it seems desirable to distinguish “public” 
and “common” goods along the familiar lines. Thus, 
the public goods of the state are those that are 
universal and indivisible, while the common goods of 
the state are those particular to identifiable commons. 
Essential to this distinction is the further distinction 
between a common good (that may be the province of 
any association) and the common good (or public 
good) that is the unique province of the democratic 
state, as dominant protective association. (Yves 
Simon, as quoted by Udoidem, ) In support of this 
view, Udoidem (1988, 98) offers the following 
branching diagram: 
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Figure 10-1 
Typology of Common Goods 
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A natural common good is said to be “a good with 
which man is naturally endowed” such as rationality, 
authority or autonomy. (Udoidem, 1988, 100) In that 
sense, mutuality of the type that arises in groups out of 
the sheer proximity of persons probably constitutes a 
natural common good. 
“A good that is achieved through human effort is said 
to be a conventional good.... Such goods include 
language, law, community, state, peace, etc.” 
(Udoidem, 1988, 101) Conventional goods, thus, come 
very close to the use employed here of non-state 
common goods. 
Udoidem quotes Jacques Maritain in a manner that 
highlights the distinction between public goods and 
common goods: “That which constitutes the common 
good of political society is not only the collection of 
public commodities and services--the roads, ports, 
schools, and so forth, which the organization of 
common life presupposes; a sound fiscal condition of 
the state and its military power; a body of just laws; 
good customs and wise institutions, which provide the 
nation with structure; the heritage of its great historical 
remembrances, its symbols and its glories, its living 
traditions and cultural treasures. The common good 
includes all of these and something more besides--
something more profound, more concrete, more 
human....It includes the sum of sociological integration 
of all the civic conscience, political virtues and sense 
of right and liberty, of all the acuity, material 
prosperity and spiritual riches, or moral rectitude, 
justice, friendship, happiness, virtue and heroism in 
the individual lives of its members. For these things 
are, in a certain measure, communicable and so revert 
to each member, helping him to perfect his life and 
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liberty of person. They all constitute the good human 
life of the multitude.”  (Udoidem, 1988, 104) 
The conception that comes closest to our usage of the 
common good is what Udoidem terms a common 
good: “A common good that is achieved through 
human effort (for example language) though universal 
to its particular community, is relative to time, place 
and people.” (Udoidem, 1988, 104) By contrast, the 
usage that comes closest to the economic meaning of 
public goods is what he terms the common good: “The 
common good in human society is that which all 
human beings, whether as individual or as a group, 
seek.”  (Udoidem, 1988, 108)  
He also links the concept of common good to 
authority: “Thus, it is necessary in a society that there 
be a single unifying principle for the recognition of 
both the common good and the means necessary to 
achieve it. This unifying principle of common action is 
what is called authority. The status of this principle 
(since it is something that is desired and pursued by all 
in the community) is that of a common good.”  
(Udoidem, 1988, 115)   
It is possible also to see the linkage of this view to 
various artistic, scientific and religious presentations. 
Udoidem does this in commenting upon his own 
dissertation defense. “The interesting thing about this 
situation is that both the epistemic authority and the de 
jure authority that was exercised by the committee was 
exercised for the sake of the common good. For my 
own good and for the good of the larger community. 
Thus, significantly enough, in the exercise of their 
function they were in fact witnessing to and defending 
my thesis in practice.”  (Udoidem, 1988, 119)   
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“In conclusion, ... one can argue that if the common 
good is a thing that is to be desired and pursued by all 
in the community, whether as a group or as 
individuals, the means or what it takes to achieve it 
must be something that is common to all.” (Udoidem, 
1988, 119)  We might add that this holds true whether 
“the community” in question is an entire democratic 
polity in pursuit of the common good, or a particular 
common in pursuit of its own particular common 
good. 
Conclusion 
The emerging discipline of nonprofit economics has 
convincingly extended microeconomic models of 
productive enterprise to a considerable portion of the 
most organized and established forms of nonprofit and 
voluntary action. In particular, tax-exempt nonprofit 
corporations that generate revenue through ticket sales 
or fees charged for services rendered, such as 
orchestras, opera companies, hospitals, nursing homes, 
and various types of social service agencies, appear to 
be particularly amenable to this approach. Although a 
number of complex issues remain, rather substantial 
progress has been made in integrating nonprofit 
establishments into the main body of economics.  
By contrast, contemporary economists have largely 
ignored large portions of the commons. There are no 
economic analyses, for example, that seek to step 
outside the familiar (and inappropriate) limitations 
imposed by the scarcity, production and maximization 
assumptions and deal with allocative decision-making 
under conditions that approximate those found in 
empirical commons.  While this has produced some 
genuinely interesting work, it has also resulted in a 
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growing accumulation of what can best be described 
as curiosities, such as analyses of professional 
behavior that suggest that incremental income gains 
are the only plausible reason for professional 
publishing. (Morin, 1966; For a different view, see 
Jeanneret, 1990) 
Likewise, analyses of “club theory” can be found 
scattered in the rational choice literature, but there are 
no empirical studies of the economics of joining or 
participating in real membership associations. (Badelt 
and Weiss, 1990, 78; Buchanan, 1965; Cornes and 
Sandler, 1986) Similarly, the economic analysis of 
forums and other common places has received 
virtually no attention. This latter is particularly 
curious, in light of the evident materialist biases of 
economic theory and the extensive record of the 
discipline in dealing with rents, properties, 
construction costs and related matters. 
Further, large segments of common economic action 
remain completely unexamined. There are no adequate 
economic analyses, for example, of professional 
conferences, academic or professional journals, 
academic disciplines, sciences or professions,   
Fernand Braudel’s three-volume economic history of 
Europe in the 16th-18th centuries offers many sound 
beginning points for examination of the economics of 
fairs and festivals and other commons. (Braudel, ) 
Mark Girouard’s two volumes also offer many 
concrete examples of historically significant European 
commons. (Girouard, ) 
The modern foundation is the subject of increasing 
attention, albeit within the bounds of the crippling 
economic maximization paridigm discussed above. In 
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many respects, the foundation (together with the 
treasuries of membership associations and non-fee 
based agencies) represent the core problem of a bone 
fide economics of the commons: On what rational 
basis does an individual or group of “stewards” 
(managers, treasurers, and so forth) in control of an 
endowment (whether through inheritance or gift) 
allocate it (including any legacies to future use)? The 
youthful pursuits of nonprofit economics, still hardly a 
decade old, have yet to deal directly with this 
important question.  
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If each citizen did not learn, in propotion as he individually becomes more feeble 
and consequently more incapable of preserving his freedom single-handed, to 
combine with his fellow citizens for the purpose of defending it, it is clear that 
tyranny would unavoidably increase together with equality. 
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 
 
 
7. The Commons, The State 
and The Democratic Polity  
 
n important focus of recent nonprofit and 
voluntary action studies has been attempting to 
account for the range of relations between 
commons and states. Scholars have sought to 
identify a distinctive political view of nonprofit action 
(Douglas, 1987); to deal with specific policy issues or 
domains (Simon, 1987); or to deal with a range of 
general issues involving changes in state-common 
relations, characterized as privatization (Netting, 
McMurtry, Kettner and Jones-McClintic, 1990), co-
production (Brudney, 1987) or some other label. A 
Tocquevillian view is clearly evident in attempts to 
deal with “mediating” institutions between individual, 
community and state. (Ben Zadok & Kooperman, 
1988; Kerri, 1972 ) Another recent line of inquiry has 
been efforts to account for the genesis of the nonprofit 
sector in the structural weaknesses and deficits of state 
and/or market. Pluralism and the mixed economy 
concept are interpreted as a division of labor between 
A 
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political states and other social institutions. (Johnson, 
1988). Weisbrod (1988, 16-42) treats the issue as a 
competition between proprietary, nonprofit and public 
sectors over which sector can deliver services most 
efficiently. Douglas chooses to deal with “nonprofit 
organizations carrying out a public function.” (1987, 
44)   Within the voluntary sector view, another widely 
cited work locates voluntary agencies “in” welfare 
states. (Kramer, 1981)   
Many nonprofit and voluntary scholars have been 
interested in the state as situational precondition or 
environmental cause of various nonprofit or voluntary 
phenomena. Contemporary nonprofit and voluntary 
action theory fails to capture the equally important role 
of commons as staging areas for the formation of 
democratic states, and for organized challenges to 
existing authority from the mildest of reforms to 
revolutions. The necessary connection between civil 
and political associations through which citizens 
influence the state noted by Tocqueville (II: 123) is the 
cornerstone of understanding the role of associations, 
interest groups and all manner of commons in the 
formation of democratic polity. 
Contemporary theory is extremely limited in its ability 
to anticipate or explain political change and its impact 
upon nonprofit and voluntary action. Foundations 
(Stanfield, 1985), associations (Delgado, 1985), 
parties, interest groups, social movements 
(Stephenson, 1991) and other commons are often 
involved in change efforts, as well as in efforts to 
resist change (for example, the Ku Klux Klan and 
various nativist associations in American history). 
Ostrander, Langton and Van Til (1988) argue that the 
classical liberal dichotomy between public and private 
sectors is neither accurate nor useful and that new 
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conceptualizations of the reciprocal relations of the 
state, market and commons are needed.  
A balanced view of the reciprocity between commons 
and states should emphasize the generative role of 
commons in state-formation and in maintaining 
continuity and change within the state, as well as such 
familiar roles as volunteers in “co-producing” services 
and states as purchasers of nonprofit services. This is 
as true for the political competition of opposition 
parties and reform caucuses within ruling parties, as it 
is of broader reform movements, reform-oriented 
interest groups and revolutionary parties. What is 
needed is a conception of the state that highlights its 
reciprocal and interdependent relations with the 
commons. In some cases, for example, evidence 
suggests a role for commons as alternative or 
substitute expressions of state powers. (Brown, 1978; 
Johnson, 1975; Bennett-Sandler, 1978;  
 This chapter sets forth a refinement of the distinction 
between public and common goods introduced earlier 
and presents a conception of politics as a distinctive 
preoccupation of urban leisure classes. It identifies 
parties and interest groups as components of the 
commons along with other types of association, and 
addresses issues of problem-solving and presentation 
through their associations to freedom of speech and 
assembly and political ritual. 
In Mapping the Third Sector, Van Til (1987, 96-7) 
identifies several “spanning and mediating” 
propositions thought to be especially useful in treating 
the reciprocity of commons and state. Three of these 
are particularly useful in understanding of the 
connections: 
  243 
a. Careful attention needs to be paid to the 
role of the corporation as it relates to 
voluntary action. 
b. All associations are in part voluntary in 
aim and principal. 
c. Voluntary associations (those in which 
the principal of shared commitment 
predominates) may be either productive 
or destructive of democratic values and 
societal stability. 
 
These three propositions are important for 
understanding the state-common connection. Modern 
corporations (whether nonprofit, commercial or 
public) are, in important respects, associations, but 
they are also creations of the state. As legally-
recognized “artificial persons” , corporations simply 
could not exist without positive state action. Further, 
the democratic state based on the principle of popular 
sovereignty is itself a unique and distinctive kind of 
commons -- an association of citizens pledged to civil 
participation, shared resources and norms of justice in 
pursuit of common goods. In many respects, 
nationalism may supply one of the most powerful of 
all modern sources of mutuality. The democratic state 
possesses coercive powers of ordering and forbidding 
like other states, but it also contains unique constraints 
upon state action -- particularly against its own 
citizens. The American Bill of Rights, in particular, 
places important constitutional constraints upon the 
state in its relation to citizens and the commons. In this 
chapter, we will address the critically important role of 
the First Amendment in setting forth a theory of the 
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connection between state and commons in which the 
elements of dialogue and association figure critically.  
 
Political Theory, Commons 
and States 
The state like the market, the family (or household) 
and the commons is an ideal type. By the state, we 
generally refer to the potential and real exercise of 
coercive authority -- collecting taxes, enforcement of 
laws (for example, the police powers), imprisonment 
and the death penalty and ability to wage wars. In the 
classic view, the state is characterized by a monopoly 
of force. (Weber, 1968)  In modern nation-states, and 
federal (or federated) states like the U.S., Canada, 
Australia, Germany, the European Commonwealth and 
the fledgling Russian Federation that replaced the 
U.S.S.R, coercive state powers are shared or 
distributed among a federation of several related 
authorities with ultimate sovereignty vested in the 
people. (Recall the importance here of the supremacy 
of the elected Boris Yeltzen over the party-designated 
Mikhail Gorbachev in the Russian revolution of 1991.) 
The state as a coercive ideal type is not synonymous 
with government or the public sector  or the political 
system or polity and we must be cognizant of these 
differences. Modern government is not exclusively 
preoccupied with the exercise of authoritative or 
coercive powers. Some functions of modern 
government (for example, funding of science, arts and 
humanities and some social services) are exercised by 
government bureaus that are virtually components of 
commons and not engaged in anything like the 
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coercive exercise of state powers. (Rourke, 1977) 
Lowi has mounted a powerful argument for the demise 
of authoritative state action in the rise of what he terms 
"interest group liberalism." (Lowi, 1969) To some 
extent, this and other arguments that modern states are 
unable to act decisively or effectively may be 
expressions of Karl Marx’s vague prediction of the 
decline of the state. 
 
State As Dominant Protective 
Association 
What is the relation between the state and commons, 
market and family?  “One of the hardest tasks in 
defining the sector is deciding where to draw the 
boundaries beween voluntary, for-profit (commercial) 
and government agencies, and between formal and 
informal activities. (Anheir and Knapp, 8) 
Weber located the study of the association (verein) “in 
the gap between the politically organized or 
recognized powers -- state municipality and 
established church on the one side -- and the natural 
community of the family on the other.” (Hughes, 
1972, 20). In a similar vein, Robert MacIver treated 
government and corporations as associations. (Van Til, 
1988, 96) Etzioni’s distinction between coercive, 
utilitarian and normative compliance is particularly 
instructive here. (Etzioni, 1961) 
In an evocative phrase, Robert Nozick defined the 
state as the dominant protective association in a 
community or society. (1974, 15-17) The state, in this 
sense consists of elected and appointed public officials 
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engaged in the enforcement of protection (or justice), 
and the associated, auxiliaries that assist them in “co-
producing” the conditions of civil society.  
Nozick’s emphasis on the dominant position of the 
state among authorities covers the same ground as 
Max Weber’s “monopoly of force” definition of the 
state, without being sidetracked by the issue of 
whether or not the state must have an outright 
monopoly of force. Nozick (1974, 108-9) argues that 
Weber’s view can be reconciled with even a 
profoundly libertarian view of the limited state. 
Nozick is certainly not the first to draw this connection 
between associations and states. The Benedictine view 
of the monastery was that of “a little state” and 
Neibuhr’s conception of a religious sect emphasized 
an ethically grounded constitution. (Bestor, 1970, 5) 
The model of the state as dominant protective 
association meets two fundamental criteria of a state: 
First, a state must be the only generally effective 
enforcer of prohibitions against the use of unreliable 
enforcement procedures by others. Thus, members of 
an association can expect to be protected by the state 
from efforts by organization officers to extort 
unreasonable dues from them. Likewise, nonmembers 
may be protected from coercive efforts to force them 
to join. Secondly, a state must protect noncitizens in 
its territory whom it prohibits from using self-help 
enforcement procedures on its clients. Thus, Latin 
American drug dealers, Arab terrorists and illegal 
immigrant street gangs constrained by the state from 
using their own enforcers to protect themselves in 
business dealings in this country still are still entitled 
to “Maranda rights” upon arrest. 
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This conception of the state as dominant protective 
association is also a remarkably concise definition of 
some aspects of the modern welfare state. Many of the 
social welfare functions assumed by the modern state 
constitute attempts at the protection of vulnerable, 
disadvantaged, victimized and helpless persons. Many 
activities of the modern welfare state, such as 
protective services, enforcement of child labor laws, 
wage and hour laws and nursing home regulations, fall 
clearly within a dominant protective framework 
requiring the exertion of legitimate force.  
However, many others social welfare activities, and in 
particular most forms of social service delivery do not 
involve the exercise of coercive force. Many of these 
latter activities more likely involve common goods and 
the kind of government bureaus embedded within 
commons discussed in the previous chapter. As such, 
they are part of the welfare state only in a very weak 
and imprecise sense of that term. They are also 
activities that can easily and readily be contracted out 
by the state to various nonprofit organizations. 
Theoretically, attempts to contract out state regulatory 
and enforcement powers to nonprofit organizations 
would be unsuccessful. This may account for some of 
the complexities one encounters in the contemporary 
social service contracting environment. (Bernstein, 
1991a; Bernstein, 1991b) 
What mainly is at issue in this definition is the 
specification of the proper limits of the state. 
Libertarians are inclined to see only a highly restricted 
state protecting primarily property rights as legitimate, 
while various forms of social democrats are inclined 
toward an expanded state role. On the basis of 
twentieth century experiences of Stalinism, Nazism, 
Maoism, and the many lesser “total states”, we can 
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also simply dismiss the option of the total state 
(“totalitarianism”) as acceptable in any way. Thus, the 
central issue raised by this definition is over the 
meaning and extent of the “limits” on the state. Milton 
Friedmann identified   Theodore Lowi identifies 
distribution, regulation and redistribution as the 
general functions of government.  
Using Nozick’s conception, the state is not said to be 
the only protective association, as implied by the 
monopoly view, but simply the dominant one. 
Legitimate and illegitimate alternative protective 
associations are of several types: Some are clearly 
legitimate: Insurance companies, for example, offer 
various forms of nonstate protection against accident, 
theft, death, and other risks. However, they are 
generally subject to state regulation. Likewise, various 
neighborhood associations, and other mutual aid 
societies afford various forms of protection to their 
members.  
On the other hand, some types of protective 
association are clearly illegitimate, in that they attempt 
to usurp or counter the protective functions of the 
state: Most prominent in this category are crime 
families and gangs, posses and vigilante groups and 
revolutionary and terrorist groups. Mutual aid and 
ethnic and neighborhood protective associations can 
also take forms such as the Jewish Defense League, 
urban street gangs and the Black Panthers.  
Finally, there are categories of protective associations 
whose legitimacy is unclear or problematic within the 
state: One such category are protest groups, committed 
to nonviolent civil disobedience in the tradition 
reaching from Thoreau to M.L. King through Gandhi. 
Another category are those “radical” communes and 
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‘cults’ (For example, “snake handling” religious cults, 
Jonestown, New Vrindabin) that seek total escape 
from civil society to voluntarily engage in practices 
that the state finds intolerable breaches of protections 
it offers to all citizens. Yet another such category 
includes private militias, “gun clubs” and private (non-
state) paramilitary organizations. 
 
States Emerge From The Commons  
From the vantage point of public programs subsidizing 
the creation and continued operation of various 
nonprofit corporations, it has proven useful to 
conclude that the state creates the commons. It is 
probably sounder, on the whole, to step back and view 
the state as arising out of the commons than to see the 
state as engendering the commons. Certainly, this is 
true in the long-term history of civilizations. 
Anthropological literature reviewed by Smith and 
Freedman for example supports the conclusion that 
commons probably predate the state in human 
evolution and the rise of civilization. (1970, 16-22) 
There are many examples in the social science 
literature of religious and ceremonial groups and other 
commons, for example, in societies and cultures 
lacking the rudiments of a political state. It is also true 
in the immediate sense that the issues that constitute 
the current agenda of the state are readily influenced 
by common action. (Thielen and Poole, 1986) 
Another more important basis for the logical priority 
of commons is theoretical: States or governments may 
enact and fund programs that result in the creation of 
nonprofit service deliverers, as in the case of the 
Community Action program of the War on Poverty, or 
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more generally employ a purchase of services strategy. 
However, when one inquires into the origins of such 
state-run programs, the answer will probably trace 
back through the political parties, interest groups, and 
legislative campaigns of the commons that preceded 
and prompted state action. 
Examples of this are multiple. The African nation-state 
of Liberia is a particularly clear example of a political 
state emerging from a commons. Liberian political, 
economic and social institutions are largely extensions 
of the values of the American Colonization Society, 
that began its campaign for the return of African-
American slaves to a newly created African nation in 
the 1820’s. (Beyan, 1991; Franklin, 1980, 176-179) 
Other political revolutions, whether the American 
Revolution of 1776, the Russian Revolution of 1917 
and the Chinese Revolution of 1949 also illustrate the 
process of the creation of entirely new states from the 
commons of revolutionary political parties. The 
connection between voluntary associations and state-
formation is particularly clear in the emergence of the 
state of Israel. (Eisenstadt, 1972; Loewenberg, 1991) 
The social behavior associated with establishment of a 
democratic state has a good deal in common with 
establishment of any paradigm. Implicit, consensual 
and shared beliefs, assumptions and values, known in 
the modern democratic political arena as public 
opinion, are of critical importance. (Campbell ) 
Foundations, interest groups, parties and policy 
planning organizations. (Peschek, 1987)  
Many different possible configurations of state and 
various interest groups have been identified. Regimes 
in which the state is relatively weak and interest 
groups represent of a broad spectrum of policy 
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positions are ordinarily designated by the label of 
pluralism. Control of the state by a small cluster of 
powerful interests is usually termed oligarchy. 
(Michels, 1949) Meier (1983) has labeled 
“corporatism” a configuration in which the typical 
pluralist relations between interest groups and the state 
are reversed. 
Moreover, in a democratic system, this process is not 
only repeated once. Indeed, in a very real sense, it can 
be argued that democratic elections are the 
“midwives” through which various party, factional and 
interest group commons gain legitimate mandates to 
rule and are transformed into legitimate elected 
governments (whether city council, county 
commission, governor and state legislature, or 
President and Congress). In this very real sense, states 
are created and empowered to act from actions by 
candidates and parties, by the platforms and issues in 
the commons of political campaigns. 
Commons can also have important, and sometimes 
unexpected, roles in implementing and enforcing state 
action when the state is not strong and commons are. 
The Elizabethan Statute of Artificers (1562) made the 
system of apprenticeship mandatory for certain 
occupations, but the uncertain powers of the 
Elizabethan nation-state were insufficient to enforce 
apprenticeship upon employers without the aid of the 
powerful medieval craft guilds. (Abbott, 1938, 81) 
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 States As Producers of Common and 
Public Goods 
What can be said about protective associations that do 
not achieve dominance as political states?  One overtly 
political role for such groups is as distinct interests 
within majority coalitions, where they function as 
interest groups. (Anderson and Schiller, 1976; Kvavik, 
1976; Levitt and Feldbaum, 1975) 
 The state, as the dominant protective association in a 
society, is often said to be uniquely concerned with the 
creation or production of public goods, frequently on a 
monopoly basis. In this section, we will expand upon 
that notion and suggest that functioning states are also 
concerned with creating common goods in response to 
the demands of interest groups with which they are 
allied. The argument here is that the concept of 
“common goods” can be employed to introduce a 
necessary corrective to this overly generalized notion 
of public goods.  
Public goods, it will be recalled, are goods that are 
indivisible and uniformly available to all. The list 
would include such things as national security, public 
highways, and clean air and water. Contemporary 
analysts of the public and nonprofit sector have tended 
to ignore the restrictive implications of this definition 
when they prove inconvenient. As a result, the analysis 
of “public goods” has been over-generalized to apply 
to virtually all possible relations between government 
and any nonprofit-voluntary-independent-third sector 
entity. Such, for example, is the case with the 
construction of nonprofit corporations in general as 
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“private producers of public goods” and the definition 
of philanthropy as “private action for the public good”. 
The underlying political formula involved is a 
straightforward one: Partisan advocates of social 
services, the arts, professions, science (in fact, 
virtually any common interest) seek various short-term 
political advantages by claiming that their common 
interests are, in fact, matters of vital “public interest”. 
Such claims are ordinarily preludes to appeals for the 
exercise of public powers or public subsidy of 
common goods. When successful they often result in 
the creation or modification of a modified commons in 
which a public bureau (for example, licensing board, 
funding agency or regulatory agency) is a participant.  
As “public goods” claims, most subsidies of nonprofit 
sector organizations are easily discounted. The claim 
that the arts, or social services directly benefit 
everyone uniformly and indivisibly is demonstrably 
untrue, simply by virtue of the fact that many people 
never even attend artistic performances or receive 
services, and could not possibly benefit directly. The 
goods of these ventures are both divisible and non-
uniformly distributed, failing both of the tests of a 
public good. This does not mean, of course, that such 
programs, services and benefits are not goods, nor that 
they may be preferred by a majority of the population 
and not just those who benefit. It does mean, however, 
that the large body of analysis and theory of public 
goods by economists, policy analysts and political 
scientists and others does not apply to them. 
Such illegitimate claims of the “public goods” status 
of government operated or subsidized goods, 
therefore, are often propped up with various claims of 
“indirect” benefit. Not only does this introduce a major 
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theoretical complexity, it usually also results in claims 
that are unverifiable. (One suspects after all that may 
increase their political utility. Unverifiable claims, 
after all, have certain strategic political advantages. 
Unverifiable propositions do not, however, make for 
sound theory.) 
Many (perhaps most) of the claims for subsidy forced 
upon the state by scientific, professional, educational, 
religious, charitable and other commons tend to be 
appeals by various leisure classes for public (tax 
supported) patronage of particular common goods 
valued by those leisure classes. There is almost never 
clear-cut majoritarian support for (and seldom even 
majority understanding of) such endeavors. What there 
is instead is a kind of mass toleration and indifference 
merging at times into alienation. There are no 
theoretical grounds in democratic theory for such 
systematic satisfactions of minority interests. As a 
result, common interests centered in the nonprofit and 
voluntary world will feel compelled to go on appealing 
to specious “public interests” in their demands for 
public subsidy until other grounds are found. And 
legislators and bureaucrats in control of restricted 
funds of this type will feel compelled to continue 
honoring such requests, at least for those leisure 
classes in position to exert their claims most 
forcefully.  
 
Non-State Protective Associations 
What can be said about protective associations that do 
not achieve dominance as states or participants in 
ruling coalitions?  One role for such associations is as 
opposition groups (loyal or otherwise). Far more 
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interesting for the theory of the commons, however, is 
the modern emergence of non-state private protective 
associations. While it would be easy to focus on 
private militias of security guards and mall police 
under this rubric, such “services” are generally 
organized as commercial ventures and outside our 
interest here. Other less obvious, but equally 
interesting examples of non-state protective agencies 
fall within the domain of the commons. 
One of the most interesting subcategories of this class 
of such protective associations are those that seek to 
enforce common goods (and even, in some instances, 
public goods) through strictly voluntary compliance of 
a group of members or clients. For example, groups 
such as the American Society for Testing and 
Materials, Philadelphia, the American National 
Standards Institute in New York City establish product 
health, safety and quality standards voluntarily for 
voluntary acceptance by manufacturers. Such groups 
may be subsidized by manufacturers. Or, like 
Consumer’s Union, they may be subsidized by 
donations from consumers and publish test results in 
the public domain.) 
The number of voluntary protective associations is 
large and the range of their standards broad. They 
include the American Welding Society’s technical 
standards for welding beads, the American Red Cross 
standards for the safe handling of blood products, and 
the familiar American Dental Association seal of 
acceptance for products that “have been shown to be 
an effective decay-preventative dentifrice that can be 
of significant value when used in a consciously 
applied program of oral hygiene and regular 
professional care.”  They also include the full range of 
ethical standards and practices of professional groups, 
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including the American Medical Association, the 
American Bar Association, the National Association of 
Social Workers and the National Society of 
Professional Engineers. 
Among the first categories of such non-state protective 
associations to emerge, of course, were the various 
voluntary charitable and philanthropic societies of the 
voluntary sector. Stereotypes notwithstanding, such 
charity work is not entirely a matter of benign good 
deeds. The various societies for the protection against 
cruelty to animals and children, domestic violence 
shelters, friendly visitors, societies for the protection 
and encouragement of the mentally ill, foreign 
immigrants, and so forth are often engaged in creating 
private protective associations where state action is 
inadequate or not forthcoming. The Civil War era 
Underground Railroad and the more recent sanctuary 
movement devoted to sheltering illegal aliens from 
Latin America, as well as covert organizations devoted 
to parental “kidnapping” in defiance of court orders, or 
societies devoted to assisting suicide are all examples. 
In each case, groups are action in support of a common 
good ignored, discouraged or opposed by dominant 
state interests.  
This by no means exhausts the possibilities for non-
dominant protective associations, however. Also 
included here would be the full range of secret 
societies and radical politics devoted to overthrow of 
the established order. It is at this point that interest in 
the commons merges with traditional interests of the 
law of civil liberties.  
Civil Liberties and the 
Commons 
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It is in the ever-present possibility that those in power 
will use their control of the state to harass, intimidate 
or suppress their rivals or enemies that we find the 
normative basis of support for civil liberties associated 
with the commons. Several commentators in the 
nonprofit and voluntary action literature have 
commented (incorrectly) on the centrality of 
associations in American political life and the absence 
of an explicit constitutional basis of a “right of 
association.”  In fact, no less than four such freedoms 
are found in the first amendment: religion, speech, 
assembly and redress of grievances. While, it may be 
argued that there is no separate “right of association” 
the related “civil liberties” to assemble for peaceful 
purpose, speak freely and seek change in public 
policies clearly outlined in a long series of Supreme 
Court rulings rather clearly outline such a right. 
Moreover, those rights --together with voting rights--
have been consistently interpreted in a manner 
consistent with the doctrine of popular sovereignty. 
In the modern democratic political arena, we get an 
exceptionally clear portrait of the underlying 
dialogical basis of the processes that portray the 
creation of the state through processes of interaction, 
discussion and debate. The first amendment to the 
American Constitution says “Congress shall make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the 
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances.” 
According to Emerson (1964) “freedom of association 
has traditionally been conceived as ‘an independent 
right possessing an equal status with the other rights 
specifically enumerated in the first amendment’. 
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(quoted in Shiffrin, 1990, 221) Yet, Shiffin notes, “the 
associational aspects of the first amendment have 
never been adequately explored.” (221) Emerson cast 
the same point more broadly when he remarked 
“Strangely enough, the fundamental structure of (first 
amendment) rights has never been fully explicated by 
the Supreme Court and stands today in a state of great 
uncertainty.” (1970, 292) 
While legal scholars have generally dealt with the first 
amendment solely in terms of individual rights, 
Shiffrin advocates treating political dissent in 
commons rather than as a strictly individual matter:  
Dissent is often construed in strictly individualistic 
terms as self- expression, self- realization or individual 
autonomy. (Shiffrin, 1990, 90) Yet, in seeking to 
realize their goals, dissenters seek to persuade others, 
form associations of like-minded individuals and in 
general promote “engaged association” to advance 
social change. (Shiffrin, 1990, 91)  
According to Shiffrin, dissent is a fundamentally 
nonprofit idea: “Dissenters do not ‘sell’ ideas in the 
manner depicted in the marketplace metaphor.” (92) 
People talk, “exchange” ideas and quote one another. 
“One could impose a market model on this process.” 
But dissenters do not generally sell their ideas. “They 
seek something other than the monetary profit of a 
commercial transaction.” (92) 
The theory of the commons provides a lattice for 
understanding the fundamental interconnections 
between the seemingly separate freedoms of the first 
amendment and their associative implications: 
Religion is a major type of commons particularly in 
need of protection from the state in the wake of the 
Reformation and Counter-reformation. Such 
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protections remain current to offset the ever-present 
impulses of religious zealots that may arise in any 
open and pluralist society. Free speech (which in the 
preceding we have termed dialogue) is a fundamental 
basis for the discovery, organization, and presentation 
of common goods of all types. People identify what 
purposes they share by discussing their dreams and 
aspirations as well as their hopes and fears and 
coordinate their actions through sharing of strategy 
and tactics.  
 Likewise, association in common places (which the 
Constitution terms peaceable assembly) is fundamental 
to the uncoerced discovery of shared purposes, sharing 
of resources, and group process that is mutual and just. 
Prior to the development of communications 
technology, the co-presence of assembly (or, perhaps 
less archaically, “getting together”) was the single 
most effective and efficient means of facilitating 
common dialogue. The importance of assembly is in 
no what diminished by the development of telephone, 
television and computer and other communications 
technologies that have revolutionized and extended the 
ways in which people can “assemble” and interact.  
Indeed, it would appear initially that freedom of the 
press is the only component in the first amendment not 
directly and obviously related with all the others and 
the commons. One might regard this as an historical 
anomaly and evidence of a former connection to the 
commons now broken. There was a strong tendency 
for 18th century newspapers to be partisan vehicles of 
political groups, parties and movements rather than the 
“objective” business institutions of today.  
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Right of Assembly 
There is a significant body of First Amendment 
constitutional law bearing on the commons. Oleck 
(Chapter 27, pp. 724-738) offers an extensive 
introduction to the legal issues of the freedom to 
associate. Despite the patina of individualistic rhetoric 
in which discussions of first amendment rights are 
usually cast, associations such as the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses and civil rights organizations of the 1960’s 
figure prominently in many key first amendment 
constitutional cases. (Lewis, 1991; Also see Emerson, 
1970, beginning on p. 292, for a dated but interesting 
discussion).  
Such constitutional cases should be of greater interest 
to nonprofit and voluntary action researchers than they 
have been. In part this is because they involve setting 
the real normative limits of common action in 
American society. In addition, constitutional cases 
often involve issues that are both controversial and 
“hard”. Dworkin, (1978, 81-130) presents a rationale 
for dealing with “hard cases”. Usually, this means that 
such cases tend to provoke strong responses, conflict 
and involve issues that are intrinsically complex and 
difficult to resolve. Many such cases, for example, 
have arisen in the wake of the labor and civil rights 
movements. Others come in the context of state efforts 
to suppress various extremist political organizations 
including the American Communist and Nazi Parties, 
the Ku Klux Klan and others. 
 In 1939, the U.S. Supreme court explicitly examined 
the issue of the freedom of assembly implied by the 
constitution, and concluded that such freedom applies 
not only to meetings in private homes and meeting 
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halls, but also to assemblies in public streets and 
parks. (Hague v. C.I.O., 1939) While licensing laws 
can be used to protect public order or public safety, 
such laws may not be used for purposes of prior 
censorship.  
At the same time, there is an undeniably political 
rationale underlying this freedom of assembly. In 
1958, for example, the court said “It is beyond debate 
that freedom to engage in association for the 
advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable 
aspect of the ‘liberty’ protected by the Constitution.” 
(NAACP v. Alabama, 1958) The court concluded that 
unless the state could show some compelling public 
interest, it may not force the NAACP to hand over its 
membership lists. (NAACP v. Alabama, 1958; Bates 
v. Little Rock, 1960)  
Whatever their other legal ramifications, such 
precedents bear directly upon the distinction between 
public and private much sought after by nonprofit and 
voluntary action researchers: From this doctrine, one 
might reasonably conclude that in the absence of 
compelling public purpose, the affairs of any common 
are “private” (that is, common only to the participants, 
who are in turn able to determine collectively who 
may be a participant).  
 
Freedom of Speech 
The standard that the court has applied to freedom of 
speech cases for more than half a century is the 
Holmes-Brandeis “clear and present danger” test: 
“whether the words are used in circumstances and are 
of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger 
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that they will bring about substantive evils that 
Congress has a right to prevent.” This is the 
constitutional basis of the famous curb on the right of 
an individual to falsely shout “fire” in a crowded 
theater. It is also the basis for the suppression of 
various “radical” political organizations and the 
protection of others.  
A somewhat less stringent criterion for the protection 
of free speech is the “dangerous or bad tendency” test 
that stems from English common law and also has 
been the doctrine of the court at various times (For 
example, Gitlow v. New York, 1925) The “preferred 
position” was in favor during the 1940’s, when it 
appeared to come close to an absolute right of free 
speech. (Burns and Peltason, 137) 
 
Freedom of Religion 
Freedom of religion might be subject to two general 
doctrines. On the one hand, the no-preference doctrine 
would prevent the state from aiding any particular 
religion, but allow public religious activities that 
indicate no preference. A major difficulty with this 
approach in a society as pluralistic as ours is whether 
any type of meaningful religious doctrine or practice 
can be non-preferential. Instead, the Supreme Court 
has generally preferred the wall-of-separation doctrine 
that forbids the government to aid, encourage or 
support any and all churches or religious activities. 
(Burns and Peltason, 131) It is the wall-of-separation 
doctrine, for example, that is responsible for bans on 
Christmas trees on public property and  
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Redress of Grievances 
In many respects, some of the most interesting recent 
political history of the commons is that involving what 
are often called “protest movements”. Whether we 
examine the labor movement, the civil rights 
movement, the women’s movement, the environmental 
movement or the recent resurgences of political 
conservatism and social traditionalism, coalescence 
around a perceived problem or “grievance” and a plan 
of action (or “redress”) is one of the most frequently 
encountered forms of common political action.  
Even in highly repressive political regimes, commons 
may emerge in the form of protest movements, revolts, 
riots or other more peaceful forms. And, inevitably 
when such a development occurs, the common rhetoric 
of mutual purpose, shared resources is likely to be 
heard.  
The many relationships of commons and the state in 
the U.S. are conditioned in fundamental ways by the 
constitutional limits on the state imposed by the first 
amendment rights of religion, speech, assembly and 
redress of grievances and the implicit right of 
association. Yet existing constitutional decision-
making has evolved largely ad hoc in support of a kind 
of radical individualism that discounts the role of 
common action. This situation offers a phenomenal 
opportunity for nonprofit and voluntary action scholars 
to join with political theorists and legal scholars in 
exploring further the implications of commons for first 
amendment law. 
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Merit Patronage 
One of the consistent historical and contemporary 
themes of the evolution of the commons in western 
civilization is the multifaceted role of the state as 
patron of diverse common goods. In discussing this 
topic, we come up against the dubious reputation of 
patronage in American politics. Since the Progressive 
era, the idea of “political patronage” has been widely 
condemned even as it continues to be widely practiced 
in American public life. One of the principal effects of 
dismissing all forms of patronage as undesirable and 
objectionable, in the manner of conventional 
Progressive analysis, is to leave us virtually without 
the means to discuss major aspects of the relation of 
state and commons. Terms like aid, assistance, grant, 
and support all have their proper and specific uses, but 
patronage remains the most satisfactory generic term. 
In the context of the commons, patronage is the giving 
or either protection or support. (Gifis, 346)  Political 
sinecures, favoritism in the awarding of public 
contracts, and protection from prosecution are forms 
of patronage, but so are commissions of works of art 
and architecture, grants, awards, honors and 
recognitions. Rather than ignoring or rejecting the idea 
of patronage outright, it is preferable to distinguish 
merit patronage, distributed on the basis of some 
defensible principle of merit from mere favoritism. 
Such a distinction might hold, for example, that 
federal aid to urban areas or the poor is patronage 
justified on the basis of merit (in this case, need).  
Indeed, it is just such a distinction that advocates of 
“positive discrimination” in affirmative action policies 
claim to be making. From this vantage point, it is not 
the fact of patronage per se, but the justification of the 
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merit case associated with it that is the key issue. A 
distinction between merit patronage and favoritism 
along these lines is entirely consistent with the 
rejection of false public goods arguments already 
discussed. Thus, there is a legitimate recognized public 
interest (in the form of an educated citizenry) in 
universal free public education, as a public good, but 
no similar public good for higher education. Instead, 
public support for higher education is in the form of 
distinct common goods outlined by the National 
Endowments for the Arts and Humanities, the National 
Science Foundation and other government agencies 
closely allied with distinct, identifiable commons.  
Ironically, the growth of government since the end of 
World War II has also meant vast increases in merit 
patronage programs, largely without corresponding 
changes in public attitudes toward patronage. The 
currently operative system of interest group liberalism 
(Lowi, 1969) is notable in part as a way of reconciling 
the resulting cognitive dissonance:  Partisans of any 
particular and localized interest tacitly agree not to 
challenge the special privileges enjoyed by others so 
long as those others do the same. 
 
Conclusion 
The most fundamental point to be made about the 
relationship between the state and the commons 
involves the reciprocal roles played by each.  While it 
does, indeed, appear to be the case that states generally 
impact upon commons in a multitude of ways 
including tax policies, civil rights and other 
distributive, redistributive and regulatory policies, it 
must be noted also that commons are generally the 
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grounds upon which campaigns are organized to gain 
control of the state as well as change particular 
policies or practices. Thus, while it can be said that the 
state shapes and molds the commons, it is likewise 
true that the commons shapes and molds the state. 
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The most democratic country on earth is that in which people have, in our time, 
carried to the highest perfection the art of pursuing in common the object of their 
common desires and have applied this new science to the greatest number of 
purposes. 
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8. Common Exchanges 
his chapter will concentrate on some of the 
elementary forms of behavior or volunteer labor 
through which commons are built up within the 
broad confines of social exchange theory with 
an eye toward breaking out of some of the rather 
arbitrary constraints imposed on nonprofit and 
voluntary action research by the market model of 
mutually profitable exchange. To explore this point, 
we will use the concept of the benefactory, previously 
introduced in Chapter 3. 
Social exchange theory has held enormous importance 
for nonprofit and voluntary action studies. (Homans, 
1961; Homans, 1968; Blau, 1967; Blau and Scott, 
1963)  American social exchange theory has its 
conceptual origins in attempts by George Homans and 
his colleagues to discover what Homans termed “the 
T 
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elementary forms of social behavior”. This approach 
has been subjected to extensive criticism and analysis. 
(Heath, 1976; Mitchell, 1978) It does, however, 
impose an interesting and seemingly rigorous model 
on the study of the commons, and organizational 
researchers have been attempting to recoup the 
research possibilities suggested by this model. (C.f., 
Seidel, 1991) Unfortunately, attention has been limited 
to the most market-like common organizations, and 
those with the closest ties to the state. The resulting 
body of nonprofit organizational studies has left many 
organized commons like those discussed in chapter 5 
completely out of the picture.  Without making any 
claims about the exhaustive or universal nature of the 
list, we can identify a number of forms of exchange, 
organization and interaction that appear to be the 
building blocks upon which many forms of commons 
are built. 
 
Common Goods Exchange And The 
Gift Map 
Common goods exchanges, or the voluntary and 
uncoerced social acts of patrons and beneficiaries in 
which purposes and resources are shared, mutuality is 
built up and fairness is assumed are the irreducible 
units of social, economic and political behavior in the 
commons. The model of the gift (or benefit) freely 
given by a benefactor to a beneficiary offers a starting 
point for analysis of all types of common goods 
exchange. Much of conventional exchange theory 
follows grant economics in treating gifts as unilateral 
transfers, in contrast to the two-way exchanges of 
buyers and sellers in the marketplace. Such an 
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approach is reductionist in deconstructing all types of 
gift exchanges to unilateral and unidirectional transfers 
in “single-round” exchanges and masks other equally 
important types of common exchange.  
An alternative model has already been suggested in the 
preceding discussion:  In common goods exchanges, 
groups of affluent persons, temporarily not at risk 
voluntarily forego their own self interest and associate 
with others to define mutual purposes, pool resources, 
in the process developing a sense of mutuality within 
group-determined standards of fairness and justice. 
This is not to say that all persons make such choices, 
or do so all the time. Nor is it to say that all affluent 
persons are obligated to do so. Nor is it to say that all 
persons act rationally all the time. However, affluent 
persons acting rationally may on some occasions favor 
the interests of others over their own. In descriptive 
terms, at least four distinct types of common exchange 
can be noted: Patronage and Tributes, Gifts, Potlatches 
and Offerings. More can be said about each of these 
without the need to preclude the possibility of 
additional types.  
 
Patronage and Tributes 
Quite possibly the simplest form of common goods 
exchange is the simple unilateral transfer of a tangible 
substance, message or other meaningful object (the 
gift, benefit or benefice) from one subject (the giver or 
donor) to another (the receiver or beneficiary). We 
shall follow Boulding and others, and refer to this type 
of unilateral transaction as patronage and tribute. We 
shall depart, however, from Boulding’s suggestion of 
patronage as exclusively positively charged (“love”) 
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and tribute as negatively charged (“fear”). Instead, the 
two terms are opposites in an almost infinite variety of 
different binary status hierarchies (higher and lower, 
richer and poorer, older and younger, knowledge and 
ignorance, and so forth) In each case, patronage 
involves a unilateral transfer (“gift”) in one direction, 
and tribute in the other.  
Patronage and tribute exchanges commonly involve 
interaction between at least two parties of manifestly 
unequal status. Because they involve manifest 
inequalities does not necessarily mean that tributes are 
always objective or rational exchanges or that 
hierarchies are static, rigidly defined or mutually 
exclusive. Gifts between lovers, for example, often 
assume the form of mutual tributes. Likewise, parental 
support of children has many features in common with 
other forms of patronage.  
It is of central importance to note the risky nature of 
reciprocity with patronage and tributes. Whether the 
tribute is to a powerful ruler, a ladylove, parents, 
children or some other subject, equitable exchange, a 
contract or obligations of reciprocity is not ordinarily 
part of the understanding in tributes. The good 
returned from tributes, in other words, can only ever 
be probabilistic, not contractual or conditional.  
An important question for nonprofit and voluntary 
studies involves the extent to which prosocial helping 
behavior and various forms of organized charities 
constitute tribute. The distinction between unreserved 
giving and gifts in anticipation of return figures 
prominently in the distinctive fourth-century positions 
of St. John Chrysostem and St. Ambrose discussed by 
Morris (1986, pp.). It is also important in the “degrees 
of charity” of Maimonides. ( 19XX) 
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Possibly the earliest forms of tributes involving 
intermediaries were the priests and temple cults of 
ancient religions. Regardless of other differences, a 
major characteristic of most religious observances 
involves the intermediary or interceding role of the 
priest, shaman, magician, soothsayer, or other between 
the worshiper-giver-subject and the god who is the 
recipient of tribute. In Buddhist ethics, the issue of 
assuring that gifts given to the intermediary actually 
“reach” the intended recipient is a major concern of 
the ethics of tribute. (Lohmann and Bracken, 1991) 
Gifts 
Tribute can be distinguished from gifts in the ordinary 
meaning of this term by the so-called norm of 
reciprocity. Unlike tribute that is given with no 
expectation of receiving a gift in return such 
expectations are ordinarily attached to gifts. 
(Gouldner, 1960)  Thus, if I give you a present for 
your birthday, it is typically with the expectation that 
you will do the same for me on my birthday. 
Reciprocity, in other words, is encoded in the gift 
situation, and establishes a fundamental equality 
between givers and recipient that is not characteristic 
of either patronage or tribute. After a period of time, 
those who fail to respond in kind to our holiday 
greeting cards may be removed from our lists. 
In what remains the classic study of gifts, the French 
anthropologist Marcel Mauss (1967) defined the gift as 
given received and returned (that is, a new gift is given 
by the original recipient to the original giver, and so 
on, ad infinitum). Indeed, it is this continuous, on-
going quality of gift-giving that is the basis for 
interpreting gifts as a key to social integration and 
solidarity. In giving and receiving individuals establish 
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and symbolize and demonstrate their on-going 
relations and mutual obligations.  
Giving-receiving-giving logic explains many aspects 
of common behavior, as well as point up some of the 
dilemmas of the field. For example, we can use it to 
offer a more benign explanation of one of the favorite 
shibboleths of critics of modern charities. It seems to 
be almost a “law of charity” that a gift given (whether 
in the form of an individual donation or an 
institutional grant) will be followed up by a later 
request for, as we say, “continued funding.” The 
almost unanimous conclusion of the self-interest 
theorists is that this is clear-cut evidence of the play of 
self-interest on the part of the recipient. Moreover, 
such self-interest easily shades over into purported 
evidence of greed if one comes to dislike the recipient 
or question their motives. The message seems clear 
enough: “I-the-donor did good in my gift to you. You 
have no right to suggest I have any further obligation 
to give you another gift!” 
We must grant initially, that if one views the matter 
exclusively from the donor’s perspective, it does 
indeed appear to such cases involve the simple 
working of self-interest-cum-greed. If, however, one 
examines the matter from the vantage point of the 
other parties to the exchange as well, quite another 
perspective arises. In the case of such gifts to 
intermediaries, the logic is quite different, and is 
entirely consistent with a reciprocal gift perspective. 
While the donor may react as above, the intermediary 
is likely to have a quite different reaction, much more 
like: “You gave me a gift on condition that I use it to 
help others. I continued the cycle and gave help to 
others (which was our gift to them-- yours and mine). 
Now, simple reciprocity says unless I receive another 
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similar gift, the chain of reciprocal giving is broken, 
and I am the victim of bad faith!” 
Thus, it would appear that norms of reciprocity based 
on gift theory are at the heart of a value conflict of 
overriding importance to the modern commons. In 
many practical cases, we simply lack an adequate 
normative basis on which to resolve the seeming 
conflict between interpretations of donor and 
intermediary. (We will leave aside entirely the equally 
important issues of donor and intermediary 
expectations upon recipients: In exchange for food 
stamps, for example, how much right does the state, as 
donor, have to prescribe eating habits?) In general, 
while it is quite clear that very real norms of 
reciprocity do, in fact, exist, it is equally clear that they 
are inadequate in a number of cases.  
Potlatchs 
In its narrowest sense, the potlatch is a distinctive 
Amerindian ceremonial gift-giving institution of 
traditional Tlingit culture on the Northwest Pacific 
coast. (Kan, 1986)  More generally, the term potlatch 
can serve to identify a broad form of reciprocal gift 
giving involving serial reciprocity of which the Tlingit 
potlatch is a noteworthy example.  
In the potlatch, reciprocity is trilateral. As opposed to 
the closed system of reciprocity of gift giving, in the 
potlatch receiving creates an obligation for further 
giving, but not simply to the original giver, but to 
others. (This form might be paraphrased as a message: 
“Here’s my gift, pass it on!) The potlatch form of 
giving is, logically, at least, eventually extended to 
embrace the entire community. In the process, both the 
self-interest and social status of givers are implicated. 
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Examples of this are numerous, from the grand 
patronage of the temples and ceremonial events of 
ancient Greece to the mayordomia of Latin American 
villages. (Smith, 1977) 
Something like the potlatch formalism shows up in 
some surprising places. The American practice of 
granting tax-exempt status to various nonprofit 
charitable organizations, for example, can be 
interpreted as a potlatch in which an original gift 
(freedom from taxation) is given by the state to 
nonprofit organizations in expectation of a return gift 
to various deserving client groups. In typical potlatch 
fashion, the process does not stop there, however. The 
distinctive rhetoric of American social and economic 
policy also anticipates further steps to this gift, in the 
expectations that those clients benefited by such 
services will, eventually, be transformed into 
productive workers whose efforts will contribute to 
increased social product, and who will become tax-
paying citizens, paying tribute to the state, that will 
continue the tax exempt status of charitable 
organizations, and so forth. 
Thus, from the perspective of the potlatch, one 
possible avenue toward resolution of the value conflict 
noted above is to bring the recipient into the picture:  
If a donor makes a gift to an intermediary who uses 
that as a basis to make a gift (as anticipated by the 
donor) to a recipient, what are the accumulated 
expectations on the recipient?  Is the first part of the 
transaction a gift and the latter part of the transaction 
tribute? In that case, we can say the recipient has no 
explicit obligation to reciprocate. If so, on what basis 
did the transformation from gift to tribute occur? If 
not, in what form can the recipient be expected to 
respond with a suitable gift? Many of the answers to 
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the current quandaries of nonprofit charity theory rest 
upon the answers to that question.  
Offerings 
The circuit is completed, so to speak, in a different 
way by offerings that can be said to be given, received 
and eventually returned to the giver but not by the 
receiver. (Strong, 1967, 7)   Interestingly, this is the 
basis of the Judeo-Christian concept of charity: It is 
the sense of offerings to a generous and loving God in 
which traditional Christian concepts of alms has been 
be interpreted. It is also an explanation of the Buddhist 
concept of dana, where donations to the Buddhist 
monk are interpreted as gifts to Buddha, who can be 
expected to respond in kind. (Dharmasiri, 1989; 
Goodman, 1987; Strong, 1967, 7) A gift is given (for 
example, to a beggar or a monk) who receives it but is 
in no position to reciprocate; divine reciprocity comes 
instead. 
Because of the overt religious connotations involved 
exchange theorists have been inclined to discount 
offerings, or deconstruct them into simpler gift, 
tribute, patronage or potlatch transactions. Yet the 
grounds on which theorists deign to redefine the 
reality of offerings as they are interpreted by various 
commons is highly problematic. Mauss captures the 
exact sense of offerings in his suggestion that alms are 
not really given to the poor, but are actually offerings 
to gods, deities or spirits who, in turn, grant that the 
obligations that were sacrificed to them should be 
given to the unfortunate. In the same vein, the Bible 
quotes Jesus as telling his disciples that whatever is 
done to the poor, weak and helpless is done also to 
him.  
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While we may be accustomed to thinking of offerings 
as ceremonial or ritual acts, the concept of the offering 
as an elementary common exchange may be a difficult 
one to accept. Offerings, whether sacred or secular, 
involve exchange among unequals linked to a long 
chain of serial reciprocity in which the most exalted 
being, whether human or supernatural, holds the 
penultimate position. This is the case with the alms 
example offered by Mauss. In such cases, however, 
offerings should not be mistaken for, or reduced to, 
simple tributes, because the various sacred personas 
assume an intermediary rather than object role.  
Thus, it is the case that offerings involve serial, triadic 
relations, rather than the simple dyadic relations of 
tributes and gifts. Rather than only the giver, receiver 
and gift, offerings also involve intermediaries who 
handle the exchange -- whether ceremonially or 
ritualistically or in more prosaic reality. The offering 
idea, for example, also appears regularly in modern, 
scientific professional guises as well. Thus, it is said of 
the practice of medicine physicians treat illnesses (for 
example, make the offerings of medicine), only God 
heals (grants the benefit of health).  
Free-Riding 
Free riding can be defined as an elementary form of 
social exchange characterized by acceptance of a 
benefit not offered. Since its introduction by Hardin in 
the 1960’s, the concept of free riding behavior has 
assumed the proportions of a given in a considerable 
portion of nonprofit economic, management and 
organizational studies. (C.f., ) It is interesting to note, 
therefore, that findings from several psychological 
researchers suggest important parameters of the free-
riding phenomenon.  
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A study of 212 undergraduates concluded from this 
that individuals are more likely to avoid socially 
responsible behavior when they are in groups than 
when they are alone. (Wiesenthal, Austrom and 
Silverman, 1983) 
Yamagishi (1986) presents an explicitly social-
psychological approach to the problem of public goods 
and concluded that members who have realized the 
undesirable consequence of free riding and the 
importance of mutual cooperation will cooperate to 
establish sanctions that assure other members' 
cooperation instead of trying to induce other members 
into mutual cooperation directly. Such an approach 
virtually cries out for connection with various findings 
in the area of the social psychology of opinion 
leadership. 
Rich (1988, 7) concluded that “there are...countless 
examples” of successful collective effort not readily be 
explained by reference to formal or informal sanctions 
against free riding. Most solutions to the free-rider 
problem ignore the importance of a sense of 
community, that is a common good as Rich defines it: 
the recognition that one’s own interests are intimately 
bound to the capacity of an identifiable group to 
satisfy their interests.” (14)  
Altogether, these point toward the tentative conclusion 
that while free-riding behavior is certainly an 
important element of the psychology of the commons, 
it is hardly a fixed and immutable characteristic of 
voluntary group action. In fact, a good deal of work 
remains to be done on specifying more precisely the 
conditions under which free-riding behavior occurs. It 
is quite plausible, for example, that free riding occurs 
primarily, or even exclusively, under conditions of 
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“normative dissonance” in which the social norms 
regulating participation, approval and affirmation, 
sharing and the other dynamics of common action are 
weak or conflicting.  
Rich (14) singles out three conditions affecting the 
likelihood of free-riding: 1) sufficient recurring 
interaction so participants have an opportunity to form 
expectations about the behavior of others; 2) 
conditional cooperation (willing to cooperate only if 
others are also willing; and 3) the nature of the 
common goods should be clear and exceed the 
individual’s cost. He goes on to suggest that the group 
size that is relevant to determining whether or not a 
group can supply itself with a common good is not the 
total number in the group, but the size of the subset of 
members who can see the relationship between their 
interests and the group’s capacity for joint action and 
are willing to pursue a strategy of conditional 
cooperation. (15)  
 
Acts of Common Good 
The everyday meaning of gifts is of tangible objects -- 
baseball bats and electric trains and fur coats -- given 
and received for birthdays, holidays. It is worthy of 
note that a synonym for such gifts is “presents”, subtly 
calling attention to the act of presentation. However, 
we have already noted that most common goods 
consist primarily or exclusively of intangible social 
acts, rather than tangible objects. Acts of common 
good are by their very nature notoriously varied, that 
brings us back again to the issue of classification 
raised in Chapter 2. We can find people praying 
together and acting and writing and singing and 
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working together to aid those victimized by all manner 
of threats and perils. We can also find them meeting 
together in groups for all manner of purposes, doing 
research and playing games and engaged in myriad 
other pursuits that are voluntary, mutual, and fair 
pursuits of common ends with shared means. Yet, we 
have great difficulty conceiving of the entire class of 
common goods and seeing any “natural” divisions of 
such goods as a class. Empirically, this may be 
because most of us are normally only involved in a 
small spectrum of the entire class of common goods, 
and our preoccupations with our fellow participants 
and the concerns we share with them. Theoretically, 
such narrow vision leads to the kind of fractured and 
partial views of the commons to which we have grown 
accustomed. We shall attempt to deal explicitly with 
the major categories of organized commons in Chapter 
9. For the moment at least, we can forsake the effort at 
exhaustive typologies of common actions, and instead 
reduce the vast inventory of possible common actions 
to two principal categories, that we shall term 
“presentations” and “problem-solving”. By doing so, 
we can identify a number of additional interesting 
dimensions of common action. 
Discourse and Presentation 
Commons, benefactories and common goods consist 
of the social acts of persons in time, and as such there 
is an inherent subjectivity, unpredictability and 
spontaneity about them that can be downplayed, but 
that cannot be arbitrarily ignored in the name of 
objective science. Common goods are ephemeral 
human creations in that they cannot be stored, saved or 
warehoused for later distribution. They are thus, 
distinctly part of what Simon (1981) calls the "artifice" 
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or the humanly constructed order of civilization. 
Unlike technology, equipment and products, however, 
the artifacts of the commons are almost entirely 
symbolic, rather than material. 
In general, the symbolic artifice of the commons can 
be divided into two broad categories of action: 
discourse, or the use of complex verbal symbols to 
assert things through a process of successive 
understanding and aggregation of separate meaning 
units, (Langer, 1967, 96) and presentations, consisting 
of rites (or rituals), ceremonies and myths. (Morgan 
and Brask, 1988; Langer, 1967, 271)  Moreover, most 
of the discourse can be subsumed within the pragmatic 
problem-solving model.  
Discourse is an important element of action in all 
commons. Indeed, common language may be the 
original commons. Discussion, debate, dialogue and 
argument are all forms of discourse. One 
contemporary indicator of the importance of discourse 
is the stress such issues as speaking order and other 
discursive issues have in constitutions, by-laws, 
Roberts Rules of Order and other common governing 
documents. The central, fundamental fact of commons 
is that discourse is the basis upon which the five 
defining elements of a commons are linked: Free and 
uncoerced participation and fairness can only be 
realized, shared purposes and resources identified, and 
a sense of mutuality and affiliation built up through 
talk, dialogue, communication and exchange. 
An equally important form of action in common 
goods, and somewhat more complex to grasp is 
presentation, that is particularly important in 
understanding the artistic, religious and emotional 
contents of common goods. The approach taken here 
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follows Langer in defining presentational symbols as 
direct presentations of objects that speak directly to 
sense and lack intrinsic generality. Presentational 
symbols have no adequate permanent units of 
meaning, Rather, their meanings are grasped only 
through their relation to larger patterns, structures or 
fabrics. (Langer, 1967, 97.)  
Because of the importance of discourse and 
presentation, the building blocks of common goods, 
that are both created and consumed in renditions, are 
symbols: In the case of discourse, discursive symbols 
require elements of both practical context and novelty 
(Langer, 1967, 13) Discursive symbols are most 
commonly encountered in activities of a "practical" or 
problem-solving (in the Deweyian sense) character, 
like philosophy, competitive athletics, helping, science 
and social action.  
Presentational acts tend to be of three types: rites, 
ceremonies and myths. Ritual acts are prescribed sets 
of words and actions used practically without variation 
and believed to have symbolic powers to produce 
certain desired effects. Ceremonies are special 
occasions in which explicit rules of behavior govern 
the performance of members. (Rose, 1958, p. 36)  
Dramas are special thematic complexes of 
institutionalized social acts that may involve several 
types of ceremonies in dealing with problems, such as 
victimage and redemption, sickness and healing, and 
so forth (Brissett and Edgley, 1990) Many nonprofit 
problem-solving activities in social services and some 
types of scientific activity constitute dramas in this 
sense. Thus, "problem" and "solution" may be knitted 
together by a fabric of meanings spelling out the 
normal or typical steps in the problem-solving drama. 
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Games are strategic social acts of a more or less 
routine nature (in which everyone "knows the rules") 
Committee meetings, conferences among experienced 
persons and budget decisions often constitute games in 
this sense.  
 
Information and Meaning 
The signs that are the building blocks of discourse and 
presentation can be organized in several different 
ways. Among the most important behavioral 
characteristics of such constructions are practical 
context and novelty, that correspond closely to what is 
ordinarily meant by information and meaning. 
Discourse always requires these two distinct elements: 
Verbal or practical context (or what we might term 
knowledge) and novelty (what the speaker is trying to 
point out or express). Knowledge can thus be defined 
as the quality of order and predictability in symbols. 
Information is generally acknowledged to be a critical 
factor in all types of community service practice.  In 
social casework, for example, the interview has long 
been held to be the central process, and information 
gathering (termed "assessment") and strategic 
information use (or "intervention") are usually 
regarded as fundamental dynamics of the interview. In 
social group theory, theories of group formation and 
dynamics often revolve around the information group 
participants have, or learn, about one another. In 
community organization, the "knowledge is power" 
dynamic has long been critical, and information is 
often seen as one of the key variables separating the 
disadvantaged from various powers and elites. And in 
administration, Simon and others have identified 
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information as a critical variable in the effectiveness of 
decision-making.  
In general, this approach makes of information and 
meaning measurable quantities--that which is and is 
not presently certain, respectively. It also 
systematically integrates time as a critically important 
factor in common goods: Both in terms of the time-
cost of searching for information, and in terms of a 
necessary time-referent for separating information and 
meaning. What is presently known and meaningful 
(for example, is the client currently employed?) is 
dynamically alterable and information must be 
collected again and again. Thus, one cannot in this 
context speak of information or meaning absent an 
explicit time reference. At the same time, the value of 
information and meanings is also dynamically 
alterable: The fact that the client is not employed today 
was established at an identifiable cost. If the client is 
employed tomorrow, the meaning of today's discovery 
may be lost (and the question arises of whether the 
cost of information gathering was justified). 
The distinction of information and meaning also 
implicates three particular types of action as critically 
important to the theory of common goods. One of 
these we shall call search that is action by which 
information is obtained.  Search is likely to proceed 
along any of a number of lines including trial-and-
error, problem-solving and planning. The other, we 
shall call technique to denote any act in which existing 
meanings are employed. Finally, there is learning, or 
the acts by which techniques (including search 
strategies) are disseminated. These categories of 
search, technique and learning can be employed to 
classify virtually all types of common repertories, 
whether the performance repertories of the concert 
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musician, the roles of the actor, or the skills of the 
human service provider.  
For our purposes, commons are ordinarily composed 
by members of leisure classes (in both an economic 
and a social status sense) who tend to be stratified into 
three (occasionally overlapping) sub-classes: patrons, 
who provide the resources; agents, who use those 
resources to act; and clientele, who are the objects of 
common goods, and the. Common goods, therefore, 
are spontaneous acts using resources for the 
achievement of some purpose. 
The question inevitably arises to what extent can we 
treat discourse and presentation as tribute, gift, 
potlatch and offering? The first turns out to be 
remarkably easy: It is standard fare in the context of 
awards banquets, convocations and numerous other 
common events to “pay tribute” in the form of 
speeches of recognition and commemoration, or the 
presentation of plaques, awards and numerous other 
mementos to those whose actions in the common good 
have been deemed praiseworthy or exemplary.  
The reciprocal circumstances of common gift giving 
are only slightly more complex. Most government and 
foundation grants, for example, explicitly incorporate 
such exchanges: You give me the money and I’ll give 
you what you want – a cure for cancer, the solution to 
poverty, greater understanding, whatever. 
Potlatches and offerings would appear to be the real 
fertile ground for extending our understandings of gift 
exchanges in the commons:  We have already 
discussed tax-exempt status as an example of potlatch 
giving. The serial sponsorship of the fiesta and ancient 
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Greek aristocratic patronage discussed in preceding 
chapters also conform to the potlatch exchange. 
Offerings are sometimes mistakenly associated only 
with religious observances. Anyone who has ever 
given a speech or presented an academic or scientific 
paper representing one’s very best efforts to a group of 
respected and valued peers should also have an 
intuitive grasp of the offering exchange. Under such 
circumstances, one may “give my best effort” (or more 
colloquially, “give it my best shot) in the hope or 
expectation that others will do likewise. When they do, 
the characteristic return of the offering is 
characteristically not associated with any particular 
individual. In religious terms, it is seen as a divine gift. 
In more secular terms, such common offerings 
frequently engender words like “synergy”, 
“actualization” and “gestalt” and phrases like “... 
greater than the sum of its parts.” 
Problem-Solving 
Discourse and presentation (talking and showing) are 
thus the elemental forms of organizing action in the 
commons, and that action conforms consistently to the 
logic of gift exchange. The further question that arises 
is to what ends does such talking and showing lead in 
gift exchange? What, in other words, is the purpose of 
common discourse and presentation? In the context of 
the micro-economic model as it is frequently applied 
to nonprofit endeavors, the answer to that question is 
simple: People speak and display themselves and their 
actions and creations in order to gain advantages and 
rewards for themselves. In the assumptions stated in 
Chapter 3, however, we explicitly rejected “self-
interest” and “profit-maximization”. To briefly restate 
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the matter, our reasons for doing so were largely the 
view that when they are acting authentically in a 
manner consistent with the stated objectives of diverse 
commons, rational actors frequently claim that they 
are not, and do not appear to disinterested observers, to 
be merely attempting to serve their own ends. And, the 
main interest of the theory of the commons is in 
creating a systematic theoretical statement of the 
commons that explores the implications of that 
position. 
The pragmatic model of problem solving forms the 
formal theoretical backbone of a good deal of common 
activity. And virtually all contemporary problem-
solving approaches begin with, or are traceable to, the 
"problem-solving" model of John Dewey. (see 
Bernstein, 1971)  The view that one solves problems 
by defining them, identifying alternatives, assessing 
the alternatives, and choosing among them is so 
universal in social welfare, extension and other 
voluntary action fields as to be considered virtually a 
"natural attitude". 
To Dewey, Mead and the other pragmatists, the 
experience of a problem is a universal one for 
individuals and groups. Recognizable problems erupt 
into the flow of "normal" (that is, non-problematic) 
personal or group experience and divert attention away 
from other things. In experiencing problems, we 
redirect our attention, temporarily or permanently, 
from other concerns and focus on the problem. An 
important aspect of the meaning of "solving" a 
problem, therefore, is the redirection of attention away 
from the problem and toward other concerns.  
Experiencing a problem also commonly results in a 
sense of problematic--of things out of the ordinary and 
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often of an urgent wish to "do something."  As a result, 
the events of awareness and in particular, when we 
become aware of a problem and when we are no 
longer aware of it as a problem per se (and only as a 
past experience) offer a convenient way to delimit the 
boundaries of a problem from an individual 
standpoint. Thus, in at least a limited sense, a problem 
is experienced in a time interval between an initial 
"horizon of indifference" prior to which there was no 
problem and a later "horizon of indifference" after 
which the problem is recalled only as a memory. (See 
Appendix A)  In the terminology of endowment 
theory, after its resolution, the problem itself has 
become part of our heritage. Knowledge gained in 
recognizing and resolving problems may in this way 
become part of our resource endowment for solving 
future problems. This is in fact the much-prized 
attribute of "experience" and "practice wisdom" that 
many social work practitioners hold over against 
"theory". 
Common problem solving that leads to a stable 
solution, or what might be termed “a solution in place” 
often corresponds closely to the gift exchange model 
as well. Contemporary social problem theory is a good 
example.  In this way, the learning that results and the 
knowledge of how to solve future similar problems in 
the future constitute important contributions to the 
overall endowment of a particular commons, and 
ultimately of the civilization as a whole (although we 
commonly only “tote up” such civilization level 
contributions when we perceive them to have major, 
overarching significance.)  
From the perspective of gift exchange, well-defined 
and understood problems are as much part of common 
endowments as solutions. Thus, those cost-benefit 
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approaches that perceive problems as negative 
valences and solutions as positive valences, and 
problem solving as “neutralization” (for example, cost 
reduction) are particularly inappropriate for the 
commons, because they simply take the problem for 
granted. The sociologist C. Wright Mills once made a 
distinction between “troubles” and “problems” that is 
particularly apt here. An individual or group may have 
a vague sense “that something is wrong” without ever 
identifying or defining the trouble as a problem. Such 
vaguely sensed problems are more likely to be adapted 
to and lived with than solved. Yet, articulating, 
clarifying and defining the trouble into an explicit 
problem, rather than being seen as an offering, can 
sometimes be interpreted as a setback or a loss.  
The history of family violence in America offers a 
particularly apt example. What some have interpreted 
as an epidemic or sudden outbreak of family violence 
may actually be a result of heightened sensitivity to the 
problems such violence represents and the deleterious 
consequences. As understanding of the problem 
grows, simple acceptance of its consequences becomes 
more and more unconscionable.  Thus deeper 
understanding and more clear-cut definition of 
problems by themselves constitute powerful resources 
for contemporary social problem action groups, 
environmental groups and many others.  
Endowment theory, as noted above, is concerned with 
a pragmatic account of the ways in which communities 
use resources, including surplus social product and 
prior problem-solving experience, in the commons. In 
the problem-solving context, it is time, rather than 
money, that is the common metric of problem and 
solution. Elapsed time is a universal characteristic of 
all problem-solving ventures, even those conducted 
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outside a money economy such as our own. When 
problem solving does involve paid employment or 
other forms of contracted service, some measure of 
time is typically involved, so that money measures 
such as wages, salaries and consults are easily 
converted into time units as well. Thus, time, rather 
than money, is the universal metric of problem 
solving.  
 
A Buddhist Ethical Perspective 
Those of us familiar with the nonprofit/voluntary 
sector in the United States are accustomed to the well-
known association between Judeo-Christian ethics and 
various elements of prosocial behavior including 
altruistic acts, donations and other forms of patronage, 
and so forth It may come as somewhat of a surprise, 
however, that theologians and ethicists in other 
religious-cultural systems have also been concerned, to 
one degree or another with comparable sets of issues. 
(See, for example, Fisher, XX; Fisher, 1978; 
Saddhatissa, 1970; Dharmasiri, 1989, 27) 
On the basis of a study of Burmese Buddhism, 
Melfred E. Spiro (1970, 109) links this Buddhist 
conception of merit to explicit charitable and 
philanthropic actions in the following manner: Merit is 
the goal of religious action because merit can improve 
one’s karma. Merit is acquired, among other ways, by 
performing acts of charity and by giving. In the 
hierarchy of giving, religious giving brings the greatest 
merit, supporting a monk or building a pagoda, for 
example. To contribute to a poverty-stricken widow, 
or to build a school is considered inferior dana. 
Although there may be other variations between 
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Burmese and Japanese Buddhism, this priority order 
applies in the case of Japanese Buddhism also. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have identified four distinct types 
of gift exchange frequently encountered in the 
commons. Tributes, or unilateral exchanges without 
expectation of return; Gifts, or reciprocal exchanges; 
Potlatches, or serial chains of reciprocal exchange; and 
Offerings, that might be termed “broken chain” 
exchanges, in which a gift is given and a return comes 
from another source. No claim is made that these types 
entirely exhaust the possible types of gift exchange. 
They do, however, occur frequently enough to attract 
our attention. We will follow up by exploring these 
four types in the context of specific forms of common 
social organization in Chapter 9 below.  
In the analysis of action in the commons, it should not 
be necessary to stop with the frequent observations 
that bone fide common action is not profit-oriented nor 
self-interested. By employing the models of gift 
exchange discussed in this chapter and other similar 
ideal types of gifts, it should be possible to identify 
more fully the actual occurrence of action in the 
commons as common gift exchange. In the chapter 
that follows, we will focus this perspective directly on 
the economics of the commons. In so doing, we will 
seek to deal explicitly with the economics of 
“unproductive labor” that Adam Smith wrote off.  
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Among democratic nations, all the citizens are independent and feeble; they can do 
hardly anything by themselves, and none of them can oblige his fellow men to lend 
him assistance. They all, therefore, become powerless if they do not learn 
voluntarily to help one another. 
They look out for mutual assistance; and as soon as they have found one another 
out, the combine. 
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 
 
 
9. Charity Theory 
eginning in the second half of the nineteenth 
century, ethical precepts of charity reaching 
back to the Ancient Hebrews and ethical 
precepts of philanthropy dating to the Athenian 
Greeks were gradually merged and transformed into 
the modern, organized institutional base of social 
service. This transformation has important enduring 
implications for the commons. In England and the 
United States this transformation took place largely 
within “the voluntary sector” of private charitable 
organizations.  
Three elements of that change are of particular interest 
to charity theory as a component of the theory of the 
commons: the focus on “charity organization”, the 
unprecedented emphasis on science as an element in 
charitable practice and the belief (at least partly false, 
as it turned out) that personal and voluntary charity 
must inevitably become a matter of specialized, 
professional practice. Although social work and a 
B 
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number of other specialized helping professions have 
arisen the professionalization of charity has not 
displaced voluntary acts of charity, or caused the 
disappearance of amateur organized charities. 
Analytically, it appears that western civilization has 
been characterized by only three distinct systems of 
charity throughout its long history: 1) personal 
charitable practice based upon the ethical obligation to 
perform other-oriented acts of positive good invented 
by the Hebrews and adopted in turn by Christianity 
and Islam; 2) religiously based systems of organized 
charity associated respectively with Jewish zedekah, 
Christian charity and Islamic zakat; and 3) the public 
responsibilities of state charities articulated in the 
locally-oriented Elizabethan Poor Law tradition and 
more recently by the nationally-oriented “welfare 
states”. The first of these is the basis of interest in 
altruism theory, as discussed below. The second has as 
a major concern the social organization of commons. 
The last of these is an important aspect of the 
contemporary relations between states and commons.  
Charity As Ethical Behavior 
Within the Judeo-Christian-Islamic heritage, the 
ethical basis for individual acts of charity has not 
changed fundamentally in more than 2,000 years. 
Robert Morris locates the historical origins of Western 
charity in ancient Hebrew ethics in the revolutionary 
ethical concept of an obligation to perform acts of 
positive good that emerged about 800 B.C.E. (Morris, 
1986)  
O’Connell, Chapter 1 (1989) provides a brief 
introduction to the fundamental Biblical citations. The 
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positions of unlimited generosity and informed giving 
advocated by various early church leaders sound 
entirely familiar to us, as do most of the issues raised 
in the monastic codes discussed below.  Whether we 
concur entirely with the priority ordering of 
Maimonides eight “degrees of charity” set forth in the 
12th century, there is little in the distinctions 
themselves to give pause to the modern philanthropist. 
(Cass & Manser in O’Connell; Morris, 80) 
Anonymity in giving was held in highest regard by the 
ancient Hebrews. What is sometimes called the 
Chamber of Whispers was an institutional expression 
of this: a quiet room set aside in the synagogue into 
that the individual philanthropist went, unobserved, 
and left donations for the poor, who went in--also 
unobserved--to obtain the help they needed.  
Principles of donation arose very early in this tradition. 
The tithe as a morally approved basis of redistribution 
for various purposes was largely an in-kind 
contribution, in which the tenth part of the yield of the 
harvest was to be given to the Lord in support of 
religion and for the relief of the poor. At every harvest, 
a corner of each field was left unharvested for the 
poor. Every seventh year, fields were left fallow and 
the poor were permitted to garner the spontaneous 
growth during this sabbatical year.  
The Jewish ethical tradition of charity was adopted by 
emergent Christianity with only slight modifications. 
Throughout the middle ages, down to the time of the 
Elizabethan Poor Law and Statute of Charitable Uses 
in 1601, organized Christian charity was closely 
associated with the institutional church, reaching back 
at least to the Roman Emperor Constantine’s sanction 
of donations in the fourth century. In 321, Constantine, 
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who had converted to Christianity, "gave license for 
persons to give or bequeath money to the church. 
From that time on substantial endowments began to 
accumulate around charitable institutions." Beginning 
about A.D. 150, Christians began to organize their 
charity work by creating a Church Fund in each 
church, supported by voluntary gifts. (Marts, 1953, 6) 
Deacons are said to have dispensed funds to the needy. 
Marts also alleges that later districts or deaconries 
were organized, each containing a hostel (Hotel Dieu) 
, alms office, orphanage and shelter for babies. The 
first documentary proof of a hospital or xenodochium 
(established first as a rest room, or hospitalium, in the 
house of a bishop) was one established in A.D. 369 in 
Caesarea by St. Basil. Apparently, it grew to a large 
institution with different pavilions for different 
diseases and residences for physicians, nurses and 
convalescents. St. Gregory called it a 'heaven on earth.' 
(Marts, 1953, 7; Morris, 103)  
By the Fourth Century, early Christian doctrine had 
evolved into two distinct schools of thought that 
constitute what might be termed the “Theory X” and 
“Theory Y” of charity:  St. John Chrysostem (347-
407) advocated a position of open generosity, 
compassion for the needy and unconstrained giving. 
“It is the season of kindness, not of strict inquiry, of 
mercy, not of calculation.”  By contrast, St. Ambrose 
(340-397), St. Augustine of Hippo (354-430) and 
others argued that the poor needed guidance and 
counsel more than money, and that giving should be 
carefully monitored to assure that it went only to the 
truly needy. (Morris, 103-4) 
 A similar profile emerges in Islamic zakat that 
involves personal ethical obligations much like those 
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incumbent upon Jews and Christians, and is venerated 
as one of the five fundamentals or “pillars of Islam”. 
Aiding those in need and giving to support Islam is the 
personal obligation of every Muslim. Moreover, a 
substantial network of waqfs, that are endowments or 
foundations, grew up in the Arab world over the 
centuries. (Hourami, pp?) Interestingly, there is little 
evidence available in English of a system of Islamic 
charity organization other than the waqfs.  
We might also note, that the Jewish-Christian-Islamic 
ethical tradition of charity is distinctive, but not 
entirely unique among the world’s major religions. 
Each of the world’s major religions appears to have 
embraced somewhat similar charitable values and 
practices. At least by the 16th century, for example, 
charitable practices were incorporated into model 
Korean village codes developed by Confucianist 
public administration scholars. (Hahm, 1991)  
Within Buddhism, there is an equally distinctive 
emergence of charitable norms and practices. About 
450 BCE, Gautama Buddha said "In five ways should 
a clansman minister to his friends and familars--by 
generosity, courtesy and benevolence, by treating them 
as he treats himself, and by being as good as his 
word."  Institutional Buddhist charity (as opposed to 
such personal obligations) developed somewhat later. 
A Northern Indian ruler cited in the English language 
sources as “King Asoka”. In the second century BCE, 
King Asoka was converted. "He foreswore war, 
conquest and greed and devoted his wealth and 
influence to spreading the gospel of Buddha as he 
understood it." Asoka sent out missionaries to the 
entire known world and gave great sums to endow the 
Buddhist religion. One of the distinctive qualities of 
traditional Buddhist charity that sets it apart from the 
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Judeo-Christian-Moslem tradition, is its distinctive 
priorities: Gifts to support Buddhist priests and 
temples are generally “rated” as greater goods than 
charity for the poor and needy, that was afforded a 
secondary status. (Lohmann & Bracken, 1991) 
In the west, medieval Christian charity became closely 
(but not exclusively) associated with the monastic 
movement. In medieval monasteries, the “Rule” was 
an important document, serving a role embracing 
aspects of the modern constitution and by-laws, codes 
of conduct and professional ethics, with perhaps just a 
dash of rental lease. Two particularly widely adopted 
and venerable Rules were those set down by St. 
Augustine (c. 397) and Benedict of Nurse roughly a 
century later. 
One of the wealthiest and most powerful medieval 
monastic orders was centered in Cluny, France. Cluny 
was founded on observation of the Rule of St. 
Benedict. In the Benedictine rule, six rules relate 
specifically to charitable practices: Comfort the Poor 
(#14); Clothe the Naked (#15); Visit the Sick (#16); 
Aid Those in Trouble (#18); Comfort the Sad (#19); 
Do not forsake charity (#26) Cluniac rule also 
mandated an Office of the Cellarer, whose duty it was 
to care for the sick, children, the poor and guests. (  )  
There are important connections between monastic 
rules and charitable practice in the commons. The 
theological and philosophical writings of St. 
Augustine are frequently cited as the original source of 
the concept of “common good” discussed elsewhere in 
this work. In his Rule, Augustine touches upon 
numerous aspects of mutuality, shared resources, need 
and community that are of general interest to the 
theory of the commons, but says very little directly 
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about standards or rules of charitable behavior. In Rule 
#3, for example, he says, “Among you there can be no 
question of personal property. Rather, take care that 
you share everything in common.”  He goes on to 
articulate a clear-cut standard of need: “Your 
superior...does not have to give exactly the same to 
everyone, for you are not all equally strong, but each 
person should be given what he personally needs...” 
(Bavel, 11)  Whether one applies them to ancient 
Greek koininia, medieval Augustine monasteries, 
nineteenth century social movements or twentieth 
century “voluntary agencies” the charitable principles 
and standards involved are recognizable and consistent 
ones.  
Overall, the Augustine approach is largely the 
statement of general principles. Much attention in the 
Augustine Rule is devoted to proper attitudes and 
motives. Somewhat in contrast, the Benedictine rule 
sets forth six rules that relate specifically to charitable 
practices and appear to mandate specific behavior: 
Rule #14 admonishes adherents to comfort the poor; 
Rule #15 mandates clothing the naked; Rule #16 
encourages visiting the sick; Rule #18 says aid those 
in trouble #19 - comfort the sad and Rule #26 says, in 
general, do not forsake charity. Yet, the underlying 
motivations are clearly the same as those assumed in 
the Augustine approach and elsewhere in the Judeo-
Christian-Islamic tradition of charity. Whatever 
differences of interpretation and emphasis there may 
be within various subgroups, monasticism was clearly 
associated with the main body of this tradition of 
charity. 
According to some sources, the 10th century Cluniac 
reformation, that led to major reforms and 
revitalization of medieval monasticism also 
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contributed to significant increases in monastic 
charitable practices. (Cass & Manser)  
In the medieval monastic system of charity provision 
for travelers and visitors was of considerably greater 
importance than in contemporary charitable practice 
(although voluntary groups like Travelers’ Aid 
Societies, continue to be of considerable importance in 
the relocation of immigrants in the U.S.)   Benedictine 
rule mandated an Office of the Cellarer, whose duty it 
was to care for the sick, children, the poor and guests.  
Quite a different approach to charity and poverty grew 
out of the Franciscan movement of the 13th century. 
Following the example of Francis of Assisi (and norms 
of voluntary poverty like those already evident in the 
Augustine Rule discussed above), Franciscans made a 
virtue of voluntary poverty even while advocating 
charity toward the involuntary poor. 
At least from the 14th and 15th centuries, 
confraternities and lay associations like the grand 
schule of Venice and the Portuguese misericórdia 
became common. (Russell-Wood, 1968) The Society 
of St. Vincent de Paul ("Paulist Order”) was founded 
as an association of catholic laymen to 'promote the 
spiritual welfare of members through works of charity, 
material and spiritual" in 1845.   
Suppression of the monasteries, together with other 
economic dislocations that led to dramatic increases in 
poverty, vagabondage and beggary in England in the 
16th century made of the century a period of “welfare 
reform” much like the twentieth. Very little of the 
ecclesiastical wealth seized in the English 
suppressions went to the state. ( ) Most went instead as 
state patronage to various friends and supporters of the 
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court, laying what some believe to be the economic 
basis of the unique English system of country estates 
(more than a few of which were located and still bear 
the names of abbeys and other monastic buildings).  
In the early modern period, public, state responsibility 
for the poor began to gradually replace the institutional 
charities of the medieval church. Municipal authorities 
in England, Germany and the lowlands attempted a 
variety of punishment, suppressions, and relief. 
Localism, filial responsibility and community control 
of vagabonds and itinerants were prominent among the 
issues addressed in the Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601, 
that has had an enduring impact upon Anglo-American 
welfare practice. The medieval practice of municipal 
ordinances against begging has recently been revived 
in the U.S. In response to the issue of contemporary 
homelessness, Seattle enacted an ordinance against 
"aggressive begging" in 1988, and Atlanta adopted an 
even more rigorous statute in 1991. 
In the Reformation, Luther and Calvin were both 
relatively hard on the poor -- pushing to new extremes 
the early medieval skepticism of worthiness first 
identified by St. Ambrose and St. Augustine of Hippo 
(Morris, 104)  Much of the contemporary “work ethic” 
that has such an enduring impact on welfare policy is 
rooted in reformation protestant ideas.  
In colonial America, the Great Awakening was an 
important period of religious revivalism and populist 
humanitarianism from approximately 1725-1745. 
Jonathan Edwards and George Whitefield were the 
foremost American exponents. There are suggestions 
scattered throughout the nonprofit history that the 
Great Awakening may be of pivotal importance in the 
extension of the philanthropic and charitable practices 
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of aristocratic and beau monde society to the lower 
classes. (Bremner, 1988, pp) Likewise, elimination of 
the practice of primogeniture in the American 
Revolution also had an important effect on breaking 
up inherited family fortunes in the U.S. However, full 
and complete treatment of the formative influences of 
the Great Awakening and the American Revolution on 
the American commons is not currently part of the 
repertory of nonprofit and voluntary research.  
  The first half of the nineteenth century was 
undoubtedly a renaissance period for the American 
commons. DeTocqueville was, by no means, the only 
visitor to 19th century America who was profoundly 
affected by what he saw. After her triumphant North 
American tour in 1850-52, Jenny Lind is said to have 
grown tired of the frivolous life of the theatre, married 
her accompanist, Otto Goldschmidt and devoted the 
rest of her life to charity. (This information is from 
wall notes of an exhibition at the National Gallery, 
May, 1988) 
A wealth of utopian and communitarian movements 
inspired by Robert Owen, the Fourists and others also 
date from the mid-19th century, roughly the time of 
Tocqueville’s visit. Although examination of social 
movements falls outside the scope of this work, the 
many possible connections of these and more 
contemporary movements to the theory of the 
commons should be on the agenda of future research. 
Kropotkin’s term “mutual aid”, for example, continues 
to be a useful descriptor (often in conjunction with 
“self-help”) of one set of interests among nonprofit 
and voluntary action scholars. (C.f., Borkman, ) 
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The Emergence of Charity 
Organization 
A renaissance in charitable practice, on par with the 
earlier transformations of Constantinian, Cluniac, 
Franciscan and Protestant ones, emerged in Britain and 
the United States after the middle of the 19th century 
and is still spreading throughout the world. The key 
emphases of this movement are upon efficiency and 
effectiveness in the organization of charitable 
practices. Some rather obvious “latent functions” are 
also involved. For example, it is becoming 
increasingly clear that women in both the Progressive 
Era and New Deal Washington used associations to 
further their causes. (Muncy, 1991; New Deal book) 
Advocates of charitable endeavor first became 
interested in improving the organization of their 
efforts, or what are today called “service delivery 
issues”. Large cities like London, New York, and 
Chicago were during times of economic distress faced 
with literally hundreds of small, independent and 
uncoordinated helping efforts, and affluent people 
(particularly those most sympathetic to the doctrines of 
rugged individualism, social Darwinism and scientific 
management) felt themselves constantly besieged by 
appeals for donations. (A somewhat similar condition 
exists today in the junk-mail charities chaos of the 
present.)  The emergent solution was to better 
“organize” the charities, improve the “efficiency” of 
their efforts, eliminate “duplication” and 
“overlapping” services, Although some of the 
terminology has been refined, the charity organization 
problematic retains a remarkable public vitality even 
today. 
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The intellectual basis for this movement toward 
improved charity organization also had implications in 
the other common domains (health care, the arts, 
sports, and so forth) as well. This broader focus may 
properly be called “scientific philanthropy”. At the 
heart of “scientific philanthropy” and its close cousin 
“scientific charity” are the assumptions that there are 
rational “principles” governing philanthropic and 
charitable practice and that these principles can be 
discovered and taught.  Andrew Carnegie’s attempt to 
articulate a new public standard of behavior for the 
rich is but one of a number of related attempts at 
locating such principles of philanthropy evident in the 
late 19th century. Amos Warner’s textbook and 
Kropotkin’s study of the biological basis of Mutual 
Aid are other examples of this same spirit, as is 
Frederick Goff’s campaign for community trusts that 
included a speech to the American Banker’s 
Association in 1919. (Goff, 1922) 
This practical interest in discovering the “principles of 
social improvement” energized not only the charity 
organization society movement (and later the social 
work profession) but also the emerging American 
social sciences of Sociology, Economics, Political 
Science and Psychology.  
Social work retains a somewhat unique position in this 
regard. One of the original founding disciplines of the 
American Social Science Association (along with 
Economics, Sociology and Political Science), social 
work is unique among the American social sciences in 
never having proclaimed or developed a “pure” or 
“basic science” approach. This is in marked contrast to 
economics and political science, in particular. Instead, 
for most of the current century the social work has 
  303 
been preoccupied with reinforcing its claims as a 
practice profession. 
The development of social work as a profession (one 
type of commons, as noted in chapter 8) and repeated 
attempts to gain monopoly control over social services 
have resulted in a series of major transformations 
within the larger charity commons. (Lubove, 1970; 
Wenocur and Reisch, 1989) In this work we are not 
primarily concerned with professional social work 
activity. That topic is covered by a large body of 
literature, and (by the very nature of a professional 
commons) of interest primarily to professional social 
workers. Nor are we concerned fundamentally with 
issues arising out of the large number of personnel in 
social service occupations who are not professional 
social workers by virtue of professional training.  
Instead, we will address the nonprofessional charity 
commons -- the bewildering variety of independent, 
voluntary, nonprofit, tax-exempt, or publicly 
subsidized organizations, mutual aid societies, support 
groups, self-help groups, and other groups that 
characterize the modern world of social service to the 
poor and other disadvantaged members of the 
underclasses of post-industrial society. Often treated as 
largely an after-thought by the existing literature on 
social welfare, voluntary charity remains a 
considerable activity. 
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Charitable Volunteering As  
Volunteer Labor 
The perspective of the commons can also be extended 
to volunteering and volunteerism. Stated simply, 
volunteer effort, with a youth group, a community 
fund-raising campaign, a church choir, or in some 
other context, is a type of leisure time activity. DeLaat 
(1987) suggests that volunteering should be viewed as 
a key linkage between sectors. Leisure is, by 
definition, a sign of affluence. One engaged in an 
active struggle for survival, for example, a Sudanese 
tribe member or a Kurdish family, does not have 
leisure by definition. Likewise, soldiers in battle and 
for that matter entire nations in wartime, may have 
respite from conflict, but such respite is not leisure in 
the usual meaning of the term. 
At a quite fundamental level, then, there is an 
important choice implicit in all decisions of whether or 
not to “volunteer”, rather than engaging (or as we 
often say “spending one’s time”) in alternative courses 
of action such as the private activities of the household 
(reading, watching TV, intimate or sexual behavior, 
and so forth), household production (gardening, 
fishing), state-related activities (paying taxes, voting) 
or market-related activities (shopping, working a 
second job).  
 
Presentation as Volunteering 
The majority of this chapter is concerned with the 
problems of charity organization, as that phenomenon 
is ordinarily understood (concern for the poor, social 
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problems, and so forth) Before getting on with that 
topic, however, let us take one brief digression  
It is fairly common for musicians, actors and artists of 
all types to refer to their extraordinary talent as a “gift” 
(we examined aspects of this usage in Chapter 5.)  
Reports of performances thus often fall clearly within 
the reciprocal cycle of giving and receiving and 
giving, as these artists “share” their gift with 
audiences. In an age as conscious as ours of public 
image and media manipulation, we can safely assume 
that at least some of those reports constitute deliberate, 
public posturing.  
What is far more important, however, than what 
percentage of such reports are sincere and genuine, are 
the underlying norms that they point to: Underlying 
the performances of “great artists” and even the near-
great is an unmistakable obligation to perform -- to 
share their gift with the world (that ordinarily make it 
a common good for those interested and willing to 
appreciate it.)  This norm -- still observable in the 
nonprofit art world of theatres, concert halls, 
museums, exhibitions, but also in the lecture tours of 
scientific and mathematical geniuses as well -- may be 
of central importance in understanding all types of 
volunteering, and worthy of further study. The high 
school dropout housewife who visits shut-in older 
people to share her “gift of gab” is engaged in a social 
act that is remarkably similar in certain respects to the 
musician, artist or scientist. 
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The Problem of Charity 
Organization 
Because of the heritage of individualism in Western 
thought, we have grown accustomed to approaching 
problems of charity and volunteering from an 
individual perspective. The above discussion, 
however, should make it clear that the personal 
obligations of charity will always be assumed in 
response to the demands of particular situations, and in 
specific reaction to the requests of others. Thus, 
charity has an inherent element of elementary 
organization associated with it. One can easily find the 
elementary transactions of patronage, tributes, gifts, 
potlatches, and offerings evident in various forms of 
charitable practice. In Buddhist ethics, for example, 
giving implies three direct steps: giving, receiving and 
giving and thus, conforms to the concept of potlatch 
introduced in the previous chapter. 
 
Mutual Aid Societies 
One of the most fundamental forms of organized 
charity is the kind of network of reciprocal giving of 
assistance based on need called a mutual aid society or 
network. Mutual aid notions run deep in American 
thought. Cotton Mather had an idea for a system of 
neighborhood benefit societies that Benjamin Franklin 
seems to have borrowed for his Junto. (Boorstin, 1958, 
221)  By the early twentieth century, mutual aid was 
evolving in various new directions. Kropotkin gave the 
notion of mutual aid a curious Darwinian twist when 
he sought to raise the principle of mutual aid to a 
determinant of human evolution. (Kropotkin, undated) 
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The settlement house movement placed great stress on 
the encouragement of mutual aid practices in 
neighborhoods. (Addams, ) The mental health self-
help movement in the U.S. originating with Clifford 
Beers' book, A Mind Which Found Itself (1906) and 
resulting in the formation of a large number of local 
mental health associations rivals the much more 
notable philanthropic crusades of Dorothea Dix.  
Ethnic Mutual Aid Associations 
Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
mutual aid associations were closely associated with 
the immigrant experience in the U.S. (Jenkins, ) Such 
groups continue to be an essential part of the 
successful adaptation of immigrant populations. 
(Borman, 1984) The mere fact that such an extremely 
wide diversity of ethnic groups engaged in similar 
practices with respect to burial, emergency assistance 
and other types of mutual aid is a clue to the very great 
likelihood that such practices did not originate after 
immigration. In all likelihood, many, if not all, 
immigrant groups brought such practices with them, 
and subsequently found a uniquely fertile ground for 
their development here. (Kropotkin, Chapter IV 
“Mutual Aid Among the Barbarians”, Chapter V, 
“Mutual Aid in the Medieval City,” and Chapters VI 
and VII, both entitled “Mutual Aid Amongst 
Ourselves.”)  
The Scots Charitable Society (founded 1657) was the 
first of a long series of "distinctively American" ethnic 
mutual aid societies founded by immigrant groups in 
the United States. (Bremner, 217) (The Scots may be 
counted as first only by ignoring the mutual aid 
practices of the indigenous native American 
populations resident here when the European invasion 
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began.) The Scots Charitable Society was founded 
nearly a century before the conquest of the Scottish 
nation by English forces in 1745. It was probably the 
creation of immigrants from an independent monarchy 
with 1) a strong sense of national identity and 2) an 
acute sense of their minority status in the 
predominantly English colonies of New England.  
From the time of the Scot’s Charitable Society in 
Boston associations devoted to providing mutual aid 
and support for members of particular ethnic groups 
have been a stable part of the American urban 
experience. (Jenkins, 1988) Such associations 
commonly place a premium on aiding the poor, 
helping the sick and burying the dead. Boston was an 
early center of ethnic mutual aid organizations. This 
was followed by the Charitable Irish Society of 
Boston, German Society of New York and hundreds of 
other such societies. (Trattner, 33)   
The Independent Order of B'Nai B'Rith was organized 
in 1843 as a mutual aid society for German Jews. 
Other ethnic mutual aid associations were not 
exclusively nationality based. They were also 
organized along religious lines, as with the Episcopal 
Charitable Society of Boston founded in 1754 for 
English immigrants. (Trattner, 33) 
A variety of evidence points toward resurgence of 
ethnic, nationality and language group based mutual 
aid and self-help activity following recent increased 
immigration to the U.S. and Canada in the past two 
decades. (Katz, 1981) More conferences like that 
sponsored by the Canadian Council on Social 
Development in 1992 on this topic are needed to fully 
articulate the role of mutual aid in initiating and 
defining common action.  
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Self Help Groups 
 Borman (1984) defined self help or mutual aid groups 
as voluntary, self governing, self-regulating 
associations that emphasize solidarity among peers, 
self-reliance and commitment to the group’s common 
purpose. One of the questions that arise is whether 
self-help groups are a type of or something different 
from, nonprofit organizations and voluntary 
associations. In a 1973 study, self help organizations 
in a medium sized city in the Midwest were 
characterized in the following way: Although half 
were founded within the past two years and two thirds 
by stigmatized groups, with stigmatized members in 
the majority in over three quarters, 85% had formally 
elected boards, the majority of which met monthly 
(58%). Although 68% had constitutions, the majority 
(56%) had not attained tax-exempt status (not unusual, 
given the high proportion of new groups), and 72% 
had budgets under $5,000. (Trauenstein and Steinman, 
1973) 
Newsome and Newsome (1983) assume that they are 
distinct and suggest giving self-help groups a legal 
status similar to that of nonprofit organizations. It 
seems more plausible to suggest that they are not 
different and that groups whose purpose is self-help fit 
easily into the existing legal categories of nonprofit 
corporation or unincorporated association. This 
conclusion may be somewhat obscured, however, by 
reliance upon the “nonprofit organization” concept 
that lacks legal reference.  
Labor organizations remain one of the most important 
examples of self-help organizations stressing solidarity 
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and mutual self-interest of members. Self-help 
organizations have, by no means been restricted 
entirely to the U.S. and Western Europe. Bouman 
(1990) updated the anthropological study of Indian 
credit associations with his study of the economic 
roles of moneylenders, pawnbrokers and self-help 
savings and loan associations. 
 
Health-Oriented Self Help Groups 
In the past two decades, health has emerged as a 
common interest around which to organize mutual aid 
of an entirely different sort. One major facet of this 
traditional concern has been the rapid proliferation of 
self-help groups of ill and troubled persons seeking to 
supplement or substitute for more traditional forms of 
treatment. The range of patients and problems for 
which self-help solutions have been posed is truly 
remarkable: recovering alcoholics, former mental 
patients, handicapped children and adults, persons 
with heart disease, cardiac and stoma patients (Butora, 
1990) cancer patients (Kobasa and others, 1991) 
bereaved parents; Multiple Sclerosis (MS) sufferers, 
obese people, (Maton, 1990) and many more. Helton 
(1990) discusses what she terms a “buddy system to 
improve prenatal care.”  
In a number of instances, the purpose of the group is to 
aid caregivers and “significant others” who may be 
providing care for an ill person. Toseland and others 
(1985; 1990) examined the comparative effectiveness 
of individual and group interventions for supporting 
family caregivers of frail older people. They found that 
individual interventions produced more positive 
effects on the caregivers’ psychological functioning 
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and well being than did group interventions, whereas 
group interventions produced greater improvements in 
caregivers' social supports. 
Contemporary social support theory is largely an ad 
hoc, middle range and freestanding creation but 
several recent writers have begun to explore some of 
its broader theoretical ramifications. (Collins and 
Pancoast, 1975; Clary, 1987) Their explorations show 
promise of connecting with the theory of the commons 
in a number of interesting ways. 
Social support can be defined in a manner that beings 
to mind the expressive/instrumental dichotomy above:  
“significant others help the individual mobilize his 
psychological resources and master his emotional 
burdens; they share his tasks and they provide him 
with extra supplies of money, materials, tools, skills 
and cognitive guidance to improve the handling of his 
situation.” (Caplan, 1974, 6)  Examination of 
definitions led Clary to conclude, “it appears that there 
are only two aspects to social support -- emotional 
support and task-oriented support...” (Clary, 59) 
Likewise Shuman and Brownell (1984, 13) bring to 
mind the discussion of gifts when they define social 
support as “an exchange of resources between at least 
two individuals perceived by the provider or the 
recipient to be intended to enhance the well-being of 
the recipient.”  
One of the most connections between social support 
and the commons is the dilemma of individual limits 
and group potentials for action. A Czech writer, 
Butora (1989) gives an account of experience with 
self-help and mutual aid groups. According to the 
author, self-help is often based on notions of 
individual self-sufficiency, encouraging individuals to 
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rely on their own strength, knowledge, abilities and 
experience. The functions of self-help groups include 
social and emotional support, defense against feelings 
of isolation and loneliness, stigmatization and provide 
sources of information and practices pertaining to a 
given disease or state. Self-help groups also encourage 
more active participation of patients in assuming 
greater responsibility for their own health. 
Interestingly, these are often the reasons cited for 
participation in other types of commons as well.  
Stewart (1990) is explicitly interested in “expanding 
theoretical conceptualizations of self-help groups.” 
Self-help groups, he says typically lacked theoretical 
grounding. He proposes grounding self-help group 
theory in psychoneuroimmunological and social-
learning theories (neither of which takes into 
consideration the interpersonal and interactional 
aspects of such groups).  
In some cases, emphasis is placed on adaptation of 
existing social theory. Maton (1990) adopted an 
ecological framework to view mutual-help groups, and 
illustrated its usefulness by examining aspects of the 
social ecology of "fit" members of different types of 
groups.  
 
Types of Self Help Groups 
There are at least four distinct functional types of 
modern self-help groups (examples are listed in 
parenthesis): 
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•Groups that focus on conduct reorganization or 
behavioral change (Weight Watchers, Alcoholics 
Anonymous) 
•Groups that utilize the “natural resources” of 
interpersonal relationships to reduce stress, ameliorate 
anxiety and cope with grief, loss and irresolvable 
problems. (Parents without Partners, terminally ill 
patients) 
•Defensive groups or mutual protective associations 
that seek to protect their members from harm, maintain 
and enhance members identity and self-esteem and 
raise consciousness. 
•Growth-oriented groups that concentrate on positive 
experiences and enhancing personal growth, and self-
actualization, of already healthy and secure members.  
Self-help groups have seldom figured very 
significantly in recent discussions of nonprofit and 
voluntary action because of the absence of theory and 
because a large proportion of them are unincorporated 
associations that fall outside the established counting 
and classifying filters. 
Self-help groups also stretch the boundaries of 
nonprofit and voluntary action beyond the 
conventionalities of nonprofit organization and 
voluntary association. An important variant on social 
support theory is “social network” theory that seems to 
place emphasis on communication networks rather 
than organized associations. Goodman and Pynoos 
(1990) studied a model telephone support program 
involving peer networks of four or five caregivers in 
regular telephone conversations. A randomized 
comparison was made of participants in such networks 
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(n = 31) and participants listening to an informational 
mini-lecture series assessed over the telephone (n = 
35) indicated information gains, increased perceptions 
of social support, and increased satisfaction with social 
supports. 
Several authors, have at least indirectly, suggested 
links between self-help groups and cults that can have 
a major impact on their members' mental health. On 
the basis of research findings, one author describes the 
charismatic group, a generic model for such cohesive, 
intensely ideological movements. (Galant, 1990)  
Nelson (1990) offers a theoretical model of “reentry” 
for victims of spinal cord injury that appears to 
describe a general model of the benefits of self-help 
groups. The four phases identified are: buffering, 
transcending, toughening, and launching. Buffering is 
the nurturing and protective process of lessening, 
absorbing, or protecting the newly injured patient 
against the shock of the many ramifications of the 
injury and the indignities of being a patient. 
Transcending involves helping patients recognize and 
rise above culturally imposed limitations and negative 
beliefs about people with disabilities. “Toughening 
up" requires compensating for physical limitations, 
gaining independence, and maintaining social 
interactions without "using the disability." Finally, 
launching involves exposing patients to the real world, 
exploring options for living in the community, 
promoting personal autonomy and decision making, 
and (4) facilitating the ejection of the patient from the 
rehabilitation program.  
As an exercise in applying the theory developed here, 
the reader with interests in this type of clinical self-
help group might try fitting Nelson’s reentry model 
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with the concept of repertory, the various elementary 
forms of benefactory and other components of the 
theory previously introduced. It should be clear from 
the result that self-help groups belong within the range 
of commons along with nonprofit organizations, 
voluntary associations and the many types of common 
action discussed in Chapter 5. It should also be clear 
that although the treatment here is very general, the 
theory of the commons has potential practice and 
policy implications worthy of further exploration. 
 
Conclusion 
Preoccupation with issues of professionalism and 
bureaucratization has created a distorted image of the 
contemporary world of charitable practice in which the 
ordinary charitable responses called forth by the very 
ancient and deeply engrained ethics of interpersonal 
aid are pictured as a mere prelude; a residual action 
that is only adequate until the experts and 
professionals arrive.  
This picture is in serious conflict with the facts of the 
case as many people with problems understand them 
today: a large portion of those engaged in charitable 
activities of all types are neither professionals nor 
officials. They are individuals and groups, acting upon 
traditional norms of personal charity through forms of 
mutual aid and self-help.  
Their actions constitute theoretical as well as practical 
challenges for nonprofit and voluntary action research. 
The personal acts of aiding themselves while aiding 
others are not easily reconciled with the “either-or” 
nature of self-interest discussions of charity in the 
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nonprofit literature. Nor is the autonomy evident in the 
self-help movement easily reconciled with traditional 
professionalism of helping professions like clinical 
and counseling psychology, social work, psychiatry 
and medicine. Self-help and mutual aid organizations 
are not “social agencies” per se, nor is the radical 
individualism of most discussions of self-help easily 
reconciled with the social nature of the commons. 
Finally, the national and international networks of self-
help groups and mutual aid societies are not easily 
reconciled with existing models of the nonprofit, and 
so forth sector. In these many ways and others as well, 
self-help and mutual aid pose interesting and 
fundamental challenges to the theory of the commons. 
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Feelings and opinions are recruited, the heart is enlarged and the human mind is 
developed only by the reciprocal influence of men upon one another. 
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 
 
 
 
10. Volunteer Labor and 
Prosocial Behavior 
ne way to begin to address the challenge posed 
at the end of the last chapter is to examine the 
models of the commons that emerge on the 
home territory of the self-help movement. Far 
from  
What we are calling the theory of altruism is that 
portion of the theory of the commons that is most 
directly related to matters of individual psychology. 
This topic is ordinarily thought to encompass a 
number of related issues: altruistic motivation, and 
such specific altruistic behaviors as donating, 
volunteering and actualization, as well as situation-
specific behavior such as crisis and disaster responses. 
In addition, we will expand the topic to include such 
additional issues as learning, the psychology of free 
riding and the nature of altruistic rationality. 
Moreover, the use of the concept of endowment in the 
theory of the commons is anchored in the multiple 
precedents of psychological research.  
O 
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We shall not be addressing a number of important 
questions or examining several significant 
psychological approaches. Most prominent among 
these are the whole range of questions raised by the 
social biology debates: We shall not address any of the 
interrelated “life science” issues of altruism: the 
implications of a genetic or evolutionary basis for 
human altruistic behavior; the emergence and 
development of altruism; genetic similarity as a basis 
for friendship selection; ethical reasoning and 
prosocial behavior in small children; or observations 
of “altruistic” behavior in ants, birds, chimpanzees and 
other animal species. Such core socio-biological 
concepts as kin selection, reciprocal altruism, the 
genetic basis of altruism and male-female reproductive 
strategies needs further examination, but not here. In 
addition, the clinical psychology literatures discussing 
clinical issues but not reporting research results, and 
literature on such esoteric subjects as the relationship 
between altruistic behavior and physical attractiveness 
was also overlooked. Each of these is an important 
topic. Indeed, to some degree the very importance of 
these issues is reflected in the enormity of available 
literature on the subject. A recent literature search of 
the Psychology Abstracts, for example, revealed 
nearly 600 citations on the question of the “prosocial” 
behavior of children for the five years prior to 1990, 
and nearly the same number dealing with “altruism”. 
Altruism 
One of the fundamental components of psychological 
interest in prosocial behavior is the measurement of 
altruistic behavior. Yalom (1982) suggests that 
altruism involves leaving the world a better place to 
live in, serving others and participation in charity. 
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Such a conception is reminiscent of traditional 
conceptions of philanthropy. Kauffmann (1984) 
defines altruism in terms of behavior that is voluntary, 
aids others, and expects no reward. Such a conception 
corresponds closely with the altruism-self interest 
dichotomy of nonprofit organizational approaches 
discussed in chapter 2. 
An important difference, however, between 
contemporary psychological research and nonprofit 
organizational studies is the manner in that the 
psychologists have looked at the larger picture and 
attempted to cast altruism as one type of a broader 
class of prosocial behavior. According to Kaufmann, 
prosocial behavior can be either positive or negative 
mood related (by positive feelings or negative affect), 
obligatory, associated with the selfish aspects of 
helping or compassionate.  
 Self-transcendence is a term for the psychological 
mechanism assumed by the theory that allows 
individuals to use hedonism and self-actualization in 
ways that transcend their self-interest.  (Yalom, 1982) 
Hardin (1982) argues that pure altruism cannot persist 
and expand over time. The principal forms of 
discriminating altruisms among humans are 
individualism, familialism, cronyism, tribalism, and 
patriotism. It is argued that universalism (altruism 
practiced without discriminating kinship, 
acquaintanceship, shared values, or propinquity in 
time/space) is not recommended, even as an ideal.  
Another major issue is how altruistic behavior is 
learned. A model of the acquisition of altruism in 
children, developed by R.B. Cialdini, D.J. Baumann 
and others (1981), might equally well be applied to 
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adults: The model proposed three steps: 
presocialization, awareness that others value altruistic 
behavior and adoption or internalization of the 
altruistic norm. This fits in nicely with our role-taking 
perspective. Rushton (1982) reviews the literature on 
the learning of altruism, through the family, mass 
media and educational system. He concludes that 
classical conditioning, observational learning, 
reinforcement and learning from verbal procedures 
such as preaching are all important.  
Jankofsky and Steucher (1983-4) argue that altruism is 
a basic trait of human character and behavior that can 
be studied in an interdisciplinary context. Comparative 
evaluations over long periods of time and in different 
SES and political structures can be made. 
Karuza (1983) noted that while a great deal of research 
had been done on the topics of altruism and helping 
behavior, the generalizability and impact of this work 
on applied settings has been limited. 
Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1984) investigated 
interdependent utility elements in three types of 
interactive preferences, that they termed altruistic, 
egalitarian and difference maximizing. When 183 
Canadian and Usonian undergraduates were paired 
anonymously, and chose payoffs that would variously 
benefit themselves and their pair-mate, non-
maximizing and non-self interested behavior was 
found consistently. Although attempts to explain the 
non-self interested choices by reference to 
psychological and ideological constructs was 
unsuccessful, statistical relationships between these 
choices and partisan political preferences were found. 
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One view, altruism is opposed to egoism as we have 
seen. Yet, Sober (1989) argues that egoism and 
altruism need not be viewed as diametrically opposite 
single-factor theories of motivation that view a single 
kind of preference (self-regarding or other-regarding) 
as moving people to act. Treating motives as deriving 
from single causes may explain why altruistic and 
egoistic hypotheses fail to explain observed behaviors. 
He also recommends distinguishing altruistic 
motivations from altruistic actions. 
From another perspective, the opposite of altruism is 
hedonism. Worach-Kardas (1980) sought to link 
leisure time use (in terms of instrumental activeness 
and expressive activeness) to the hedonism-altruism 
dichotomy. 
Daniel Batson has been identified by other researchers 
(Nancy Eisenberg) as the foremost psychological 
advocate of the existence of altruistic behavior. In a 
1990 article, Batson suggested that psychologists had, 
for many years, assumed (along with the nonprofit 
organization researchers) that humans were social 
egoists, caring exclusively for themselves, but that 
recent research evidence in support of the empathy-
altruism points instead to feelings of genuine empathy 
for others in need, as well as the capability of caring 
for them for their own sakes and not for our own. 
(Batson, 1990) 
At the same time, numerous studies confirm the 
importance of ethnocentrism and group membership at 
various levels as an important intervening effect. 
Shane and Shane (1989) provide a psychoanalytic 
discussion of what they term “otherhood”, or the 
attainment of the status of other for someone else’s 
self. In a study of Canadian and Japanese 
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undergraduates, Iwata (1989) found that in both 
cultures, person perception was more positive and 
affiliative/altruistic behavior stronger toward those 
with whom the subjects had close personal relations 
than toward those who were more distant. 
A comparative study of middle class female Hindu, 
Muslims and Christian undergraduates in India found 
no significant differences in altruistic behaviors. (Seth 
and Gupta, 1984) However, among the similarities was 
the fact that all three groups showed a tendency to 
allocate higher rewards to members of their own 
group. (see also Seth and Gupta, 1983)  
As with many other factors, there may also be 
important differences in altruistic behavior by age, 
gender, and other variables such as income. In a study 
of 370 subjects from age 5 to 95, Weiner and Graham 
(1989) found that kindness and altruism, pity and 
helping behavior were all more prevalent among older 
subjects, whereas anger decreased.  
The gender question has also received considerable 
attention. In a study of 35 men and 35 women, aged 
17-68, Mills, Pedersen and Grusec (1989) found no 
differences between men and women in their 
resolution of pro-social dilemmas involving self-
sacrifice. However, women used more empathic 
reasoning with other-choices, and attributed their self-
choices more to minimal conflict and less to concern 
with the other’s interests than men. Gender differences 
were also reported in subject’s self-reported feelings 
about their choices. 
In fact, Ma (1985) identified just such an altruistic 
hierarchy: The likelihood of performing an altruistic 
act depends on the relationship with the beneficiary, 
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with probability decreasing in the following order: 
close relatives, best friends, strangers who are very 
weak, very young or elite in society; common 
strangers and enemies.  
Batson and others (1986) reject the likelihood of an 
“altruistic personality”. Although they found evidence 
of association of increased helping with three 
personality variables--self-esteem, ascription of 
responsibility and empathic concern, they concluded 
that the underlying motivations appeared egoistic 
rather than altruistic. Altruistic motivation was said to 
involve benefit to another as an end in itself, while 
egoistic motivation helping was seen as an 
instrumental means to avoid shame and guilt for not 
helping. 
 
Prosocial Behavior 
In general, the concept of pro-social behavior appears 
to have originated as a general antonym to anti-social 
behavior, such as shoplifting (Fedler and Pryor, 1984). 
Its initial theoretical value appears to be to separate the 
issues of motivation and consequences that are so 
thoroughly intertwined in the concept of altruism. The 
concept itself appears to be one of the products of new 
thinking about moral behavior and its social and 
cognitive development, research and theorizing about 
positive social behavior that flourished in the 1970's. 
(Asprea and Betocchi, 1981) The renewed emphasis 
also brought into focus the need for refinement of the 
conceptualization and measurement of empathy, and 
altruism has been a major challenging facing studies of 
prosocial behavior in the last decade. (Eisenberg, 
1983). 
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What does the psychological literature identify as the 
range of prosocial behavior? We can get some idea by 
looking at the range of substantive topics under study 
in the 1980’s. They include care-giving in families 
(Hall, 1990; Schmidt, Dalbert and Montada, 1986); 
interpersonal helping behavior such as helping a 
graduate student on a research project (Diaz, Earle and 
Archer, 1987); whistle-blowing (Miceli and Near, 
1988); organizational behavior, compliance and 
commitment (Brief and Motowidlo, 1986; O’Reilly 
and Chatman, 1986); public goods (Yamagishi, 1986); 
“sociability work” (charitable volunteering) (Daniels, 
1985); response to mass emergencies (Lystad, 1985); 
spontaneous comforting behavior (Samter and 
Burleson, 1984); sperm donation (Jarrige and Moron, 
1982); organizational behavior (Staw, 1984); helping 
behavior (Wilson and Petruska, 1984). 
In seeking to characterize whistle blowing, Dozier and 
Miceli (1985) argue that whistle blowing is generally 
not an act of pure altruism, but rather “prosocial” 
behavior that involves both selfish (egoistic) and 
unselfish (altruistic) motives.  
And what is prosocial behavior related to? Here too, 
the field is somewhat unsettled, and the choices are 
many: empathy (Eisenberg and Miller, 1987; Elizur, 
1985; Diaz, Earle and Archer, 1987; Diaz, Rolando, 
Maricela, Palos, Rosa and others); sympathy 
(Eisenberg, Fabes, Miller, Fultz and others, 1989); 
personal distress (Eisenberg, Fabes, Miller and Fultz, 
1989); age-based attitudes (Ryan and Heaven, 1988); 
satisfaction with performance (Organ, 1988); gender 
(Stockard, Van de Kragt and Dodge, 1988); need 
(Krishnan, 1988) anticipation of reciprocity (Krishnan, 
1988); personal norms (Schmitt, Dalbert and Montada, 
1986); mood (Carlson and Miller, 1987; Shaffer and 
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Smith, 1985); social intelligence (Marlowe, 1986); 
aggression (Rutter, 1985); task-group experiences 
(Weathers, Messe and Aronoff, 1984); alcohol 
consumption (Steele, Critchlow and Liu, 1985); non-
urban residence (Amato, 1983); opinion-formation 
(Orive, 1984); culture (Miller, 1984); religion (Batson, 
1983; Morgan, 1983); personality (Penner, Escarraz 
and Ellis, 1983; Reykowski and Smolenska, 1980); 
Autonomy (Kofta, 1982); group influences (Mullen, 
1983); social responsibility (Banu and Puhan, 1983); 
attribution of motives (Schlenker, Hallam and 
McCown, 1983); cost (Staw, 1984; Krishnan, 1988); 
moral development (Morgan, 1983; Bar-Tal, 1982; 
Van Lange and Liebrand, 1989; Eisenberg, 1982; 
Tietjen, 1986; Feldshtein, 1983); focus on self 
(Gibbons and Wicklund, 1982); and cooperation (Van 
Lange and Liebrand, 1989) 
There have been efforts to being some conceptual 
order to this mass of variables. Brief and Motowidlo 
(1986), for example, argue for four individual 
antecedents to prosocial organizational behavior: 
empathy, neuroticism, educational level and mood. 
They also point to nine contextual antecedents that 
may be of particular interest to organizational 
researchers: reciprocity norms, group cohesiveness, 
role models, reinforcement contingencies, leadership 
styles, organizational climate, situational stressors and 
any additional organizational conditions affecting 
moods and feelings of satisfaction/dissatisfaction. 
A cross-cultural study of Brazilian and American 
undergraduates Bontempo, Lobel and Triandis (1990) 
categorized subjects as either allocentric 
(subordinating personal goals to the goals of others) or 
idiocentric (subordinating the goals of others to 
personal goals).  
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Shaffer and Graziano (1983) concluded that many 
everyday acts of altruism are interpretable as forms of 
hedonism: Moods were associated with increases in 
the amount of help given if the request was likely to 
have positive consequences. Moreover, there was a 
clear tendency for moods to inhibit the expression of a 
prosocial act that could have negative consequences 
for the benefactor. According to Hook (1982), share-
the-gain norms are generally stronger than share-the-
loss norms. 
Empathy is thought to lead to increased helping only 
under socially evaluative circumstances. (Fultz and 
others, 1986) Yet, in 1982, Underwood and Moore 
reported no relation between affective empathy and 
prosocial behavior on the basis of a literature review 
and meta-analysis. Five years later, Eisenberg and 
Miller (1987) explicitly sought to overturn this finding 
with their findings of low to moderate positive 
relations between empathy and both prosocial 
behavior and cooperative/socially competent behavior. 
Batson (1983) reported a series of three studies in 
which a distinction was made between two emotional 
responses to suffering -- personal distress and empathy 
-- and two associated motivations to help. Personal 
distress was hypothesized to lead to egoistic 
motivation while empathy was associated with 
altruistic motivation. In the first two experiments, the 
hypothesized relations were identified. However, in 
the third, where when the cost of helping was 
especially high, results suggest an important 
qualification on the link between empathic emotion 
and altruistic motivation. Apparently, making helping 
costly evoked self-concern that overrode any altruistic 
impulse produced by feeling empathy. 
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Staw (1984) recommends treating cooperative 
behavior in organizations as a form of prosocial 
behavior. Brief and Motowidlo (1986) call for further 
investigation of prosocial behavior in organizations 
and identify thirteen specific kinds of prosocial 
organizational behavior. Individual antecedents of 
such behavior are said to include empathy, 
neuroticism, educational level, and mood. Contextual 
antecedents include reciprocity norms, group 
cohesiveness, role models, reinforcement 
contingencies, leadership style, organizational climate, 
stressors, and anything that affects moods and feelings 
of satisfaction/dissatisfaction. They go on to suggest 
that four areas of research are necessary to advance the 
study of prosocial organizational behavior: basic 
dimensions of POB; possible personal correlates; 
organizational conditions, practices, and structures that 
affect prosocial behavior; and how to increase the 
incidence of prosocial behavior in organizational 
functioning. They conclude that the construct is value-
laden but that some types of POB are important 
elements of individual performance in organizations.  
Smith, Organ and Near (1983) suggest that 
organizational citizenship behavior includes at least 2 
dimensions: altruism, or helping specific persons, and 
generalized compliance, a more impersonal form of 
conscientious citizenship. 
According to Elizur (1985), empathy consists of four 
principal components: perceptual, affective, cognitive 
and object-relations.  
According to Pulkkinen (1984), research through the 
mid-1980’s tended to focus on prosocial development 
as well as on the inhibition and control of aggressive 
behavior. In a review of the literature on families, 
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Rutter (1985) concluded that aggression in family 
settings is least likely when prosocial feelings are well 
developed, when good social relationships are 
enjoyed, when there is adequate self-control under 
stress, when the individual experiences high self-
esteem, and when there are effective social problem-
solving skills. 
In a study of 140 male undergraduates, Weathers, 
Messe and Aronoff (1984) found that that prior group 
experiences affected prosocial behavior. Ss were more 
willing to help when they were asked to do so by their 
former co-worker and when they had had an 
egalitarian group experience. 
A number of factor analyses offer further light on the 
nature of prosocial behavior. Walkey, Siegert, 
McCormick and Taylor (1987) found three principal 
factors in an inventory of socially supportive 
behaviors. The three are labeled Nondirective Support, 
Directive Guidance and Tangible Assistance. Elizur 
(1985) claims four principal components of empathy: 
perception, affective, cognitive and object-relations. 
Marlowe (1986) located prosocial attitudes within a 
factor structure of five domains of social intelligence. 
The other four were labeled social skills, empathy 
skills, emotionality and social anxiety. Prosocial 
attitudes were further divided into social interest and 
social self-efficacy.  
Batson (1983) suggests that a function of religion may 
be to extend the range of limited, kin-specific altruistic 
impulses that are genetically derived, through the use 
of kinship language and imagery. Such terms as 
“brotherly love” may provoke and sustain various 
types of prosocial behavior. 
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Tyler, Orwin and Schurer (1982) set out to test the 
hypothesis that holding prosocial norms will not 
increase prosocial behavior in situations in which such 
behavior has high personal costs, because those 
holding prosocial norms will redefine the situation as 
inappropriate for norm activation.  
Gibbons and Wicklund (1982) identify two conditions 
under which self-focus actually enhanced prosocial 
behavior. The situation must clearly set off an 
orientation toward acting on a value of helping; and 
the person who is called upon to act prosocially must 
not come to the helping situation with personal 
preoccupations inimical to thinking about helping. 
Both of these are related to our assumptions stated 
earlier.  
Bar-Tal (1982) suggests that cognitive, social-
perspective, moral skills and self-regulatory skills 
determine the extent, quantity and quality of helping 
actions. Altruistic behavior is said to be a specific, 
highest-level kind of helping behavior.  
 
Helping Behavior 
Kerber (1984) examined helping in five non-
emergency situations and concluded that willingness 
to help in the 5 nonemergency situations was 
negatively related to costs for helping and positively 
related to rewards for helping and to personality 
differences in altruism. He says individual differences 
in willingness to help may reflect variations in 
situation perception. In this case, the altruistic person 
would be an individual who consistently evaluates 
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helping situations more favorably in terms of the 
potential rewards and costs of providing help. 
Moore (1984) cautions that sharing and helping are 
fundamentally different behavior and should not be 
confused. Also distinguishes reciprocal altruism from 
cooperation, mutualism and nepotism. Eber and Kunz 
(1984) argue that the desire to help others should be 
seen in the framework of the maturational 
achievements of the development of the self. 
 
Bystander Behavior 
An interest tangent on helping behavior arose in the 
late 1960’s with the celebrated Kitty Genovesse case. 
The young woman was assaulted and killed in front of 
a large number of onlookers who failed to come to her 
aid. This incident raised the interesting and troubling 
question of the circumstances under which 
“bystanders” would intervene to provide assistance 
and when they would not, and led to a number of 
interesting research endeavors. Ethically, the issue is 
an old and familiar one, dating at least to the biblical 
parable of the Good Samaritan, in which an “outsider” 
(the Samaritan) came to the aid of a victim after two 
members of his own community had ignored his cries 
for aid. 
Two variables that should be of primary importance to 
a bystander deciding whether or not to help would 
appear to be the need of the victim and the cost to the 
bystander. A review of the literature, however, 
provides inconsistent empirical support for the need 
variable. (Shotland and Stebbins, 1983) 
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Dozier and Miceli (1985) provide a modified version 
of a bystander intervention framework that traces the 
decision process through 5 steps: awareness of the 
event, deciding that the event is an emergency, 
deciding personal responsibility for helping, choosing 
a method of helping, and implementing the 
intervention.  
Meindl and Lerner (1983) examined what they termed 
“heroic motives” -- the willingness of undergraduates 
to confront someone insulting a partner. Rimland 
(1982) found what he termed “empirical support for 
the Golden Rule” by showing that selfish people were 
less likely to be happy than unselfish people. (Both 
selfishness and happiness were established as ratings 
of their friends of 216 college students.) 
In a psychological twist on familiar “costs” and 
“rewards” formulations, Smith, Keating and Stotland 
(1989) introduce the possibility of an entirely new 
level of information exchange based upon sensitivity 
to the emotional state of the victim and feedback. 
Specifically, they suggest that the prospect of 
empathic joy, conveyed by feedback from the victim 
anticipating help accounts for the special tendency of 
empathic witnesses to help. In an experimental 
situation, empathically aroused witnesses offered help 
reliably to a person in distress only when they 
expected feedback on the result. When denied 
feedback, they were no more likely to help than their 
empathic counterparts, who were, in any event, 
unaffected by the availability of feedback in deciding 
whether to help. 
DeGuzman (1979) studied by-stander responses to a 
lost passenger among 120 Philippine commuters. 
Contrary to expectations, urban commuters helped as 
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frequently as rural, and the quality of intervention was 
found to be better when a pair of bystanders, rather 
than a lone bystander, were involved. (De Guzman, 
1979) 
 
Donative Behavior 
An additional topic that has interested psychological 
researchers is what might be termed donor behavior: 
Literature on donor psychology deals with a number of 
different types of donations, and the attendant issues 
they raise: Money, blood, organs, sperm, and children 
are just some of the objects donated that have been the 
subject of research. (Kessler, 1975; Titmuss, 1970) At 
times, this issue also involves cross-cultural 
implications: For example, in parts of rural Mexico it 
is apparently traditional for the majority of parents to 
“donate” their children to the grandparents. (Gramajo, 
1988) 
It would appear that inducements may aid in inducing 
initial donations, but that other factors are stronger in 
continued donation: Ferrari, Barone, Jason and Rose 
(1985) found that non-monetary incentives 
significantly increased first time blood donations 
among a group of 80 college students of both sexes 
when compared with a control group receiving 
altruistic appeals only. Such incentives were not 
considered effective, however, with repeat donors.  
It would appear also that even major donations might 
not be psychologically harmful. Sharma and Enoch 
(1987) found, in a study of 14 donors and a control 
group of 9 nondonors refused on medical grounds, that 
kidney donation does not cause long-term adverse 
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psychological reactions. Parisi and Katz (1986) in a 
cluster analysis of pre- and post-donation responses by 
110 organ donors identified both positive beliefs 
(“humanitarian benefits” and feelings of pride) and 
negative beliefs (fear of body mutilation and of 
receiving inadequate medical care in life threatening 
situations). Hessing and Elffers (1987) identified two 
potential “death anxieties” operative in the organ 
donation context: general attitude toward death and 
fear of being declared dead too soon.  These same 
authors earlier found that a questionnaire survey of 
143 students found neither a direct relation between 
general self-esteem and post mortem organ donation 
nor between physical self-esteem and donation. A 
significant relationship, however, was observed 
between fear of death and donation behavior with 
regard to Ss with negative physical self-esteem. 
(Hessing and Elffers, 1985)  
Results of a comparison of 186 blood donors and a 
control group of 106 nondonors indicate that both the 
aversive nature of the donation procedure and the 
donor's motivation exerted considerable influence on 
the donors' decision to return and donate again. 
(Edwards and Zeichner, 1985) Additionally, the 
donors' experience of physical discomfort and 
fearfulness about the donation procedure made the 
major contributions to the donation's aversive nature. 
Results also reveal significant differences among 
nondonor, ex-donor, and irregular and regular donor 
groups on several personality characteristics, on their 
motives for donating, and on the components 
comprising the aversive nature of the donation 
procedure.  
O”Malley and Andrews (1983) examined the impact 
of emotions on giving behavior. Happy, guilty, and 
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neutral mood states in 90 undergraduates were 
compared with responses to an opportunity to donate 
blood for free, to donate in exchange for $5, or to 
choose between donating for free or for $5. As 
expected, there was a significantly higher incidence of 
helping when Ss felt happy or guilty as opposed to 
emotively neutral. Contrary to predictions, helping 
was unaffected by the type of incentive Ss were 
offered in interaction with their mood state. However, 
the type of incentive did seem to influence the post-
donation emotions of Ss: Guilty Ss who donated for 
money felt significantly less guilty following donation 
than prior to it, and happy Ss felt more self-altruistic 
(kind and generous) following donation when they 
helped for free. 
Piliavin, Callero and Evans (1982) introduce the 
possibility of an affective “addiction” to blood 
donation, through a complex emotional response set in 
motion by the donor’s initial anxiety, as one of the 
complex set of motivations for donation. 
In a study of 22 Australian semen donors, Daniels 
found that, in contrast to some commonly held views 
concerning the importance of anonymity for this group 
of donors, there were important psychological bonds 
and interest in resulting offspring.  
One major focus of the donations research is on adding 
to the repertory of donor-solicitation skills: Fraser and 
Hite (1989) found that offers to match funds, paired 
with legitimization of paltry donations, increased 
compliance rates and donation sizes and generated 
greater revenues than either tactic used alone. Two 
field experiments by LaTour and Manrai (1989) with 
2,000 community residents manipulated informational 
(through a direct mail letter about donating blood) and 
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normative (a telephone request to donate blood from 
another resident) influences and found that both 
influences interacted to yield substantial increases in 
donations. Another study found that subjects who 
approached either friends or strangers with a direct 
face-to-face request, including the fact that they 
themselves had just donated, were more likely to 
solicit additional donors than any combination of 
media publicity, personal letters and follow-up phone 
calls. (Jason, Rose, Ferrari and Barone, 1984) 
Weyant (1984) and others, have found that adding a 
phrase like “even a penny will help” at the end of a 
solicitation request significantly increased the 
proportion of those who donated.  Lipsitz, Kallmeyer, 
Ferguson and Abas (1989) found that asking for an 
additional commitment during a reminder call can 
appreciably increase blood drive participation rates for 
college students. 
On the other hand, Wiesenthal and Spindel (1989) 
reported no statistically significant differences in 
return rates among 209 first-time blood donors who 
received follow-up telephone contacts using four 
different “scripts” and a control group receiving no 
follow-up contact. Research in Germany by Strack, 
Schwarz and Kronenberger (1987) suggests 
differential effectiveness of “abstract” and “concrete” 
appeals in generating funds. 
Williams and Williams (1989) did a door-to-door 
donation study of 204 households. Their results 
support the existence of two distinct patterns of the 
strength of sources of influence on donation requests: 
On the one hand, they found that if the underlying 
motive for complying with a donation request was 
some form of external impression management (as 
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hypothesized in the door-in-the-face technique and an 
earlier social impact theory put forth by Latane), 
stronger influences were likely to have greater effect. 
If, however, compliance is internally motivated, such 
as by self-perception (as hypothesized in the foot-in-
the-door technique), the strength of a source of 
influence probably will have little or no effect. 
Giecken and Yavas (1986) assessed the potential 
impact of opinion leaders on donation behavior. They 
concluded that the impact of opinion leaders was 
greatest when the leader was demographically similar 
to the prospective donors, actively involved in the 
topic and attentive to mass media messages about the 
topic. 
Another major thrust of donations research has been to 
isolate characteristics of individual donors. One such 
study compared 715 donors with 1,245 nondonors of 
money and time to nonprofit human service agencies. 
Donors were more likely than nondonors to be 
employed, have some college, be older, have larger 
incomes, have a more positive attitude toward the 
agency's fund-raising efforts, believe volunteer 
training is important, have benefited from the agency, 
and think the agency is efficient at channeling funds to 
the needy. (Harvey and McCrohan, 1988) Another 
study of heavy blood donors (for example, those who 
donated most frequently) were predominantly male, 
older and less educated, effectively reached by direct 
mail and motivated by the perception that their ‘blood 
type is always in demand’. (Tucker, 1987) 
Gender is an issue of some importance in this context: 
Carducci and others (1989) found a greater willingness 
to become organ donors among female college 
students than among their male counterparts. Another 
study found that Canadian men and women donated 
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about equally to a voluntary blood donor system, but 
that women were less likely to donate to a market-
based blood procurement system. (Lightman, 1982) 
Age is also an important factor. In a cross-sectional 
study of persons aged 5-75 that controlled for financial 
costs, elderly persons proved to be the most generous. 
(Midlarsky and Hannah, 1989) 
The ethics of various forms of donation are always of 
considerable concern in nonprofit and voluntary 
settings. Bouressa and O’Mara (1987) discuss the 
ethical implications of informed consent of organ 
donors, brain death, the emotional needs of the 
competent donor and the emotional responses of health 
care providers engaged in retrieving organs. 
Quigley, Gaes and Tedeschi (1989) found that any 
information that could suggest selfish motivation 
(whether the prosocial actor was aware of the 
information or not) was found to detract from 
attributions of altruism, charitableness, benevolence, 
and friendliness. When no information for selfish 
motivation was present, positive attributions occurred.  
 
Volunteering 
The behavior of volunteers has been a stable, long-
standing interest within ARNOVA and the broader 
nonprofit and voluntary action community. (Rose, 
1955; Smith and Freedman, 1972; Smith, 1974) To 
anyone familiar with the literature on volunteering and 
volunteerism, the psychological studies in this area 
will be much more familiar territory than many of the 
topics previously discussed. However, in contrast with 
  338 
the traditional social literature on voluntarism (c.f., 
Sundeen, 1990), most of the studies in the 
psychological literature involve investigations with 
undergraduate student populations.  
McCarthy and Rogers (1982) found evidence of the 
paradoxical quality of altruistic behavior. In a study of 
48 undergraduates, half of an experimental group who 
had lost a reward still agreed to volunteer help, while 
all of a control group who gained the same reward 
agreed. Subjects who had lost rated themselves higher 
on altruism than those who refused, those who gained 
and a control group who were not asked to help. The 
authors concluded that their results suggest the most 
effective way of inducing altruistic responding may be 
to provide an extrinsic reward. However, this can 
undermine intrinsic motivation and reduce future 
helping behavior. At the same time, loss of reward 
may raise self-ratings of altruism for those who help 
and increase the likelihood that they will help again. 
 
Types of Support Groups 
...the growth of a vast range of support, self-help and 
“natural helping” groups in the past two decades. 
Within the practice contexts of mental health, aging 
and alcohol services and other areas, a voluminous 
literature has grown up in this area. An electronic 
literature search, for example, turned up more than 700 
citations on “social support” in the period 1984-1991. 
Much of this literature, however, is highly empirical 
and practical in intent, and numerous sources comment 
on the lack of theoretical development in this area. 
Social support theory appears an ideal candidate to 
develop in concert with the theory of the commons. 
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Because of the central place of social approval and 
affirmation in support theory, it could be of major 
long-term importance in explaining the dynamics of 
why and how people become involved in charity, 
philanthropy and other common activities. 
 
Disaster Response 
Many of the clearest cases of social affirmation 
processes in operation are to be found in the aftermath 
of various types of disasters. In many respects, the 
volunteer fire department is the quintessential 
American symbol of voluntary action. (Perkins, 1989) 
Recent work by nonprofit and voluntary action 
researchers in Australia, Canada and elsewhere on 
organized disaster response services points up an 
important and understudied phenomenon. (Britton, 
1991) Modern disaster response studies remind us that 
nonprofit and voluntary action has also long been 
important during and after floods, landslides, 
tornadoes and myriad other forms of disaster. 
Moreover, disaster research points to important 
international and cross-cultural examples of concerted 
common action. Britton reviews the implications of 
many of these studies for voluntary action research.  
Edney and Bell (1984) conducted a study in which 180 
undergraduates divided into groups of 3 participated in 
what the authors termed a commons game in which 
they had to harvest resources from a shared pool so as 
to maximize their individual harvests without 
overexploiting the pool. In one third of the groups, the 
group experienced a disaster” that cancelled all their 
earnings. A second third only one member 
experienced the disaster, and in the remaining third 
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there was no disaster. In this gaming environment, 
stealing was about five times as frequent as altruism. 
However, groups made higher scores and showed 
more altruism and less stealing when members' scores 
were tied to the group's score. Paradoxically, more 
stealing occurred in groups that did not experience 
ruin. The authors concluded that stealing of this type 
was in fact functional in preserving the life of the 
commons, but not in improving members' scores. 
 
Conclusion  
Psychological researchers have invested a good deal of 
common effort in the investigation of prosocial 
behavior. In the process, they have provided a number 
of important avenues for further exploration by the 
interdisciplinary community of nonprofit and 
voluntary action scholars. Most importantly, the 
concept of prosocial behavior -- even in the present, 
somewhat uncertain form in which operationally 
oriented researchers have left it -- appears to be an 
umbrella concept vastly superior to the altruism/self-
interest dichotomy that still permeates far too much of 
the nonprofit and voluntary action dialogue. 
Popular stereotypes notwithstanding, one does not 
need to wear a hair shirt and take vows of life-time 
poverty, chastity and total commitment to altruistic 
self-denial in order to engage in prosocial behavior, or 
participate authentically in a commons. At the same 
time, one hardly needs to add that the commons hardly 
has a monopoly on pro-social behavior. For example, 
one of the genuinely intriguing issues that economists 
understand, but which other social scientists have been 
somewhat prone to ignore are the pro-social 
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implications of market consequences pointed to by 
Adam Smith’s famous (but often confusing) “hidden 
hand” concept. 
At the same time, much of the present psychological 
literature is limited in generalizability, because of the 
tendency to focus heavily on studies of captive 
populations of school children and college students, 
and on the origins and development of moral attitudes. 
While these may be important questions in themselves, 
their utility for enriching the nonprofit and voluntary 
action dialogue is somewhat limited. However, many 
of those limitations would be enormously expanded if 
similar investigations were conducted with adult 
volunteers (and non-volunteer control groups), patrons 
and other common participants and beneficiaries. 
Some intriguing starts have already been made in this 
area in the by-stander studies, in disaster studies, and 
certain other areas, but much significant investigation 
of this type remains to be done. 
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If people are to remain civilized or to become so, the art of associating together 
must grow and improve in the same ratio in which the equality of conditions is 
increased.  
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 
 
 
 
 
 
11. An Interdisciplinary Value 
Theory 
 
he 1972 interdisciplinary voluntary action task 
force planning conference identified “The 
values of voluntary action” as a major 
analytical topic of voluntary action theory and 
research. (Smith, 1972) Although the interdisciplinary 
literature on values offers a bewildering variety of 
approaches, definitions and analytical styles, a 
common central theme is normative analysis of goods, 
preferences, norms, beliefs, and interests. Based upon 
the belief, stated in Chapter 1 that a complete theory of 
the commons must include a normative component 
T 
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this chapter is devoted to an exploration of possible 
common value bases implicit in the commons. Such a 
discussion must, of necessity, be offered largely in 
terms of the metavalues upon which common values 
are based, since freedom to act in an internally 
consistent manner is one of the defining characteristics 
of commons. 
This discussion is addressed primarily to the 
contemporary American context. Its full historical and 
cross-cultural implications must, of necessity, be left 
largely unexplored. Nonetheless, comparative value 
theory may be one of the ways of approaching the 
spreading, worldwide phenomenon of nonprofit and 
voluntary action. Schwartz and Bilsky (1990) suggest 
a common psychological content to human values 
across cultures. Prosocial motives are one of the eight 
classes of “distinct motivational types” they identified. 
Brown (1991) develops a listing of 400 “human 
universals” traits and characteristics said to be present 
in all known cultures in the intriguing format of a 
discussion of what he calls “the universal people.”  
Some of these traits, such as gift giving, relate directly 
to the commons.  
Value Theory For the Commons 
Commons have been defined here as collectivities in 
which uncoerced participation, sharing, mutuality and 
fairness play an important part. On this basis, it is 
reasonable to ask what standards of participation, 
sharing, fairness and mutuality in the commons may 
be. In some common contexts, most notably religious 
ethics and scientific methodologies, such questions are 
addressed directly and explicitly. In other cases, 
predominant economic values such as efficiency, 
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effectiveness and productivity have been asserted. In 
still other cases, approaches to value issues are more 
indirect and implicit. In general, however, certain 
recurrent themes are evident.  
The previous suggestion of the pragmatic origins of 
the theory of the commons bears directly on 
application of its theory of value to common 
situations. As many commentators have noted, 
pragmatic philosophy incorporates a unique and 
distinctive approach to values. (Bernstein, ) That 
approach may be summarized roughly as the view that 
values can be tested and verified in much the same 
manner as facts; that both are subject to verification in 
terms of their consequences; and that value- and fact-
testing are important steps in fully informed action. 
According to Hill (who refers to pragmatism by 
Dewey's term, instrumentalism): “Perhaps the greatest 
contribution of the instrumentalists to economics and 
the other social sciences is their theory of normative 
value. Dewey believed that normative value judgments 
are instrumental and corrigible. People have the ability 
to learn how to derive values from experience and how 
to use these values in the instrumental process of 
making normative value judgments and solving 
practical problems. Moreover, people also have the 
ability to test and to verify the truth of value 
judgments by drawing from experience to evaluate 
their practical consequences. You should accept a fact 
as true only if it relates the various parts of your 
experience into an authentic whole and successfully 
integrates your past with your future. You should 
accept a value judgment as true only if it is based on a 
true value and only if it contributes significantly to the 
instrumental process of solving problems. This process 
of instrumental verification can result in a revision and 
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improvement of both values and value judgments.” 
[Dewey, 574-598] (Hill, 1983, 7) 
This view is consistent with the previously stated 
assumptions of the theory of the commons, 
particularly the assumptions about the capacity of 
commons to make and enforce their own worldviews. 
Presumably, such worldviews incorporate value 
judgments and their evaluations of practical 
consequences.  
Since the work of C. S. Pierce, the concept of 
“community” has served as an important marker of 
common pursuits in science. According to Bernstein 
"Peirce's theory of inquiry stands as one of the great 
attempts to show how the classic dichotomies between 
thought and action, or theory and praxis can be united 
in a theory of a community of inquirers committed to 
continuous, rational, self-critical activity." (199) This 
concept of community is likewise implicated in the 
pragmatic approach to reality itself. The pragmatic 
concept of reality encompasses the concept of 
community in a way that has direct consequences for 
value determinations in the commons: 
“The real, then, is that which sooner or later, 
information and reasoning would finally result in, and 
which is therefore independent of the vagaries of me 
and you. Thus, the very origin of the conception of 
reality shows that this conception essentially involves 
the notion of a community, without definite limits, and 
capable of a definite increase of knowledge. And so, 
these two series of cognitions--the real and the unreal--
consist of those which, at a time sufficiently future, the 
community will always continue to affirm; and those 
which, under the same conditions will ever be denied. 
Now, a proposition whose falsity can never be 
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discovered, and the error of which is absolutely 
incognizable, contains, upon our principle, no absolute 
error. Consequently, that which is thought in these 
cognitions is real, as it really is. There is nothing, then, 
to prevent our knowing outward things as they really 
are, and it is most likely that we do thus know them in 
numberless cases, although we can never be absolutely 
certain of doing so in any special case.” (Bernstein, 
quoting Pierce, 1971. 176) 
The immediate task that faces us now is applying this 
perspective to the circumstances of the commons in 
useful ways. In particular, two issues will concern us 
here. The first is the question of further identifying an 
appropriate theory of value for the commons, and the 
second is the related question of the place of need in 
value judgments made in the commons.  
 
Value and Role-Taking 
Is it possible in the context of the commons, to set 
forth a limited, institutionally specific theory of value 
that is of relevance to the particular, associational 
context of the pursuit of common goods?  The 
tentative answer offered here is in the affirmative. The 
conception of a community of inquirers (or what might 
be thought of as a rational community) set forth by 
Pierce offers a solid base upon which to suggest that 
there is a "natural" (that is, spontaneously occurring) 
value standard that arises in most human groups and is 
operational in most common decision contexts. We 
can call this a common theory of value, and state it 
thus: Things are of value to participants in a commons 
because they are of value to other persons whom they 
value.  
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This is the standard of value underlying peer review of 
scientific proposals and scientific publication, critical 
reviews of artistic productions, the notion of board 
members as “trustees” of the membership found in 
many member associations and a host of other specific 
values found in the commons. This may also be the 
most powerful sanction available to commons: 
Rejection, shunning or expulsion from the commons 
of those who disregard or violate common values is 
one of the most universal practices of religious, 
scientific, artistic and other commons. 
Common goods are not of value because they allow us 
to survive, as would be assumed by a labor theory of 
value. Survival is a precondition of the commons. Nor 
are they valuable to us because of their use-value or 
their exchange value. We value common goods in 
response to others' valuations (and they, in turn, 
respond to our valuations if and to the extent that they 
value us.)  This is one of the most fundamental 
implications of the mutuality of the commons. 
 
General Principles of Allocation and 
Distribution 
Two further principles of common behavior must be 
articulated in order to adequately cover the issue: 
Rational actors operating within a commons, and 
possessed of knowledge of the values of their peers, 
also require principles upon which to ground their 
choices (analogous to the economic principle of 
maximization) and principles of distribution 
(analogous to Paretoan optimality).  
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In the first case, we may suggest the principle of 
satisfying (derived from traditional philosophical 
concerns with "satisfaction" or "happiness" by way of 
Herbert Simon's satisficing principle of organizational 
decision-making). Satisficing, according to Simon, is a 
rational decision procedure to terminate the process of 
considering all possible alternatives by selecting the 
first alternative that fully meets the criteria. (Simon, 
1974) Simon may have felt it necessary to use the 
neologism he did, rather then the simpler gerund 
satisfying, because of the enduring Benthamite 
utilitarian associations of satisfaction with pleasure 
and pain. It is essential to a proper understanding of 
this criterion that it be stripped of the futile utilitarian 
legacy of debate over the issue of pleasure and pain. 
There need be no necessary connotations of hedonism 
or satiation raised in this connection. Thus, for 
example, the principle of satisfying as used by Simon 
might imply that one need not be familiar with all 
possible dramatic works to determine that Hamlet is 
the greatest of tragedies. One willing to “join” the 
commons defined by knowledgeable authorities on 
drama can note that this is the consistent conclusion of 
the field. This is, however, a purely voluntary and 
uncoerced choice for all concerned and one is 
completely free to reject the consensus and continue 
searching for a better tragedy.  
Satisfaction as a decision-criterion refers explicitly to 
the intersubjective dialogue of decision-makers: 
Specifically, it refers to the transfer of interest or 
attention among the actors in a common decision 
situation. It relates directly to contemporary 
psychological perspectives on attention and 
perception, and in particular to the pragmatic concept 
of "problem" as articulated by Dewey, Mead and the 
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other pragmatists. It is also an explicitly behavioral 
and verifiable criterion.  
Satisfaction is attained, in the commons, when search 
is suspended, and dialogue on awareness and purpose 
are shifted elsewhere. Thus, the point of rational 
decision-making in the commons is not to attain a 
maximum of goods (that is, “maximization") or even 
attaining some optimal level of goods, but to attain 
satisfactory levels of goods. That is, to attain a 
sufficient level of goods that the problem that 
prompted the original search is arrested, and attention 
is shifted elsewhere. Actors in the common context 
recognize when this point has been attained and shift 
their attention elsewhere. Excessive preoccupation 
with maximization in the context of commons, 
therefore, is not a virtue but a serious shortcoming, and 
a form of irrational behavior.  
Sometimes the suspension of search and the shift of 
attention that are implied in the criterion of satisfaction 
occur when needs have been met.  Needs-meeting, in 
this sense, is not the basic concept of value that it is 
sometimes set forth as being, however, for the simple 
reason that satisfaction, in this sense, may also occur 
for other reasons.  
 
Proportion As A Criterion 
The second principle involves the specification of a 
criterion governing distribution of resources within a 
community and between communities. The term that 
has been chosen for it is "proportion", at least partially 
because of connotations associated with classical 
aesthetics (for example, the "human scale" of classic 
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Greek architecture) and ethics (for example, the 
Aristotelian "golden mean"). As employed here, the 
criterion of proportion can be used in a problem-
solving contexts so that the resources used are 
approximately equivalent (or in proportion to) the 
"needs met", the problem solved or the results 
attained. It can also be employed in a similar vein in 
religion, athletics, art and other presentational settings. 
In both instances, the criterion of proportion has an 
operational expression fully as coherent as Paretoan 
optimality: Resources should be allocated in such a 
manner that no rational actor with standing to do so 
will act to gain more resources except from 
unallocated funds.  
The criterion of proportion in no way suggests that all 
actors involved in a situation in which resources are 
distributed by or among endowments must be fully 
pleased or happy with the outcomes. Given the range 
of human differences, and the plurality of human 
values, that seems as excessive and artificial a standard 
to apply to nonprofit activities, as would be the related 
standard that everyone should (or must) “profit” by 
such transactions. More important in a context of 
sharing and mutual trust is the question of whether 
anyone is sufficiently displeased to object. It is in such 
objections that self-interest begins to overwhelm the 
shared interests of the commons and mutuality begins 
to break down. 
One can see particular manifestations of this principal 
in operation in contemporary United Ways, for 
example. Few, if any such community fundraising 
campaigns ever collect all of the contributions they 
may need or desire, and there may be intense 
competition for shares of the funds collected, and 
dissatisfaction with the resultant distribution. 
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However, the most common reaction most of the time 
for most of the competitors in such distributions is 
satisfaction, in the above sense that further seeking 
after additional funds is abandoned and attention shifts 
elsewhere. The effect upon the commons as a whole of 
a series of such independently arrived at is the 
condition we are calling proportion. (Based upon the 
common phrase “putting things in perspective” and 
“keeping things in proportion” that are often used to 
describe such acceptance.)  
Proportion in this sense serves to sanction the 
equilibrium of networks of common institutions. 
Where it exists, the rule of proportion functions as a 
rough-and-ready kind of concept of equity among 
endowments, as well as accounting for the social order 
or equilibrium of the commons, in a Hobbesian sense. 
Proportion provides a general criterion for how 
rational allocative decisions are made in commons 
settings. Like satisfaction, it applies to a broad range 
of different possible situations, and encompasses 
proportion grounded in despair of further gains as well 
as proportion based in contentment or satiation.  
 
Contextualism 
Yet a third principle is also necessary to properly set 
common decisions within a context of values by which 
they are to be judged. We have already begun this task 
with the statement of the emergence of value in role 
taking above. There remains, however, the issue of 
locating an adequate substitute for the misleading 
model of universal objectivity put forth by utilitarian 
economics. We might characterize this as the 
"grandstand model" of objectivity: The "full 
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knowledge" premise of classic rationality sets up a 
circumstance much like that of a spectator in the 
grandstand with full view of all the action (or decision-
making) occurring on the field. In reality, no one is 
ever afforded such a grandstand position with respect 
to organized decision-making, as Braybrooke and 
Lindblom, Simon and others have been at pains to 
point out. (Simon, 1976; Braybrooke and Lindblom, 
1963)  
Recently, works in the history and philosophy of 
science working in the Pierce tradition have pointed up 
the need for such a criterion in the debate over 
"scientific revolutions" beginning with Kuhn's famous 
paradigm shifts. (Berger and Luckmann, 1970; 
Bernstein, 1983; Kuhn, 1962)  Such paradigm shifts 
have major implications for common resources and 
goods. In major paradigm shifts, any type of resources, 
from treasuries, collections and repertories to key or 
central problems may be transformed from valuable to 
worthless, or vice versa. Thus, for example, the 
paradigm shift accompanying the development of 
printing not only placed new importance on research 
on the chemistry of ink; it also relegated the medieval 
scriptorium to unimportance except as an historical 
curiosity.  
Anthropologists, archaeologists, art historians, 
theologians, librarians and others concerned with 
issues of the value of manuscripts and other artifacts 
from cultures widely different from our own have had 
to struggle with this issue, as have social workers, 
psychiatrists, special educators and others who deal 
with what are euphemistically called "special 
populations." Amateur athletics has had its own 
distinctive struggle with similar issues around the 
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definition of "amateurism" in other (particularly 
nonwestern) cultures.  
What is needed is at least partial relief from the 
burdens of judgmentalism placed upon us by 
preoccupation with universal objectivity without 
succumbing to the equally oppressive burdens of 
relativism. The pragmatic theory of value cited above 
offers a philosophically grounded, empirical basis for 
dealing with the contingencies of such relativism as 
they apply to the commons. 
Perhaps the most interesting candidate of all has 
evolved in the multidisciplinary field of studies of 
biblical texts. It involves the interpretation of "texts" in 
context, that is with reference to our knowledge of the 
social, political, economic and historical circumstances 
in which they were written, and not from our 
"hindsight" vantage point. Gadamer and other 
European advocates of hermeneutics have broadened 
and generalized this central idea into a full blown 
philosophical position in recent decades. Bernstein has 
explored closely the connections between European 
hermeneutics and American pragmatism of Pierce and 
others ( ) 
The intent is only to suggest that values that are the 
basis of judgment of all decisions--including those 
allocating resources--arise in the context of particular 
communities or commons, and can only be properly 
assessed within the context of those commons. We 
shall refer to this as the contextual principle, and set it 
off against the "universal objectivity" principle widely 
endorsed in social science.  
The bottom line objection to the use of maximization, 
production and optimality is that while these may 
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clearly be the group values of the researchers 
conducting the investigations, they have not been 
shown to be values adopted or endorsed by the 
commons being studied. Nor are there existing 
explanations for why such values are superior to those 
adopted by participants of the commons, or should be 
coercively imposed upon the commons. 
 
Majordomia: The Carnegie 
Principle 
There are other possible general values or principles of 
the commons that speak directly to various aspects of 
common experiences. There are many value premises 
of possible general interest articulated in the literature 
on nonprofit and voluntary action. One of these, the 
Good Samaritan rule is intended to protect volunteers 
from legal liability arising from actions associated 
with helping others. Some would, for example, invoke 
what could be called the Asoka principle in some 
instances and argue that rulers in control of significant 
patronage have a responsibility to create endowments 
to further the advance of religions. Then, we might 
debate the relative merits of a Chrysostem principle, 
stated as “Give Unreservedly to the Poor” and a 
Gregorian-Augustine principle, “Give Generously, but 
Prudently”. (Morris, 1986) Further, we might also 
isolate a Bonifacius principle, which states that charity 
like virtue is its own reward. This view was articulated 
by the Boston cleric and Puritan theologian Cotton 
Mather in his famous essay on philanthropy entitled 
Bonifacius: An Essay Upon the Good (Levin, 1966; 
Bremner, 1988).  
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We might also look more closely at the central 
principles articulated by Andrew Carnegie in his 
Gospel of Wealth. Carnegie’s “gospel” is one of those 
cultural icons that is universally celebrated in public 
school civics texts, and alluded to frequently by 
scholars but seldom actually read or taken seriously by 
anyone.  
Andrew Carnegie's name is familiar to every 
American school child as the Scottish immigrant steel 
entrepreneur whose life was a "rags to riches" tale, and 
whose generous beneficence salted the American and 
English landscapes with public libraries (66 branches 
of the New York Public Library alone). College or 
university faculty also know Carnegie as the initiator 
of what has become the Teachers Income Annuity 
Assistance (TIAA) program, and the Carnegie 
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, while 
residents of the Pittsburgh area know Carnegie also for 
the museum, auditorium and collection of the Carnegie 
Institute, Carnegie Tech (now merged into Carnegie-
Mellon University) and the industrial suburb bearing 
his name. 
In all, Carnegie created 11 enduring charities bearing 
his name in the United States, Britain and his native 
Scotland, and gave away an estimated $350 million. 
We are less interested here in his philanthropic actions 
than in his spoken and printed thoughts on the 
responsibilities of patronage. Quite independent of his 
motives, whatever they may have been, Carnegie’s 
actions represents a veritable archetype of modern 
American patronage, and his “gospel” offers a possible 
standard by which to evaluate patronage of all types.  
Carnegie recognized the necessity for flexibility in the 
management of a "charitable trust." In his first "letter 
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of gift" to the trustees of the Carnegie Corporation, for 
example, he wrote: 
“Conditions upon the earth inevitably change; hence, 
no wise man will bind trustees forever to certain paths, 
causes, or institutions. I disclaim any intention of 
doing so. On the contrary, I give my trustees full 
authority to change policy or causes hitherto aided, 
from time to time, when this, in their opinion, has 
become necessary or desirable. They shall best 
conform to my wishes in using their own judgment.” 
(Chronicle of Higher Education, p. 11. August 7, 
1985) This statement is an interesting twist on the cy 
pres doctrine that in new or unenvisioned 
circumstances trustees of an endowment have an 
obligation to engage in those actions which most 
closely conform to the wishes of the patron. 
The issue to which Carnegie (and the cy pres doctrine) 
was responding is a serious one in which a good deal 
of thought has been invested. Brickwedel (1929) cites 
the case of a fund left to accumulate for 335 years 
before any portion may be spent. A number of trusts 
established by Benjamin Franklin in the late 18th 
century only matured in the 1990’s. The problem is 
not exclusively an American one. Under Islamic law, a 
number of very ancient educational and religious 
endowments have endured. The Waqfizah of 'Ahmed 
Pasa, for example, was a Turkish endowment of the 
sixteenth century which continued at least into the 
1940’s. (Simsar, 1940)  (It may, indeed, still exist 
today. Efforts to locate information on it have been 
unsuccessful.) 
More controversial (especially among the higher 
income segments of American society) are Carnegie's 
sentiments on the responsibilities of the rich, and his 
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standard of what might be called the "inverse tithe". 
Carnegie's views, which have always been treated as 
somewhat eccentric and largely ignored or discounted 
as philanthropic principles, were set forth in a famous 
essay entitled "The Gospel of Wealth,” His personal 
performance against this standard is a matter of record. 
Carnegie’s famous paper on philanthropy was first 
published as "Wealth" in the North American Review 
in 1889, and later as the Gospel of Wealth (1900). 
Carnegie wrote that "the man who dies thus rich dies 
disgraced," and he went on to state that the rich were 
obligated to spend their surplus wealth for the public 
good. Following the sale of his U.S. Steel company to 
J.P. Morgan in 1901 for $400 million, Carnegie spent 
the rest of his life practicing his principles.  
One can argue many different interpretations of the 
motivations of wealthy men such as Carnegie. He may 
"really" have been motivated by a desire to prevent the 
initiation of an income tax in the United States, or to 
avoid the payment of inheritance taxes. Others are 
inclined to interpret all such acts of --large and small-- 
as futile efforts to prop up a faltering system of class 
domination by capitalists and forestall revolution by 
the underclass.  
Viewed as an issue of endowment patronage, 
Carnegie’s actions stand alongside numerous other 
examples of comparable behavior that one might 
identify throughout world history. For example, 
throughout history, military generals have returned 
home rich with the spoils of war. Pericles, however, 
devoted spoils from the Persian War to the 
construction of the Acropolis, thereby committing an 
uncommon act of common good.  King Asoka, 
following his conversion to Buddhism, announced and 
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sought to practice a principle of philanthropy quite 
different in intent but very similar to Carnegie’s in its 
overall effect.  
The rich in America today (many of whom may be 
arguably less rich than Carnegie) feel very little 
obligation to follow the precedent set by Carnegie. 
Indeed, one might argue that for most of the 
contemporary rich, Carnegie's problematics of: 1) 
selecting trustworthy trustees and 2) not dying rich 
have been replaced by the quite different problematics 
of celebrity image-maintenance and tax avoidance. 
Unfortunately, the central problem in the practice of 
patronage today, at least as it is presented by countless 
tax accountants, media consultants and others bears 
little relation to the entire philanthropic tradition, but is 
instead a perverse variant of the profit maximization 
theme: how to appear maximally generous on minimal 
contributions. Corporate executives "on the way up" 
see service for themselves and their wives on the 
boards of community charities as tribute to the well-
crafted corporate leadership image. Personal managers 
of athletes, politicians and other popular culture 
celebrities work hard to create public images of their 
clients as patrons of charity, culture and politics. 
While every celebrity player in the professional sports 
during the past decade appears to have posed with a 
handicapped child for a fundraising poster, actual 
amounts of their contributions are less regularly 
publicized. One suspects this may be for good reason. 
The contemporary rich in American society -- the beau 
monde neuvo society of "jet sets", oil barons, stock 
brokers, rock musicians and professional athletes, 
among others -- get off remarkably easy in terms of 
their personal obligations to community services; 
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certainly easier than comparable elites in ancient 
Athens, Central American villages or urban elites 
throughout history. This is particularly true in personal 
(as opposed to purely financial) terms. Tax 
accountants, media consultants, lawyers and other 
retainers have simplified and routinized the 
contemporary procedures often to the point of simple, 
painless signing of a statement of "after-tax income" 
and a few checks. Charitable contributions easily 
become not an act of personal (or even foundational) 
patronage at all. They have become merely the 
afterthoughts of tax calculation; part of an overall plan 
to maximize after-tax income. 
It is easy from this perspective to engage in a "flog the 
rich" --those people, who in F. Scott Fitzgerald's 
famous canard "are different from us"--and to develop 
a campaign of moral smugness and superiority with 
statement such as those just made above. To counter 
act this tendency, we can easily characterize middle 
and upper middle-income groups in exactly the same 
way. With average estimated giving hovering between 
two and two and a half percent of personal income, it 
seems clear that there is little concern for the kind of 
patronage of which Carnegie spoke, and a motivation 
primarily of tax-avoidance. 
The real challenge facing non-profit fundraising in 
America, therefore, is not "management improvement" 
or "greater efficiency". It is not economic, or even 
narrowly political (in the sense of campaigns for 
policy or legal changes). It is more fundamentally 
practical: Specifically, the discovery of a modern 
"moral equivalent" to the majordomia, liturgia; 
accepted moral norms which create sufficient 
incentives, if you will, for people to contribute to 
civilization. The traditional philanthropic nominalism 
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(naming as tribute honoring patrons; the practice of 
naming towns, buildings, rooms, furniture and even 
picture frames after benefactors) and tax advantages of 
philanthropic behavior alone are insufficient to 
generate the necessary revenues. It is this 
insufficiency, and not the mismanagement and 
inefficiency of community services, which is at the 
heart of the current crisis in philanthropy. 
Inflation, technology and the legitimate wage demands 
of employees in the community service sector have 
acted to send costs skyrocketing, while real 
contributions (adjusted for inflation) have risen only 
slightly or perhaps even fallen. To speak of Carnegie's 
90% contribution, or even to fall back to the traditional 
Biblical tithe (10%) is almost farcical; most Americans 
do not give 5%!  Many do not even give 1% of the 
wealth to community services. For the $20,000 a year 
worker, $10 to the United Way and $100 a year to the 
church does little but perhaps salving a guilt 
conscience. 
 
Conservation and Prudence 
Finally, there are two distinct monetary principles that 
can be applied to common treasuries, and perhaps to 
collections or repertories. Each is a reflection of the 
mutual obligations participants in the commons feel 
for one another. One is sometimes mislabeled 
“efficiency”, “cost-effectiveness” or “cost-efficiency”. 
The other is seldom given a name.  
Generally speaking, attempts to apply “efficiency” and 
similar concepts to the commons have been largely 
exercises in metaphysics, and devoid of empirical 
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content or referents. They usually an oversimplified 
engineering metaphor, in which efficiency is “defined” 
as the ratio of one group of arbitrarily selected 
situational elements labeled “inputs” to another 
arbitrarily selected group of elements arbitrarily 
labeled “outputs”.  Since the directionality of 
conversation and interaction is subject to some 
indeterminacy, there are no generally applicable rules 
and what is determined to be input and what output is 
strictly an ad hoc determination. What is usually 
missing is an understanding that because we are 
dealing with social acts, rather than physical 
substances, no underlying assumptions like those of 
the conservation of matter and energy are appropriate. 
As a result, there is no particular reason to expect that 
routine, predictable, or even measurable ratios will 
result from this effort. No generally recognizable 
measurements of the “efficiency” of rendering 
common goods have emerged from this approach, and 
as a result, discussions of “efficiency” in the commons 
usually confuse and obscure what are, in fact, two 
principles of action that actually are quite important in 
the commons:  
Karst calls the first the principle of conservation and 
sums it up as follows: "There remains substantial 
unanimity on one goal: the greatest possible portion of 
the wealth donated to private charity must be 
conserved and used to further the charitable, public 
purpose; waste must be minimized and diversion of 
public funds for private gain is intolerable." (Karst, 
1960) It should be noted that although Karst uses the 
term “public” here, his intent is clearly directed at 
nongovernmental efforts, and the term “common” 
would be more suitable. Trustees of commons who 
spend excessive sums for purposes unrelated to the 
rendition of common goods, or who pay excessively 
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high prices to obtain needed resources, or divert 
common resources to their own profit are clearly 
violating the principle of conservation.  
The second principle we can call prudence, which is, 
as Wooster stated it, "to maintain and increase dollar 
income without excessive risk to principal. Judgment 
and experience will continue to be the most valuable 
tools available." (Wooster, 1952)  The principle of 
prudence, as it applies in the commons is, in fact, 
broader than Wooster’s statement, since it applies not 
only to treasuries, but also to collections and 
repertories. The key to the principle of prudence is 
avoidance of excessive risk. The trustees or agents 
who protect a priceless painting by placing it in a 
fireproof vault, and those who protect the rigorous 
standards of a science or profession both may be said 
to act prudently.  
 
Principles of Consensus 
Together, these principles form the core of a normative 
model of common goods that can be found in 
operation in the everyday life of most American 
commons. In the most general sense, the principles of 
satisfaction, proportion, contextualism, conservation 
and prudence as they operate in the commons are all 
principles of consensus and community. As such, they 
prove most workable in circumstances of cooperation. 
Their greatest collective weakness (and the greatest 
weakness of common action in general) is the inability 
to adequately resolve contested, controversial or 
difficult issues. It is this inability, and not 
“inefficiencies” or “mismanagement” which is the 
  363 
most frequent target of contemporary concern by the 
management scientists.  
 Examples of this basic inability abound among 
common institutions. The Protestant Reformation and 
the continuing tendencies toward schism evident in 
many contemporary religious bodies are evidences of 
the unsatisfactory nature of this process.  When 
religious factions quarrel over matters of doctrine, 
ritual or belief, the issues often have major economic 
implications involving the proper use of collective 
treasuries and collections or the proper selection and 
enactment of presentations--rituals, music, and other 
ritual elements. Luther’s concern over the sale of 
indulgences, Puritan opposition to ‘idolatrous’ 
displays of religious icons, and the schism of two 
branches of the American Church of Christ over the 
use of music in worship services are three of many 
possible examples of this type.  
Similar phenomena can be found in many types of 
commons. Indeed, contemporary efforts to apply 
market economic principles to the commons must be 
seen as arising from one such situation. Suggestions 
that nonprofit efforts are not sufficiently “efficient” or 
as “effective” as they might be are themselves 
expressions of latent or real conflict between factions 
within many contemporary commons. In many cases, 
the issue is further exacerbated as partisans of one 
point of view or the other appeal to academic 
economists on the one hand, and decision makers in 
government on the other to reinforce their particular 
views. Regrettably, the scientific issues of nonprofit 
economics cannot be entirely divorced from this 
hermeneutical conflict at present.  
  364 
What is at issue in the current situation in public 
funding or social services and the arts in particular is 
often as much who shall control the definition of 
appropriate action in the commons, as it is who shall 
control the actual resources. In general, the absence of 
adequate consensus and community, however, does 
not constitute a sufficient rationale for ignoring or 
violating the principle of hermeneutics and the 
autonomy of groups in the commons. Discovery of 
possible general solutions to the problem of 
hermeneutics that could be applied in the same way as 
the other economic principles of the commons is 
perhaps the single greatest theoretical challenge facing 
the theory of the commons.  
 
Conclusion 
There is very little to be gained by attempting to apply 
the existing value theories of economics to the 
commons. The plurality of standards -- labor content, 
use, and exchange -- leave us unable to resolve 
important questions of resource application through 
this means. Likewise, however useful the concept of 
need may be for other purposes, it has been shown not 
to be especially helpful in settling important or 
controversial questions of resource use in the 
commons. Need is, at best, only part of the answer to 
adequate criteria for an economic theory of value in 
the commons.  
The real basis of value theory for the commons is 
recognition of the reference group character of value 
determinations made by benefactories. Need is 
important, for example, not for any theoretically 
transcendent reasons, but because large numbers of 
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actors in the commons consider it important, and 
therefore take it into account in their actions. It is not 
universal, however, because of the observation that 
many in religious, scientific and other commons 
appear to have no particular need for the concept. In a 
similar way, the criteria of satisfaction, proportion and 
hermeneutics do appear to be widely employed in 
contemporary and historical commons. Yet we have 
no choice but to leave it to the pragmatic test of 
consequences to determine whether, indeed, these 
principles are truly universal or situationally and 
culturally specific.  
This approach is not as unsatisfactory as it may 
initially sound: Ascribed motives and value standards 
are also at the heart of market economics. The criteria 
of profit and maximizing behavior which are critically 
important in market economics are not grounded in 
deep philosophical principles, but in the commonsense 
observation that ordinarily businessmen -- producers, 
traders, arbitragers, or retailers -- act in ways 
consistent with an assumption of profit orientation and 
maximizing behavior.  
The problem of economic value in the commons 
generally is resolved into two broad possibilities: 
When community and consensus exist, the criteria of 
satisfaction, proportion and hermeneutics are 
ordinarily sufficient to secure adequate shares of the 
social surplus, in the form of endowments of money, 
collections of valued objects and repertoires of skilled 
presentations and problem-solving strategies. Where 
value consensus breaks down, neither the economic 
value theory of the commons nor importing of use and 
exchange values criteria from the market is 
satisfactory to the task. Therefore, the greatest 
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challenge currently facing nonprofit economics 
involves solving this problem of contested value. 
 12. Summing Up 
he core of nonprofit and voluntary action 
encompasses a single theoretical domain that is 
only partially examined by current research 
investigations on nonprofit organizations, 
voluntary action and prosocial behavior. The theory of 
the commons opens up a potentially powerful 
theoretical English-language vocabulary for treating 
many interrelated aspects of such action using terms 
which have evolved over the centuries to discuss 
various related associative, philanthropic, charitable 
and related ideas. Linking all of these terms and 
concepts is the concept of the commons as a social, 
economic and political space for uncoerced 
participation, sharing of resources and purposes, 
mutuality and peer relations.  
Commons are spaces outside the home and away from 
families, and independent of political states, and 
economic markets. They are found in many different 
cultures, locations and historical periods. We refer 
generally to participation in commons as voluntary 
association. Truly voluntary association is possible 
only under conditions of leisure, or freedom from 
necessity and labor, and those who are thus free 
constitute, to varying degrees, leisure classes. They are 
engaged in what may be seen from some perspectives 
as paradoxical behavior: unproductive labor or 
productive consumption.  Ultimately, the volunteer 
labor of such leisure classes is justified by the 
observation that civilizations are built up of such 
common goods.  
T 
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Purposes shared in association can be termed common 
goods. The pursuit of common goods is rational 
behavior, albeit distinguishable from the self-
interested pursuit of profit that characterizes markets. 
Such behavior often consists of prosocial mixtures of 
self-interested and altruistic behavior, whether the 
prosocial involved is philanthropic (for the common 
good of all who would benefit) charitable (for the 
common good of others) or mutual (for the common 
good of our group).  
The shared resources of commons constitute 
endowments -- treasures of money and marketable 
goods and services; collections of valued objects and 
repertories of routines, rituals and performances. 
Mutuality and fairness find expression in explicit value 
preferences for satisfaction, proportion, autonomy, 
conservation, prudence and the social responsibility of 
leisure classes. 
The theory of the commons as offered here is a fit 
platform to issue a number of challenges to the 
multidisciplinary community of nonprofit and 
voluntary action scholars: Psychological researchers 
have built up a large body of findings in the area of 
altruistic, charitable, by-standers, donative and other 
forms of “prosocial” behavior. They have generally 
shown little inclination or interest in connecting this 
up with the main body of interdisciplinary commons 
studies. Researchers engaged in the study of common 
social organizations have, on the whole, shown 
relatively little imagination in looking beyond the 
traditional American view of associations and 
nonprofit social agencies to the broader world of 
multicultural common activity. At the same time, 
political researchers have been generally reluctant to 
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acknowledge the link between their studies of parties, 
interest groups and factions and the broader research 
community of organizational studies, restricted though 
it is. For their part, economic researchers have 
concentrated chiefly upon a rather narrow band of 
“profitable nonprofits” -- particularly hospitals and 
nursing homes -- as indicative of the entire domain. 
And social welfare researchers have until recently 
neglected the continuing importance of volunteer 
charity organization. 
There are many examples of hybrid institutions mixing 
characteristics of commons with families, states and 
markets. Recent preoccupation with revenue-
generating nonprofit corporations, for example, is such 
a concern. Such organizations are neither truly market-
oriented, nor truly in the commons.  
 Many other types of organized benefactory in addition 
to social agencies and public bureaus can be identified. 
Recently, we have seen a trend away from group-
trusteeships in the direction of nonprofit organizations 
in the effective control of a solo trustee. Campaigns, 
committees, conferences, producer and consumer 
cooperatives, disciplines (whether academic 
disciplines, religious orders, or professions), festivals, 
foundations, literary and scientific journals, political 
parties, pilgrimages, research institutes, secret 
societies, sciences and trusts are among the many 
possibilities. The conventional term for control 
centralized in a small group is oligarchy, but we shall 
refer to nonprofit organizations controlled by an 
individual as solo trusteeships. (Michels, 1949)  
The democratic political state can be seen as a special 
type of commons that has been termed a dominant 
protective association. Political states arise out of the 
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common goods and mutual actions of interest groups, 
factions and political parties, and in turn exercise a 
measure of control over the activities of commons. 
The American constitutional tradition, and in 
particular, the first amendment rights of assembly, 
freedom of speech, religion and redress of grievances 
establish strong normative barriers against excessive 
state interference in the pursuit of common goods. 
They are a major institutional expression of the value 
of institutional harmony.  
The problem of charity organization is a continuing 
concern, even in a period characterized by extensive 
networks of nonprofit charitable corporations, helping 
professions. Although the general approach of social 
work and other charitable professions has been to 
ignore or downplay the importance of charity 
commons, the phenomenon itself remains alive and 
vital. 
Economists have grafted a substantial theory of 
nonprofit economics onto existing economic theory by 
relaxing definitions of firms, public goods and related 
concepts on the basis of the general “rational choice” 
models of human behavior. Beyond the limits of this 
model, where the customary assumptions of scarcity, 
production, profit maximization and unrestrained self-
interest do not apply, very little work has been done. 
Although there are numerous bold proposals and 
sound theoretical reasons for transcending this 
particular limit, the paradigm of the scientific 
commons of the economic profession still seeks to 
encompass all common goods economics within 
conventional perspectives. 
Finally, there are many additional disciplinary 
contributions yet to be made to our collective 
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understandings of the commons. In particular, further 
examination of psychological, anthropological, legal 
and historical studies are likely to bear much fruit. (In 
this regard, note the many excellent suggestions of 
anthropologists responding to Kerri’s 1976 article in 
Current Anthropology.) 
The focus in this volume has been upon rethinking 
traditional perspectives on nonprofit organizations and 
voluntary associations, with particular concern for 
extending the scientific research commons of 
nonprofit and voluntary action studies. That is, in the 
language of the model presented, on identification of a 
plausible common good. By the very nature of 
common goods, however, the broader adoption and 
utilization of this good is dependent not on the author, 
but on its acceptance and transformation by the 
community of readers. Mutual concerns were the 
starting point of this exercise. An effort has been made 
to call upon the rich endowment of the English 
language as a shared resource for the writing and 
speaking that make up the dialogue of this particular 
commons. 
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188-194 
Civilization: and Age of 
Reason, 119-121; and 
agricultural/urban 
revolutions, 91-93; 
Arabic, 101-103; 
Byzantine, 115-116; 
classical Greek, 93-97; 
and collection, 75; and 
common goods, 69; and 
commons, 70, 85; early 
American, 121-124; and 
endowment, 68-71; 
Hellenistic Greek, 97-99; 
medieval European, 103-
115; prehistoric, 86-91; 
and Reformation, 117-
119; and Renaissance, 
117; Roman, 99-101; and 
social surpluses, 85-86 
Club sector, 44 
Club theory, 175 
Collection: art, 75-76; and 
civilization, 75; defined, 
73-74; types, 74-75 
Collective choice theory, 
167-169 
Committees, 65, 140-141 
Common goods: as acts, 
205-206; and commons, 
60; conceptual origins, 
172; defined, 17-18, 69, 
173-175; and democracy, 
172; economics, 163-164; 
exchanges, 197-204; and 
metric measurement, 69; 
and political theory 171-
172; and public goods, 19, 
69, 158, 168, 172-175; 
and rational behavior, 51-
52, 273; and state, 187; 
and symbols, 207; and 
values, 256-257 
Common goods exchange: 
and acts of common good, 
205-206; and free-riding, 
204-205; and gift giving, 
200-202; and offerings, 
203-204; and 
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patronage/tributes, 198-
200; and potlatch, 202-203 
Common theory of value, 
257 
Commons: and Age of 
Reason, 119-121; and 
ancient urban 
communities, 91-93; and 
Arabic civilization, 101-
103; and 
art/science/literature 
academies, 119-121; and 
Byzantine civilization, 
115-116; and Carnegie 
Hall, 138-140; and 
classical Greek 
civilization, 93-97; and 
common goods, 60; and 
coproduction, 162; 
defined, 17-18, 58-59; and 
democratic governance, 
65; and discourse, 63, 
206-207; and early 
American civilization, 
121-124; and emerging 
state, 183-185; and 
endowment, 18-19; and 
Greek philosophical 
schools, 96-97; and 
Hellenistic Greek 
civilization, 97-99; 
institutions, 64; language, 
63-64; and markets/states, 
59-60, 62-63, 177-179;  
and medieval European 
civilization, 103-115; and 
monuments, 90-91; and 
mutual reciprocity, 60; 
organization, 63; places, 
136-140, 272; and polite 
society, 124-125; 
prehistoric, 86-91; and 
public goods, 171; and 
Reformation, 117-119; 
and Renaissance, 117; and 
research, 19-20; and 
rituals, 88-89, 149; and 
Roman civilization, 99-
101; and satisfaction, 258; 
as social acts, 20, 62; as 
social worlds, 64; 
symbolic role, 61-62; and 
theoretical basis, 58-65; 
and third sector, 20; and 
value theory, 254-257; and 
values, 166-167; and 
village communities, 91.  
See also Common goods; 
Commons action; Theory 
of the commons 
Commons action: and 
benefactories, 138-131; 
and 
discourse/presentation/off
ering, 210-211; and 
microeconomic model, 
211; and Pareto 
optimality, 167; and 
problem solving, 211; 
types, 209.  See also Acts 
of common good; 
Learning; 
Nonprofit/voluntary 
action; Search; Social 
action; Technique 
Community, 255,268 
Company, 27 
Conferences, 103-14;, 141 
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Consensus, 268-269 
Conservation, 267-268 
Contextualism: and 
amateurism, 261; and 
common values, 261-262; 
and objectivity, 260; 
principle, 260-262 
Continuity, 50-51 
Cooperatives, 28, 143 
Coproduction, 162-163.  
See also Production 
Core/periphery distinction, 
78-79 
Corporation, 27 
D 
Democracy, 65, 172, 179-
180.  See also State 
Disaster response, 250-
251 
Discipline, 144-148 
Discourse, 63, 206-207, 
210 
Donations, 246-249 
Donor behavior: and 
donations, 246-247; and 
emotions, 248; factors, 
249-250; and motivation, 
247; and solicitation skills, 
248-249 
Dramas, 208.  See also 
Ceremonies 
E 
Economics: and club 
theory, 175; defined, 158; 
of fairs/festivals, 175-176; 
and maximization 
paradigm, 163, 176; and 
surplus theory, 163.  See 
also Economics of 
common goods; Grant 
economics; Nonprofit 
economics; 
Microeconomics; Welfare 
economics 
Economics of common 
goods, 163-164, 170-171.  
See also  Nonprofit 
economics 
Efficiency, 26 
Empathy, 242-243 
Endowment: and 
civilization, 68-71; and 
collection, 73-76; defined, 
18-19, 65-67; genetic, 68; 
and gifts, 67; and 
patronage, 80-82; 
personal, 67-68; and 
regime, 78-80; and 
repertory, 76-78; and 
shared resources, 273; and 
socialization/technique/sea
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rch, 71-72; and treasury, 
73 
Endowment theory: 
defined, 12-13; and 
problem solving, 213; and 
rational choice, 19 
Ethics, 213-222 
Ethnic mutual aid 
associations.  See  Mutual 
aid societies 
Europe.  See Age of 
Reason; Middle Ages; 
Reformation; Renaissance 
Exchange.  See  Common 
goods exchange 
Existential scarcity, 161 
F 
Festivals/holidays: 
anthropological studies, 
149; economics, 175-176; 
medieval European, 113-
114 
Fiestas, 148-149.  See also 
Festivals/holidays 
Foundation, 149-150 
Freedoms.  See   Civil 
liberties 
Free-riding: and collective 
choice theory, 168-169; 
and common goods 
exchange, 204-205; 
defined, 169, 204; 
likelihood conditions, 205 
Fund accounting, 66 
Fund raising, 125, 136 
 
G 
Gift giving: and commons, 
11-12; and common goods 
exchange, 200-202; and 
discourse/presentation, 
210; and endowment, 67; 
and gifts, 200-201; Greek 
village, 93-94.  See also 
charity 
Gift theory, 11-12, 201-
202 
Gifts, 200-201, 205-206 
Gilds, 114-115, 147 
Goods.  See Common 
goods; Private goods, 
Public goods 
Grant economics, 170-171 
Greece: and associations, 
98-99; classical, 93-97; 
and gift giving, 93-94; 
Hellenistic, 97-99; and 
patronage, 95, 98; and 
religious/philosophical 
schools, 95-97 
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Group trusteeships, 133 
H 
Helping behavior, 245-
251 
Holidays.  See  
Festivals/holidays; Fiestas 
Hull House, 134-135 
I 
Incentives, 169 
Incorporation, 65, 131 
Independent sector, 43-44 
INDEPENDENT 
SECTOR, 7, 35 
Information, 208-209 
Intangible commodities.  
See Services 
Internal Revenue Service, 
30-31 
Islamic: charity, 218; 
commons, 102-103.  See 
also Arabia 
 
J 
Jewish: charity, 217; 
medieval European 
communities, 112; secret 
societies, 154-155 
Journal of Voluntary 
Action Research, 46 
Journals, 150-151 
K 
Ku Klux Klan, 154, 191 
L 
 
Labor: defined, 86; 
organizations, 230; 
productive/unproductive, 
36-37; 160; volunteer, 39, 
164-165, 225-227.  See 
also Unproductive labor 
Law: and agencies, 133; 
and endowment, 66-67; 
nonprofit, 27; 
organization, 27-28; and 
self-help groups, 230 
Learning, 209 
Leisure, 39, 162 
 
M 
Maximization, 163, 176 
Measurement, 165-166, 
209 
  
 
458 
Medieval Europe.  See 
middle Ages 
Meetings, 65 
Microeconomics, 165, 211 
Middle Ages: cathedrals, 
104-105; chantries, 107-
108; charity, 108-109, 
219-220; defense/sport 
organizations, 109-112; 
fairs/holidays, 113-114; 
gilds, 114-115; 
monasteries, 105-106; 
synagogues/Jewish 
communities, 112; 
synods/conference, 103-
104; universities, 106-107 
Monasteries, 105-106 
Monuments, 90-91.  See 
also Art 
Mutual aid societies, 228-
229 
National Taxonomy of 
Exempt entities (NTEE), 
30, 31 
Nazi party, 154, 191 
Nondistribution constraint, 
28 
Nongovernmental 
organizations, 27 
Nongovernmenal sector, 
44 
Nonprofit and Voluntary 
Sector Quarterly, 7 
Nonprofit business 
perspective, 13 
Nonprofit economics: and 
collective choice theory, 
167-168; market-
government failure theory, 
159; and measurement, 
165-166; and scarcity 
theory, 160-162; and 
unproductive labor, 38-39, 
160; voluntary failure 
theory, 159; and volunteer 
labor, 164-165.  See also 
Economics of common 
goods 
Nonprofit Management 
and Leadership, 7 
Nonprofit organizations: 
criteria, 25; definitions, 
25-27; economic theory, 
38-39; for-profit 
assumption, 26; IRS 
approach, 30; and 
nondistribution constraint, 
28; and not-for-profit 
organizations, 24-25; 
NTEE approach, 31-32; 
and 
productive/unproductive 
labor, 36-37; and profit, 
24-26, 28; and 
terminology, 23-25; type 
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A/B subclasses, 33-36; 
typologies, 30-32.  See 
also Nonprofit sector; 
Nonprofit/voluntary 
action; Voluntary 
associations 
Nonprofit sector: 
definition/organization, 
28-29; and fund 
accounting, 66; popular 
view, 23-24; size, 32-33; 
and tax exemption, 29-30; 
and voluntary sector, 42-
44.  See also Club sector; 
Independent sector; 
Nongovernmental sector; 
Nonprofit organizations; 
Nonprofit/voluntary 
action; Third sector; 
Voluntary sector 
NonProfit Times, 7 
Nonprofit/voluntary 
action: American-style, 1-
2; bibliography, 2; and 
Eastern European 
changes, 2; four-part 
dialogue, 5-6; history, 84; 
new terminology, 4-5; 
political view, 177-178; 
rethinking, 3-5; and ritual, 
89-90; scholarly 
community, 6-8; and self-
help groups, 230-231; and 
social exchange theory, 
196-197; social theories, 
127-128; theoretical 
origins, 36-39, 44; and 
theory of the commons, 
272.  See also Nonprofit 
organizations; Nonprofit 
sector; Research; 
Voluntary associations; 
Voluntary sector 
O 
Offerings, 203-204, 210-
211 
Order, 145-147 
Organizations, 27-28, 58.  
See also Nongovernmental 
organizations; Nonprofit 
organizations; Not-for-
profit organizations 
 
P 
Pareto optimality, 167 
Parsimony, 9 
Patronage: and ancient 
civilization, 92-93; 
classical Greek, 95; as 
common goods exchange, 
198-200; defined, 11, 80-
81, 199; and endowment, 
80-82; and interest group 
liberalism, 200; merit, 
199; Ptolomeic, 98; 
Roman, 100 
Patronage theory, 10-11, 
81 
Philanthropy, 10.  See also 
Charity; Gift giving 
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Pilgrimages, 152-153 
Plenary session, 65 
Polite society, 124-125 
Political parties, 151-152 
Potlatch: as common 
goods exchange, 202-203; 
defined, 11, 202; 
examples, 202; and tax-
exempt organizations, 
202-203, 210 
Presentation, 207-208, 
210.  See also Ceremonies 
Principle: Carnegie, 262-
267; of consensus, 268-
269; of conservation, 267-
268; of contextualism, 
260-262; of proportion, 
259-260; of prudence, 
268; of satisfaction, 257-
259 
Private goods, 69, 168 
Problem solving, 259 
Production, 162-163.  See 
also Coproduction 
Program on Nonprofit 
Organizations, Yale 
University, 7 
Proportion, 259-260 
Prosocial behavior: and 
aggression, 243-244; and 
altruism, 242; basis, 241-
242; and empathy, 242-
243; factors, 244; and 
organizational behavior, 
243; range, 240-241 
Protective associations: 
nonstate, 187-188; state, 
178, 180-183.  See also 
Associations 
Protestant Reformation.  
See Reformation 
Prudence, 268 
Public choice theory, 168 
Public goods: and 
collective choice theory, 
168; and common goods, 
19, 69, 158, 168, 172-175; 
and commons, 171; and 
free-rider problem, 169; 
and rational choice model, 
274; and state, 185-187; 
theory, 167.   See also 
Common goods 
R 
Rational choice theory, 
19, 21, 274 
Rationality, 51-52 
Reformation, 117-119, 
221 
  
 
461 
Regime, 78-80 
Renaissance, 117 
Repertory, 76-77 
Research: areas of interest, 
6-7; and commons, 19-20; 
conference, 142; and 
nontraditional disciplines, 
8; scientific, 156; 
voluntary action, 46-47.  
See also 
Nonprofit/voluntary 
action: scholarly 
community; Theory of the 
commons 
Research institute, 153 
Rites, 208.  See also 
Ritual 
Ritual: and art/sculpture, 
90; and commons, 88-89; 
feasting, 88-89; initiation, 
88; and non-
profit/voluntary action, 
89-90; and offerings, 204; 
and secret societies, 154.  
See also 
Festivals/holidays; Rites; 
Symbols 
Role taking, 256-257 
Rome, 100-101 
Russell Sage Foundation, 
150 
 
S 
Satisfaction, 257-259 
Scarcity, 161-162 
Science: benefits, 155-
156; and community, 255; 
defined, 155; fundamental, 
156; and peer review, 257; 
research, 156 
Search, 72, 209 
Secret societies, 153-154 
Sector theory, 78-79 
Selective incentives, 169 
Self-help groups: benefits, 
231-232; and charity, 229-
233; and cults, 231; 
defined, 229; health-
oriented, 232-233; legal 
status, 230; and 
nonprofit/voluntary action, 
230-231; theoretical basis, 
233; types, 230 
Self-interest, 162 
Service production.  See 
Production 
Services, 162-163 
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Social action, 47-48.  See 
also Acts of common 
good; Commons action 
Social exchange theory, 
196-198 
Social surpluses, 85-86 
Socialization, 71 
Sociology, 20 
Solo trusteeships, 134 
State: and common/public 
goods, 185-187; and 
commons, 177-179, 183-
185, 274; defined, 180; 
democratic, 179-180; as 
protective association, 
178, 180-183; welfare, 
178.  See also  Democracy 
Surplus, 163-164 
Symbols, 207.    See also 
Ritual 
Syndicate, 28 
Synods.  See Conferences 
 
T 
Tax-exempt status, 28-30 
Technique, 72, 209 
Theory.  See Altruism 
theory; Charity theory; 
Collective choice theory; 
Endowment theory; Gift 
theory; Nonprofit 
economic theory; 
Patronage theory; 
Philanthropic theory; 
Public choice theory; 
Rational choice theory; 
Sector theory; Social 
exchange theory; Theory 
of the commons; Value 
theory 
Theory of the commons: 
and affluence, 48-49; and 
altruism theory, 9-10, 236; 
and authenticity, 49-50; 
and autonomy, 53; and 
benefit/benefactory, 55-
58; and charity theory, 12; 
and civil liberties, 188-
194; and commons, 17-18, 
58-65; and continuity 50-
51; and endowment, 12-
13, 65-82; and gift theory, 
11-12; goal, 20-21; 
intrinsic valuation, 53-54; 
language resources, 13-16; 
near universality, 52-5e; 
and nonprofit business 
perspective, 13; and 
nonprofit/voluntary action, 
272; and ordinary 
language, 54; overview, 
17-21; and parsimony, 9; 
and patronage theory, 10-
11; and philanthropic 
theory, 10; 
premises/assumptions, 47-
54; and rational choice 
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theory, 21; and rationality, 
51-52; and social action, 
47-48; and sociological 
theory, 20; 
terms/concepts, 54-65; 
theoretical challenge, 273; 
and values, 254-256.  See 
also Commons 
Third sector, 20-21, 44.  
See also Club sector; 
Independent sector; 
Nongovernmental sector; 
Nonprofit sector; 
Voluntary sector 
Treasury, 73 
Triage, 161 
Tributes, 198-200 
Trusteeships, 133-134 
 
U 
Underground Railroad, 
154, 191 
Unions/professional 
organizations, 147-148 
Universities, 106-107.  
See also Academic 
discipline 
Unproductive labor, 36-
39, 160. See also Labor 
 
V 
Value judgments, 167 
Value theory, 254-256 
Values, 166-167 
Voluntary action theory, 
46-47 
Voluntary associations: 
defined, 39-40; expressive 
vs. social influence, 41-
42; legal/environmental 
distinctions, 40-41; and 
nonprofit sector, 42-44; 
and sodality, 40; 
theoretical origins, 41, 44.  
See also Nonprofit 
organizations; voluntary 
sector 
Voluntary sector, 42-43.  
See also Club sector; 
Independent sector; 
Nongovernmental sector; 
Nonprofit sector; 
Independent sector; Third 
sector 
Voluntas, 7, 47 
Volunteer labor, 39, 164-
165, 225-227.  See also 
Disaster response; Donor 
behavior; Helping 
behavior 
Volunteerism, 224-227 
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W 
Welfare economics, 165-
166.  See also 
Microeconomics: 
normative 
Welfare state, 59, 114, 
252, 258, 306, 
 
